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Scholars have drawn heavily on new institutionalist approaches in the study of comparative 
European politics and European integration. These approaches however have been neglected 
in the study of Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. And although Turkey-EU relations 
have been widely researched, there has been little scholarly engagement with the role of Tur-
key‘s National Security Council (MGK) in shaping the country‘s European policy, result-
ing in a significant gap in the academic literature on Turkey and the EU.  To fill this gap this 
thesis provides an historical institutionalist account of the role the MGK has played in Tur-
key-EU relations. There are two central and interlinked hypothesises: (1) The origins of both 
the MGK and Turkey‘s relations with Europe can be found in the years between 1923 and 
1957, and the MGK‘s evolution, its decisions/preferences and the changes it embarked upon 
shaped the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EU relations; (2) the historical 
institutionalist conceptualisations of how institutions originate, in what ways they determine 
political actions, and the types of changes they go through can best explain the interaction 
between the MGK‘s institutional processes and Turkey–EU relations. This thesis draws upon 
both primary sources such as the MGK‘s press releases (1983–2004) and secondary sources. 
It shows that historical institutionalism and its associated concepts of critical junctures, path 
dependence and unintended consequences, and punctuated equilibrium may help to explain 
not only the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe between 1923 and 1957, but 
also the three significant phases of Turkey‘s subsequent European policy: the evolution of the 
MGK and the development of Turkey–European Economic Community (EEC)/ European 
Community (EC) relations amid the Critical Junctures of I–III (1957–1983); the MGK‘s ten-
dency to rule through states of emergency and its incompatibility with EC/EU membership 
criteria (1983–1997); and the curtailment of the MGK‘s powers and the EU‘s decision to 
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This section expands some of the abbreviations used in this thesis. 
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ARGK   Kurdistan People‘s Liberation Army  
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EU   European Union  
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HEP   People‘s Labour Party 
JP   Justice Party 
KADEK the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress 
Kongra Gel     the People‘s Congress of Kurdistan 
MGK   National Security Council 
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MSP   National Salvation Party 
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OCP   Free Republican Party (also known as Liberal Republican Party)  
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SP   Felicity Party- Bliss Party 
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TBMM  Turkish Grand National Assembly 
TCF Progressive Republican Party 
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and Trade Exchange 
TSK   Turkish Security Forces 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The role of the National Security Council (hereafter MGK) in Turkey‘s progress towards 
integration in the European Union (EU) has been largely overlooked in the literature on 
Turkey and the EU. Thus there has been little attention paid to matters such as the origins and 
the evolution of the MGK in the context of the development of Turkey–European Economic 
Community (EEC) relations; the interaction between the MGK‘s treatment of the Kurdish 
Workers‘ Party, the PKK, and Turkey‘s slow progress in meeting European Community 
(EC)/EU‘s membership criteria; and the relationship between the changes both in the MGK‘s 
powers and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Additionally, historical institutionalism as a 
useful analytical approach has been neglected in literature on Turkey and the EU – this has 
meant that the role of critical junctures in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has 
not been highlighted; the unintended consequences of the MGK‘s treatment of the PKK on 
both the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s bid to join the EC/EU have been overlooked; 
and the relationship between developments in the MGK‘s endogenous variables such as the 
closure of the Welfare Party (RP) and the ban on Necmettin Erbakan‘s political involvement 
in 1997 and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK in 1999 and changes both 
in the MGK and Turkey–EU relations has not been unveiled. The central question to this 
thesis is what role did the Turkish National Security Council play in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU 
relations between 1923 and 2004? 
Historical institutionalism is a strand of New Institutionalism which emerged out of a critique 
of the behavioural revolution in political science. The New Institutionalists argued that 
institutions determine social and political outcomes. Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three 
strands within New Institutionalism: rational choice institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism (ibid.: 936). Each strand of New 
Institutionalism offers different approaches and frameworks for the study of institutions and 
institutional processes. In this research, I focus on four distinct parts of institutional 
processes: (1) institutional genesis; (2) institutional evolution; (3) the relationship between 
institutions and policy outcomes; and (4) institutional change. Mainstream literature covering 
the strands of New Institutionalism and the scholars employing different branches of New 
Institutionalism on various policy areas however have not clearly separated different parts of 
these institutional processes; in fact they have generally conflated the different parts of 
institutional processes. I argue that each part of these institutional processes develops one at a 
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time; by this I mean that each level of the institutional processes occur within a distinct 
period of time. This is because an institution needs to exist to either evolve or change. For 
instance institutional genesis takes place separately from institutional evolution and 
institutional evolution operates separately from how institutions determine political action. 
This does not however mean I suggest that each part of the institutional process take place 
independent of each other.  I rather believe that one part of institutional processes can follow 
the other, but I would not make any predictions in which order it happen since historical 
institutionalists are generally not interested in making predictions. Since the institutional 
processes develop one at a time, I suggest that there should be clearer lines drawn between 
different parts of institutional processes, and it will be useful to associate certain concepts or 
approaches with explaining and studying the separate parts of institutional processes. 
This has a number of advantages. One of the advantages is that it brings clarity to what part 
of an institutional process the researcher is explaining. As it stands at the moment there is no 
clarity in any of the strands of New Institutionalism as to what parts of institutional processes 
should be explained with what concept or approach. It thus makes the application of the 
concepts more dynamic and fruitful since the researcher knows which concept to use for 
which part of an institutional process. One can argue that this would curtail rational choice; I 
would rather suggest that when new and young researchers of historical institutionalism are 
provided with clear ways of applying historical institutionalist concepts, they can be at least 
given a chance to engage with the concepts of historical institutionalism in the simplistic 
manner. Otherwise, since there is such no clarity, many new researchers can diverge their 
interests to other theoretical frameworks. However, once new researchers‘ interest is kept in 
the first instance, then as they gain more experience in using historical institutionalism I am 
very sure they would go make their own rational choice in their future works. The second 
advantage is that it brings focus to the study of institutional processes. With this level of 
focus, a researcher may produce a more detailed analysis of a single part of an institutional 
process. And once this is done successfully, future researchers could pull all the findings 
together and this could contribute to the development of historical institutionalism into a 
rigorous theory. 
Additionally there is a lack of clarity among the well-known historical institutionalists such 
as Steinmo (2008), Pierson (1993) and Peters (1999) as to whether they treat historical 
institutionalism as a theory or a framework or an approach. However looking at their work, I 
found that while Pierson (1993) refers to it as either a ―framework‖ or an ―approach‖, Peters 
15 
 
(1999: 70) references it as an ―approach‖. Steinmo (2008: 118) openly puts forward his 
position on this subject, saying: ―Historical institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor a 
specific method. It is best understood as an approach to studying politics‖ (italics in 
original). These scholars‘ treatment of historical institutionalism has been very helpful for me 
to think about my own categorisation of historical institutionalism. It is however a bit 
difficult to agree with Steinmo‘s denial of the status of theory for historical institutionalism. 
Hay and Wincott (1998: 955) draw our attention to historical institutionalism‘s potential ―to 
develop into a theory of institutional innovation, evolution, and transformation capable of 
linking the subject in a creative relationship with an institutional environment.‖ My 
separation of institutional processes, drawing clear lines between these processes and 
associating a concept to each of these processes, has developed into a framework which may 
be used to understand and to explain the interaction between institutional processes and 
policy outcomes. More specifically, in this thesis I use historical institutionalism as a 
framework to interpret the interaction between the MGK‘s institutional processes and the 
development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. Additionally, I would 
argue we should not overlook Hay and Wincott‘s statement about how historical 
institutionalism has the potential to develop into a theory and I therefore urge that academic 
attention be paid to historical institutionalism‘s potential to develop in to a theory. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the Turkish National Security Council‘s (MGK‘s) 
evolution, policy preferences and the changes it has embarked upon have made a major 
contribution to the nature, development and pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations 
and that the historical institutionalist framework of institutional processes can help to explain 
how and why the MGK shaped Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. This can be divided into 
further four hypothesises: 
i. Rational choice institutionalism‘s approach to institutional genesis would tell us 
that not only the MGK, but also Turkey‘s interest in Europe originated through 
the actions of self-interested actors in order to reduce their political or economic 
costs relative to the benefits gained. On the other hand, it could be 
hypothesized that the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe were socially 
structured and given, following sociological institutionalism. Historical 
institutionalism however would claim that one needed to go back and look so as to 
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identify what factors and developments instigated the genesis of the MGK and 
Turkey‘s interest in Europe.  
ii. While sociological and rational choice institutionalisms do not say much 
on institutional evolution, historical institutionalism provides a framework of 
questions which unveil the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 which have 
contributed both to the evolution of the MGK and to the development of Turkey–
EEC/EC relations.  
iii. As far as the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes are concerned, 
the historical institutionalist concepts of path dependence and unintended 
consequences may highlight the interaction between the MGK‘s policy 
preferences and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. On the other hand the 
calculus approach of rational choice institutionalism can help to understand the 
power relations between different members of the MGK and this approach would 
argue that the policy preferences of the MGK and its implications for Turkey–
EC/EU relations were shaped by the strategic actions of the MGK‘s members. 
Whereas the cultural approach that is put forward by the sociological 
institutionalist would suggest that the established routines and familiar pattern of 
behaviour of the members of the MGK have shaped the MGK‘s future actions and 
in the same way Turkey–EC/EU relations have been shaped by the established 
routines of the Turkish politicians.    
iv. If sociological institutionalism‘s approach to institutional change is adopted to 
explain how and why both the MGK and Turkey–EU relations have changed, we 
can refer to three possible mechanisms of change: (1) coercion (2) mimesis and 
(3) norms. However, the rational choice institutionalists would suggest that the 
changes under question have occurred because either the MGK and Turkey–EU 
relations were dysfunctional or the incentives for the MGK and Turkey–EU 
relations were changed. In contrast, the historical institutionalist concept of 
punctuated equilibrium would provide a framework of questions to unveil the 
causes of the changes both in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations.  
There are therefore two objectives in this thesis: (i) to provide an historical institutionalist 
account of the role the MGK has played in the development, in the nature and in the pace of 
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Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; and (ii) to show the utility of historical institutionalism in 
highlighting the interaction between the MGK‘s institutional processes and Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relations. 
I opt for an in-depth and longitudinal approach to study both the origins of the MGK and 
Turkey‘s desire to be part of Europe covering the years between 1923 and 1957 and the three 
significant phases of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between the late 1957 and 2004. It is vital 
for this thesis to study the early years of both the Turkish Republic and the European 
Economic Community to find out not only the factors that have contributed to the genesis of 
the MGK, but also to illuminate the origins of Turkey‘s aspiration to be part of Europe. 
Chapter 3 will therefore test hypothesis (i) to find out if the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s 
interest in Europe can be better explained by the historical institutionalist framework than the 
rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. The first phase of Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relations covers the period between late 1957 and 1983. This is an important 
period to study to unveil the domestic political, economic and social developments that 
triggered the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980; and it is also helpful in explaining 
the causes of the delays in Turkey‘s Associative Membership application for the EEC in 
1960s and the EC‘s decision to freeze dialogue with the Turkish authorities in the early 
1980s. Chapter 4 will test hypothesis (ii) to find out if the historical institutionalist framework 
explains better the factors behind both the evolution and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC 
relations than the rational choice and sociological institutionalists‘ approaches. The second 
phase covers the period from late 1982 to 1997; this is a key period when the MGK‘s policy 
preferences on domestic politics hindered Turkey‘s membership of the EC/EU – the EC 
refused to begin political dialogue with Turkey; Turkey‘s application for Full Membership of 
the EC received a response two years after the submission of the application; the resolution of 
the Kurdish issue became a condition for Turkey to sign the Customs Union; and finally 
Turkey chose to freeze its political dialogue with the EU at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. 
In Chapter 5 therefore I will test the hypothesis (iii) to test if the interaction between the 
MGK‘s actions and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations would be explained better with the 
historical institutionalist framework or the rational choice and sociological institutionalist 
approaches. The last phase of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations covers the years between 1998 
and 2004; this is the phase of change in both the Turkish political system and the pace of 
Turkey‘s European policy. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party (RP), was 
banned from politics and the RP was closed in 1999; Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, 
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was captured in 1999; the MGK was abruptly wakened, a moderately Islamic Justice and 
Development (AKP) party won the November 2002 general election; and in 2004 the EU 
decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Therefore in Chapter 6 I will 
test hypothesis (iv) to find out if the causes of the changes in the both MGK and pace of 
Turkey–EU relations can be better explained with the historical institutionalist framework of 
institutional change or the rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. 
The study of the years between 1923 and 2004 provides the contextual background to 
highlight thoroughly both how and why the MGK and Turkey‘s aspirations to being part of 
Europe have originated and how and why the MGK have contributed to the development, 
nature and pace of Turkey‘s European policy. It is also necessary to investigate several 
decades to capture sufficient details to appropriately assess the role the MGK played in 
shaping and determining Turkey‘s European policy. I end my thesis in 2004 because my 
decision to carry out this research was instigated by the EU‘s decision of 2004 to begin 
accession negotiations with Turkey; there and then I began to question why it had taken so 
long for Turkey to be this close to Full Membership and who or what actor shaped Turkey‘s 
bid to join the EU up to this point. 
It is important to carry out this research because the MGK‘s role in Turkey‘s European policy 
has been overlooked and understudied, which results in a significant gap in the literature in 
the following areas: European integration, Turkey‘s European policy and Turkish politics. 
Although scholars accept the significant role of the MGK in the Turkish political system and 
make comments on the authority and influence of the military members over the civilian 
members of the MGK (as I discuss in more depth below), there has not been a thorough 
analysis of either the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system or with reference to 
Turkey–EU relations. This has resulted in the overly simplistic assumptions that the MGK is 
dominated by the Turkish army and thus hinders Turkey‘s accession to the EU. In this thesis I 
will go beyond existing assumptions about the MGK and provide an in-depth analysis of the 
MGK‘s role in Turkish political decision making with reference to Turkey‘s bid to join the 
EU. 
Turkey–EU relations have been considered within the framework of constructivism (Piccoli 
2004), Europeanisation (Diez et al. 2005a) and post-Westernisation (Rumford and Turunc 
2011), but New Institutionalism has hardly been used to understand Turkey‘s decades-old 
desire to be both part of Europe and a full member of the EU. However, Zeki Sarigil (2007) 
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in his PhD thesis entitled ―Endogenizing Institutions‖ opted for rational choice 
institutionalism to study the changes in civil–military relations in Turkey. His ―conflicting 
process‖ framework was made of two stages: initiation, and bargaining, and he saw the EU as 
having played a primary role in initiating shifts in power relations between the civilian and 
military sides in post-Helsinki Turkey, suggesting that the Turkish military found itself 
entrapped by its own pro-European rhetoric and thus forced to agree to the changes the 
government introduced (for more on this see Chapter 6). While different strands of New 
Institutionalism, in particular rational choice and sociological institutionalism, have been 
heavily used to explain the role of institutions in European integration, historical 
institutionalism has not received much interest in the study of either Turkey–EU relations or 
EU studies in general. It has however been most used in comparative politics such as 
Immergut (1992), Skocpol (1992), Rose and Davies (1994), King (1995), Mahoney (2001) 
and Hansen (2002). I would argue that it is important to study Turkey–EU relations 
within the framework of historical institutionalism, not only to make an original contribution 
to the literature on Turkey–EU relations by studying the MGK‘s influence on the 
development, nature and pace of Turkey‘s European policy with the use of concepts such as 
critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium, but 
also to show the importance of domestic political institutions and the wider political, social 
and economic context in shaping policy processes and outcomes. This will consequently 
bring out the significant role of institutions in political decision making and policy processes 
in Turkish and EU studies. 
This research was also carried out in the hope of demonstrating the utility of historical 
institutionalism and its associated concepts for understanding different parts of institutional 
processes and how these processes may interact with the development and pace of policies. 
Although rational choice and sociological institutionalism can also be helpful in studying the 
MGK‘s position in Turkey‘s policy making, I found historical institutionalism more suitable 
to trace back the political developments and highlight the interaction between the MGK and 
Turkey‘s European policy outcomes for the following three reasons. Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002) note, historical institutionalism tends to engage with big and real-world questions of 
interest far beyond the academy (2002: 697). Questions like ―why have welfare states 
emerged and developed along various paths?‖ or ―why do some countries become stable 
democracies, while others do not?‖ constitute clear real-world puzzles that are not driven by 
methodological or narrow theoretical concerns (Meunier and McNamara 2007: 4). Likewise, 
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I address the important puzzle of why Turkey has been waiting for so long to join the EU, 
and question what developments in Turkey affected the prospects of membership between 
1923 and 2004. 
A second reason why historical institutionalism can help shed light on the importance of the 
MGK is its emphasis on the importance of history and past policy choices in determining 
political action, or path dependence. I agree with Pierson and Skocpol (2002) that a particular 
characteristic of historical institutionalism is its stance in relation to history, claiming that the 
approach does not just consider the past, rather it looks at processes over time (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002: 713). This investigation of processes over time therefore allows for a wider 
range of experiences to be considered and it becomes necessary to investigate a long period 
of time to encompass all the influencing effects that may contribute to a particular policy 
output. And this is really helpful to investigate how over time the MGK‘s institutional 
processes influenced Turkey‘s European policy and the preferences it opted for in relation to 
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. By contrast, rational choice institutionalism treats history 
simply as a series of discrete events in which strategic actions are taken by utility-maximizing 
agents. This means that past political decisions and policy preferences made by the utility-
maximising agents do not particularly impact on the choices they make at the present moment 
or in the future. It is therefore not very helpful to unveil the MGK‘s policy preferences in 
relation to the Kurdish problem in the early 1980s and whether it opted to maintain a similar 
line in handling the Kurdish problem over the years and what this meant for Turkey‘s 
aspiration to join the EC between 1983 and 1997. Whilst sociological institutionalism 
similarly does not pay much attention to the role of history; it suggests that individuals act in 
accordance with the expectations of the given cultural settings. It thus lacks interest in 
questioning what contribute to the genesis and to the development of the so called ―given 
cultural settings‖. If one accepts that the MGK acted and acts in accordance with the 
expectations of the Turkish cultural settings, then we would not question what contributed to 
the genesis and the development of the MGK‘s policy choices and preferences over time. I 
therefore argue that rational choice and sociological institutionalism lack tools to 
trace in history the patterns and sequences of decisions made in the past, but also overlook 
the relationship between the past and future decisions or choices institutions make. 
The third reason is that historical institutionalism‘s approach to institutional change is helpful 
to this thesis in unpacking two separate aspects of the MGK‘s institutional processes: the 
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MGK‘s evolution from advisory body to a paramount institution, and the curtailment of the 
MGK‘s powers. On the former, historical institutionalism‘s emphasis on the role of 
institutional change in institutional evolution (Pierson 1996), its references to the triggers of 
critical junctures (Hogan 2006; Cortell and Peterson 1999) and its position on the 
characteristics of critical junctures such as the conditions under which political leaders make 
decisions at critical junctures (Gourevitch 1986; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) help not only 
to identify three important critical junctures in the history of Turkish politics, but also to 
analyse under what conditions and by whom the MGK was gradually empowered, on the one 
hand, and how and why the EEC chose to partially freeze its relations with the Turkish 
authorities, on the other. On the latter, neither rational choice institutionalism‘s suggestion 
that institutions change when they are dysfunctional (Lecours 2005: 12) nor sociological 
institutionalism‘s references to mechanisms of institutional change (Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
provide a framework for questioning what precipitated the changes both in the MGK and in 
the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Historical institutionalism however points to the sources of 
change, in this case exogenous crisis/shock (Krasner 1984).  
EU studies scholars, however, such as Mark Pollack (2009) and Aspinwall and Schneider 
(2001) who have opted for rational choice institutionalism have heavily criticised historical 
institutionalism; thus historical institutionalism‘s utility has not been clearly set out in this 
area of research. Pollack (2009) says that although historical institutionalism rejects 
functionalist accounts of institutionalism – which can be found in rational choice 
institutionalist approaches – it shares a similar position with functionalism on how actors‘ 
preferences are formulated, pointing to David (1985), North (1990) and Pierson (2000a). He 
then notes that he does not ―consider historical institutionalism as a distinct and competing 
school of thought, but rather as a particular variant of rational choice theory emphasising the 
importance of inertia, sequencing and path dependence in the process of European 
integration‖ (2009: 346). In similar vein Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) argue: 
[H]istorical institutionalism, while not a coherent body of thought, stresses the role of prior 
commitments and institutional and policy stickiness in the process of European integration. 
Unlike neo-functionalism, with which it shares some traits, historical institutionalism does 
not predict movement toward or away from integration; rather it predicts that agency 
rationality, strategic bargaining and preference formation are conditioned by institutional 
context. (2001: 12) 
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Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider‘s point of view indicates the lack of dialogue between 
historical institutionalism and newly emerging interests in different strands of New 
Institutionalism in EU studies. There are, I argue, three significant differences between 
rational choice and historical institutionalism which make historical institutionalism a distinct 
school of New Institutionalism. The first is that rational choice and historical 
institutionalisms‘ positions on how and why institutions originate vary significantly. While 
the rational choice institutionalists‘ position on how and why the institutions originate is 
shaped by the functionalist perspective, the historical institutionalist framework is built upon 
rejecting the functionalist position. More specifically, rational choice institutionalism‘s 
response to the question of how and why institutions originate is that one can tell how and 
why an institution originated by looking at the current functions of that institution, while the 
historical institutionalists rather suggest that one should go back and look to unveil the factors 
that have contributed to the genesis of an institution (see Chapter 2 for more details). I found 
the functionalist perspective on institutional genesis very reductionist; historical 
institutionalism however provides a framework of questions to investigate how and why 
institution originates. The second is that these two schools of New Institutionalism diverge on 
how they define institutions. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) observe that the historical 
institutionalists agree with rational choice institutionalists that institutions provide a context 
in which political actors define strategies and pursue their interests. The historical 
institutionalists nevertheless find rational choice institutionalism‘s strict rationality 
assumption overly confining; therefore they not only propose to go beyond rational choice 
institutionalism‘s strict treatment of the institution, but also claim that institutions play a 
much greater role in shaping politics, and political history (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992: 7). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) suggest that one of the other differences 
between rational choice and historical institutionalism is their position on preference 
formation. The rational choice institutionalists assume that political actors are rational and 
will act to maximise their self-interest; they do this by deducing the preferences of the actors 
from the structure of the situation itself. This is however different for historical 
institutionalists, who argue that not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are 
shaped by the institutional context. ―For example, a historical institutionalist would 
emphasise how class interests are more a function of class position (mediated – reinforced or 
mitigated – by state and social institutions like political parties and union structure) than 
individual choices‖ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 8). 
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Furthermore, I would like to make three more points in respond to Pollack, Aspinwall and 
Schneider‘s position on historical institutionalism. The first is that it is incorrect to disregard 
historical institutionalism and suggest it is a particular variant of rational choice theory; there 
are many historical institutionalist scholars who have produced excellent studies contributing 
to theory building and have applied historical institutionalism to various empirical case 
studies, enriching our understanding of different policy making (Pierson 1996; Meunier and 
McNamara 2007; Hall 1989, 1992; King 1995; and Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Pollack‘s 
position in relation to historical institutionalism undermines the existing literature and 
discourages the use of historical institutionalism in EU studies. The second point I want to 
make is in relation to Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider‘s suggestion that historical 
institutionalism neither predicts movement toward nor away from integration. I think one 
could use the historical institutionalist approach to how and why institutions originate to first 
unveil the factors that underpinned European integration in the first place, and then use 
historical institutional approaches on how institutions shape political action to analyse the 
factors that contributed to the maintenance of European integration, and lastly, on the basis of 
the findings, one could make predictions about the continuing pace of European integration. 
The third is in response to the argument that historical institutionalism is not a coherent body 
of thought; I argue that they simply overlook the utility of historical institutionalism. In this 
thesis, I will show that although historical institutionalism may have shortcomings like any 
theoretical framework, its associated concepts on different aspects of institutional processes 
builds into a coherent body of thought which may be useful to study the genesis and 
evolution of institutions, to trace historical paths and sequences of decisions or political 
preferences made by the institutions, and to unveil the cause of changes in the institutions. It 
is therefore helpful to highlight how and why the institutional processes may interact with 
one or two policy areas. And my use of historical institutionalism and its associated concepts 
may encourage new researchers to draw more on historical institutionalism to explain other 
puzzling questions in the political and social sciences. 
Assessment of the Literature on Turkey–EEC/EC/EU Relations 
Turkey‘s decades old desire to be both part of Western Europe and a full member of the 
EEC/EC/EU has received a lot of attention in both Turkish and EU studies. The origins of 
Turkey‘s interest in being part of Europe; the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations; 
changes in the EC‘s attitude towards Turkey post-Cold War; Turkey‘s journey from 
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Luxembourg Summit to Helsinki Summit; whether and how Turkey may join the EU; the 
likely benefits of Turkey‘s EU membership for the EU; what and who may or have impacted 
on Turkey–EU relations; and the changes in Turkey-EU relations have all been discussed in 
the literature. However the role that the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) has played 
in Turkey‘s slow progressing relationship with the EEC/EC/EU has been neglected. This 
neglect has meant that the existing literature fails to discuss how and why the MGK‘s 
institutional processes have interacted with Turkey‘s European policy and what this has 
meant for the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. In 
addition, Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations have not been studied in the context of domestic 
political, economic and social developments. More specifically this has meant that the role of 
domestic political instabilities have not been considered in the context of Turkey-EEC/EC 
relations; the impact of the MGK‘s handling of the PKK on Turkey‘s journey from 
Luxembourg Summit to Helsinki Summit has not been paid attention; the impact of domestic 
political developments have not been considered in the context of whether and how Turkey 
may join the EU; what in Turkish politics may be overshadowing Turkey‘s likely benefits for 
the EU has not been discussed; and the MGK‘s position has not discussed in the context of 
impacts on Turkey–EU relations; and the changes in Turkish political dynamics have not 
received much attention in the discussions over what contributed to the changes in Turkey–
EU relations. I therefore argue that it is very important to conduct an in-depth study of the 
MGK‘s role in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations in the context of political, economic and social 
developments. This section will assess the existing literature on Turkey and the EU to 
identify (1) how Turkey‘s European policy has been interpreted, (2) the benefits of the 
existing literature for understanding the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relationship and (3) the omissions which this thesis will address. 
The reason behind Turkey‘s application for the Associative Membership of the EEC and how 
the Turkey–EEC/EC relationship developed has been of interest to academics. Ian Bache and 
Stephen George (2006) Politics in the European Union suggest that Turkey‘s application for 
the EEC‘s Associative Membership application was driven both by the elites in Turkey who 
wanted to see Turkey as Western and by those who benefited economically from the 
Modernisation period in Turkey. I agree that the elites in Turkey wanted and want Turkey to 
be part of Europe, but it is difficult to say they were the driving forces. In Chapter 3 I will 
show that Ataturk‘s desire to see Turkey part of Western Europe has shaped Turkish political 
structure and culture in a Western way; and it was in fact Fatif Rustu Zorlu, the Turkish 
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Foreign Affairs Minister, who was behind Turkey‘s initial application for the EEC‘s 
Associative Membership. 
Gulnur Aybet and Meltem Muftuler-Bac (2000), in ―Transformations in security and identity 
after the cold war: Turkey‘s problematic relationship with Europe‖, recognise Turkey‘s 
economic problems, its shortcomings in upholding democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, 
the Cyprus problem, and the size of its population as some of the factors that have posed 
serious obstacles to Turkey‘s integration into the EU. Aybet and Muftuler-Bac argue that at 
the root of Turkey‘s problematic relationship with the EU is the contrast between Turkey‘s 
place in Europe before and after the cold war. They argue that at the end of the Second World 
War Turkey‘s participation in the new European order was crucial for maintaining stability in 
southeast Europe as well as for marking Europe‘s boundaries against the communist ‗other‘; 
equally, during the cold war Turkey‘s position was relatively secure despite various ups and 
downs in Turkish-European relations. When, however, the Soviet threat disappeared, 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU worsened because Turkey‘s association with the EU was a by-
product of its inclusion in the ‗Western security community‘. Additionally Turkey‘s 
Europeanness has become questionable because the idea of Europe as constructed along 
historical and cultural lines, that is, an attempt to redefine Europe in terms of Christianity, 
ethnicity, and race, has become much important. Furthermore Meltem Muftuler-Bac (2001)  
in Turkiye ve AB: Soguk Savas sonrasi iliskiler (―Turkey and the EU: Post-Cold War Era 
Relations‖) has observed the EC‘s interest in forming and developing relations with the 
countries of the former Soviet bloc has increased while Turkey‘s efforts to join the EC has 
been overlooked by the EC authorities observes that the EC‘s interest in forming and 
developing relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc showed that Turkey‘s 
efforts to join the EC was overlooked by the EC authorities. In addition Neil Nugent (2006) 
in The Government and Politics of the European Union says that the identity issue is raised in 
even sharper focus in the case of Turkey and suggests this is partly because most of Turkey is 
not geographically located in Europe and partly, and for many of those who are opposed to 
Turkish membership, namely, ―because it is an Islamic country‖ (ibid.: 64). Furthermore, on 
why Turkey applied for the Full Membership of the EC in 1987, Nugent says a constructivist 
theoretical framework is very helpful to understand the EC/EC/EU‘s position on Turkish 
application for membership. Nugent argues that: 
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[Such a framework] can help explain why in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
the EU moved from its preferred policy of being close to Turkey but stopping short of 
holding out the possibility of membership, to giving Turkey a foreseeable membership 
perspective. The gradually evolving ‗upgrading‘ of language – which can be traced through 
European Council Conclusions –produced a situation that made it progressively difficult for 
doubters and opponents to backtrack. Notions of collective identity and kinship-based duty 
are by no means as strong in respect of Turkey then they were in respect of CEECs, which 
helps explain why upgrading of the language has been much more hesitant and drawn out in 
the Turkish case than it was in the case of the CEECs. But some such notions – emanating in 
part from shared membership of European and Western organisations, in part too from 
empathy with Turkey‘s liberalising and democratising reforms programmes, in part from a 
sense of responsibility towards an Islamic state that is looking to Europe and the West – 
appears to exist amongst many European governing elites. (Nugent 2006: 70). Going back to 
Turkey‘s application for full membership of the EU in 1989, Atilla Eralp (1994) in ‗Turkey 
and the European Community, Forging New Identity along Old Lines‘ said that Turkey 
applied to the European Community for full membership at a time when the chances of its 
immediate inclusion were at their lowest and suggested that the outcome of the application 
have contributed to the debate on the Turkey‘s Europeanness in both Turkey and Europe. 
These works are important to gain an insight into how the EC treated Turkey‘s interest to join 
the EC post-Cold War or in late 1980s and how and why this impacted on the nature of 
Turkey–EC relations and what role Turkey‘s identity played in changing the EU‘s attitudes 
towards Turkey. They however pay little attention to how and why the three years of military 
rule in Turkey, the rise of the PKK and the Kurdish problem, the rise of Turkey‘s human 
rights records, and the MGK‘s role in handling the Kurdish problem have contributed to the 
EC‘s position on Turkey from the early 1980s to late 1990s. 
By the end of the 1990s Turkey–EC relations were facing a more challenging time. The 
standards of democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey, the consequences of the 
latter on the relationship and what role the EU could have played have been discussed to 
understand the EU‘s exclusion of Turkey at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Chris Rumford 
(2000), in ―From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and 
Prospects for Accession‖, considers how and why Turkey was granted a candidate 
membership status in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, after being excluded from the 
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Enlargement process at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. Rumford refers to the EU‘s 
concerns over democratic and human rights abuses in Turkey and Greece‘s opposition to 
Turkey‘s membership of the EU as to why Turkey was not added to the list of candidate 
countries in 1997, and suggests that the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 meant that Greece was 
no longer a rival of Turkey. He then argues that although Turkey was granted a candidate 
membership status in 1999, Turkey has been over the following ten years and is still excluded 
from a whole range of pan-European initiatives (infrastructural projects, environmental 
initiatives, and transport and communication networks) that have been made available to the 
candidate countries from eastern and central Europe (CEECs). He suggests that Turkey‘s 
exclusion should not continue since it was made clear that Turkey‘s candidature was to be 
equal to that of other applicants in every EU-network programme. I agree with Rumford that 
Turkey should not have been excluded from EU-network programmes and Turkey should 
have received all the financial support the other candidate countries received over many 
years. It is however more important to question why the EU excluded Turkey from these 
programmes. Although Rumford refers to Turkey‘s human rights abuses, he does not draw a 
connection between Turkey‘s systematic of abuse of human rights and treatment of ethnic 
minority and the EU‘s exclusion from these funds. Helene Sjursen (2002) ―Why Expand?; 
The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU‘s Enlargement Policy‖ argues that 
―Turkey‘s failure to respect fundamental human rights is on its own enough to explain why 
the country was included neither in the first nor in the second round of enlargement 
negotiations‖ (ibid.: 508). Sjursen then points out that if human rights concerns were the 
principal driving force behind enlargement, then there should have been comparatively more 
resources in support of democratization going from the EU to Turkey than from the EU to, 
for example, Poland. I agree with Sjursen that the EC could have put in more resources to 
help Turkey in democratising its political system, but it is important not to overlook how the 
EU constantly requested Turkey to resolve its Kurdish problem through both use of political 
means and removing state of emergency from the South East of Turkey. Pinar Bilgin (2007a) 
in ―Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey‘s Geography‖: The uses of ―geopolitical 
truths‖ in Turkey‖ has reflected on the implications of the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999 for 
debates in Turkey, in relation to the plausibility of EU membership for Turkey in the context 
of geopolitics, EU conditionality and EU reforms. Those who favour Turkey‘s membership 
of the European Union have deployed the metaphor of ―bridge‖ to substantiate Turkey‘s case 
when talking to EU audiences; such representations of Turkey as a ―bridge‖ between regions, 
continents and cultures have resonated with some EU actors as well in that they have invoked 
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similar notions to convince the sceptics within the EU of the virtues of Turkey‘s membership. 
Those who oppose Turkey joining the EU have deployed a similar notion to arrive at 
different conclusions; referring to General Ilhan‘s (2000) book entitled ―Why No to the 
European Union: The Geopolitical Perspective‖, it is believed that the EU stands to gain 
―geopolitically‖ from Turkey‘s membership: ―it enhances its horizons and sphere of influence 
to include the Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia; attains the opportunity to enhance and 
reinforce the advantages created by the Customs Union treaty‖ (ibid.: 750).  
Whether and how Turkey could join the EU is also an area of interest to scholars. Mehmet 
Ugur (1999) in Avrupa Birligi ve Turkiye: Bir dayanak/ Inandiricilik Ikilemi (The European 
Union and Turkey: An Anchor/ Credibility Dilemma) considers both the Turkish and the EU 
sides in assessing what he names the problematic nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. Ugur 
claims to discover sources of incompatibility in Turkey–EU relations and analyses what 
factors have underpinned the ongoing difficulties. He then claims that the problems between 
Turkey and the EU can be resolved if both sides learn from their past mistakes and if they are 
willing to reduce the scope for discretion in the interpretation as well as implementation of 
the contractual provisions that govern EU–Turkey relations. Ugur is very positive that if 
Turkey and EU do what he sets out then Turkey could join the EU as a full member. Harun 
Arikan (2003) in Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? is very 
negative about Turkey‘s EU membership prospect. Arikan observes that Turkey was treated 
as an ―awkward candidate‖ country by the EU authorities. He then argues that the EU 
developed an alternative form of bargaining for a Turkish round of EU enlargement and 
recognises this form of bargaining as a ―containment‖ strategy, ―designed to delay 
indefinitely the prospect of membership while keeping Turkey within the economic, security, 
and political sphere of influence of the EU‖ (ibid.: 1–2). Similarly Erol Manisali, who has 
numerous publications on Turkey–EU relations (2001, 2002a, 2002b and 2002c), predicts 
that the EU never will grant Turkey a full EU membership status. Manisali particularly 
concentrates on the impacts of establishing the Customs Union before Turkey was a full 
member of the EU and what this has meant for Turkey‘s importance for the EU. He argues 
that since the EU already receives economic benefits from its relations with Turkey, the EU 
would not grant Turkey Full Membership. While Ugur, Arikan and Manisali have overlooked 
what other options could be available to Turkey other than Full Membership, Thomas 
Silberhorn (2009) ―Tertium Datur: Turkey‘s Application for EU Membership‖ asserts that 
alternatives to full Turkish membership in the EU should be developed. Silberhorn refers to 
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Turkey‘s cultural differences as to why Turkey and the EU members do not have a common 
identity and suggests that if the EU wants to attain a political union in Europe, Turkey should 
be given a privileged partnership status of the EU. The discussed works are very useful to 
develop an understanding of what Turkey and the EU could do to unlock Turkey‘s 
problematic relationship with the EU, why the EU would not grant Turkey full EU 
membership status and what options are available as alternatives to Turkey‘s Full 
Membership in the EU. In contrast to Ugur‘s attention to what steps the Turkish authorities 
need to take to gain Full Membership of the EU, Arikan and Manisali entirely understate the 
impacts the domestic political developments had on the EU‘s position on Turkey‘s 
Associative Membership, on Turkey‘s requests to form a political dialogue with the EU after 
the 1980 army intervention, on Turkey‘s application for the Full Membership of the EU and 
on Turkey‘s requests for establishing the Customs Union. By doing this they neglect to see 
that if Turkey makes the necessary changes in its own political system, it has a good chance 
of joining the EU. Additionally I argue that Manisali and Silberhorn overlook the fact that 
both Turkey and the EU may benefit politically and economically from Turkey‘s full EU 
membership – there is thus also a good chance that the EU may grant a Full Membership to 
Turkey. 
On whether Turkey‘s Full Membership would generate benefits to the EU, academics such as 
William Chislett (2008), Laciner et al. (2005), Pantelis Sklias (2009), Michael Lake (2005) 
and Dirk Rochtus (2008) refer to a number of benefits Turkey‘s Full Membership may have 
for the EU. William Chislett‘s chapter ―Socio-Economic Arguments For and Against 
Turkey‘s EU Membership‖ (2008) suggests that Turkey‘s fast-growing young population can 
give an injection of labour into the European labour market, which can be seen as an asset 
since the EU‘s population is ageing rapidly. Laciner et al. (2005), who wrote European Union 
with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey‘s Membership on the European Union, after the 
11 September attacks in New York and the March 2004 Madrid bombings, argue that 
―probably only a Europe with Turkey may embrace the world … there is no other alternative‖ 
(2005: 14). They suggest that 
[T]here is nothing strange in Turkey‘s aspirations for membership. However, Turkey offers a 
remarkable difference than other members. Turkey has certain qualities that no other member 
has. It does have material expectations from the EU, on the other hand, it has so much to 
offer to European civilization that other member cannot offer. Turkey is not only a 
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―demanding‖ party vis-à-vis the EU. It also wants to contribute. It has the features that can 
ease Europe, on the verge of yet another edge, to leap to the next stage. In this respect, 
Turkey has a request from the EU not just for itself but also from the future of Europe and the 
whole world. (Laciner et al. 2005: 14).  
Like Laciner Pinar Tank (2007) in ―Turkey‘s Ambiguous Identity: The Symbolic 
Significance of EU membership‖ has put emphasis on Turkey‘s desirability for both the USA 
and the EU in the world of post 9/11. Tank observed that since the inception of the Turkish 
Republic, Turkish authorities have regarded themselves as Western and secular, denying their 
Muslim identity, but the Europeans recognised Turkey as the other, not part of Europe. With 
the success of the moderately religious AKP (Justice and the Development Party-AKP), 
however, Turkey‘s Muslim identity began to be widely accepted in Turkey and in EU. Tank 
said: 
―…after 11th September 2001, Turkey‘s Islamic identity became a desirable, even 
‗marketable‘, attribute and set the stage for an alternative ‗branding‘ of Turkey. The United 
States‘ plan to ‗democratise‘ the Middle East stands little chance of success without the 
support of regional powers while Europe‘s efforts to create a sense of belonging among its 
Muslim communities cannot succeed if the EU is perceived as a ‗Christian fortress‘. Thus, 
the United States and Europe have begun considering the security advantages, rather than the 
cultural burdens, of Turkey‘s Muslim identity‖ (Tank 2007: 144). 
Sklias (2009) in ―The Political Economy of Turkey‘s Accession to the EU: A Comparative 
Analysis‖ on the other hand pointed out that although Turkey‘s European integration will 
probably be a lengthy and difficult process, its political-economic transformation will be in 
the EU‘s interest. In The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone? Michael Lake 
(2005) notes that starting accession negotiations with Turkey will bring an immediate 
advantage of more predictability, reliability, and commitment to the EU (ibid.: 13–14), and 
therefore suggests that the different sections of the media should also move away from 
constantly reporting the difficulties lying ahead of Turkey‘s accession to the EU and move 
towards reporting a range of positive aspects of Turkey‘s accession. Dirk Rochtus (2008) 
―European Hesitation Turkish Nationalism on the Rise?‖ suggests that one of the benefits of 
Turkey‘s candidacy is that ordinary EU citizens have started to think about the further 
enlargement of the EU – that is something the accession of the central European and Baltic 
States in 2004 could not bring about. 
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I found these studies very useful to identify what benefits Turkey‘s EU membership may 
have for the EU and what actions for example the media should take to inform public opinion 
about Turkey and what Turkey can offer to the EU in the post-9/11 era. I would however ask, 
if Turkey can provide these benefits, why has the EU not yet accepted Turkey as a full 
member? These authors overlook how Turkey‘s domestic political developments have 
overshadowed the benefits Turkey could have offered to the EEC/EC/EU. For instance over 
many years Turkey‘s geostrategic and geopolitical importance has been overshadowed by the 
Kurdish question and Turkey‘s poor human rights records. I argue that it is therefore 
necessary to investigate what or who in Turkey has been determining the nature and pace of 
Turkey‘s progress in meeting the membership criteria and as well as overshadowing the 
benefits Turkey may provide to the EU. 
As to what factor(s) or actor(s) have shaped Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, this has been 
discussed widely in academia, for example: Esra Cayhan (1997) considers the role of Turkish 
political parties; Saban Calis (2001) studies Turkish identity in the context of Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relations; the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (2004) 
discuss whether Turkey‘s religion hinders its EU membership possibility; Tevfik Nas (2011) 
questions Turkey‘s economic performance in the context of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; 
Arrmagan Emre Cakir (2011) investigates the role of Turkey‘s rivals; and Pinar Bilgin (2011) 
questions the security dimension of the relationship. A very important and useful book by 
Esra Cayhan (1997), Dunden Bugune Turkiye ve Avrupa Birligi Iliskileri ve Siyasal 
Partilerin Konuya bakisi (―From Past to the Present, The Turkish Political Parties‘ Views on 
Relations with the EU‖) explores the debate in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TBMM) on the EEC/EC/EU by looking at the political parties‘ stances on Turkey‘s bid to 
join the EU. Although this is a very useful work for charting the attitudes of parliamentary 
political parties towards Turkish membership in the EU, it overlooks the crucial fact that 
most of the political parties have been inconsistent in their position towards EU membership, 
and does not question whether and how this inconsistency contributed to the shape of 
Turkey‘s European policy. Saban Calis (2001) however in Turkiye-Avrupa Birligi Iliskileri, 
Kimlik Arayisi, Politik Aktorler ve Degisim (―Turkey and EU Relations: Search for Identity, 
Political Actors and Changing Attitudes‖) analyses the role of identity and political actors‘ 
roles in Turkey–EU relations between 1959 and 2000. Although Calis‘s book has been a 
useful source of information in preparation of this thesis, it lacks focus and contextualisation 
as he uses many explanatory factors in his assessment. On the other hand, however, his 
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application of Lindblom‘s (1959) and Idem‘s (1979) approaches on foreign policy making 
and decision making enriches the work. The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy‘s (2004) report entitled ―The European Union, Turkey and Islam‖ suggests that after 
the September 11 attacks the concerns in member states about Islam and Muslims have 
increased, and therefore contributed to growing doubts over the question of whether Turkey‘s 
Islamic character is compatible with the political achievements of the EU and member states. 
The author argues however that the fact that Turkey is a country with a majority Muslim 
population is no hindrance to its EU accession because the principle of the secular democratic 
state is solidly rooted in Turkish society. Thus from the EU perspective the issue of Islam in 
Turkey is not so much a problem of the influence of religion on the state as a problem of the 
influence of the state on religion; there is no indication that Turkish Islam will lose its 
moderate character. Although this is a very enlightening piece of research, it does not 
however make any suggestion as to how the absence of overwhelming support by the citizens 
of the EU can be changed and what steps should be taken to change general negative 
perceptions of Turkey‘s Muslim population. Tevfik Nas (2011) in ―Economic Dimension: 
The Turkish Economy from the 1960s to EU Accession‖ instead refers to Turkey‘s economic 
performance affecting its chances of accession to the EU. Nas is very helpful for developing 
an understanding of how and why Turkey‘s economic performances have determined the 
future of Turkey–EU relations. I however think that it is important to pay attention to the 
choices made by the Turkish politicians in relation to the economy and the country‘s 
obligations to meet the requirements of Associative Membership and the Customs Union. In 
particular, Bulent Ecevit‘s constant requests for concessions on the protocols of the 
Association Agreement should be paid attention as it was Ecevit who eventually called for 
the freezing of Turkey‘s obligations under the Associative Agreement in 1978 (see Chapter 4 
for more details on this argument). Arrmagan Emre Cakir‘s (2011) ―Political Dimension: 
Always in the List of ‗Also-rans‘; Turkey‘s Rivals in EU–Turkey relations‖ argues that 
Turkey‘s rivals have had an important impact on EU–Turkey relations. It provides an 
interesting debate about Turkey‘s perceived rivals, such as Greece, and how Turkey managed 
its rivals and what implications the rivals‘ preferences have had on, for instance, Turkey‘s 
Associative Membership application in 1959. I think Cakir overemphasises the role of rival 
countries. I suggest if Turkey had met with, for example, the criteria for Associative 
Membership of the EEC, the rivals would have not been that influential in delaying Turkey‘s 
accession. It is important to look at domestic political developments such as the army‘s 
intervention in 1960 and the preferences the army made and how this changed the EEC‘s 
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attitudes towards Turkey‘s Associative Membership application. Pinar Bilgin (2011) 
―Security Dimension: A Clash of Security Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the 
European Union Revisited‖ suggests that the ―difficult‖ relationship the European Union and 
Turkey have had since the late 1980s is rooted in their security cultures that grew 
increasingly apart during the Cold War. Bilgin‘s chapter brings in Turkish internal and 
external security in understanding the EU‘s security perceptions post-Cold War. Although 
Bilgin writes about Turkey‘s internal and external security perceptions, she overlooks to the 
role the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) played and plays in formulating Turkey‘s 
security policy. I found all the works discussed above very informative as to who and what 
have been important in shaping, contributing and influencing Turkey‘s bid to join the 
EEC/EC/EU, but the role the MGK has played has entirely been overlooked. 
As to what, or what conditions, initiated changes in Turkey–EU relations, how effective these 
conditions have been, what needed to be done to maintain the change and what theoretical 
framework can explain the changing nature of Turkey–EU relations, these have all been of 
interest to academics. Frank Schimmelfenning et al. (2003) in ―Governance by 
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe‖ 
argue that once Turkey was recognised a candidate county in 1999, the EU used the 
membership carrot to put pressure on Turkey to refrain from specific norm-violating actions. 
For instance, when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested, the EU demanded 
that he not be executed. And ―When Turkey threatened to annex Northern Cyprus in 
November 2001, EU Commissioner Verheugen responded that ‗the EU will admit Cyprus 
whether there is an agreement or not‘‖ (ibid.: 507). The EU has stressed repeatedly that the 
date of negotiations totally depends on the progress achieved in Turkey. As far as the 
effectiveness of these conditions is concerned, Schimmelfenning et al. suggest that ―Three 
years after Turkey received candidate status at the Helsinki summit of 1999, EU 
conditionality has produced its first significant effects. The legislative package passed by the 
Turkish Parliament in August 2002 includes the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime 
and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority (the teaching of Kurdish in education and its use 
in broadcasting)‖ (2003: 508). Turkey‘s progress was acknowledged by an increase in its pre-
accession financial assistance as well as the fixing of a target date (December 2004) to decide 
on the opening of membership negotiations. I found Schimmelfenning et al. very useful to 
understand how and why the EU put pressure on Turkey in relation to Ocalan and what steps 
the Turkish authorities were expected to take and have taken since it was recognised as a 
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candidate country in 1999. Although Schimmelfenning‘s et al. reference to the capture of 
Ocalan shows that they are aware of the domestic political developments in Turkey, they 
however overlook what Ocalan‘s capture meant for Turkish political system. In this thesis I 
will show that the capture of Ocalan and Ocalan‘s conciliatory approach during his trial have 
generated an ―improved security environment‖ in Turkey, which then initiated changes in the 
Turkish political system. Along similar lines to Scimmelfening, Ziya Onis (2003) in 
―Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in 
the Post-Helsinki Era‖ argues that the EU, by granting a candidate membership status to 
Turkey, provided an incentive for the Turkish authorities to make a number of reforms and 
changes in the Turkish political system. Onis suggests that the EU should break the deadlock 
and shift power in favour of the pro-EU coalition in Turkey as it did with the East and Central 
European counties. Onis suggests that this is vital because the pro-EU coalition in Turkey 
could make an important contribution by challenging the orthodox, security-conscious mind 
set in Turkey and conveying what EU integration is all about in the first place. He then 
suggests that it is also crucial that the reforms process is ―internalised‖, meaning that the kind 
of reforms needed to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria ought to be portrayed as reforms which 
are intrinsically valuable and not simply accomplished to meet EU criteria in a purely 
instrumental fashion. I agree that the EU needs to anchor Turkey in pursuing the political 
reform process, but as I will show in this thesis there is only a little the EU can do when the 
domestic political dynamics are ready for change. This then takes us to Michelle Cini (2007) 
European Politics who suggests that the speed of the negotiations depends on progress made 
by the state on the implementation of EU rules; the pace of negotiations will be determined 
by Turkey‘s own merits. Perhaps knowing that Turkey has been slow in meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria, Cini predicts that some prospective applicant states in the Western 
Balkans become member states before Turkey (2007: 429). I agree with Cini that the pace of 
the accession and negotiations process depends on the Turkish government‘s performance on 
meeting the membership criteria. However, I also think it is important to pay attention to how 
and why domestic political dynamics are impacting on Turkey‘s performance in meeting the 
membership criteria. As to how this changing period of Turkey–EU relations should be 
contextualised, Chris Rumford and Hasan Turunc (2011) in ―Identity Dimension: 
Postwesternisation: A Framework for Understanding Turkey–EU Relations‖ put forward a 
new theoretical framework to study Turkey‘s changing relationship with the EU. Rumford 
and Turunc challenge the prevalent belief that Turkey‘s accession to the EU can be 
understood in the context of Westernisation. They suggest that Turkey and the EU are both in 
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an era of post-Westernisation, which means that the relationship should be analysed within 
the parameters of post-Westernisation. I think their proposed framework provides an original 
perspective for the study of changes in the both the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s 
progress toward meeting EU membership criteria. I however think Rumford and Turunc lack 
the necessary attention to the domestic political developments. 
Since Turkey‘s accession negotiations started, progress has been slow and at times stalled. 
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfenning (2006) in ―Relations with Wider Europe‖ argue 
that the conditions the EU has set out for candidate countries not only casts doubts on the 
EU‘s appetite for further expansion, but also raise questions about the future effectiveness of 
the EU‘s accession conditionality. Lavanex and Schimmelfenning notes that the EU put 
forward two conditions for Turkey: enactment of the revised penal code and signature of an 
additional protocol, which would extend the 1964 Ankara Agreement of association and the 
Customs Union with the EU to the new Member States. In June 2005, the revised penal code 
entered into force and on 29 July 2005, Turkey also signed the additional protocol, although 
it issued a political declaration that the protocol did not entail recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus. Apart from still refusing to implement the additional protocol by 2006, Turkey was 
heavily criticised by the European Commission for the slow pace of change and use of 
repressive law, such as that prohibiting the insulting of Turkish identity. They conclude that 
by saying that it is not clear how, in the absence of the attraction of accession, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy will succeed in promoting democracy and human rights. I agree with 
Lavanex and Schimmelfenning that the EU‘s accession conditionality causes a lot of 
uncertainties in Turkey as to whether Turkey ever will be able to join the EU as a full 
member. I would however draw Lavanex and Schimmelfenning‘s attention to why the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) have stalled their plans to resolve the Kurdish problem and 
adopt a new and democratic Constitution for Turkey.  
Additionally the EU‘s decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey has also been 
considered in the context of Turkey‘s handling of its internal and external policy challenges 
and Turkey‘s uniqueness. Gulnur Aybet (2006) ―Turkey and the EU After the First Year of 
Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges‖ argued that the EU‘s 
commencement of accession negotiations left Turkey with the dilemma of how to reconcile 
its internal policy challenges such the Kurdish minority rights and external policy challenges 
namely the Cyprus question and unresolved Aegean disputes with Greece and the Armenian 
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issue. Traditionally Turkey has separated its security challenges such as Kurdish separatism 
and Islamic fundamentalism, from its external security relations, which are based on state-
centric security relationships (529). Between January and May 2005, the implications of 
reconciling internal and external pressures led to a rise in nationalism, a drop in interest in 
EU membership in public opinion polls and the military has been supportive of the 
government‘s EU accession policy but the issues of Cyprus and Kurdish minority rights stills 
constitute red lines (p.530). While Turkey‘s uniqueness-such as the special place of its 
military within the state and society-is difficult for the EU grasp, the very speciality of the 
Turkish case does not itself warrant an alternative to full membership, such as privileged 
partnership. All previous accession negotiations have ended in full membership. If Turkey 
were to become an exception, this would have wider repercussions for Turkey‘s relations 
with the West and the EU‘s image in the Islamic world at large.  Aybet thus concludes that 
the case of Turkey constitutes the greatest challenge the EU has had to face in dealing with an 
accession country (p.546). 
Just as EU citizens are not very supportive of Turkey‘s accession to the EU, on the grounds 
that Turkey is not European and is Muslim, academics also have questioned whether Turkey 
is part of the West or part of Asia, and what implications Turkey‘s religion may have for the 
future of the EU and EU identity. Desmond Dinan (2006) The Origins and Evolution of the 
European Union very briefly says that Turkey‘s possible accession to the EU has encouraged 
debates about where the Union‘s borders should be (2006: 292). Gerard Delanty and Chris 
Rumford (2005) in Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization consider the issue of the borders of the EU in a more sophisticated manner. 
Delantly and Rumford say: ―As the borders of the EU move closer to Russia and with the 
eventual entry of Turkey, extending to Asia, the identity of Europe will become more and 
more ‗post-western‘‖. This, they suggest, is not anti-Western or non-Western, but a condition 
defined increasingly by the legacy of an earlier modernity which will have to be negotiated 
with other modernities (2005: 47). Turkey‘s close relationship with the countries of Central 
Asia will also have implications for the present countries of the EU, which will no longer be 
entirely within Europe, but will also be partly with Asia (ibid.). The other prevalent 
difference of Turkey to the current EU Member States is its religion. In the context of 
Turkish membership and the drafting of the European Constitutions there has been 
considerable debate on the foundations of the EU in Christianity. Even though the Turkish 
state is highly secular, the inclusion of a large Islamic population will certainly have 
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implications for the definition of European identity as rooted in Christian tradition. As 
opposed to Robins‘ (1996) statement that Europe is Christian and that Turkey cannot 
therefore be European, Delantly and Rumford argue that this view does not fit comfortably 
with the view that by virtue of its NATO membership Turkey is part of the West (2005: 48). 
This mentioned work is very important to gain an insight to debate where the EU‘s borders 
end and whether the EU is a religious entity or a political Union. 
While the above authors do not make comment as to what European politicians could do to 
change public opinion in the EU in relation to accession to the EU, Jurgen Gerhards and Silke 
Hans (2011) in ―Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU 
Among Citizens in 27 European Countries‖ suggest: 
EU citizens‘ attitude will only change in a positive direction if they are convinced that the 
expansion process will not bring about inordinate financial costs or increased immigration 
from the accession to the well-off countries. If politicians want to influence their citizens 
towards a more positive view of Turkish accession, they should address these specific 
concerns. They should work to better portray the economic and political advantages that 
Turkey‘s EU membership would have for current EU citizens. If the common fear is that 
accession would create large-scale migration and therefore threaten culture and labour 
markets in the EU, then politicians could set longer-term limits on freedom of movement, for 
example. (2011: 763, italics in original). 
Gerhards and Hans‘s work is very important because it make recommendations for the 
European politicians‘ attention about what steps they can take to change their electorates‘ 
opinion in relation to Turkey‘s accession to the EU. In this thesis I like to draw academics‘ 
interest to the Turkish National Security Council whose decisions, preferences and choices 
have I think contributed to the negative perception in relation to Turkey‘s accession in 
member state of EU. To do this I will first below study what has already been said about the 
MGK and how I propose to examine it. 
The position of the National Security Council (MGK) in Turkish political system began to be 
discussed among academics right after the 1980 army intervention. Gareth Jenkins (2001) in 
Context and Circumstances: The Turkish Military and Politics describes the MGK as a 
symptom rather than a cause of the flawed nature of Turkish democracy and recognises the 
MGK as platform on which the army attempts to exercise influence in the Turkish political 
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system (ibid.:7), and Pinar Tank (2001) in 'Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU: Will the 
Generals Retreat from Politics?' said ―The MGK was created in 1961 as a channel for the 
military voice (ibid.: 220).  However Jenkins does not explain how and why the MGK is a 
symptom and he and Tank do not comment on why he believes that the MGK is a platform 
for the army to have control over Turkish politics. I would argue that Jenkins overlooks the 
fact that the civilian and military members of the MGK have mostly held equal votes in the 
MGK. Cengiz Candar (1999) in ―Redefining Turkey‘s Political Centre‖ describes the MGK 
as ―the institution that really runs the country‖ (1999: 131). I found Candar‘s position very 
interesting, but it is difficult to understand why he argues that the MGK was the institution 
running the country. Furthermore Mehmet Ali Birand (1986) in Emret Komutanim (―At your 
command, Sir!‖) argues that after the 1980s intervention the MGK was given a new role and 
position in the Turkish political system that was both outside and above the democratically 
elected government (ibid.: 462). I agree with Birand that the MGK was given new powers 
after Critical Juncture III, but it is unclear why he thinks that the MGK‘s new powers made it 
more powerful than the democratically elected government. Tanor speaking to Atay ([1998]: 
128) focuses on the MGK‘s position in Turkish legislation and argues that the MGK is an 
institution that is above the elected government and even above the TBMM. Tanor describes 
the MGK‘s position by drawing an analogy in which the legislation process was depicted in 
the shape of a triangle: one of the three edges of the triangle was taken by the President; the 
other two were taken by the Prime Minister and the military, with the MGK at the heart of 
this triangle. This rather meant, according to Tanor, that the MGK was the ―beyin‖ (―brain‖ – 
author‘s translation) of the legislation (Tanor, cited in Atay 1998:128). Although this is a 
very interesting point of view, Tanor does not test his thesis with reference to a particular 
policy area – it is unknown how in practice the MGK is above the other bodies and the 
institutions in the legislative process. 
While Jenkins, Birand, Candar and Tanor only comment on the MGK‘s position with respect 
to domestic politics, Bertil Duner and Edward Veverall (2001) in ―The Country Cousin: 
Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights‖ study the EU‘s perception of the MGK. 
Duner and Veverall suggest that the EU treated the MGK as an obstacle to Turkey‘s bid to 
join the EU and therefore advised the Turkish authorities to abolish the MGK in order to 
remove the army‘s position in the Turkish political system (Duner and Veverall 2001: 3). I 
found this article very useful in understanding how the EU treated the MGK and what the EU 
asked the Turkish authorities to do in relation to the future of the MGK. There are however 
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two problems with this article. The first is that the European Commission‘s Regular Reports 
of 1998 to 2004 never asked the Turkish authorities to abolish the MGK, but they 
consistently suggested that the MGK needed to be democratised. The second is that the MGK 
is not a military body; it is made up of military and civilian members and each side has an 
equal say on the decisions made in the MGK. 
Similar to the EU‘s and Duner and Veverall‘s perception of the MGK, Umit Cizre-
Sakallioglu (2003) in ―Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey‖ 
argues that the military has often used the MGK to put forward its own political agenda 
(ibid.: 222). In another publication, Cizre (2004) speculates on the way the composition of 
the MGK has affected politics. In this very important work, she argues that the military 
members of the MGK have dominated the civilian members of the institution. To support her 
argument she draws a comparison between civil–military relations in Turkey and in the 
Western European countries. Thus she asks, ―who describes the nature of the threat posed by 
a particular enemy and who has the authority to decide whether to feel threatened and if so, 
how, or even whether, to respond?‖ Her finding is that while in Western European countries 
it was the civilians who described the threat and decided how to respond to it, in Turkey it 
was the military who described the nature of the threat and decided whether and how to re-
spond (2004: 104–5). She concluded by arguing ―one of the central factors preventing Tur-
key‘s potential accession into the European fold is the prevailing civil–military relationship‖ 
(Cizre 2004: 104). This is a very interesting point of view; however, Cizre appears to conflate 
three different issues she discusses in this article: the military (TSK)‘s authority over the 
MGK; the military members‘ authority over the civilian members of the MGK; and civil–
military relations in Turkey in general. It is therefore very difficult to grasp what she thinks 
of the MGK‘s position in both the Turkish political system and in Turkey‘s European policy. 
On the other hand, Burak Ulman (2000) in ―Increasing influence of the Military in the 1990s 
in Turkish National Security and Foreign Policy‖ speculates over the role of the military wing 
of the MGK in making Turkey‘s National Security policy and argues that it is against the 
principles ofany democratic political system for the military to have a say on national security 
policy making and suggests that this responsibility should reside in the hands of the elected 
representatives (ibid.: 105). 
The above literature shows that Ataturk‘s interest in seeing Turkey part of Europe has not 
received much attention, and Fatih Rustu Zorlu‘s role in Turkey‘s Associative Membership 
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application has also been overlooked. It shows that the impacts of what I suggest are the 
Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and the 1980s have not been analysed in the context of the 
development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. Little attention has been paid to how Turkish 
political developments have contributed to the EC/EU‘s changing position on Turkey‘s 
membership of the EC/EU. The interaction between Turkey‘s poor human rights and the 
exclusion of Turkey from the EU network has not been highlighted. Although a number of 
factor(s) and actor(s) roles have been considered in the context of Turkey‘s relations with the 
EEC/EC/EU, the role of the Turkish National Security Council has been entirely overlooked 
and neglected. And the changes both in the pace of Turkey–EU relations and in the MGK 
have not been analysed in the context of changes in Turkish political dynamics. Furthermore, 
the MGK has been treated as the army-dominated body of the Turkish Security Forces; its 
origins and evolution from advisory body to paramount political institution have been 
neglected. Although it has been suggested that the MGK is a very influential institution in 
Turkish political system, its position in reference to any single policy has not been shown, 
and the changes it went through have not been analysed in the context of domestic political 
dynamics. In this thesis I will study the MGK‘s genesis, evolution, its decisions and 
preferences and the changes it experienced with reference to Turkey‘s European policy and 
will analyse how the MGK‘s institutional process impacted on the development, nature and 
the pace of the relationship. 
The above literature review also shows that the use of New Institutionalism has been 
neglected in the study of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; in particular historical 
institutionalism has not received any attention in the literature covering Turkey‘s slow 
progressing relationship with the EU. I argue that this has resulted in, if I can borrow the 
expression from Pollack (2009), ―institution-free‖ studies of Turkey‘s European policy. This 
means that not only domestic political institutions have been overlooked in the study of 
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, but also the role of domestic political developments in the 
origins, in the nature and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations have not been considered. 
Historical institutionalism has however been popular in Comparative Politics and in 
American Politics. There are a number of good examples which have been inspirational for 
the use of a historical institutionalist theoretical framework to study the MGK‘s role in 
Turkey‘s European policy, for example, Judith Goldstein‘s (1988) ―Ideas, Institutions and 
American Trade Policy‖, in which she studies the impacts of protectionism in the making of 
trade policy in the USA. She suggests that protectionism and its origins should be analysed in 
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its historical context and three kinds of protectionism are identified, namely liberalism, fair-
trade and redistributive, each operating according to a different logic. She then shows that the 
policy makers‘ choice between different types of protectionism depended on when 
protectionist legislation was chosen (ibid.: 183). This is a very important work because it puts 
greater emphasis on the historical context and time, which is something I will also pay 
attention to in this thesis when I am studying the MGK‘s institutional processes and its bo 
A very important and relevant article is by Paul Pierson (1996), ―The Path to European 
Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis‖, which asks why member states cannot 
take control of the subsequent developments of institutions, and argues that, despite the initial 
primacy of member governments in the design of Community institutions and policies, 
―gaps‖ may occur in the ability of member governments to control the subsequent 
developments of EC institutions and policies, for four reasons. First, member governments in 
democratic societies may, because of electoral considerations, apply a high discount rate to 
the future, agreeing to EC policies which lead to a long-term loss of control in return for a 
short-term electoral return. Second, even when governments do not heavily discount the 
future, unintended consequences of institutional choices may create additional gaps, which 
the member governments may be able to address only imperfectly. Third, Pierson argues, the 
preferences of member governments may change over time, most obviously because of 
electoral turnover, leaving new member governments, with new preferences, to inherit an 
acquis communautaire negotiated by, and according to the preferences of, a different 
government. Pierson is very helpful for seeing that institutions may produce unintended 
consequences, but he does not provide a framework in which one can analyse the sources of 
such unintended consequences, and it is not clear what he means by unintended 
consequences. In this thesis I will show that the concept of path dependence and the concept 
of unintended consequences can both formulate a framework to study how one institution‘s 
path dependent action can cause unintended consequences. 
The last book I have found very helpful in conducting my research is Sophie Meunier and 
Kathleen McNamara‘s (2007) edited book entitled Making History: European Integration and 
Institutional Change at Fifty: The State of the European Union. This places the analysis of 
European Integration in broader historical perspective, probing the sources of stability, crisis, 
and change across the Union as a whole as well as within all the key policy arenas the EU 
encompasses (ibid.: Preface).The theoretical approach best suited to this goal is that of 
historical institutionalism. Throughout the volume, leading scholars of European integration 
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situate a wide variety of policy issues, from citizenship to competition policy to foreign 
policy to the stability of the EU as a political system, within the historical institutionalism. 
All of the accounts are united in stressing the role of temporality, in addition to formal and 
informal institutional contexts, in mediating political struggles and outcomes. Meunier and 
McNamara‘s very brief and rigorous framework has been instructive for me in preparation of 
my use of historical institutionalism. They cover most of the concepts associated with 
historical institutionalism and I think their book is one of the few books on EU studies 
drawing on historical institutionalism. They do not however explain in detail what these 
concepts are, how they have been used so far, how and why historical institutionalism has 
been criticised in EU studies and what contribution they are making to historical 
institutionalism. In this thesis however I provide detailed explanations of the concepts of 
critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium and 
I show how and why they can be used to understand a number of different institutional 
processes in the context of the interaction of two policy areas. 
1.1.Contributions, Sources of Data and Readership 
The originality of my thesis lies in treating the Turkish National Security Council as the main 
explanatory independent variable in studying Turkey‘s slow progressing relationship with the 
EEC/EC/EU. This is entirely new and different in Turkish studies and European studies since 
the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system and its role in the development, the nature 
and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations have not been considered at this level before. 
This thesis therefore brings a new and different dimension to the study of the MGK and 
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. Additionally employing historical institutionalism to analyse 
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations is completely new since domestic institutions‘ role in Turkey‘s 
European policy has been neglected. I however offer a different and original application of 
historical institutionalism that draws heavily on the concepts of critical juncture, path 
dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium to explain how the 
MGK‘s genesis, evolution, political preferences and the changes it embarked upon have made 
a major contribution to Turkey‘s slow and inconsistent relationship with the EEC/EC/EU. 
Distinguishing parts of institutional processes and associating each part with one or more 
concepts is also an entirely new and different form of application of historical institutionalism 
since historical institutionalism and its associated concepts have not been used in this form 
and at this level before. In addition applying this framework to how and why a chosen 
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institution‘s processes have interacted with a policy‘s development, nature and pace is also a 
new use of historical institutionalism and its concepts. 
My thesis therefore makes original contributions to three areas of research. This research 
makes an original contribution to EU studies by providing an historical institutionalist 
account of the impact of a domestic institution‘s institutional processes on a candidate 
country‘s path towards EU membership between 1923 and 2004. In addition my treatment of 
the MGK as an institution brings in a new dimension to the study of institutions in Turkish 
Studies. This historical institutionalist account of the MGK‘s institutional processes within 
the context of domestic economic and social developments makes an original contribution to 
Turkish studies. Drawing clear lines between different parts of institutional processes and 
assigning different concepts to explain each part makes historical institutionalism more 
dynamic; to study the interaction between an institution and a policy‘s development, nature 
and pace in this way is a major contribution to the literature on historical institutionalism. 
More specifically, as said earlier, the origins of the MGK have been overlooked in the 
literature. Using historical institutionalism‘s approach on institutional genesis I study the 
origins of both the MGK and Turkey‘s desire to be part of Western Europe in the context of 
political, social and economic developments in the early years of the Turkish Republic. By 
doing this I give a detailed insight into not only how and why the MGK was established, but 
also Ataturk‘s interest in adopting a Western European political system for the newly 
established Turkish Republic. It is generally assumed, as shown above, that the MGK was 
given more authority and power so that the Turkish military could have control over Turkish 
politics, thus there has not been a detailed analysis of how and why the MGK was 
empowered. In addition, the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has not been studied 
in the context of domestic political developments; particularly there is not a detailed analysis 
of what, how and why, at a domestic level, has contributed to the development of the 
relationship. By heavily relying on the concept of critical juncture I will study the role of the 
Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 in the evolution of the MGK and in the 
development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. Additionally, it is generally argued that Turkey‘s 
weak democracy and poor human rights records have hindered Turkey‘s bid to join the 
EC/EU, but it is not well researched as to what or who contributed to this. By using the 
concept of path dependence I will highlight the MGK‘s role in handling the Kurdish 
Workers‘ Party (PKK), and the outcomes of the MGK‘s path of pursuing a state of 
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emergency on both the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s slow progress in meeting the 
membership criteria. Lastly, it is generally agreed that the EU‘s requests or incentives have 
triggered the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. This has meant 
that the domestic political developments related to the MGK have been overlooked. By using 
the concept of punctuated equilibrium I will study sources of institutional changes with 
particular interest in endogenous causation; the closure of the Welfare Party (RP) and the ban 
on Necmettin Erbakan‘ active political involvement and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the 
leader of the PKK, will be considered as the developments in the MGK‘s endogenous 
variables that have generated an improved security environment in Turkish political system 
which then triggered the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. 
The third of area of contribution I am making to is historical institutionalism, my distinction 
of different parts of the institutional processes and my reference to using certain concepts for 
certain parts of the institutional processes is a major contribution to the theory building, as 
well as bringing dynamism to the use of historical institutionalism. More specifically, I make 
a number of original contributions to historical institutionalism‘s position on different parts of 
institutional processes. The existing literature considering the origins of institutions is 
generally limited to description of how one institution originates; the above outlined 
historical institutionalist study of how institutions originate has not been used before. 
Therefore I am making an original contribution to the literature on the both institutional 
genesis and origins of policies. The concept of critical junctures is generally used to explain 
institutional change, but these explanations are generally brief – merely lines or paragraphs. 
The existing literature additionally has overlooked the connection between critical junctures 
and institutional evolution and policy development. In this thesis I show the utility of critical 
junctures in explaining institutional evolution and policy development. This is a very 
important contribution to the literature of historical institutionalism because it not only allows 
the researcher to explain what role critical junctures may play in the evolution of institutions, 
for example, here, from advisory body to a paramount institution, but it makes it possible to 
highlight how and why a policy‘s developments may be stalled and delayed at the critical 
junctures. While the concept of path dependence has been criticised for drawing a prominent 
dichotomy of stability and changes, thus masks the possibility of gradual policy change 
(Peters et al. 2005: 1277), I in this show that the concept of path dependence is only equipped 
to explain the institutions‘ path dependent actions and path policies. My use of the concept of 
path dependence is also original because I study how one institution‘s path dependent actions 
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on a policy interact with another policy area. When I find the concept of path dependence not 
entirely helpful, in a situation when an institution chooses to maintain its original path despite 
its negative consequences, I opt to complement the concept of path dependence with the 
concept of unintended consequences. This framework is completely new and makes an 
original contribution to the study of how institutions influence political action and policy 
outcomes. Additionally, it is a very useful framework to highlight the interaction between one 
institution‘s path dependent actions and its unintended consequences for other policy areas. 
Lastly, the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been neglected in the study of institutional 
change and one of the reasons for this is it has been criticism of the notion of exogenous 
shock as a source of radical institutional change. This means that the concept of punctuated 
equilibrium treats institutions as the dependent variable and so the emphasis is on external 
developments, rather than institutions themselves. In this thesis however I focus on the 
endogenous source of institutional change and show that developments in the endogenous 
dynamics of an institution may trigger radical institutional changes. My contribution on 
radical institutional change is that I show how the punctuated equilibrium framework can be 
very helpful to explain radical institutional changes; it can show both how and why a 
powerful institution‘s power may be curtailed. And the originality of the framework lies in 
the emphasis on the endogenous causation of the change. This framework is also helpful to 
understand changes in the pace of policies. 
This research will appeal to those interested in the study of: 
 New Institutionalism, with particular focus on the historical institutionalism and its 
associated concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences 
and punctuated equilibrium 
 The Turkish National Security Council‘s origins, evolution, political preferences and 
the changes it went through within an historical institutionalist framework 
 The MGK‘s role in Turkey‘s European policy in the context of Turkey‘s Associative 
Agreement (1963) with the EEC, Turkey‘s application for EC‘s Full Membership 
(1987), the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the introduction of the 
Copenhagen Criteria (1993), the establishment of the Customs Union (1994) between 
Turkey and the EU, the Luxembourg Summit (1997) and the EU‘s decision to both 
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grant Turkey a candidate membership status (1999) and begin accession negotiations 
with Turkey (2004) 
 Turkish political history and domestic political developments and the EU‘s attitudes 
towards these developments: the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980; the rise of 
the Kurdish issue and the PKK; the Islamic Movement and religiously oriented 
Turkish political parties; and democracy and human rights. 
This thesis is a piece of historical research, and adopts a qualitative approach. Hockett 
(1955, in McNabb 2010: 248) said that ―historical research occurs in three steps: the 
gathering of data; the critical evaluation of the data; and the presentation of the facts, 
interpretations, and conclusions the historical researcher draws from the data‖. As Hockett 
suggests, I first gathered data that is relevant to the question this thesis 
asks, and then evaluated the data, using the historical institutionalist framework of 
institutional processes that I briefly introduced above and will explain in greater detail in the 
next chapter. The historical institutionalist framework has helped me not only to ask 
questions about how and why the MGK‘s institutional processes interacted with Turkey‘s 
European policy, but it also helped to analyse the impacts of this interaction on the 
development, in the nature and in the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations within a 
theoretical framework. 
Harrison said: ―[I]f we adopt a qualitative approach, we may choose to gather primary data, 
and we can do this via two particular research tools: interviews and observation. Alternatively 
(and as supplementary) we can analyse existing data – be it official documents, reports, 
biographical studies or the media‖ (Harrison 2001: 78). Although I have not conducted 
interviews, I have chosen to draw upon the existing primary and secondary data. 
Harrison again notes: ―[I]f we wished to discover how political institutions operate, how 
important decisions are made and how political power is attained, we are not likely to ask the 
public at large, but rather those individuals (very often a small group) who have access to this 
level of information – those referred to as political elites‖ (2001: 94). In the case of my 
research, to understand how and why the MGK made the decisions it made, it would have 
been useful to have interviews with the MGK members. In the early days, furthermore, it was 
part of my PhD proposal to conduct interviews with the both civilian and military members 
of the MGK. Before I explain why I chose not to conduct elite interviews, I want to consider 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of having interviews. If we are interviewing the 
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actual actor, it may help with the interpretations of existing documents and reports (Harrison 
ibid.) and it can provide access to crucial information about political events that otherwise 
unavailable (Manheim et al.2008: 373). As far as the disadvantages are 
concerned, Manheim et al. (2008) argues that interviewing those who are or were deeply 
involved in political process may threaten the scientific validity of the information obtained if 
the interviewees, for example, ―have convinced themselves, in order rationalize their 
own actions, that things are one way when they are actually 
another‖ (Manheim et al. 2008: 373–374). Harrison (2001) has suggested that the most 
challenging issue is ―where to start – or, put it another way, who to interview and 
when‖ (ibid.: 95). If I had interviews with the civilian and army members of the MGK, I 
would have had the opportunity not only to ask them for clarifications on some of the 
decisions and preferences of the MGK, but also I would have had insight to some of the 
conversations took place in the MGK meetings between the civilian and the army members. 
However, as I read more about the MGK and analysed the MGK‘s press releases I identified 
a number of difficulties and problems in organising and conducting interviews with the 
political elites concerned. One of which was to decide on where to start and whom to 
interview; as I said earlier, my thesis covers over eighty years, it is therefore very difficult 
and time consuming to have interviews with every one of the political and military elite who 
sat in the MGK between 1923 and 2004. Additionally, some of the civilian and army of the 
MGK have passed away and the composition of the MGK changed many times over the 
years. The military members of the MGK, as well as the politicians, are hard to reach and it is 
particularly difficult to interview around sensitive issues like the Kurdish question or the 
Islamic movement. 
Harrison (2001) has noted: ―[I]n order to answer a political question, it may be more 
appropriate to analyse data that which already exist, rather than collect new information.‖ 
(ibid.: 106). There are a number of reasons for this: (1) due to time restraints, (2) as historical 
context needs to be taken in to account (Harrison ibid.) and (3) it may allow access to 
subjects that may be difficult or impossible to research through direct, personal contact 
(Johnson and Reynolds 2012:301). I chose to rely on existing primary and secondary sources 
of data since newspapers, the MGK‘s press releases and the Official Journal of European 
Community helped me to highlight the interaction between the MGK and Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relations, which would not have been possible without them. The primary 
sources I used in this thesis include the minutes of the National Security Commission (1980–
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1983); the press releases of the National Security Council (MGK) (1983–2004); the minutes 
of the debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), and the Turkish broadsheet 
newspapers: Cumhuriyet; Tercuman; Hurriyet; Sabah; Milliyet; Zaman; and Radikal. Most of 
the primary data was collected from a number of libraries in Turkey: the library of the 
Turkish parliament; Beyazit Merkez Kutuphanesi (Beyazit Central Library); and Ataturk 
Kitapligi (Ataturk‘s Library). I agree with Johnson and Reynolds (2012) that one of the 
disadvantage of the use of existing information is that ―some written records are unavailable 
to researchers‖ (Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 301) and this applies to the Minutes of the 
MGK‘s meetings, which are recognised as top-secret documents and are not available to 
public view under Law 2945, which was introduced in 1983. To a certain extent this has 
limited my understanding and analysis, such as understanding the interaction between the 
civilian and military members of the MGK. The only available data to gain an insight to the 
MGK was the MGK‘s press releases. I therefore collected these from the MGK‘s official 
website. However since 2010 these press releases – covering the years between 1980 and 
2004 – have been removed from the MGK‘s official website. I think this will make it difficult 
for new researchers to consider looking into the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political 
system; however I am happy to share the data I have with the other researchers, upon 
request. Having said that, the MGK‘s press releases gave me an insight into how often the 
MGK met, who sat at the MGK‘s meetings and what sort of decisions the MGK made.  It is 
commonly argued that the reliability and the accuracy of this sort of data can be questionable. 
One should note that the MGK‘s press releases were products of the MGK‘s meetings and 
were published in the widely read newspapers. I think this is adequate to suggest that the 
MGK‘s press releases are reliable since they were exposed both to the media and to public 
scrutiny. It is however questionable how objective the press releases are; and that is 
something I cannot be sure of since the minutes of the MGK‘s meetings are not open to 
public view. I thus cannot compare the minutes of the meetings with the MGK‘s press 
releases to decide how biased the press releases are. The secondary sources I used in this 
thesis include the Official Journal of European Community (1980–1997); the European 
Commission‘s Annual Regular Reports on Turkey (1998–2004); English newspapers: the 
Guardian, the Independent, and the Financial Times; and academic writings. I collected the 
secondary data mostly from the London School of Economics Library, the British Library 
and the Royal Holloway College Library. One of the most contentious disadvantages of the 
use of existing data is that its content may be biased, or may be incomplete or inaccurate. 
And it could be claimed that some of the existing information I have used in this thesis may 
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be biased or inaccurate. However, throughout this thesis I have aimed to use facts – be it a 
decision made by the MGK or the EU‘s position on the MGK – only after I have double 
checked it with another source of information. This will have hopefully minimised the risk of 
the information being biased or inaccurate. 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The current chapter covers the questions I will address, 
hypotheses I will test, the brief outline of why I chose historical institutionalism, the literature 
review and the methodology I will adopt in this thesis. Chapter 2, ―The Historical Institution-
alist Framework of Institutional Processes‖ will debate the strengths and weaknesses of ra-
tional choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms‘ positions on the distinct parts of 
institutional processes; it will then outline in greater details the historical institutionalist 
framework of this thesis. Chapter 3, ―The Genesis of Both the MGK and Turkey‘s Interest in 
Europe in an Illiberal Context, 1923–1957‖ shows how well historical institutionalism can 
explain the factors behind the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in being part of Eu-
rope. Chapter 4, ―The Evolution of the MGK and the Development of Turkey–EEC/EC Rela-
tions, 1957–1983‖ analyses the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–
EEC/EC relations post Turkey‘s transition to a multi-party system and discusses how the crit-
ical junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 contributed to Turkey‘s aspiration to join the EEC/EC. 
Additionally, it argues that the concept of critical junctures, their characteristics and their 
sources are very helpful not only to unveil how and why the MGK evolved, but also very 
helpful to explain what contributed to the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations between 
1957 and 1983. Chapter 5, ―The MGK‘s Tendency to Rule through States of Emergency and 
its Incompatibility with EC/EU Membership Criteria, 1983–1997‖ shows that the concept of 
path dependence is inadequate on its own for analysing how institutions influence political 
decision making. It suggests that the concept of unintended consequences is needed to sup-
plement the formulations of path dependency if we are to understand why the state of emer-
gency was kept for more than fourteen years while this conflicted with Turkey‘s progress to-
wards EU membership. Chapter 6, ―The Curtailment of the MGK‘s Powers and the EU‘s De-
cision to Begin Accession Negotiations with Turkey, 1998–2004‖, assesses the existing in-
terpretations of the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. It goes 
on to suggest that the concept of punctuated equilibrium is suitable to understand the source 
and mechanism of change. Chapter 7, ―Conclusions‖, begins by setting out the findings of 
this study and discusses my contributions to the literature on Turkey and the European Union 
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as well as the theoretical approach of Historical Institutionalism and outlines what future 























CHAPTER 2: WHY HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Introduction 
Neither sociological institutionalism nor rational choice institutionalism pays an academic 
attention to the role of history in the study of the institutional processes. Historical                  
institutionalism on the other hand is fundamentally driven by its emphasis on history in 
shaping the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes. Whilst rational choice and 
sociological institutionalisms‘ position on the institutional processes do not form a productive 
framework in highlighting the interaction between the MGK and Turkey-EEC/EC/EU 
relations, historical institutionalist framework is very fruitful in gaining an insight to how and 
why the MGK‘s institutional processes have interacted with Turkey‘s bid to join the EU and 
what outcomes this interaction had produced for the nature, the development and the pace of 
the relationship. To show these points, I will begin by comparing and contrasting rational 
choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms‘ positions on institutional genesis, 
institutional evolution, the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes and 
institutional change. I will then set out the historical institutionalist framework of the 
institutional processes; as well as I will discuss the benefits and the limitations of this 
framework in explaining the interaction between the MGK‘s institutional processes and 
Turkey‘s European policy. Conclusions will follow. 
2.1 Rational Choice, Sociological and Historical Institutionalisms on Institutional 
Processes 
Early rational choice institutionalists (Shepsle and Weingast 1995) questioned the impact of 
the American Congress on the behaviour of legislators and analysed the relationship between 
Congress and regulatory agencies. In addition, a variety of other phenomena including cross-
national coalition behaviour, the development of political institutions, and the intensity of 
ethnic conflict have been at the centre of rational choice institutionalism. For instance, 
Przeworski (1991, 2000) analysed democratic transitions in game-theoretic terms, and there 
are many other examples of the application of rational choice institutionalism in European 
studies such as Pollack (1996, 2009); Jupille and Caporoso (1999); Aspinwall and Schneider 
(2000); and Scully (2006). The rational choice institutionalists‘ definition of what an 
institution does varies. Riker (1980) refers to institutions as ―congealed tastes‖ (ibid.:432), 
describing them as condensed conventions reflecting tastes and values about interpersonal 
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rules; they consist of attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and preferences about the way things are 
done around the individuals In contrast to Riker, Shepsle (1989) describes them as 
―procedures‖, ―arrangements‖, or as a ―structure-induced equilibrium‖ or ―game‖ (ibid.: 135–
42). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) note: ―For the rational choice scholars, institutions are 
important as features of a strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested behaviour. 
Thus political and economic institutions are important for rational choice scholars interested 
in real-world politics because the institutions define (or at least constrain) the strategies that 
political actors adopt in the pursuit of their interests‖ (ibid. : p.7). Sociological 
institutionalism on the other hand adopts a broad definition of institutions and recognises 
informal norms and conventions as well as formal rules and regulations as institutions. For 
instance, March and Olsen (1989) describe institutions as a ―collection of interrelated rules 
and routines‖ (ibid.: 2). Scott (1995) however improved this by expanding on the features of 
institutions and emphasised the cognitive, the normative, and the regulative structures and 
activities which arguably provided stability and meaning to social behaviour (ibid.: 33). 
Sociological institutionalism has been heavily used in EU studies to examine the EU 
enlargement (Fierke and Weiner 1990); regionalism and European integration (Christiansen 
1997); domestic–European relations (Larsen 1997); the European Commission‘s political 
strategy in creating the Single European Market (Jabko 2006); and the effects of Europe on 
national identity constructions (Diez 1996). 
Like sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism‘s definition of institutions has 
been broad. A very well-known early historical institutionalist, Hall, describes institutions as 
―formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure 
relationships between individual units of the polity or the economy‖ (1986: 19). Another 
well-respected historical institutionalist, Ikenberry, calls this the ―normative social order‖ that 
comprises not just formal constitutional entities, but also instances of established informal 
interaction (1988: 222–23). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) however combine the latter two 
perspectives and say institutions are both formal organisations and informal rules and 
procedures which generally structure political or social action (ibid.: 2). Peters (1999) notes 
that one of the other operational definitions of institutions that stand out in the historical 
institutionalist literature is the role of ideas in defining institutions: Goldstein‘s (1988) 
emphasis on protectionism, Hall‘s (1989) focus on Keynesianism, Immergut‘s (1992) 
analysis of health policies, Skocpol‘s (1992) interest in the relationship between moral values 
and formal institutions such as courts of law, and Kings‘s (1995) study of the liberal 
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principles in work–welfare programs reflect the broadness and variation in the use of 
explanatory factors in historical institutionalism. It is necessary to clarify what I treat as 
institutions in this thesis and why. I agree that informal institutions such as ideas, traditions or 
interests can play an important role in shaping political action and policy outcomes. 
However, in this thesis I will show that ideas can evolve into formal institutions; in this case 
it was ―Ataturk‘s desire to protect the Turkish Republic‖ that evolved into the National 
Security Council (MGK). I therefore begin by discussing how and why a informal institution 
evolved into an formal institution and I then, in a very large part of the research, focus on 
what role the formal institution, that is to say the MGK, played in Turkish political decision 
making and what implication this had for Turkey‘s European policy. The reason for this is 
that, as I will show throughout this thesis, the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in 
Europe, and the MGK and its institutional processes, have interacted with Turkey‘s European 
policy and this shaped the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU 
relations between 1923 and 2004. I argue that this requires academic attention. 
On institutional genesis, sociological institutionalism‘s approach is that institutions are given 
and socially constructed. Sociological institutionalism focuses attention on the processes 
whereby actors who develop new institutions borrow from the existing world of institutional 
templates (Solton 1998: 30). If a researcher accepts that institutions are given and socially 
constructed, does it mean that we do not need to research the origins of that institution? Then 
does not this limit the researchers‘ ability to research and investigate? I argue that accepting 
that institutions are given restricts the researchers‘ ability to conduct a detailed investigation 
of why an institution is formed. In addition, while sociological institutionalism has society as 
its focus, it is difficult to understand why it may overlook the ways in which social 
developments may have contributed to the genesis of institutions. Rational choice 
institutionalists, on the other hand, would argue that institutions are chosen; and suggest that 
they do not simply happen (McCubbins and Sullivan 1987: 313 and Tsebelis 1990); self-
interested actors will make decisions and create institutions that will reduce their political or 
economic costs relative to the benefits gained (Campbell 1997: 15). Another point of view on 
institutional genesis comes from Weingast (2002) who suggests that the reason societies or 
groups cannot do without institutions is because ―parties often need institutions to help 
capture gains from cooperation. In the absence of institutions, individuals often face a social 
dilemma, that is, a situation where their behaviour makes all worse off‖ (Weingast 2002: 
670). Furthermore, rational choice institutionalists borrow from functionalism, suggesting 
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that the origins of an institution can be explained in terms of the effects that follow from its 
existence; as Soltan et al. (1998) note: ―Although such effects may contribute to the 
persistence of an institution, explaining persistence should be confused with explaining an 
institution‘s origins‖ (ibid.: 29). Additionally, suggesting that ―the institutions are chosen‖ or 
―a product of strategic action‖ results in limiting the researcher‘s aim of investigating and 
questioning why an institution is formed. If one applies the rational choice institutionalist 
approach to how and why the MGK was established, one would list the MGK‘s functions and 
point them to as to why the MGK was established; and if one applies rational choice 
institutionalism to understand the origins of Turkey–EU relations, one would perhaps suggest 
that the current state of Turkey–EU relations can explain the origins of the relationship. As I 
said earlier, this is a reductionist approach to institutional genesis, as one cannot pursue a 
detailed analysis of how and why institutions originate or why relationships are formed. Since 
I am interested to find out how and why the MGK was established and since I want to do 
research in the context of Turkey‘s relationship with Europe, I will opt for historical 
institutionalism. Pierson and Thelen‘s proposal to ―go back and look‖, and Thelen‘s emphasis 
on paying attention to political and social settings, are instructive and may lead to a detailed 
analysis of what political, economic and social developments contributed to both the 
formation of the MGK and Turkey‘s desire to be part of Europe. 
Peters (1999) identified the concepts of critical juncture and punctuated equilibrium as 
important elements of the historical institutionalist model of change, but Peters did not 
comment on what concepts should be used to understand what type of change. In contrast to 
Peters, Cortell and Peterson (2001) identified two forms of institutional change: incremental 
change and radical change. Cortell and Peterson did not comment on what concept can 
explain what types of institutional change. Drawing on both Peters‘ and Cortell and 
Peterson‘s findings, I argue that incremental changes tend to occur slowly and continuously 
and they tend to contribute to both the evolution of institutions and the development of 
policy. I thus suggest that incremental institutional changes and their further implications can 
be explained by the concept of critical juncture. As I said earlier, apart from historical 
institutionalism, the other strands of New Institutionalism have not said much about how and 
why institutions evolve. Institutional evolution is one of the fundamental parts of the 
institutional process and I argue that it requires theoretical attention. I found the concept of 
critical junctures very helpful in forming a framework to identify the critical junctures in the 
history of Turkish politics, to explain what decisions were made at these critical junctures and 
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under what conditions and by whom. It has proved helpful to analyse the role critical 
junctures played not only in the evolution of the MGK from an advisory to a paramount 
political institution, but also in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations, particular why 
Turkey‘s application for Associative Membership was delayed in the 1960s, why Turkey‘s 
Associative Agreement was stalled in the 1970s and why the EC chose to freeze its political 
dialogue with Turkey. 
As for how institutions influence political action and preference, rational choice 
institutionalism suggests that institutions do shape action through offering opportunities for 
action and imposing constraints (Lecours 2005: 9). Hall and Taylor (1996) regard this as the 
―calculus approach‖ (ibid.: 939). Under the calculus approach: 
institutions affect behaviour primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser degree of 
certainty about the present and future actions/preferences of other actors. More specifically, 
institutions provide information relevant to the behaviour of others, enforcement mechanisms 
for agreements, penalties for defection and the like. The key point is that they affect 
individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are 
likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action. Strategic interaction 
clearly plays a key role in such analyses. (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939, see also Lecours 2005: 
9–11) 
Rational choice institutionalism‘s calculus approach can be helpful for understanding the 
power relations between different members of one institution and it can provide an insight 
into the debates in one institution. This approach however is not equipped to explain how the 
MGK‘s actions in domestic politics have interacted with Turkey‘s European policy. I further 
disagree that institutions or the members of the institutions make strategic actions all the time 
and suggest that we should pay more attention to the role of history and past decisions that 
have been made by the institutions and how these decisions constrain the future decisions of 
that institution. Sociological institutionalism disagrees with the argument that the social 
world reflects a formal means–ends ―rationality‖ and suggests that it displays a diverse set of 
practices associated with culture (Hall and Taylor 1996: 946). I agree with the sociological 
institutionalist approach that the social world is not only shaped by means–ends rationality. 
Political life for sociological institutionalism is organised by shared values and worldviews 
based on a community of common culture, experience, and vision (March and Olsen 2006: 
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4). Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991) note: ―institutions do not simply limit options: 
they establish the criteria by which people discover their preferences‖ (ibid.: 11). 
The sociological institutionalists rather apply a ―cultural approach‖ to analysing and 
demonstrating how institutions determine political action. Under this approach behaviour is 
not always rational or purposive; the individual‘s established routines and familiar pattern of 
behaviour tend to decide their actions. The individuals are, therefore, ―satisfiers, rather than 
utility maximizers‖, which means that the individual‘s choice of action depends on the 
interpretation of a situation rather than on a purely instrumental calculation (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 939). In this branch of institutional theory, institutions influence how individuals view 
the world and how they act within it. In my opinion it is difficult to make a generalisation 
about whether individuals are satisfiers or utility maximisers; I think beginning a research 
project with the assumption that the individuals involved are either satisfiers or utility 
maximisers may lead to a reductionist analysis of how an institution shapes political or social 
action or policy outcomes. I think recognising the important role of the shared values and 
worldviews of communities is vital; having said that, attention also needs to be paid to history 
and the political, social and economic context. Sociological institutionalism‘s suggestion that 
institutions behave in the form they are expected also fails to see that institutions have a 
number of opportunities to opt for a different form of action. 
Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that historical institutionalism applies an ―eclectic approach‖ to 
the study of how institutions shape political action and outcome (ibid.: 940). The eclectic 
approach is made of both the ―calculus approach‖ and the ―cultural approach‖. I do not agree 
with Hall and Taylor and suggest instead that historical institutionalism has developed a 
―temporal approach‖. Under this approach, ―time‖ and ―history‖ are two fundamental factors 
in the study of how institutions determine political action and policy outcomes. It is 
conditioned by the concept of ―path dependence‖. 
The general argument of the concept of path dependence is that the decisions and policy 
preferences made earlier do influence the nature of the decisions taken in the future (Peters 
1999: 63). Krasner (1984), Levi (1997) and Pierson (2000a, 2000b, 2004) develop different 
approaches to the concept of path dependence. I found these scholars‘ formulations of the 
concept of path dependence very helpful in identifying not only the options available as 
alternatives to an institution‘s original policy preference (the path), but also to analyse how 
and why institutions maintain their original paths over a long period of time. Krasner‘s 
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emphasis on institutions keeping naturally to their original path, Levi‘s suggestion that 
institutions respond to the costs of any reversal and Pierson‘s emphasis on the increasing 
returns of staying on one path have provided me with a framework for formulating a number 
of questions to research in order to understand why an institution may maintain its original 
path. The concept of path dependence is one of the most popular concepts emerging from 
historical institutionalism and examples include Mahoney (2001), Hansen (2002) and Ackrill 
and Kay (2006). These works appear however less willing to recognise that institutions may 
have other options to their original paths and that the reasons for institutions to remain on the 
same path may differ from one institution to another. This means that they have been limited 
in applying the basic principles of path dependence to their empirical case studies and have 
overlooked the alternative options and the reasons for maintaining the original path suggested 
by Krasner, Levi and Pierson. Furthermore, they have failed to question if the original paths 
of the institution produce the intended outcomes all the time. Having said that, Krasner‘s, 
Levi‘s and Pierson‘s conceptualisations of path dependence have not paid attention to 
whether established institutional paths do always produce the intended outcome and if not, 
why institutions maintain their original paths. I therefore propose to complement the 
conceptualisations of path dependence with Merton‘s (1936) concept of unintended 
consequences to explain the cases in which institutions maintain their original path despite its 
unintended consequences. 
Historical institutionalism gives importance to history and past decisions; the concept of path 
dependence is central to historical institutionalism‘s temporal approach. The concept of path 
dependence and formulations of this put forward by Krasner, Levi and Pierson are very 
helpful for identifying both what path the MGK formed against the PKK and how it 
maintained it. In addition the concept of path dependence highlights how the MGK‘s 
treatment of the PKK and the Kurds hindered Turkey‘s progress in meeting the EC/EU 
membership criteria. The formulation of the concept of path dependence however says little 
about the fact that institutions‘ paths do not always produce the intended outcomes, therefore 
they fail to provide an answer as to why the MGK maintained its path on the PKK and the 
Kurds when this path had unintended consequences for both the Turkish political system and 
Turkey‘s European policy. In Chapter 5, I therefore complement the concept of path 




Peters (2008) says that rational choice institutionalism sees change as occurring easily – all 
one needs is to do change the incentives (e.g., the pay-off matrix of the game) and behaviour 
will almost immediately change (see Goodin 1995; Keman 1996). Another view on rational 
choice institutionalism‘s perspective on institutional change is that the institutions may 
change when they are dysfunctional or yield sub-optimal results (Lecours 2005: 12; Thelen 
2003: 215). The last possibility is a power-based political bargaining approach that tends to 
consider distributional outcomes in order to account for institutional change (see Knight 
1992). It is an interesting point of view that under rational choice institutionalism institutional 
change can easily take place and there are references to a number of causes of institutional 
change such as ―change in incentives‖, ―dysfunctional institution‖ or ―distributional 
outcomes‖ which are important in identifying some of the causes of institutional changes. It 
is however unclear how one researcher is supposed to discuss and analyse the sources of an 
institution and difficult to formulate questions under rational choice institutionalism to carry 
out a detailed analysis of why an institution may change and what consequences this may 
have for policy outcomes. 
Scholars writing on sociological institutionalism on the other hands tend to argue that there is 
not a common position on whether institutions change or maintain equilibrium in sociological 
institutionalism. Institutional processes, and thus they can be studied independent of each 
other – my suggestion is, if there was not an institutional equilibrium, institutional change 
would not have taken place. And I suggest that institutions at times remain in equilibrium and 
at times change. Academics should therefore aim to understand the cause of the equilibrium 
and change and analyse what these institutional changes mean for policy outcomes. Clemens 
and Cook (1999) argue that the sociological institutionalist generally treats institutions as 
durable to the extent they are reinforced through socialization or interaction or legitimisation 
while alternative scripts remain unimaginable (ibid.: 445; see also, Mahoney and Thelen 
2010: 5). Since institutional equilibrium of the institutional processes is not of interest in this 
thesis, I will not be saying more on it. 
In contrast to Clemens and Cook, Powell and DiMaggio (1983, 1991) however identify three 
mechanisms of institutional change: (i) ―coercion‖, which involves explicit pressures from 
other institutions, as well as from the cultural environment; (ii) ―mimesis‖, under which one 
organisation recognises the success of another and attempts to copy it; and (iii) ―norms‖, 
through which an organisation adopts the ―conventional wisdom‖ that certain forms are more 
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―modern, appropriate, and professional‖ (1983: 151–54; 1991: 67–74 respectively; see also 
Gorges 2001: 157). I find Powell and DiMaggio‘s approach to institutional change very 
informative as they make references to three different sources of institutional change. A 
researcher can easily use these mentioned sources of institutional change to investigate how 
and why institutions change – it is however unclear how the researcher is supposed to do that; 
the tools of research are not provided. Overall, I would argue that sociological 
institutionalism, like rational choice institutionalism, fails to provide the researcher with a 
framework to carry out a detailed analysis of the causes of institutional change and whether 
institutional changes have implications for policy outcomes. 
Radical institutional changes occur abruptly and discontinuously and they tend to contribute 
to the curtailments of an institution‘s powers and to policy changes. I found Krasner‘s 
concept of punctuated equilibrium very helpful for studying sources of radical institutional 
change. In particular Krasner‘s emphasis on the long years of stasis in institutions being 
broken by an exogenous shock has provided me with a framework to see stasis in institutions 
as linked with the concept of path dependence, and to analyse radical institutional changes 
and their implications for policy outcomes in relation to sudden changes (shocks). I disagree 
however with Krasner‘s emphasis on exogenous crisis in breaking the institutional stasis and 
rather emphasis the MGK‘s endogenous political developments as the source of radical 
institutional changes. 
Overall, rational choice institutionalism is driven by the central perception that the strategies 
of political actors or individuals are either defined or constrained by the institutions; and the 
actors involved generally aim to maximise their interests. This perception then shapes 
rational choice institutionalism‘s position on different part of the institutional process: 
institutions are established for certain gains and institutions change when they are 
dysfunctional. Rational choice institutionalism‘s emphasis on the rationality of political 
actors and individuals in the study of institutional processes may provide a focused analysis 
of how and why the interests of individuals‘ can shape the policy outcomes of an institution. 
One major problem I find in rational choice institutionalism is that it overlooks other factors 
such as history, and political, social and economic surroundings of institutions in which 
institutions originate, evolve and shape political decision making and policy outcomes. 
Unlike for rational choice institutionalism, for sociological institutionalism the community of 
common culture, ideas and vision is central to their analysis of the different parts of 
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institutional processes. The strong point of sociological institutionalism is that it pays 
attention to the social surroundings of institutions – their suggestions that institutions are 
socially constructed, are embedded in the society and are satisfiers of the existing social 
institutional structure prove this point. However, I have two problems with sociological 
institutionalism. The first is that while it makes references to how institutions are socially 
constructed and embedded, it overlooks the role of history and past decisions in how 
institutions evolve over the time. In particular I find some informal institutions such as ideas 
or interests evolve into formal institutions over time; I will show that the idea of ―the need to 
protect the Republic and its very principles‖ evolved over the years into a formal institution, 
that is to say the MGK. The second point is that it lacks dynamism, which means that 
institutions are treated as passive actors. It overlooks the options institutions have, as opposed 
to the behaviour expected of them by society. I argue that institutions can and do choose from 
options available to them; they do not always act in the way the society would expect them 
to. And institutions‘ preferences or decisions can be shaped by the earlier choices made by 
that institution and this original behaviour can be maintained by other reasons than solely to 
satisfy social expectations.  
Both rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism point to different 
sources of institutional change; this is very useful for helping a researcher to spot a change in 
one particular institution. These two strands of New Institutionalism however do not provide 
a concept or an approach for a researcher to analyse the sources of these institutional changes. 
Additionally they lack clarification as to what types of change may exist. It is therefore very 
difficult to analyse the radical changes in the MGK and what implications these have for 
Turkey–EU relations with these strands of New Institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is 
better equipped, because it points to a concept of punctuated equilibrium which puts the 
emphasis on the sources of institutional changes and thus directs researchers to investigate 
sources of the institutional changes. Although Krasner points to exogenous factors as the 
sources of institutional change I show endogenous developments may also be sources of 
radical institutional changes.  
2.2 Historical Institutionalist Framework  
Kreps (1990), who analysed the effects of institutions in the microeconomic literature, asked 
the very pertinent question, ―where did the institutions come from?‖ and added, ―having a 
theory about how institutions arise and evolve could be more informative than theories of 
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equilibrium within the context of a given set of institutions‖ (ibid.: 530). Agreeing with 
Kreps, Pierson (2000b) has said, ―the origins of institutions … remain opaque ...[and] 
political scientists have much more to say about institutional effects than about institutional 
origins …. Both cause and consequence of these lacunae has been a turn to functionalist 
reasoning‖. He argues that as a result ―in each case one is left with the impression that 
institutional functioning in large part explains the presence of particular institutional 
arrangements‖ (ibid.: 475–76, italics in original). The functionalist assumption is that 
institutions exist in the form they do because they are functional for social actors. This 
approach is associated with Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. According to Lipset 
(1985), Durkheim argued that different men must be motivated to perform different roles in 
modern society since there is a complex and highly differentiated system of rules (ibid.: 60). 
Lipset added, ―the functionalists see man as a social animal whose needs are not primarily 
physical and satiable but, rather, culturally determined and potentially unlimited‖ (ibid.). In 
contrast Parsons (1951), according to Peters (1999), argued that societies must fulfil the 
―adoptive‖ function and extract sufficient resources from the environment to survive – the 
performance of these functions was then related to the existence of institutions (structures), 
with the comparative analysis of societies being possible through different manners of 
relating structure and function (ibid.: 99). 
Pierson (2000a) argues that the task of the analyst in the functionalist approach is to lay bare 
the particular function (ibid.: 477) and refers to this approach acting as an end-point rather 
than a starting point. He suggests in fact that institutions do not have a single effect and nor 
do the institutional designers act instrumentally or have short-term horizons (Pierson 2000b: 
109–22). For Pierson, the study of institutional genesis should not begin from the end-point 
but from the starting point and he points out that we cannot assume a connection between 
current effects and original intentions (ibid.: 477). Similarly, Thelen (2004) argues that the 
main problem with functionalism is that there is a tendency to work backwards in order to 
develop an account of how these institutions were rationally chosen (ibid.: 25). Thelen in 
contrast to functionalism argues that institutions should be seen as the product of concrete 
temporal process. Thelen then emphasises the features of the broader political and social 
context in the study of how institutions originate and suggests that institutional arrangements 
cannot be understood in isolation from the political and the social settings in which they are 
embedded (ibid.: 384). 
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For both Thelen (2004) and Pierson (2000a), then, ―we have to go back and look‖ (ibid.: 25, 
264, respectively, italics in original) to find out how and why institutions originate. I would 
agree that history, social and political settings are very important in the study of institutional 
genesis since institutions are embedded in these settings. I furthermore agree with Pierson 
and Thelen that we should ―go back and look‖ to highlight why institutions are established. 
Pierson and Thelen do not comment over what the researchers should look for when they go 
back. Peters‘ (1999) argument is ―when an idea becomes accepted and is embodied into a 
structural form then the institution has been created‖ (ibid.: 67). 
Criticisms of the functionalist approach to how and why institutions originate have shaped 
the historical institutionalists‘ position on institutional genesis. Pierson has described the 
functionalist approach as acting as an end point rather than starting point, as it was argued 
that the functions the institutions perform were related to the existence of that institution. 
Thelen also criticised the functionalist approach for having a tendency to work backward to 
account for how the institutions were rationally chosen. I agree with Pierson and Thelen on 
this because if I had applied the functionalist approach to try and understand how and why 
the MGK was established I would have researched what function the MGK performs and 
then listed the MGK‘s functions and responsibilities as reason enough for the existence of the 
MGK. Additionally if I had employed a functionalism to understanding Turkey‘s interest in 
being both part of Europe and a full member of the EU, I would have argued that the current 
state of Turkey–EU relations can explain the origins of Turkey‘s interest in being part of 
Europe. This is a very reductionist approach as it limits the researcher from carrying out 
detailed research, such as how and why the MGK was established in 1933 and why Turkey 
developed an interest in being part of Europe or being Western. Thelen and Pierson, as I have 
noted above, suggest that the researcher needs ―to go back and look‖, to find out how and 
why an institution originated. I would argue that this approach is very helpful because it 
provided me with a framework to follow – going back to when the institution was 
established. In addition, Thelen‘s emphasis on the history, social and political settings is very 
informative in the sense that you know that institutions are mostly embedded in social and 
political settings and you know when you go back and look, you will need to pay attention to 
the context of social and political settings. This very framework can also be applied to 
investigate the origins of Turkey‘s interest in adopting a Western political system and way of 
living. In addition, Peters‘ emphasis on how ideas are embodied into the structural form of an 
institution has also been useful for seeing the link between Kemalism and why the MGK was 
63 
 
established in 1933. In the following section therefore I will study the historical and political 
background of the early years of the Turkish Republic beginning from 1923 and leading up to 
1957 to analyse how and why the MGK was established and how and why the Turkish 
Republic felt close to Western Europe. And this will be done with particular focus on 
Kemalism and the political, economic and social context.  
Incremental institutional changes are both evolutionary and gradual ones which either 
weaken or empower institutions. Pierson (1996; see also Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 708–9) 
has pointed out that evolution is an important process of change in historical institutionalism 
and argued more gradual change is also possible. As I said earlier I will use the concept of 
critical juncture to explain institutional evolution. The concept of critical juncture (after time 
and political sociology derives from a ―dual‖ conception of political (social, organisational, 
historical, institutional, depending on the phenomenon of interest) development, including 
moments of fluidity and rapid change followed by phases, normally longer, of relative 
stability (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Collier and Collier (1991) defined critical juncture as 
a period of significant change that generally occurs in distinct ways in different countries and 
can shape politics, institutions and policy formation into the future (ibid.: 27–29). 
As far as the sources of critical junctures are concerned, while Cortell and Peterson (1997) 
point to international and domestic triggers, Hogan (2006) focuses on societal cleavages. 
Cortell and Peterson (1999) argue that in democratic states the following three factors may 
lead up to critical junctures and institutional changes and these include (1) triggers; (2) 
changes-oriented preferences; and (3) institutional opportunity. The latter two will not be 
discussed here as it is not relevant to this thesis; triggers will however be studied to bring 
some light to understanding the cause of critical junctures. Cortell and Peterson break the 
triggers down into groups as international and domestic triggers. They argue that 
international triggers include war, geopolitical conflict, changing balance of power, 
technological change and macroeconomic change, while the domestic triggers cover 
revolution, civil war, coup d‘etat, election/change of government, economic growth rate, 
demographic change and social movement/conflict (ibid.: 185). Hogan (2006) suggests that it 
is important to examine the tensions between social cleavages that may lead to critical 
junctures and periods of change (ibid.: 664). 
Gourevitch (1986) and Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) point to the characteristics of critical 
junctures and comment on the role political or non-political actors play at critical junctures. 
64 
 
Gourevitch names critical junctures as ―crises‖ and describes them as ―open moments when 
system creating choices are made‖ (1986: 236). Similarly Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) note 
that critical junctures are characterised by a situation in which the structural (that is, 
economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly 
relaxed for a relatively short period. They then argue this significantly relaxed period has two 
consequences: (1) the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands 
substantially and (2) the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are 
potentially much more momentous (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 343–44). In contrast to 
Gourevitch and Capoccia and Kelemen, Gorges (2001) has commented on how political or 
non-political actors makes changes, and said that leaders at critical junctures are presented 
with an opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas, embedding them in the 
institutions they establish (ibid.: 156). 
I agree with Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) that ―most scholars invoking critical junctures 
have been rather causal users, simply referring to the concept as a model of change but not 
probing its meaning or developing methodologies associated with it‖ (ibid.: 346). Some of 
the early users were Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Collier and Collier (1991) and there are 
later examples in EU studies such as Deschouwer (2005), Stetter (2007) and Oner (2011). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue in their seminal work that the development of the European 
party system took place as a result of critical junctures in history and suggest that these 
junctures resulted in social cleavages of class, religion, centre-periphery etc. which in turn led 
to the formation of political parties representing distinct social and economic interests. I 
found Lipset and Rokkan‘s work very useful for identifying how critical junctures may 
contribute to the evolution of a structure or of an institution, as this is something I will do in 
Chapter 4, showing that the critical junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 made a major 
contribution to the evolution of the MGK into a very influential political institution in 
Turkey. They however do not explain not only what critical junctures mean to them, but also 
how and why critical junctures contributed to the evolution and the formation of political 
parties, for example. Another very important study is provided by Collier and Collier (1991) 
who are among the few authors who have employed the concept of critical juncture to 
describe and to explain change in the institutionalist literature. Collier and Collier analyse the 
relationship between the state and the organised labour movement in Latin America in the 
early and mid-twentieth century. They associate critical junctures with institutional or 
political changes; with the concept of critical junctures they explain the patterns of 
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differences in labour movement incorporation and their legacy and heritage in eight different 
Latin American countries. Collier and Collier‘s work is helpful to see that institutional 
change may follow critical junctures, as this is something Lipset and Rokkan overlooked. 
However, Collier and Collier do not pay attention to whether or how the changes introduced 
at the critical junctures contributed to the nature of the labour movements in different Latin 
American countries. 
Deschouwer (2005), when studying the role of political parties and democratic political 
representation in the context of changing institutional arrangements in European politics, 
refers to ―the process of European integration‖ as a new critical juncture in the development 
of the political institutions of Europe (ibid.: 86, italics in original). It is however unclear how 
and why Deschouwer recognises the process of European integration as a critical juncture 
and if he used any theoretical framework to this end. Stetter (2007) recognises the Maastricht 
Treaty as a critical juncture in the development of EU Foreign Policy and notes ―some 
incremental, yet highly significant changes towards a greater autonomy of the Council of the 
Secretariat in Foreign policies‖ was made at the Maastricht Treaty (ibid.: 62). Stetter, like 
Deschouwer, does not explain how and why he recognises the Maastricht Treaty as a critical 
juncture. It is however very interesting to see very rightly how both Deschouwer and Stetter 
associate critical junctures with institutional development and institutional changes. Since 
these works are lacking substantial theoretical frameworks, they do not provide a full picture 
of the triggers of critical junctures, of the decisions and the preferences made at the critical 
junctures and of the political, economic and social conditions under which the decisions and 
the preferences are made. This simple use of the concept of critical juncture in EU studies 
also proves my earlier point made in Chapter 1 that the utility of historical institutionalism 
and its associated concepts have yet not yet been highlighted in EU studies, which results in a 
significant gap. This thesis may make a significant contribution to EU studies by showing 
that incremental institutional changes may lead to institutional evolution and this can be well 
explained by the concept of critical junctures outlined above. 
Oner (2011), while questioning the role of European identity in the context of Turkey and 
European Union relations, refers to a number of international developments as critical 
junctures and assesses their implications ―for the dynamics of the interaction process between 
Turkey–EU‖ (ibid.: 119). Additionally, Oner recognises the collapse of the Soviet Union as a 
critical juncture. She suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the EU to 
66 
 
reconstruct itself. This meant according to Oner that the EU changed the way it interacted 
with Turkey ibid.: 196). She also treats the September 11 attacks in New York as a critical 
juncture; and comments that ―the possibility of Turkey‘s EU membership has been 
increasingly discussed in terms of ‗clash of civilisation‘‖ (ibid.: 173). This is a useful and 
interesting work to gain an insight into how internal political developments have interacted 
with Turkey‘s European policy, but there are a number of problems with Oner‘s use of the 
concept of critical juncture. The first is that Oner claims to use a social constructivist 
framework to answer the questions she sets in this book, but she instead heavily draws on the 
historical institutionalist concept of critical juncture. The second is that as she does not 
provide a detailed explanation of what critical junctures mean to her and how and why she is 
using this very concept. It is therefore not clear how and why she both recognises the collapse 
of Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks as critical junctures and analyses the impacts of the two 
so-called critical junctures on the Turkey–EU relations. 
Since I am interested in incremental changes introduced at the critical junctures, I would also 
like to draw attention to modes of incremental institutional change. Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) identified five modes of incremental and transformative institutional change: layering; 
conversion; drift; displacements; and exhaustion. I found Streeck and Thelen‘s reference to 
modes of institutional change very useful to think about whether the incremental institutional 
changes in the MGK can be explained with any of these five modes of changes. 
On institutional evolution, I agree with Pierson that institutional evolution is an important 
process of change; it is however not clear what Pierson means by that statement. My 
interpretation of Pierson‘s statement is that institutional change may lead on to institutional 
evolution.  I opt to use the concept of critical juncture to explain institutional evolution and 
policy development. It is through the triggers and the characteristics of critical junctures that 
one can highlight how and why institutions evolve. This framework can also be used to 
investigate policy development. On the trigger of critical junctures I found Cortell and 
Peterson‘s emphasis on domestic triggers of critical junctures very helpful to seek what in 
Turkish political history triggered the critical junctures of 1960, 1971, and 1980. Hagon‘s 
reference to social cleavages and social tension also provides me with a framework to study 
the triggers of the critical junctures in the context of social cleavages and social tensions. 
Once the critical junctures and their triggers are identified, it is important to find out under 
what conditions decisions and preferences were are made at the critical junctures and by 
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whom. Gourevitch and Capoccia and Kelemen‘s descriptions of critical junctures as free 
moments where the rules of decision making are relaxed is instructive: I shall investigate 
under what conditions and by whom decisions in relation to the MGK and Turkey‘s European 
policy were made at the critical junctures I identify in the history of Turkish politics. 
Gorges‘s point about actors having the opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas, 
embedding them in the institutions they establish, is very helpful to direct us to pay attention 
to how and why Kemalism was embedded in the MGK after the critical juncture of 1980. 
One last point is that Streeck and Thelen‘s reference to modes of institutional change is 
helpful to seek not only if the changes introduced at the critical juncture took place in a mode, 
but also what this meant for the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system. 
Sewell (1996) defined path dependence as a concept in which ―what happened at an earlier 
point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later 
point in time‖ (ibid.: 262–63). Pierson (2000a) conceptualised the different claims of path 
dependence in his description of path dependence as a notion that is used to reinforce a few 
key claims: that specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; that starting from similar 
conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; that large consequences may 
result from relatively ―small‖ or contingent events; and that particular courses of action, once 
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse (ibid.: 251). The main claim here is that 
history matters because ―where we go next depends not only on where we are now, but also 
upon where we have been‖ (Liebowitz and Margolis 1998: 981).  
On the issue of how and why institutions maintain their original path, my analysis will draw 
on conceptualisations of the issue put forward by Krasner (1984), Levi (1997), and Pierson 
(2000a, 2002b, 2004). Krasner (1984) notes: ―once a critical choice has been made it cannot 
be taken back. There may be a wide range of possible resolutions of a particular state-
building crisis. But once a path is taken it canalizes future developments‖ and he adds, ―it is 
not possible in human affairs to start de nuevo with every change in wants, needs, and power 
capabilities‖ (ibid.: 240). Levi (1997) focuses on the cost of reversal, putting an emphasis on 
the existence of the other choice points, and argues, ―once a country or region has started 
down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial 
choice‖ (ibid.: 28). He furthermore presents a metaphor of a tree, rather than a path, and goes 
on to say: ―From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. 
68 
 
Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if 
the chosen branch dies – the branch on which climber begins is the one she tends to follow‖ 
(ibid.). Pierson (2004) similarly argues: ―The paths, once created, are inflexible in the sense 
that further steps on a certain path make shifting from that path to another one much more 
difficult‖ (ibid.: 157). The reason for this is the ―increasing returns process‖ – by which he 
means that the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move 
down that path, since the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible 
options increases over time: ―each step along a particular path produces consequences which 
make that path more attractive for the next round‖ (ibid.: 253). 
Three of the early historical institutionalists, Hall (1986), Rose and Davies (1994), and 
Berman (1998) have questioned why countries in similar circumstances make different policy 
choices. Hall analyses the development of economic policy in France and the United 
Kingdom (UK), and shows the importance of institutions in shaping policies over time. By 
looking at these countries‘ political and policy histories, he argues that the choices being 
made during the 1970s and 1980s reflected very clearly long-established patterns of 
economic policy making in these countries. Rose and Davies conclude that public policies in 
Britain were inherited from the past, and argue that past policy choices tend to determine 
present and future policy choices. Berman uses the concept of path dependence to examine 
responses to the depression in Germany and Sweden by asking how and why different paths 
were taken in these countries. She found that the policies chosen by the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) in Germany and Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden (SAP) could be 
understood only in the context of their choices and actions in the past (1998: 380 and 397). 
Overall, these three works provide useful case-studies of countries‘ different preferences in 
policy choices in similar situations.  
Mahoney (2001) and Hansen (2002) make their analyses within a much more rigorous 
theoretical framework. Mahoney has studied the reasons for diverging regime trajectories in 
Central American countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Theoretically 
speaking, according to Mahoney, there are two components of path dependence: Critical 
Junctures and legacies. Thus, in his work he recognises the nineteenth century liberal reform 
period as a ―Critical Juncture‖ locking the Central American countries onto divergent paths 
which in turn yielded contrasting outcomes. Hansen discusses certain feedback effects in the 
context of path dependence, and develops an account of (certain) categories of colonial 
69 
 
migrants to the UK and France, and the disproportionate number of asylum seekers Germany 
received (2002: 260–61). He notes: ―it is useful to view path dependence as a particular type 
of positive feedback effect. When policy at one point limits choice points at subsequent 
points, it engenders feedback in the form of path dependence‖ and he adds ―large patterns of 
colonial immigration … and migration-related issues were engendered by path-dependence 
and policy feedback‖ (ibid.: 272). 
A distinct use of this concept comes from Ackrill and Kay (2006) who argue that the concept 
of path dependence offers an appealing framework within which the stability and persistence 
of policies can be analysed and explained. This meant they sought to show that change and 
stasis can co-exist. To do this they adopt an approach they name as ―fine-grained analysis‖, 
that is, the observation of a complex policy framework consisting of multiple interrelated, or 
layered, and institutions. They propose distinguishing between the changes that are likely to 
occur at the individual institution level and at the overall policy framework level. Through 
applying this framework to the principles of the EU budget, they analyse both how and why 
the EU member states agreed ‗reforms‘ at the individual budgetary institution level in order 
to maintain the overall policy framework. I would agree with Ackrill and Kay that change 
and stasis co-exist. Since these occur at two different levels (the level of individual 
institutions and that of overall policy), it is important to keep them as separate as possible. I 
argue that one can also find stasis at both of these levels at the same time, which is something 
I will show in detail in Chapter 5.  
As far as critiques of the concept of path dependence are concerned, Hall and Taylor (1996: 
942), and Gorges (2001) claim that the application of the path-dependency mechanism blinds 
the researchers to gradual changes or policy drifts over time. However, I would defend the 
concept of path dependence by arguing that Krasner‘s, Levi‘s and Pierson‘s conceptualisation 
rigorously confirms the availability of other options to the institutions‘ original path. The 
researcher in this field is therefore always aware of the possibility that institutions can drift 
away from their original path if they opt for one of the other options. 
Peters et al. (2005) similarly point out ―path dependency assumes a prominent dichotomy of 
stability and change that masks the possibility of gradual policy evolutions‖ (ibid.: 1277). I 
would not agree with these critiques and find them flawed. I argue that there is absolutely a 




Peters et al. (2005) therefore put forward a way to consolidate the path dependence approach. 
They suggest including some dynamism by paying more attention to the role of both agency 
and political conflicts. By this, they aim to make this approach more adequate to explaining 
institutional stability (ibid.: 1277). They note: ―Political conflict … is not just a feature of 
formative moments but just as often occurs during path-dependent periods, whenever path 
dependency is sustained by a dominant political coalition successfully fending off all 
attempts by minorities to alter the political course. With political pressures for change being 
more common than assumed under this approach, there is more probability of incremental 
change than appears as admissible in the prevailing conceptions of historical institutionalism‖ 
(ibid.: 1278). As said earlier, my argument in this thesis does not support the idea of 
interlinking institutional stability with institutional change. 
I find Peters et al.‘s (2005) way forward to make path dependence an adequate approach not 
very convincing. The authors fail to see that there are choice-points during the stasis when the 
institutions and the members of the institutions do have other options to choose from, and in 
case where they do choose another option, this does definitely mean a change. These choice-
points are not critical junctures; rather they are times when the members of the institutions 
meet to decide on how to proceed. The members of the institutions do discuss the other 
options and decide on whether it is appropriate to maintain the original path. The empirical 
evidence in Chapter 5 will show that the MGK at a number of choice-points had different 
options to choose from. Additionally, at these choice points there were conflicts among its 
members with different preferences. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that conflicts and 
political stability can co-exist, which means conflict does not necessarily lead to change in 
the original path. However, the challenge or the conflict among the members of an institution 
could produce a new short-term dimension that is likely to disappear once the conflict is 
withdrawn. 
Greener (2005) asks two questions: (1) what exactly is the role of ideas in path-dependence? 
(2) what is the relationship between ideas and history, and how can they combine to create 
continuity and resist forces for change in the past? Greener argues that the historical 
institutionalists use ideas in a systematic and coherent way in to understand the role ideas 
play in institutional genesis And he criticises the historical institutionalist for their lack of 
interest in ideas in other parts of institutionalist research, for instance in path dependence. To 
a certain extent I would agree with these criticisms, because scholars who have written on 
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path dependence tend to overlook the role of ideas in their analysis. I above showed that 
Peters (1999) recognised the role of ideas in forming an institution, but when it comes 
questioning how institutions determine action/policy, Peters et al. writing in 2005 do not 
comment on whether ideas play a role in institutional stasis. Chapter 3 will assess how ideas 
do play a very significant role in how institutions emerge by looking at how the MGK 
emerged once the idea (Kemalism) was accepted in the early 1920s, and how the principles of 
Kemalism were imposed on the MGK at Critical Juncture (III). Here the aim is to understand 
how institutions determine political action by analysing how the MGK‘s recommendations 
shaped the government‘s political action in relation to the Kurds, and to question whether the 
MGK‘s recommendations were determined by Kemalism (the idea). Chapter 5 however will 
assess how ideas tend to play an important role in influencing the nature of the 
recommendation only at the initial decision making. However, they do not particularly play a 
significant role in how/why an institution remains on the same path, because there tend to be 
other factors influencing that trajectory. 
The functionalists argue that institutions are purposive and efficient in producing intended 
outcomes. By this, they overlook to the fact that institutions may also produce unintended 
outcomes. Thelen (1999) suggests that unintended consequences are central to historical 
institutionalism and Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that institutions may not always produce 
the intended outcomes (Ibid.: 941–42). Two important works which have applied the concept 
of unintended consequences are Pierson (1996) and Vachudova (2007). Pierson was one of 
the first historical institutionalists who used the concept of ―unintended consequences‖. 
While writing about European integration, Pierson showed that gaps emerge in member 
states‘ control over the evolution of European institutions and public policies and suggested 
that these gaps were difficult to close. He went on to argue that these gaps allowed other 
actors to get involved in policy and decision making which then produced outcomes that were 
not the initial intention. The case of interventions on gender equality was used to prove his 
point of view. The key development here was the inclusion of Article 119 of the Treaty of 
Rome that required member states to ensure and maintain the application of the principle that 
men and women receive equal pay for similar work (Pierson 1996: 156). Contrary to the 
initial aim, the proposal of equal payments played a major role in the development of gender 
policies in the EU and granted a determining role to the European Court. I would agree with 
the argument that this was not the intended outcome, but would not support conclusions, as 
the EU member states had at all times the option of not letting the other actors (or factors) 
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such as the governments‘ electoral considerations interfere with the EU‘s decision-making 
process, which meant that the member states could have chosen to eliminate the influence of 
other actors in this process (path) if they had thought it was necessary. Since this option was 
not chosen, Pierson‘s work should rather have asked: why did the member states let the other 
actors influence the future of EU policies? 
Studying the EU‘s eastward enlargement, Vachudova (2007) argues that there have been two 
unintended consequences of the EU‘s response to the collapse of communism. The first is 
that enlargement has become a very successful democracy-promotion programme. The 
second is that the quantity of new members and the long membership queue have become 
implicated in the disaffection of EU citizens for deepening integration (ibid.: 105–6). 
Although Vachudova‘s work has been interesting and helpful in how one could identify 
unintended consequences, it displays a number of weaknesses. Since Vachudova has taken a 
limited period of history to apply the concept of unintended consequences, her work lacks 
attention to the broader factors that have gradually contributed to the occurrence of these 
unintended consequences. She overlooks the fact that a path toward EU enlargement was 
established in early 1973 and was followed by five subsequent enlargements between 1985 
and 2007. Hence she does not discuss how and why the path of EU enlargement may have 
contributed to the EU‘s role of democracy promotion. When writing about either the intended 
or the unintended consequences of the institutional actions, it is beneficial for researchers not 
to limit their study to a limited section of history. It would be useful to go as far back as 
possible to trace a pattern like a path that may have contributed to both the occurrence and 
the evolution of intended or unintended consequences. 
Pierson and Vachudova have been helpful, in providing examples of how the concept of 
unintended consequences has been applied to empirical case-studies. As said above however 
these works have not paid attention sufficiently to tracing whether there was pattern or a path 
that contributed to the occurrences of unintended consequences. These studies have not been 
conducted in the context of the concept of path dependence. When this framework tested in 
Chapter 5, a significant contribution will be made to the literature on how institutions shape 
policy outcomes through a framework that is based on both concepts, of path dependence and 
unintended consequences. In addition, Pierson and Vachudova have both overlooked the 
origins of the concept of unintended consequences; below will show that Robert K. Merton is 
one of the early scholars who named the concept of unintended consequences. It is necessary 
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to develop a theoretical understanding of the concept of unintended consequences so that it 
can be used to understand how and why the MGK‘s path of state of emergency produced 
unintended consequences for the Turkish political system and the Turkey-EC/EU 
relationship. To do this, I will draw on Robert K. Merton‘s (1936) classic piece titled The 
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. The following will discuss 
Merton‘s methodological suggestions as to how to identify unintended consequences and 
discuss factors that cause the occurrence of the unintended consequences. 
Merton was known as both a functionalist and critic of the functionalists because he was not 
supportive of the functionalist grand narrative associated with Talcott Parsons (1951). Merton 
(1936) argued ―... the consequences of purposive action are limited to those elements in the 
resulting situation which are exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e., those elements which 
would not have occurred had the action not taken place.‖ (ibid.: 895). As Aydinonat (2008) 
notes: 
Thus, unless the action of an individual (or individuals) is, at least partially, causally 
responsible for the ―consequence‖, it is not the consequences of that action. If there is an 
unintended consequence of an action, it is plausible to think of other unseen or neglected 
(disturbing) causal factors which prevented the action from bringing about the intended end. 
However, for us to consider this as an unintended consequence of an action, it is also 
necessary that if the action had not taken place, the unintended consequence would not have 
occurred. That is, the action in question is a necessary condition for the unintended 
consequence, ceteris paribus. (ibid.: 13–14, italics in original).  
In addition, on the question of what type of unintended consequences could occur and whom 
and what these unintended consequences concern, Merton attempts to classify unanticipated 
consequences according to the notion of the ―sum-total‖ consequences of action: ―These sum-
total or concrete consequences may be differentiated into (a) consequences to the actor(s), (b) 
consequences to other persons mediated through (1) the social structure, (2) the culture and 
(3) the civilization‖ (Merton 1936: 895). When I apply Merton‘s framework on the MGK‘s 
path of state of emergency in Chapter 5, I will show that the MGK‘s choice of keeping the 
state of emergency in the South East of Turkey had resulted in deterioration of Turkey‘s 
political system and its relations with the EC/EU as the MGK‘s consistent choice of path 
resulted in poor human rights and weak democracy. By this I will be making a contribution to 
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Merton‘s list of ―sum-total‖ consequences of action: (1) ―consequences of actions to the 
political system of a country (2) ―consequences to its international relations‖. 
There are however two problems with the methodology used in identifying the unintended 
consequences of a given situation and action (Merton 1936: 897). The first problem is how 
one could reasonably justify the attribution of a certain consequence to a certain action. For 
example, to argue that unintended consequence X was caused by A‘s intention to bring about 
Y, one would need to know whether A‘s action caused X or not. To challenge this problem, 
one should ask whether X would have occurred in the absence of A‘s action and this should 
provide a justifiable connection between A‘s action and X. The second is about clarifying the 
actual purposes of a given action. That is, if we want to show that X (unintended 
consequences) was caused by A‘s action, it is essential to know the actual intention of A to 
do Y, or it could be useful to show whatever A‘s intention might be, it is not that of bringing 
about X (Aydinonat 2008: 16–17). 
Merton identified three factors which tend to cause occurrences of unintended consequences, 
namely ―existing state of knowledge‖, ―ignorance‖ and ―imperious immediacy of interests‖ 
(1936: 898–901). Aydinonat (2008) suggested that we might think of different cases to 
conceive of Merton‘s distinctions 
 ―Existing state of knowledge‖: for example, let us assume that A intends to achieve X 
and it believes that by doing Y it could achieve X. This means A thinks that Y causes 
X and acts upon this. A can however be mistaken in supposing that Y causes X 
because it might be the case that Y causes V. If this is the case, V is an unintended 
consequence of A‘s action and this consequence can be accounted for by A‘s lack of 
knowledge of the causal determinants of X 
 ―Ignorance‖: another case might be that A is right about the determinants of X, but 
they might be ignorant of the other factors that may change the course of events that 
will follow his or her action. We can therefore say that A is ignorant of the fact that Y 
only causes X, and if this is the case, when A does Y to achieve X, because of other 
interfering factors some other event, say Z, may happen – Z is an unintended 
consequence of A‘s action and it can be accounted with A‘s ―ignorance‖ about the 
other possible interfering factors 
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  ―Imperious immediacy of interests‖, if A is motivated by his or her ―imperious 
immediacy of interests‖, they might want to achieve X by doing Y without thinking 
about the other further consequences of their actions. In this case when A does Y to 
achieve X, A‘s action Y will bring about X, V, and Z all together. This because V 
and Z were not part of A‘s intentions, they are the unintended consequences of A‘s 
action and can be explained as due to A‘s ―imperious immediacy of interests‖. 
(Aydinonat 2008: 14–15). 
There are two points to be made in relation to the above outline. The first point is that Paul 
Pierson wrote a theoretical paper entitled ―The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional 
Origins and Change‖ in 2000, in which he discussed and explained the concept of unintended 
consequences in institutional processes. Although it is clear Pierson was influenced by 
Merton‘s article of 1936, he omitted any reference to Merton‘s earlier findings and analysis. 
Unlike Pierson, I intend to use Merton‘s framework, and contribute to the literature on the 
concept of unintended consequence. The second point is that when Merton defined and 
explained what unintended consequences were, he did this in the context of purposive 
human/individual actions. In Chapter 5 I will use this framework to analyse if the MGK‘s 
path of state of emergency produced unintended consequences. Once this framework is 
applied to the empirical case study, original contributions will be made to the historical 
institutionalist literature on path dependent institutional action, showing that the concept of 
path dependence on its own is not equipped to explain why an institution chooses to maintain 
its original action while that path clearly does not produce the intended outcomes, but the 
unintended. Thus complementing the concept of path dependence with the concept of 
unintended consequences will increase the utility of the concept of path dependence to 
explain not only the case studies where institutional actions are simply path dependent and 
the intended outcomes are met, but also the situation in which the institutions maintain their 
original path despite hardly achieving their intended outcomes and producing unintended 
consequences. 
The concept of path dependence is helpful to trace both how institutions establish a form of 
action (path). Once a path of an institution is traced with the tools of the concept of path 
dependence, Krasner‘s (1984), Levi‘s (1997) and Pierson‘s (2000a, 2002b, 2004) 
conceptualisations of how and why institutions maintain their original path help to ask the 
following series of questions: 
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 What path did the MGK establish? 
 How and why did the MGK maintain its original path? 
 Has the MGK‘s choice of instituting a path of state emergency canalised the 
development of this path? Or, has the MGK naturally kept to its original path?  
 Or, is it because it would have been costly had the MGK chosen to reverse its original 
path? 
 Or, is it because it generated benefits either to Turkish political system or Turkey‘s 
European policy?  
 Did the MGK have other options to its path of imposing a state of emergency? 
In Chapter 5 I will try to answer the above questions to highlight the interaction between the 
MGK‘s instituting a path of state of emergency and Turkey‘s progress in joining the EC/EU 
in the years between 1983 and 1997. 
Three of the earlier works to use the concept of path dependence include Hall (1986), Rose 
and Davies (1994) and Berman (1998). These three academics looked at why countries in 
similar circumstances make different policy choices. These three works have been useful to 
get an insight into how the concept of path dependence was used in earlier works. They 
remained descriptive and lack a rigorous theoretical framework, which was substituted in 
later work by Mahoney (2001), Hansen (2002) and Ackrill and Kay (2006) with strong 
theoretical frameworks. One thing these mentioned works have in common is that their works 
involve a number of case-study countries and a single area of policy. I, however, have one 
case study country and two areas of policy, that is to say I am considering how the Turkish 
National Security Council‘s path of a state of emergency interacted with Turkey‘s European 
policy between 1983 and 1997. Additionally, the mentioned works that have used the concept 
of path dependence have not applied Krasner (1984), Levi (1997) and Pierson‘s (2000a, 
2002b, 2004) conceptualisations of path dependence in the way I propose to use in this thesis, 
and thus I will be making a contribution to the literature on path dependence, using these 
conceptualisations to understand why the MGK maintained its original path of a state of 
emergency over many years. 
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As shown above, the concept of path dependence does not pay attention to whether the 
institutions‘ original paths always continue to produce their intended consequences over a 
long stretch of time. I thus propose to complement this with the concept of unintended 
consequences. It is important to mention here that Pierson (1997) and Vachudova (2007) 
have the used the concept of unintended consequences in their works. Both of these works 
have been useful to identify not only how the concept of unintended consequences could be 
applied to an empirical case study, but also how its application to an empirical case study 
could be improved with the additional concept of path dependence. Using Merton‘s (1936) 
conceptualisations of what are unintended consequences, how they can be identified and what 
may be the causal factors of unintended consequences, I would ask: 
 Did the MGK‘s state of emergency produce any unintended consequences for either 
the Turkish political system or Turkey‘s European policy? 
 And if it did, why the MGK maintain its path of a state of emergency? 
 What caused the MGK‘s path to produce unintended consequences? 
 Is it the MGK‘s ―existing state of knowledge‖? 
 Or, is it the MGK‘s ―ignorance‖? 
 Or, is it the MGK‘s ―imperious immediacy of interests‖? 
In Chapter 5 I will answer the above questions to find out why the MGK pursued its path of a 
state of emergency while it had clear unintended consequences for the Turkish political 
system and Turkey‘s progress in meeting requirements of the EU membership. 
Krasner (1984) described punctuated equilibrium as a notion that implies that the ―normal‖ 
pattern of institutional equilibrium or stasis is punctuated by sudden changes caused by 
exogenous pressures. Krasner writes, ―once institutions are in place they can assume a life of 
their own extracting societal resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the basic 
nature of civil society itself.‖ (ibid.: 240). Furthermore, he argues, ―punctuated equilibrium is 
an apt description of an analytic stance that sees political institutions enduring over long 
periods once they are established‖ (ibid.: 243). Krasner‘s emphasis on institutions 
maintaining stasis for long stretches of time is appropriate here because, there were changes 
neither in the MGK‘s position nor in the pace of Turkey–EU relations between 1983 and 
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1997. I however do not agree with Krasner that institutional changes tend to be underpinned 
by exogenous pressure. I will show that endogenous pressure also tends to trigger 
institutional changes; by endogenous pressure, I mean the pressure for change that is 
generated by political developments in the areas for which the institution under study is 
responsible (endogenous variables). 
Krasner furthermore notes, ―If institutions adjusted relatively quickly to societal changes, and 
if formal institutions did not explain political behaviour, there was little point in making them 
an object of scholarly investigation. Attention could be focussed on the motivations of 
individuals or groups…. But if institutions – the administrative apparatus, legal order, and 
political beliefs – are seen as basis determinants of both the interests and the power of 
political actors, a different agenda is suggested for political research‖ (ibid.: 243). I would 
agree that if an institution changes quickly in accordance with societal changes, it is less 
worthy of research because such change is relatively easy to understand. It seems more 
important to research sources of abrupt change in a politically powerful institution, 
particularly if this took place immediately after developments in the endogenous variables 
The use of the concept of punctuated equilibrium has however been less popular in 
understanding an empirical case study of institutional change. Many academics mention the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium, but only in passing (Pollack 1996; Bromley 2001: 49; 
Clements 2001; Kelam 2001; Bailes and Frommelt 2004: 100; Smith 2004). It has, however, 
been used to a greater extent in studying policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Cashore and Howlett 2006; Ingram and Fraser 2006; Lynggaard 2006; Repetto 2006; Repetto 
and Allen 2006). 
Kelam‘s perception of punctuated equilibrium is that it is associated with a situation where 
"[s]pecies ...develop quickly, endure with little change for a long time, and then die out 
suddenly" (Kelam 2001: 14). He therefore suggests that the rise, long ascendancy and decline 
of the Hanseatic city-states on the Baltic Coast fits the pattern of punctuated equilibrium 
(ibid.: 14). However, in the rest of the book, there is only a description of the rise and decline 
of the Hanseatic city-states; it is not clear how the concept of punctuated equilibrium has 
been used or whether it has been really helpful to understand the chosen case study. In 
another case, in order to understand the new security challenges of Europe, Clements put 
forward a complex theory framework, saying that this framework integrates many concepts 
(Clements 2001: 58): (i) the concept of fitness, which means that European security must be 
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evaluated in tandem with the security of other actors; (ii) optimal fitness, generally found 
between rigid order and chaos, that illuminates Europe‘s deep assets; and then (iii) the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium. Of this, he says ―the notion of punctuated equilibrium 
also helps explain the movement toward European integration. The concept helps us to 
understand why there have been surges toward European unity followed by long periods of 
stability‖ (ibid.: 59). Again, Lynggaard (2006) has suggested that the current literature on the 
stability and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) does not adequately explain 
the interrelation between the institutions and ideas and the related dynamics of change within 
them. He therefore opts for a New Institutionalist framework. In doing this, he gives an 
insight to the three strands of New Institutionalism: sociological, rational choice and 
historical institutionalism; and he goes on to refer the concept of punctuated equilibrium 
under historical institutionalism‘s perspective on institutional change. However, he does not 
apply the concept of punctuated equilibrium to understand the changes in the CAP, and rather 
suggests that the study of types of institutional changes may be advanced by the discursive 
institutional approach. 
Pollack (1996) and Smith (2004: 230) have loosely used the concept of punctuated 
equilibrium in their works. Pollock argued that the literature on EC governance and European 
integration has a tendency to ignore or downplay the fundamental insights offered by New 
Institutionalism. As far as change in the EC was concerned, Pollock did not agree with the 
rational choice institutionalist approach that institutions are resistant to change. He said that, 
―change is not impossible: environmental and other changes may occasionally lead to the 
necessary convergence of the preferences of all the member states around a given 
institutional reform, or set of reforms‖ (Pollack 1996: 439). He then pointed to the historical 
institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium but did not agree that punctuated 
equilibrium produces radical institutional change, and said ―European integration, in other 
words, is a path-dependent process, in which past institutional choices shape not only day-to-
day policy-making ... For this reason, treaty amendments such as the Single European Act 
and the Maastricht Treaty have generally taken the form of incremental adjustments ... which 
remains essentially unchanged‖ (ibid.: 439-40). While I agree with Pollack that change is not 
impossible, I would not agree that change is always incremental; changes have sometimes 
been relatively sudden at the EU level. In addition, one should note that the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium is often applied to understand abrupt institutional or policy changes 
and there are other theoretical frameworks to analyse incremental institutional changes. 
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Smith (2004) takes a rather different approach from Pollack. In order to explore the factors 
influencing the nature of European foreign policy cooperation Smith employs an eclectic 
framework of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. He argues that 
there is a two-way relationship between institutional developments and foreign policy 
cooperation, that this interaction profoundly influences foreign policy cooperation. On 
change, he notes that ―the trajectory of change varies, depending on the policy area, the 
original agreement to institutionalise cooperation in the policy area and the actors involved in 
that agreement, and later historical and environmental conditions‖ (ibid.: 31). As to the 
sources of the changes, he points to many factors; external crises are just one of them, to be 
understood by the concept of punctuated equilibrium. Smith appears to be considering many 
concepts and factors in order to understand institutional changes and therefore, his work lacks 
focus and detailed analysis of use to the chosen case study. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) were among the early political scientists who applied the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium to policy processes. They noted that those who follow 
public policymaking in the United States (US) have long have suspected that the dynamics 
they observed hardly seemed to match up to the laws embodied in the discipline‘s dominant 
models. Instead they suggested that the concept of punctuated equilibrium could explain both 
the long periods of stability that students of public policy have noted to be characteristic of 
most public policy as well as the occasional bursts of policy innovation that come at the 
beginning of a new policy or in its occasional restructuring. In addition, they provided a 
different interpretation of a number of policy changes by taking the long view of several 
issues – including nuclear energy; urban affairs, smoking and safety – to demonstrate that 
bursts of rapid unpredictable policy change punctuated the patterns of stability more 
frequently associated with government. When these cases were taken individually, they 
showed long periods of policy subsystems stability interspersed with by sharp spasms of 
change. The work of Baumgartner and Jones has been most helpful to this thesis to  drawn on 
their framework and methods of analysis. 
While the authors discussed so far have referred to punctuated equilibrium merely in passing, 
the volume edited by Repetto, entitled Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Dynamics of 
U.S. Environmental Policy has the concept of punctuated equilibrium at its heart. In his 
introduction, Repetto observes: ―When both positive and negative feedbacks are at play in the 
policy arena, it is possible to observe the ‗punctuated equilibria‘ that seems to justify many 
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policy areas‖ (Repetto 2006: 9). By negative feedback he is referring to the forces within 
institutions that tend to resist change, and if such forces dominate policy change will rarely 
occur. By positive feedback, he meant the forces that would ensure that when a policy 
position is established, change is driven even further from the initial position. Some of the 
examples of positive feedback include (i) bandwagon effects which means ―Most politicians 
dislike being on the losing side of what appear to be popular issues and are more likely to 
support a policy, the more evidence there is of political support, creating a positive feedback‖ 
(ibid.: 10); (ii) social contagion or social learning which means ―Many people, including 
politicians, form their opinion on an issue by consulting polls, other indications of popular 
opinion, or expert opinion; so the more people build a particular view, the more convincing 
or compelling it will become to others, ultimate becoming ‗common knowledge‘‖ (Gavious 
and Mizrahi, cited in Repetto 2006: 11); and (iii) media mimicry which means ―Media outlets 
are more likely to ‗cover‘ a story that their competitors are covering. As a result, issues may 
either be largely ignored or afforded a great deal of attention, at least temporarily‖ (ibid.: 11). 
This thesis will add ―improved security environment‖ to Repetto‘s list of examples of 
positive feedback. Baumgartner (2006), who wrote one of theoretical chapters of this book, 
argues in it that the dynamics of environmental policy behave in accordance with the 
punctuated equilibrium model and suggests that generally however stability and incremental 
adjustment are the norm. He observes that abrupt policy innovations and reversals do occur, 
only rarely; and he suggests that this pattern appears across many environmental and resource 
policy issues. He furthermore identifies critical elements that often form part of abrupt policy 
change, including an institutional shift that opens the previously constrained decision-making 
domain to other interests and participants, and a ―reframing‖ of the issue that undermines the 
previous policy justification. In addition, he puts emphasis on the usefulness of the empirical 
case studies that follow in comparing episodes of rapid change and period of stalemate and 
stability which helps in identifying key differences in the conditions that make for stability 
and those that allow punctuated change. I would agree with Baumgartner that it is vital to 
have empirical case studies of abrupt change, and one of the contributions of this thesis will 
make would be applying the concept of punctuated equilibrium to an empirical institutional 
change and to the outcomes of these changes. 
Brock (2006), in the same volume, argues that the reason for the manifestation of punctuated 
equilibrium is not just that things happen to disturb the status quo. He emphasises the 
dynamics created by the interdependence of choices and social or economic pressures that 
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tend to arise whenever the positive feedback mechanisms were present, i.e., bandwagon 
effects, social contagion and media mimicry. He shows that policy discontinuities and abrupt 
transitions can arise, especially when one participant‘s actions or decisions are conditioned 
by her expectations about what others will do, such as the tendency of compact special 
interest groups to prevail against the broader public interest or the tendency of political 
advocates to use propaganda and disinformation campaigning to confuse voters on issues 
(ibid.: 13-14). 
Using Baumgartner and Brock's theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium, the 
following chapters by Ingram and Fraser (2006), Repetto and Allen (2006) and Cashore and 
Howlett (2006) test the applicability of the framework to different forms of environmental 
policies. Ingram and Fraser (2006) show how a punctuated equilibrium framework helps in 
understanding the policy innovations introduced in connection with long-standing California 
water management problems. Here, Ingram and Fraser recognise that the professional 
ideology (professionalization of management) as the path-dependency. They then analyse the 
events leading up to two remarkable innovations: (1) an institutional change that broke the 
previous policy oligopoly and admitted a broader range of stakeholders interests into policy 
and management; and (2) the introduction of a market mechanism, the Environmental Water 
Account, to ensure sufficient water for endangered fish species. When they examine the 
antecedents to the innovations, two key developments are identified that arguably pushed the 
policymaking process to dramatic change. These include a change in the policymaking venue 
and the emergence of a shared perception among these stakeholders that the existing 
approach was not feasible to any further extent. 
Cashore and Howlett (2006) tested the punctuated equilibrium framework by examining 
changes in timber management and harvesting in old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. 
They identify a correlation between the abrupt drop in the timber harvest from national 
forests in the regions in the early 1990s and water policy innovation further south in 
California. According to Cashore and Howlett, for decades, the Forest Service maintained a 
policy subsystem based on the ideology of scientific management. In addition, they observe 
that it was able to use the discretion implicit in its multiple-use management mandate to give 
primacy to cutting the trees at the expense of ecological and economic considerations. They 
suggest that the policy ―punctuation‖ was precipitated by a change in venue and the 
―reframing‖ of the issue from one of commodity supply to endangered species protection. 
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This meant that the environmental groups were able to draw the federal courts into an active 
oversight role in harvesting decisions; the outcome was dramatic reduction in the harvest 
from national forests and a shift toward ―ecosystem management‖ by the Forest Service. 
Repetto and Allen (2006) investigated punctuated equilibrium in the approach to managing 
maritime fisheries. They observe that the fisheries managers opted for an approach that was 
based mainly on input controls by which they mostly ignored more successful experience in 
other countries, such as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), which limited the catch to 
sustainable levels through transferable harvest quotas. Repetto and Allen found that when 
management councils in a few fisheries adopted the latter approach, a coalition of opposed 
interests secured a congressional legislative moratorium on any further development of such 
systems; this moratorium was renewed and sustained for six years, which prevented any 
further policy experimentation or innovation. However, in 2002, without much significant 
change from the conditions prevailing in most fisheries when the moratorium was adopted, 
the moratorium was dropped and two years later, the ITQ approaches were accepted widely. 
While it appears useful in these case studies, however, the concept of punctuated equilibrium 
has been criticised by well known institutionalist scholars such as Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992), Cortell and Peterson (1999) and Peters, Pierre and Kings (2005) for various reasons. 
Thelen and Steinmo argue: ―The problem … is that institutions explain everything until they 
can explain nothing. Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes 
in periods of stability, but when they break down, they become the dependent variable, whose 
shape is determined by the conflicts that such institutional breakdown unleashes. Put 
somewhat differently, at the moment of institutional breakdown, the logic of the argument is 
reversed from ‗Institutions shape politics‘ to ‗Politics shape institutions‘‖ (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992: 15). As I have argued above, endogenous pressure deserves academic 
attention in understanding why radical institutional changes occur; by endogenous pressure, I 
mean pressure which emerges from developments in endogenous (internal, domestic) 
variables. In this case, these were the political incidents that were related to the MGK‘s areas 
of responsibility, see Chapter 6 for details. I argue that an institution that is pressured for 
change by endogenous pressure not only continues to be an independent variable, but still 
matters. The outcomes of the changes and the changed institution itself continue to play an 
important role in policy making. 
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As opposed to Krasner‘s conceptualisations of change, Thelen and Steinmo have proposed 
―[a] more dynamic model‖ to understand institutional change (ibid.: 15). Thelen and Steinmo 
present three models of institutional change and dynamism, all of which emphasise 
exogenous causation. First, ―broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can 
produce a situation in which previously latent institutions suddenly become salient‖; second, 
similar drivers of change ―produce a situation in which old institutions are put in the service 
of different ends‖, and third, where ―exogenous changes produce a shift in the goals or 
strategies being pursued within existing institutions‖ (ibid.: 16-17). The dynamic model is 
interesting, but not convincing. The manoeuvring among either the political actors or within 
the members of a particular institution does not always take place strategically and it is not at 
all times underpinned by the calculated interests of the political actors. It can rather take place 
suddenly by the pressure emerged from the aftermath of the political incidents that unsettled 
the related domestic political dynamics. 
Cortell and Peterson (1999) similarly contend that the idea of punctuated equilibrium offers 
an incomplete understanding of change. They note: ―by focusing attention on periods of 
radical change precipitated by crisis, a model of punctuated equilibrium downplays the roles 
individuals play in affecting domestic structural change … state officials decide when and 
how to seek change in existing institutional configurations‖ (ibid.: 179). It is true that the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium does not say much about the role of individuals in 
affecting institutional change. However, the individuals‘ role in radical institutional changes 
is limited to taking the official decisions that make the changes. It is therefore more helpful to 
ask what pressure or endogenous situation motivated the political actors in taking the 
decisions they did. 
Another criticism of the concept of punctuated equilibrium has come from Peters, Pierre and 
Kings who argue that there appears to be little or no capacity to predict the occurrence of 
punctuations in a given stable path (Peters et al. 2005: 1289). Peters argues that ―when a 
major institutional (evolutionary) change does occur … it can be argued that there was a 
sufficient force available to produce a movement away from the equilibrium and inertia 
affecting an institution. How do we know? The change surely did occur, so there must have 
been sufficient political or environmental ‗pressure‘ to generate a change‖ (Peters 1999: 68-
69). I do not agree with Peters and would suggest that one could have predicted that changes 
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would occur both in the MGK‘s position in Turkish political system and in Turkey-EU 
relations after many years of stasis. 
As I have shown above, the concept of punctuated equilibrium has often been used to understand 
changes in the policy realm. Although it has not been overlooked in the institutional change 
literature, there has not been a detailed study of institutional changes from within the punctuated 
equilibrium framework. I will use the concept of punctuated equilibrium to both investigate the 
sources of the changes in the MGK and analyse its outcomes for Turkey–EU relations. By doing 
this, it will make a contribution to the literature on institutional change. 
Although I would disagree with Krasner‘s emphasis on exogenous pressure, his description of 
the concept of punctuated equilibrium is helpful to formulate a series of questions: 
 Have the changes in the MGK occurred after long years of stability? 
 If so, what punctuated the long years of equilibrium? 
 Is it exogenous or endogenous pressure? 
 What formed the endogenous pressure? 
 What effect do the changes in the MGK have for both policy processes (the pace of 
Turkey–EU relations) and policy outcomes (the EU‘s decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey)? 
As far as the criticisms of the concept of punctuated equilibrium discussed above are 
concerned, I argue that they are abstract and lacking empirical evidence. Chapter 6 will 
benefit from the above outlined questions to explore the sources of changes in the MGK, 
in the endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. In particular my 
emphasis on endogenous rather than exogenous pressure may be used to defend the concept 
of punctuated equilibrium against Thelen and Steinmo (1992) who have suggested that when 
institutions are changed by exogenous pressure, they become dependent variables. Chapter 6 
will show that when and if institutional changes are caused by endogenous pressure, the 





2.3. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I introduced rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms' 
positions on the four distinct parts of institutional processes. I then have discussed how and 
why historical institutionalism is better equipped than rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism in explaining the origins of the both the MGK and Turkey‘s aspirations to be 
part of Europe (1923-1957) and the three significant phases of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations 
(1957-2004). Having done this I went into details of explaining the historical institutionalist 
framework of institutional processes, as well as debating the use of historical institutionalist 
concepts by other scholars and addressing some of the criticisms put against the use of 
concepts of critical junctures, path dependence and punctuated equilibrium.  
By doing so, I have found that rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalists not 
only differ in what they define institutions as, but also differ in how they propose to study 
distinct part of the institutional processes. I furthermore have found that the historical 
approach on institutional genesis and its concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, 
unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium all form a better framework than the 
rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives in explaining both the origins of 
the MGK and Turkey's interest in Europe (1923-1957) and the role MGK has played in 
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations (1957-2004). Additionally, I have found that the historical 
institutionalist approach and its concepts have not widely been used by current scholars and it 
has rather been criticised by many. Although I have defended the use of historical 
institutionalism in the study of institutions‘ political decision and policy making, I have also 
identified some of the limitations with historical institutionalist concepts and made some 
suggestions for improving the use of, for example, the concept of path dependence by 
supplementing it with the concept of unintended consequences. The next chapter will test 
hypothesis (i) through studying the early years of both the Turkish Republic and the 






CHAPTER 3: THE GENESIS OF BOTH THE MGK AND TURKEY’S INTEREST IN 
EUROPE, 1923-1957 
Introduction 
It is generally agreed in the academic literature that the Turkish National Security Council 
(MGK – its predecessor was called the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defence 
Assembly, YMMUK) was established in 1961. The earlier origins of the MGK, however, 
have been overlooked and unquestioned. While the origins of Turkey‘s interest in forming 
good relations with Europe and becoming more like the Western European countries have 
been researched widely, the connections between the origin of the MGK and the origin of 
Turkey‘s interest in Europe have not been studied together in one piece of work. This chapter 
will investigate how and why the MGK was established alongside how and why Turkey‘s 
desire for strong relations with Europe originated. What material does currently exist on these 
issues covering the years between 1923 and 1957 lacks, I would argue, a rigorous theoretical 
engagement with how the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe originated. This chapter 
proposes to test whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best 
explain the origins of both the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in forming relation with Europe. 
Thus there are two questions central to this chapter. 
 How can the genesis of the MGK and Turkey‘s aspiration to be part of Europe be 
understood? 
 What school of new institutionalism can best explain the origins of both the MGK and 
Turkey‘s interest in Europe? 
I will answer the above questions first by discussing the benefits and the limitations of the 
existing academic material. Then I will move on to trace a theoretical debate as to which 
school of New Institutionalism can best explain the origins of Turkey‘s interest in Europe. 
Once this is done I will show how beneficial historical institutionalism is for unveiling in 
what social and political context the Turkish political leaders aimed to adopt a Westernisation 
and modernisation programme and what domestic political developments contributed to the 
genesis of the MGK. This will be followed by discussing the benefits and limitations of 
sociological and rational choice institutionalism using the evidence gathered in the former 
sections, and drawing conclusions as to the best way to understand this material. 
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3.1. Brief Literature Review and Theoretical Debate 
Guvenc and Barlas‘s (2009) article ―Turkey and the idea of a European Union during the 
Inter-war Years, 1923–1939‖ has been useful for this chapter to gain insight into the first pro-
European political elites and their ideas around integrationist European projects, as well as 
being helpful to find out about how the newly established Turkish Republic treated these 
integrationist European projects. However, the paper pays little attention to domestic political 
developments in the early years of the Turkish Republic since it predominantly focuses on 
developments in Europe in the inter-war years. Aydinli (2004), in ―The Turkish Pendulum 
between Globalization and Security: From the Later Ottoman Era to the 1930s‖ fills this gaps 
by giving detailed analysis of the two attempts to introduce multi-party politics during the 
Republican era. And he shows how the previously identified dichotomy between 
liberalisation and security developed into a ―national security syndrome‖, through which the 
democratic liberalization process was systematically administrated, managed and, ultimately, 
contained (ibid.: 102). I found Aydinli‘s paper very useful for developing an understanding of 
both Turkish politics in the 1920s and 1930s and Ataturk‘s perceived contradictory desires 
for democracy and state security. Aydinli, however, like Parker and Smith (1940), Howard 
(1966), Kazancigil and Ozbudun (1981), Weiker (1981), Landua (1984), Zurcher (1993), 
Mango (1999), Kili (2003) and Kucera (2010), who have all written about Turkish politics 
covering the years the MGK was established, fails not only to mention the MGK, but also 
fails to discuss how and why the MGK originated at this point. Having said that, these works 
have been very useful for gaining an insight into the early years of the Turkish Republic more 
generally, to help understand the secular and democratic political structure Ataturk had 
introduced and to learn how Turkish people reacted to the newly established Turkish 
Republic.  It is however important to mention her a recent work Gencer Ozcan (2007) in 
‗National Security Council‘ mentioned that the MGK was founded on 24 April 1933, saying 
that the Higher Defence Council (Yuksek Mudafaa Meclisi, YMM), was a predecessor of the 
current National Security Council (Milli Guvenli Kurulu, MGK) (ibid.:41). Ozcan (2007) 
does not however does not comment how and why the MGK was established. This chapter 
argues that it is important also to understand how and why the MGK was established, and to 
have a complete overview of the political and social developments that may have contributed 
to the genesis of the MGK. 
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Out of many views that have been put forward by the rational choice institutionalists on how 
institutions originate, I will be testing three commonly used approaches to explain how and 
why the MGK was established and how and why Turkey developed an interest in forming 
relations with Europe (see Chapter 2 for more details). These three viewpoints include: 
 ―institutions are chosen; and … they do not simply happen‖ (McCubbins and Sullivan 
1987: 313 and Tsebelis 1990) 
 ―self-interested actors will make decisions and create institutions that will reduce their 
political or economic costs relative to the benefits gained‖ (Campbell 1997: 15) 
 the reason societies or groups cannot do without institutions is because ―parties often 
need institutions to help capture gains from cooperation. In the absence of institutions, 
individuals often face a social dilemma, that is, a situation where their behaviour 
makes all worse off‖ (Weingast 2002: 670). 
Suggesting that institutions are chosen and they do not simply happen can be useful to a 
certain extent. One can then suggest that the MGK was chosen, in the sense that it was 
planned to set up the MGK, and it thus did not simply happen. This approach can be useful to 
the extent that you can question who decided to establish the MGK and why. There is 
however one problem with it and that is, if institutions do not simply happen, how and in 
what ways do they appear? In the last section of this chapter I will therefore test the case that 
it was planned to set up the MGK. 
To take the second point, Campbell‘s suggestion of how institutions originate, one could 
argue that the MGK was created by self-interested actors who aimed to reduce their political 
and economic costs whilst increasing their gains from the MGK. However there is no clarity 
about who these self-interested actors are and how one can find out about these actors. As far 
as the reasons behind this self-interested behaviour are concerned, this approach is useful to 
question if the formation of the MGK increased the political and economic benefits of those 
who formed the MGK, and whether the formation of the MGK was their conscious choice to 
reduce political and economic costs. Thus in the very last section of this chapter I will 
examine the idea that the MGK was created by the self-interested actors who aimed to reduce 
their political and economic costs whilst increasing their gains from the MGK. 
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Again, it is very interesting to argue that societies need institutions not only to help capture 
gains from cooperation, but also to diminish the risk of social dilemmas which individuals 
may face. This approach is useful to consider whether the MGK was established to increase 
cooperation within Turkish society and diminish social dilemmas. Testing this approach can 
help to reveal much about the characteristics of Turkish society and discuss whether there 
were any social dilemmas. It is however difficult to say how one would start to research this 
perspective since the researchers are not signposted about how one can begin a research on 
institutional genesis. In the last section of this chapter I will nevertheless examine the case the 
MGK was established to increase cooperation and diminish social dilemmas. 
If however one applies the same approach to exploring the origins of Turkey‘s interest in 
Europe, one would argue that Turkey‘s interest in being both like and part of Europe was 
planned. This can be very useful to discuss who planned for Turkey to both adopt a Western 
European political structure and be part of Western Europe, and how and why they planned 
it. This approach however does not comment on how one would go about conducting such 
research. If one rather takes Campbell‘s suggestion, one may argue that self-interested actors 
originated this interest in Europe in order to increase their gains from Turkey‘s relations with 
Europe. And when it is tested on the evidence which will be gathered in this chapter, it will 
be interesting to discuss if Ataturk and his successors were self-interested and if they wanted 
to increase their political and economic gains from Turkey‘s relations with Europe. Applying 
Weingast‘s point of view on Turkey‘s interest in forming relations with Europe, one could 
argue that Turkey‘s interest originated in order to develop cooperation between Turkey and 
Europe and hence diminish the risk of social dilemma. This is a very interesting point of 
view, and testing it in the last section of this chapter can generate an interesting debate as to 
whether cooperation between Turkey and Europe was necessary so as to diminish the risk of 
social dilemma. 
The above discussion attempts to apply rational choice institutionalism show that this 
approach is lacking in providing a framework for research as to how both an institution is 
established and a country‘s interest in forming relations with the another country/continent 
originated, but it has some potential in pointing to some reasons which can explain both why 
an institution may be established and why a country might develop an interest in forming 
relations with another one. As I said earlier, I will test them in the last section of this chapter. 
First, however, I want to discuss how well sociological institutionalism is equipped to 
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provide a framework to unpack how and why both the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe 
originated. 
Unlike rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism does not offer a selection 
of different viewpoints as to how and why institutions originate. The general agreement is 
that institutions are given and socially constructed. If one applies this approach to the case 
study in hand then one would argue that the MGK was given and socially constructed. From 
this point of view, the role of social practice is given greater attention in the study of 
institutional genesis. Relying on this approach, one can develop a research into questioning 
what social practices constructed the MGK and how. This may then generate a detailed study 
of the MGK‘s origins. Applying the same approach to how and why Turkey developed an 
interest in Europe, one can suggest that Turkey‘s interest in Europe was socially constructed. 
It is however unclear how one would go and find out about what social practices or social 
attitudes have generated the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe. In the last section of the 
chapter, I will examine the case for arguing that both the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in 
Europe was socially constructed. 
Another viewpoint is that when actors develop new institutions they tend to borrow from the 
existing world of institutional templates (Solton 1998: 30). This approach suggests that when 
actors decide to establish an institution, they tend to look at other institutions to learn about 
how to form a new one. Using this approach would suggest that the MGK was established by 
actors who had adopted another institution‘s templates. This could lead into an interesting 
debate as to whether, when the MGK was established, anyone thought about the existing 
world of institutional templates. Furthermore, applying the same approach to the question of 
how and why Turkey developed an interest in forming relations with Europe, one would 
argue that Turkey learned from other countries‘ interest in being like Europeans and being 
part of Western Europe. 
While rational choice institutionalism has potential for explaining why an institution is 
established, sociological institutionalism is not concerned with the question of why an 
institution is formed. Sociological institutionalism however has some potential in explaining 
how institutions are established since it points to some possible ways in which both how an 
institution originate. However both of these schools of New Institutionalism lack signposts 
for the researcher to a starting point that can be utilised to begin a research on institutional 
genesis. Historical institutionalism however fills this gap by Thelen‘s (2004) and Pierson‘s 
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(2000a) suggestion that ―we have to go back and look‖ (Thelen 2004: 25; Pierson 2000a: 264, 
italics in original). This gives instructions to the researcher as to how they can start their 
research on institutional genesis. 
Historical institutionalism also points to what a researcher needs to look for when they go 
back and look. Thelen‘s emphasis on the features of the broader political and social context in 
the study of how institutions originate and suggestion that institutional arrangements cannot 
be understood in isolation from the political and the social settings in which they are 
embedded is also very useful. This is very helpful to unveil the political and social settings in 
which the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in forming relations with Europe was established. This 
can help to develop a detailed analysis of political and social development in Turkish politics 
of the years in which the MGK formed. And Peter‘s (1999) point that ―when an idea becomes 
accepted and is embodied into a structural form then the institution has been created‖ (ibid.: 
67) is very instructive for the researcher to trace if there was a prominent idea that was 
structured in to the MGK. Therefore the researcher who applies the historical institutionalist 
framework of institutional genesis knows that when they ―go back and look‖, they need to 
pay attention to the political and social settings in which the institutions is established, and 
question if there is a prominent idea which was embodied into the structural form of an 
institution. One last point I want to make in relation to the historical institutionalist 
framework is that like sociological institutionalism, it is not concerned with why institutions 
originate; it rather provides the researcher with instructions to trace how an institution 
originates. This means that the intention behind the genesis of an institution is not as 
significant for historical and sociological institutionalism, as for rational choice 
institutionalism. 
Since both sociological and rational choice institutionalisms are lacking in not signposting 
how to begin a research into institutional genesis, I will utilise historical institutionalism‘s 
position on how one may begin to find out about how and why an institution originate. The 
discussion above has shown that while rational choice institutionalism has some potential in 
pointing to some reasons as to why institutions originate, sociological institutionalism has 
some potential in pointing to some ideas as to how institutions originate. This does not 
however mean that I will not utilise these points of view hereafter. In the very last section of 
this chapter, when all the details of the political and social settings in which the MGK 
established are considered, I will then move on to discuss to what extent sociological and 
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rational choice institutionalisms can help to explain how and why the MGK was established, 
respectively. 
3.2. Tracing the Origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe with the historical 
institutionalist approach 
Having above outlined the historical institutionalist framework of institutional genesis, I will 
below apply this framework to understand how and why the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in 
Europe originated. Since the MGK was established in 1933, relying on the instructions 
provided by the historical institutionalist framework, I will ―go back and look‖ at the era in 
which the MGK was established. I will begin by giving a swift summary of the rise and the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of Turkish Republic. This will be done to 
have a better understanding of Ataturk‘s Westernisation and modernisation period during 
which he introduced a series of reforms in the hope of changing the characteristics of the 
former Ottoman Turkey and its people. I will then study the early years of the Turkish 
Republic when, as said earlier, Ataturk‘s political, social and cultural reforms aimed to create 
a new Western way of living in the newly established Turkish Republic. Utilising Thelen‘s 
suggestion I will then pay attention to both the political and the social settings of the newly 
established Turkish Republic to both find out about what political and social developments in 
the years between 1923 and 1933 contributed to the genesis of the MGK and discuss whether 
there was a prominent idea behind the embodiment of the MGK. Using the same framework I 
will consider the early European integrationist initiatives and discuss Turkey‘s position in 
them. This will be followed by briefly discussing Ataturk‘s position on Turkey‘s relations 
with the West. Once the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe are unveiled, I 
will move on to discuss Turkey‘s adoption of a multi-party system and its position in the 
developing federal and intergovernmental European organisations in the years between 1933 
and 1957. This will be useful not only to gain insight into how and why the Turkish political 
system shifted from a single party regime to a liberal democratic multi-party system, but also 
how and why Turkey‘s interest in European organisation grew. And lastly I will discuss the 
limitations and benefits of sociological and rational choice institutionalism in explaining how 
and why the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe originated, respectively, using the 
evidence gathered before. 
The Ottoman Empire was founded at the end of the fourteenth Century and reached its peak 
in the fifteenth century, stretching around the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, at one 
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point reaching across northern Africa and up through Eastern Europe to Austria. Turkey was 
a central component of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul served as the capital and leading 
city of the Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire, the ruling power was assigned to the Sultan 
who was expected to respect the Caliphate. The Caliphate was religious in character and its 
authority extended beyond the boundaries of the Empire itself (Parker and Smith 1940: 19) 
and under universal Islam its jurisdiction covered almost every aspect of life (Tamkoc 1976: 
99–100). Heper (1992) described the role of state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity as ―isolated 
from and autonomous vis-à-vis civil society … The Ottoman-Turkish polity thus constituted 
a polar case among the polities with a strong state.‖ (187).The Empire however began to lose 
the momentum of expansion from the second half of the sixteenth century until the end of the 
nineteenth century and this era is known as the ‗Period of Decline‘ (Heper 2000: 63). When 
the territorial expansion of the Empire came to an end, then the Empire began to lose territory 
steadily and regions of the Empire began pulling away and forming independent countries, 
such as Greece. The Ottoman Empire emerged economically exhausted from the wars with 
Egypt and the Russian Empire. The Ottoman Empire was introduced into Europe with the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856, following the Crimean War; with this treaty the European powers 
acknowledged both that the Ottoman Empire was a member of the Concert of Europe and the 
Empire‘s independence and territorial integrity (Karaosmanoglu 2000: 206). Furthermore 
when the Ottoman Empire took sides with Germany in WWI, the victorious Allies – Britain 
and France – occupied most of the land of the Empire (Ahmad 2003: 78). The partition of the 
Empire however was confirmed by the signature of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920; 
Ozoglu (2011) regarded the Treaty of Sevres as ―practically the death sentence for the 
Ottoman Empire‖ (ibid.: 47), but the Sultan never ratified the Treaty. By this time a Turkish 
Nationalist movement emerged, rebelling against the partition of the Empire. Thus a war of 
National Liberation took place between 1919 and 1923. This meant that the civilian and the 
military bureaucrats took the control of the Ottoman states apparatus and started its 
transformation into a nation-state (Aktar et. All. 2010: xiv). And when the Treaty of Sevres 
was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, the Turkish Republic proclaimed 





3.2.1. The Origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe in the context of 
illiberal political and social settings, 1923–1933 
 (i) Ataturk’s top-to-down reforms 
Phillips (2004: 84) says ―In 1923, Mustafa Kemal collected the remnants of the shattered 
Ottoman Empire to create the Republic of Turkey, hoping to build a truly modern state on a 
par with its European neighbours‖ and Ataturk introduced a political structure consisting of a 
parliament, a president, a single political party, and universal franchise. Kili (2003) describes 
it thus: 
The Turkish Republic was founded upon the former territory of the Ottoman Empire 
in Anatolia and Thrace. Its form and system of government and policies were future 
oriented from its very inception. But the founders of this state are one of the oldest 
nations in the history of mankind. The structure and fabric of this new state structure, 
its political, cultural and economic features and aspects, were formed within the 
framework of the system of thought of its founder, Ataturk. (2003: 83) 
Landua (1984) says that Ataturk tended to believe that progress could never be achieved 
within the multi-racial Ottoman state and for modernisation to succeed it was necessary not to 
combine the old with the new. He notes ―It would have to assume a radical character, to 
affect all aspects of Turkish society, and to sweep away most, if not all, of its traditional 
beliefs and institutions‖ (ibid.: 51). Tank (2007) said ―the Kemalists ardently adopted 
Western civilisation and culture as the foundations of modern Turkish identity‖ (ibid.:133) 
and it was believed that nation-state building and civilisation is intrinsically linked to and 
operates with the distinctive horizon of global modernity that is believed to be only achieved 
through the introduction and dissemination of Western reasons (Keyman 2010: 16). 
Therefore political modernity for the Kemalist could have been only achieved through a top-
down and state-led transformation of the traditional society into a modern nation (Keyman 
2010:20). Therefore in November 1922, Ataturk abolished the Sultanate and assigned 
sovereignty in the new regime to the citizens of the Turkish Republic (Aksin 2007: 191–97). 
The 1924 Constitution granted legislative and executive powers to the National Assembly 
(Parker and Smith 1940: 60). Although participation in politics or political decision making 
was restricted in the early days of the new Turkish Republic, legal and constitutional 
amendments were later made which paved the way for a more participatory democracy. For 
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this purpose, the requirement of electors, candidates, and voters to be tax payers was 
eliminated from the Electoral Law in April 1922. Ataturk then extended the right to vote to 
all male citizens over eighteen. 
As far as women‘ position was concerned in Ataturk‘s Republic, the extract below from 
Ataturk‘s speech in 1923 gives the indication that women were to be treated as equal with 
men: 
Win for us the battle of education and you will do yet more for your country than we 
have been able to do. It is to you that I appeal. … If henceforward the women do not 
share in the social life of the nation, we shall never attain to our full development. We 
shall remain irremediably backward, incapable of treating on equal terms with the 
civilizations of the West. (Quoted in Kinross 1964: 390) 
Women then were given the right to vote in municipal elections in 1930 and four years later 
they were allowed to vote at the national elections (Tamkoc 1976: 100–1; Aksin 2007: 195). 
And the Turkish Civil code was passed in October 1926 through which women gained 
equality with men in inheritance and divorce matters. And then Ataturk decreed that every 
Turk should have a Western-style surname in June 1934. 
Additionally, Ataturk defined nation: ―as a community that is based on common political 
existence, language, territory, descent, historical affiliation, and morality‖ and religion was 
not included in the common bond that constitutes a nation (quoted in Kadioglu 2011, 41).  
Thus the religious schools and the medreses mektebs were abolished; and all schools were put 
under the Ministry of Public Instruction. Soon after, all religious courts were closed, leaving 
to the secular courts the application of religious law in appropriate cases‖ (Davison 1998: 
149). Thus the Islamic education system was replaced with a secular education that was open 
to everyone, female as well as male. European languages were taught in the newly 
secularised Turkish universities (Starr 1992: 14; Tank 2007: 134). Additionally, so as to 
eliminate the wearing of religious and traditional clothing, Ataturk introduced the Hat Law in 
November 1925: this abolished the use of religious headgear by citizens (except for religious 
officials who were authorized, approved and appointed by the government) and the use of 
Western style hats was encouraged. Furthermore, in July 1928 Ataturk adopted a Latin 
alphabet for Turkish language, replacing the Arabic alphabet; Ahmad (2003) said ―`At a 
stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past. Overnight, virtually the entire 
97 
 
nation was made illiterate' (ibid. : 34). Another dress control was introduced in 1934 to ban 
religion-based clothing such as the veil, rather promoting Western style dressing. 
Some of the other reforms included: 
 The Caliphate‘s ―Sacred Religion Law‖ was abolished in March 1924 
 Sharia courts were abolished in April 1924 
 All activities of the Dervish order and visits to tombs of sultans and sheiks were 
prohibited by law in November 1925 
 Reference to Islam as the ―religion of the state‖ was removed from the Constitution in 
April 1928 
 The Islamic Sabbath was changed to Sunday in 1935 
With these reforms Ataturk and his colleagues aimed to create a new Turkish identity. Kadi-
oglu (1996) argues that: 
Turks were a ―made‖ nation by virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Otto-
mans along the similar Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in creating 
the Frenchman. The fervent desire to break with the past was clearly manifested in the 
ensuing reforms.(ibid.: 188) 
In the subsequent sections I will show that when the above reforms were not successfully 
adopted, the problem was remedied with further reforms from above  in order to create a new 
Turk (Kadioglu 2011: 188). 
I have considered above the very early years of the Turkish Republic and found that Ataturk 
introduced a number of reforms concerning various aspects of the former Ottoman Turkish 
Republic. Ataturk changed how people conducted themselves in politics, as well as in public 
life; reformed how they dressed, what they could wear and what they could not wear; granted 
a new status to the women of his Turkish Republic, equalised them with the men; and dimin-
ished people‘s practice of Islam in everyday life. In this sense I agree with Keyman (2010) 
who said ―[T]he Kemalist commitment to political modernity … aimed to achieve top-down 
and state-based transformations of a traditional society into a modern nation by introducing 
and disseminating Western reason and rationality‖ (ibid.: 20). Whilst doing all of these, how-
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ever, he never consulted the people of the Turkish Republic; he entirely overlooked people‘s 
views and preferences. For him there was his Westernisation and modernisation reforms to 
implement, which he believed to be in the interest of his people – without realising he was 
actually imposing his most desired way of living, political system and practice of religion on 
others by force. 
 (ii) Origins of Turkey’s position in the integrationist European projects  
Whilst the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923, pro-European integration groups were 
emerging in post-war Europe. In 1923, Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi
1
 put 
forward the idea of a European Union in his book Paneuropa (or Pan-Europe). Coudenhove-
Kalergi argued that the League of Nations (LON) was a failure for a number of reasons: (1) 
two world powers including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United 
States of America (USA) rejected the League; (2) the League was inorganic; instead of 
grouping the peoples and states of the world organically according to their economic, cultural 
and geographical affinities, it joined them together mechanically, without regard to 
geography, history, culture, or economics; (3) it had an abstract structure, rendering it 
impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of mankind, which starting from 
the family (quoted in Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 426).  Coudenhove-Kalergi rather put forward 
a United Europe which would be defined politically rather than geographically or culturally; 
for him, Europe was a political concept which embraced all the non-Soviet states of 
continental Europe. European Turkey however belonged to Asia, politically. He believed that 
nationality problems in Europe could be diminished by means of both economic and political 
integration based on democratic principles. 
In contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi‘s idea of pan-Europe, Aristide Briand2, at his address to 
the League of Nations in September 1929, called for the creation of a sort of federal link 
between the European nations, having pointed out the important role the League of Nations 
have played in reaching a peaceful settlement. Briand suggested that his European federation 
would act especially in the economic domain as it was the most pressing need and he 
emphasised geographic criteria in the making of the European federation, saying ―I think that 
a sort of federal link has to exist between people geographically grouped like the European 
                                                             
1
 Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi is Austrian politician, geo-politician and philosopher; is recognised 
as the founder of the first popular movement for a United Europe. 
2
 French statesmen who served eleven terms as Prime Minister of France during the Third Republic; is one of 
the first politicians who promoted the idea of a ―Regime of Federal European Union‖.   
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people‖ (quoted in Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 428). Briand believed that the collaboration of 
three great powers – France, Britain and Germany – was fundamental for the formation of a 
new order in Europe; he however was not clear about the nature of his own European Union. 
As far as Turkey‘s position in these two projects was concerned, Coundenhove-Kalergi and 
Briand had different views. Coundenhove-Kalergi initially wanted to leave Turkey out of his 
Pan-Europe, but then he was convinced that Turkey was an integral part of Pan-Europe. It 
was the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos who persuaded Coundenhove-Kalergi 
that Turkey under the rule of Kemal Ataturk had become an integral part of Western 
civilization and that whatever the future Pan-Europe, Turkey should be made a part of it 
(Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 438–439). Despite this change in Coundenhove-Kalergi‘s position 
on Turkey and its European identity, Turkish leaders preferred to avoid being seen as 
publicly enthusiastic about Pan-Europe. Government representatives nevertheless participated 
in the Pan-Europe conferences; records show that Turkish Ambassador Cemal Husnu Taray 
and Secretary Nedim Veysel Ilkin attended the Basel meeting in November 1932 as official 
delegates of the Republic of Turkey. Coundenhove-Kalergi, thereafter, defined this 
participation as a manifestation of Turkey‘s accession to Europe. While Coudenhove-
Kalergi‘s Pan-Europe called for participating states to make concessions from their 
sovereignty to a somewhat supranational entity, the newly established Republic was 
preoccupied with gaining full sovereignty. Therefore, Ankara‘s immediate objectives were 
not compatible with some of the founding principles of Pan-Europe. 
Like Coundenhove-Kalergi, Briand did not initially include Turkey among the 26 European 
countries which were invited to discuss his ‗Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime 
of European Federal Union‘. There were two reasons for this:(1) Turkey was not a member of 
the League of Nations; and (2) Turkey was not part of the geographical Europe as defined by 
Briand (Barlas and Guvenc 2009: 431). This made Turkish political leaders draw links 
between Brian‘s attitudes towards Turkey and France‘s hostility towards Turkey. According 
to the Turks, nevertheless, Turkey was geographically in Europe, since it was bounded by 
two European seas: the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. 
When I went back and looked I found that the first founders of the United Europe Movement 
held mixed feeling towards Turkey‘s position in Europe. Similarly, Turkey on the one hand 
wanted to be part of any pro-integrationist European project while on the other hand it was 
reluctant to give up on its newly earned national sovereignty. Ataturk said ―the West has 
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always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always consistently moved 
towards the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative‖ (quoted in 
Erdogdu 2002: 40). There are two points I want to make in relation to this quote. The first is 
that it shows that Ataturk is aware of Europe‘s perception of Turkey with its Ottoman 
background. The second is that it shows how Ataturk associates civilisation with the West. 
Probably this is why the reforms he introduced have all been influenced by Western values 
and principles since there was not any other alternative. Thus only five years later after the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Aras defined his 
country‘s new orientation and identity as being a Western power and paid a visit to European 
countries. Following on this Ataturk chose to cut his country‘s traditional ties with the Arab 
world, and Republican Turkey distanced itself from Middle Eastern politics. 
 (iii) Origins of illiberal democracy 
Furthermore, although Ataturk wanted to adopt a multi-party system, he believed a single 
party regime would not only be in the interest of the nation but would also assist a smooth 
transition to a democratic and modern way of living. Kili (2003) argues that Ataturk was 
convinced that only a unified party organisation could have imposed his programme of 
Westernising reforms and any organized opposition might demand the restoration of the 
caliphate and religious traditions (ibid.: 152). Heper (2000) says that the Republican founders 
hoped that Turkey would have a rational democracy, where long-term interests of the 
community would not be sacrificed to narrow political interests and the objective was to 
enable Turkey to catch up with the West (ibid.: 72). Ataturk however was not the only 
political leader in Europe at the time who opted for a single party regime; there were two 
other examples. The first is Benito Mussolini who ruled Italy between 1922 and 1943 under 
his National Fascist Party (PNF), having crushed all the political opposition, and the second 
is Adolf Hitler who ruled Germany between 1933 and 1943 under the National Socialist 
German Workers‘ Party (NSDAP). However Mussolini being fascist and Hitler being 
totalitarian, the only similarity they had with Ataturk was their choice of single party regime. 
Ataturk had however used illiberal and undemocratic ways to establish a Western Secular 
Liberal Democratic Republic; I will explore this further below. 
When Ataturk dissolved the Grand National Assembly on 15 April 1923, nationwide 
elections were held over the months of June, July and August of the same year. The 
candidates‘ political records and qualifications were closely scrutinized by Ataturk, and 
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consequently a parliament consisting largely of Ataturk‘s chosen candidate was produced 
(Lewis quoted in Aydinli 2004: 116). Ataturk formed the Republican Peoples‘ Party (CHP) in 
1923 with the name ―People‘s Party‖ and gave it the responsibility of guiding modernisation 
and political development in Turkey. Ozoglu (2011) has noted that most members of the 
group that formed the CHP shared a political vision similar to that of Mustafa Kemal for the 
modernisation of the state (ibid.: 84). The CHP members were divided into two groups: the 
evolutionists, who were responsive to the demands of the public, and the revolutionists, who 
believed that there was no time to waste in introducing and promoting new reforms – they 
believed that ―people needed to be led, and the reforms, if possible, had to be top down for 
the good of the country‖ (ibid.: 84). Yet seeds of opposition to the ruling elite and their vision 
of governance were nonetheless present in the second parliament of the republic, and were 
growing more vocal (Aydinli 2004: 204). Ataturk‘s support for a single party regime did not 
mean that no opposition political parties were established. Between 1924 and the mid 1930s 
three different political parties were formed, but all were short-lived. 
The first opposition political party, called the Progressive Republican Party (TCF), was 
established in October 1924 by Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Rauf Orbay. The 
Progressive Republicans declared their commitment to liberalism and promised to respect 
religious opinions and beliefs. Although Ataturk was supportive of having a second political 
party in the newly established Turkish Republic, there was a serious opposition to it from 
other CHP members. Aydinli (2004) said that the CHP members made their discomfort 
obvious with the TCF in everyday political debates through, for example, a parliamentary 
inquiry in 1924 into corruption charges concerning the population exchange between Greece 
and Turkey that turned into a serious struggle between the government and the TCF. The 
CHP representatives did not hold back from suggesting that the opposition‘s views were 
shaped by anti-republican principles, even pro-sultanate, despite the fact that the leaders of 
the TCF were well known to be in favour of the Republic, national independence and 
liberties. Rauf Orbay, one of the founders of the TCF, was accused of being anti-republican 
and pro-sultanate (Ozoglu 2011: 89). The government concentrated on out-of-context extracts 
of opposition speeches such as ―‗the declaration of the Republic is rushed‘, rather than on 
broader opposition statements such as ‗we became MPs in order to establish the system of 
democracy, not to pass this authority over to the hands of institutions that are not directly 
responsible to the society‘‖ (Aydinli 2004: 117–118). This thus led into debates about the 
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security of the regime, with suggestions that having the TCF in the political arena threatened 
Ataturk‘s project of secularisation. 
Soon after the TCF was formed, complaints about the TCF members and their political 
activities found their way into the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In February 
1925, a complaint claimed that the TCF recruiters signed up new members by asking the 
question ―Do you prefer the Sultan or Mustafa Kemal‖ (quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 89). And this 
complaint was investigated by the Ankara Independence Tribunal. Another complaint 
concerned Mehmet Fethi Bey, TCF representative, who was accused of manipulating religion 
for political gains. This case was brought before the Eastern Independence Tribunal and it 
resulted in the closing down of TCF branches in Eastern Anatolian on May 25, 1925 (Ozoglu 
2011: 116; for more information on the rise and fall of the TCF see Zurcher 1991: 52–94). 
Ismet Inonu considered the closure of the TCF in June 1925 necessary because the party had 
challenged the Republican ideals (Heper and Sayari 2002: 31).Ozoglu (2011) notes, ―It was 
almost a natural reflex to force the opposition to dissolve, for it was obvious that what the 
radical Kemalists hoped to accomplish and the methods to achieve that would be hindered by 
any political opposition‖ (ibid.: 119). Ahmad (2003) connected the closure of the RPP with 
the Kurdish rebel movements in the same year – this will be explained below– saying ―The 
Kurdish rebellion provided the pretext to dissolve the PRP and crush all opposition‖ (ibid.: 
86). 
Five years after the TCF was closed down, another attempt towards liberalising the Turkish 
Republican political system was made through forming the Free Republican Party (OCP) in 
1930 (Yerasimos 1987: 87; Heper 2000:72). Ali Fethi Okyan, former prime minister and later 
Turkish ambassador to France said: ―Our new republic does not look that impressive. I am a 
mortal, before I die I want to see my nation accustomed to real freedom and democracy, and 
for this there is the need for a new alternative political party‖ (quoted in Aydinli 2004: 
222).He asked Ataturk‘s permission for this, saying: 
In order to consolidate and further the republican regime in Turkey, instead of having a 
single party system [we need] a multi-party system that will establish freedom, debate, 
and control over the government about its policies vis-a-vis society. With your 
permission, I intend to enter politics with another party in order to reach this goal. 
(Quoted in Aydinli 2004: 222) 
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Ataturk agreed with Okyan forming the OCP in 1930. Aydinli (2004) notes that there are two 
main arguments to explain why Ataturk wanted to promote the formation of an alternative 
party and make another attempt at multi-party politics. The first is the external image of the 
Turkish elite; some of the Turkish elite observed Turkey‘s single party political system as 
inferior to the Western democracies. It has also been noted that the speaker of the Turkish 
parliament told Ataturk that it was ―really embarrassing‖ to try to defend the single-party 
system when he was in Europe. The second is that with the intensive transformation which 
took place in the newly established Turkish Republic, an opposition group had emerged 
which gained support day after day. Thus the opposition had to be controlled by the 
government through allowing it to form a political party to channel the opposition in a more 
manageable way. 
Unlike the TCF, the OCP received significant support from wider society and this was very 
unwelcome to the CHP; for example when the leadership of the OCP travelled to the city of 
Izmir, the local CHP city administrators tried to block their coming. Aydinli (2004) notes that 
the OCP slogans of ―Long live the free republic‖ and ―Long live the free country‖ also 
reflected what the people saw in this party, or what they wanted from it for themselves. There 
was constant discussion between the CHP and the OCP on what level of democracy was 
needed in the newly established Turkish Republic. While the leader of the OCP, Fethi Bey, 
criticized the existing conditions for the improvement of democracy, a CHP parliamentarian 
said, ―we cannot give up state authority in the name of freedom and democracy‖, adding that 
free politics would ―plunge the country into a blood bath‖ (quoted in Aydinli 2004: 125). 
This meant that the CHP‘s priority was protecting state authority rather than freedom and 
democracy (liberalisation) since they believed the people could not be trusted. 
Thereafter charges were brought against the OCP with regard to threats to the regime and to 
state security. It was suggested that the OCP leadership be tried for betrayal and treason to 
the motherland. To control the OCP Ataturk thought about chairing both the CHP and the 
OCP, as well as nominating candidates for each party's forthcoming elections; this however 
never was put into practice since Ataturk rather opted to chair only the CHP and suggested 
that if the OCP ran for the elections, it would be competing against him. Fethi Bey, leader of 
the OCP, said that the party had not been formed in order to fight Mustafa Kemal, and on 17 
October 1930, the OCP closed itself down. 
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When I above paid attention to the political settings of the newly established Turkish 
Republic, I found that the CHP was the political party allowed to stand in the elections and 
represent the people of Turkey in the TGNA. However, looking at it closer I noted that the 
CHP in practice stood for Ataturk's reforms and did not particularly represent the views of the 
electorate. Ataturk and his CHP colleagues believed that people had to be led and could not 
trusted as far as the future and success of Ataturk's reforms were concerned, this meant that 
Ataturk‘s Turkish Republic was far off from adopting features of liberal democracy. I also 
found out that when Ataturk‘s single party regime was criticised by the Europeans and the 
Turkish elite, the TCF and the OCP were formed to show that Turkey is a multi-party system. 
This meant that Ataturk was prepared to take any step to increase Turkey‘s prestigious among 
the Europeans. It did not however mean that Ataturk changed his top-to-down and 
authoritarian approach after he allowed formation of opposition political parties. In fact they 
adopted much stricter line on the opposition political parties when the TCF and the OCP 
criticised Ataturk‘s republic for lack of strong sense of democracy. And furthermore the 
OCP‘s calls for more democracy and freedom triggered the debate about state security.  
(iv) Growing opposition against Ataturk’s Republic 
Heper (2000) has said that ―Westernisation reforms faced stiff opposition from the Islamist 
traditionalists‖ (ibid.: 72) and I suggest as well as from Kurds. This means that the reforms 
that were introduced in the 1920 had not taken root (Kadioglu 1996: 188). I argue the reasons 
for this lies in the exclusionary and assimilating principles of Turkish Nationalism on which 
Ataturk‘s Turkish Republic was established; Keyman (2011) argued that ―in the making 
modern Turkey as an organic society was … the governmentality of nationalist discourse to 
practice inclusion/exclusion, to create identity in relation to difference, and to freeze the 
Other (such as the Islamic identity, the Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman root) into history‖ 
(ibid.: 18).  Furthermore Ozdogan (2010) observed that the territorial-political aspect of 
Turkish nationalism purports that all citizens of Turkey are considered Turkish, that is, ―the 
people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship, as 
officially expressed in the constitution (Ozdogan 2010: 49).  
Ataturk‘s directive, which said that Turkish alone is permissible for the proclamation of the 
call to prayer and the delivery of an entire sermon, including passages from the Qur‘an, 
caused protests in Bursa. Although no directive had been issued on a national level, officials 
in Bursa were under instructions to ensure the use of Turkish during Ramadan (Brockett 
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1999: 51). This directive coincided with the closure of the OCP; a rebellion thus took place in 
the small town of Menemen, near Izmir, where the OCP had enjoyed significant popularity 
(Ahmad 2003: 88). This was followed by another group which was led by ―Dervish Mehmet‖ 
to organise some pro-caliphate groups; in December 1930, they called for a rebellion, citing 
the ―siege‖ on religion and Islam, and calling for sharia. A total of 36 alleged participants 
were later sentenced to death for opposing the state. Kadiologlu (1996:187) has said ―The 
Menemen incident is critical in channelling the subsequent route of the Republican regime 
since it made it quite clear to the Republican elites that the reforms that were undertaken in 
the 1920s had not taken root‖ (Ibid.:187). This meant that Ataturk‘s authoritarian approach 
was not very successful in winning the hearts and minds of the people of Turkey. These 
incidents, according to Aydinli (2004), provided a kind of justification to the elite who had 
emphasized the importance of state security and regime safety; and Ataturk and the security-
minded elite who subscribed to the argument that democratic expansion would lead to 
anarchy now seemed to be proved right. Thus it became now ―obvious‖ to many elite minds 
that society was not ready to be trusted with democracy – international standards of 
democratic values had to be at least postponed, if not sacrificed, in the name of preventing 
anarchy and insecurity of the regime (ibid.: 128). Aydinli‘s observation supports my earlier 
point about the emergence of a debate about state security. While earlier the opposition 
political parties were perceived as threat for the future of Ataturk‘s Westernisation and 
modernisation projects, now the people who asked for more of a democracy were treated as 
threats to state security. Brockett (1999) has noted that the Kemalists have perpetually cited 
these incidents as evidence of the potential threat posed by radical Islamists (ibid.: 54). This 
chapter notes that this is first time in history the radical Islamists or the Islamists are 
recognised as a potential threat to the Turkish Republic. Kadioglu however argued that ―The 
plain fact remained, however, that the Kemalist ideology could not replace Islam in the lives 
of the people (Ibid.: 188). 
According to Zurcher (1993) the relationship between the Kurds and the Turkish Government 
deteriorated not only because the public use and teaching of Kurdish languages was 
prohibited (ibid.: 178), but also because the abolition of the Caliphate had removed a symbol 
that had bound the two communities together. In December 1926, the Ministry of Education 
decreed that ethnic names such as Kurd or Laz should not be used, as it was believed to be 
damaging Turkish unity. According to Mango (1999) Ataturk supported these restrictions on 
the use of the Kurdish language because he wanted to create a single nation united by the 
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Turkish language and Turkish culture, in the same way that the French language and French 
culture had formed the French nation (ibid.: 428). The first sign of resistance among the 
Kurds against these policies was an abortive rebellion by the garrison in Beytussebap in 
August 1924 in the South-East. A year later, another serious revolt took place in 1925 in 
Piran, a village in the eastern Anatolian province of Bingol and this quickly spread to the 
district of Lice led by Sheikh Said of Palu (Howard 1966: 336; Davison 1998: 150). The 
leader of the revolt, Sheik Sait, who was the head of his own clan and a member of the 
Nakshibendi religious order, also had influence over the other clans (Aksin 2007: 200). 
Initially the rebels were successful in defeating several local military units; however, when 
the government mobilised and dispatched more layer units, the rebellion was contained in 
two months. Sheikh Said and his 47 followers were tried and hanged on June 29, 1925 
(Ozoglu 2011: 90). In 1927, Khoyboun (Independence), a transitional Kurdish party that had 
been founded that year in Lebanon, helped to launch another major uprising under General 
Ihsan Nuri Pasha in the Ararat area that was completely crushed, this time with Iranian 
cooperation. Zurcher (1993) suggested that this could be considered as a direct outcome of 
the Sheik Sait rebellion, but it did not spread (ibid.: 179). Finally, there was the Dersim (now 
called Tunceli) rebellion from 1936 to the end of 1938, led by Sheikh Sayyid Riza (Gunter 
2006: 99).  
According to Metin Toker, son-in-law of Ismet Inonu who became the Prime Minister at the 
time of the revolts, the new reforms were incompatible with the freedom that the Kemalists 
pledged. Hence, in order to eliminate the opposition and to introduce the reforms, the 
Kemalists postponed implementing democracy, and this revolt was instrumental in that 
regard (Toker 1968: 44, quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 90). Ozoglu (2011) has said that this line of 
thinking reminded the opposition in and out of parliament of the Young Turks period, in 
which the slogan ―for the people, by the people‖, was replaced with ―for the people, despite 
the people‖ (Tuncay 1999, quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 84). This meant that Ataturk and his CHP 
colleagues were not ready to adopt a more democratic political system, since they interpreted 
democracy as the source of opposition against their Westernisation and modernisation 
project. According to Brockett (1999), the Sheik Sait rebellion was the only significant 
internal threat to the security of the Turkish state in the early 1920s (ibid.: 52); and Ozoglu 
(2011) has said that the revolt is regarded in republican history as one of the greatest internal 
challenges to the new Turkish state. However, at the same time, it is often postulated that the 
Sheikh Said Revolt provided Mustafa Kemal with the appropriate milieu in which to 
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complete his radical reforms without any political opposition (Ozoglu 2011: 90). There are 
two points I want to make in relation to the Kurdish movement being recognised as an 
internal threat. The first is that this is first time in the history of Turkish Republic that the 
Kurds or any other group of people are recognised as internal threat. The second is that the 
origins of Turkey‘s long standing Kurdish problem lies in the years studied above. 
Having above considered the social settings of the early years of the Turkish Republic, I have 
identified the Kurds and the Islamists as being against Ataturk‘s reforms; the Kurds for being 
banned from speaking their own language and the Islamists for being banned from wearing 
religious gowns. Here I then found that the state security debate was enhanced by the Kurds 
and the Islamists‘ opposition to the Ataturk‘s new way of living. While the Islamists were 
recognised as a potential threat to the Turkish Republic, the Kurdish movement was treated 
as an internal threat for state security and unity. Furthermore, I also noted here that 
democracy was seen as a source of insecurity for Ataturk. 
(v) The need for an institutional solution 
To address these upsurges, the government took strong countermeasures (Heper and Sayari, 
2002: 30). I would argue that the first time Ataturk recognised the need to protect the 
Republic and their principle was in 1920s. Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister, sent Ataturk the 
following telegram: 
[B]ecause of the necessity demonstrated by the recent extraordinary circumstances and 
events, in order to strengthen the power and strength of the Turkish Republic and to 
safeguard the foundation of the revolution and in order to persecute and subject quickly 
the foolhardy ones who are harming and humiliating the innocent masses, through the 
adoption of the necessary measures against the reactionary and subversive actions and 
initiatives which may threaten the safety, law and order and social structures in the 
country, I request you to agree that this bill, which has been approved in the cabinet 
meeting March the 4th, 1925, be submitted to the exalted Assembly for approval and 
adoption. (Quoted in Zurcher 1991: 160). 
The law on the maintenance of order consisted of three Articles. The first article said: ―The 
government is empowered to prohibit on its own initiative and by administrative measure 
(subject to the approval of the President) all organisations, provocations, exhortations, 
initiatives and publications which causes disturbance of the social structures, law and order 
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and safety and incite to reaction and subversion. The government can hand over the 
perpetrators of these acts to an Independence Tribunal‖. The second said: ―This law will be in 
force for a period of two years from the date of its promulgation‖. The last said: ―the cabinet 
is entrusted with the implementation of this law‖ (Zurcher 1991: 160). Martial law thereafter 
was applied in the Kurdish provinces, which included Bingol, Elazig and Diyarbakir. The 
High Treason Law was changed to include the political use of religion and sacred religious 
notions among the treasonable offences and these were implemented nationwide and used to 
silence all dissident opinions. Additionally eight of the most important newspapers and 
periodicals (Conservative, Liberal, and Marxist) in Istanbul were also closed down when the 
law on maintenance of order was applied. All the leading journalists from Istanbul were 
arrested and brought before the Independence Tribunal in the East (Zurcher 1993: 179–80). 
The law was in force for a period of two years. According to Mango (1999), Ataturk, at the 
time, did not deny that there were Kurds in Turkey. He however believed that ―Turks and 
Kurds were indissolubly linked by a common history and interests, and should be considered 
an indivisible national identity‖ (Mango 1999: 367). Therefore in 1927 he defended ―the Law 
on the Maintenance of Order‖ as a necessity at a time of revolutionary change (Mango 1999: 
429). 
Further uprisings by the 1930s, which have been discussed above, caused Ataturk to become 
seriously concerned that Turkey‘s territorial integrity was threatened (Mango 1999: 492); 
Ahmad (2003) has noted that the Kemalists‘ state of mind was ―shaken by [these] incidents‖ 
(ibid.: 8). These statements suggest why it was that Ataturk stated that civilisation and ―law 
and order‖ were inseparable and Turkey‘s territorial integrity and independence needed to be 
safeguarded.  I would argue that this is the second time Ataturk recognised the need to protect 
the Republic and its very principles; he therefore agreed on a three-fold solution involving 
cultural enrichment, articulation of Kemalism and the establishment of security measures. By 
which Ataturk consolidated state‘s authority and power in every sphere of the Turkish people.  
Ataturk formed a number of organisations that were set up with the aim that Turks could live 
in integrity by feeling proud of their history and language/culture. From 1932 the People‘s 
Houses (Halkevleri) were founded in fourteen cities in order to promote the core principles of 
the republic (Kadioglu 2011: 42). In 1931, the Historical Society (Turk Tarih Kurumu) was 
established and new history books were written – all emphasising Turkey‘s accomplishments 
and that all civilisations in the world stemmed from the Turkish civilisation that was rooted in 
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Central Asia and has researched the history of Turks the Pre-Islamic period (Mango 1999: 
493; Kadioglu 2011: 42). Landua (1984) has argued that this can be best evaluated as yet 
another revolutionary step in the break with the Ottoman and Islamic past and its replacement 
with a new political and social culture (ibid.: 131). A year later, the Turkish Linguistic 
Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) was formed in 1932 and was given the task of simplifying and 
purifying the language, not only by bringing written Turkish closer to the spoken tongue, but 
also through trawling dictionaries of various Turkish languages for ―pure‖ Turkish words, 
which had fallen into disuse (Mango 1999: 494–95. Kadioglu (2011) argued that The 
People‘s Houses as well as the Turkish History Society and Turkish Linguistic Society aimed 
at creating a Turkish citizen prior to the emergence of an individualist ethos in Turkey and 
therefore they were instrumental in forming a notion of citizenship that emphasised 
obligations instead of rights. These meant that ―Turkish nationalism served the function of 
generating obligations for Turkish citizens rather than empowering them‖ and have 
contributed to the generation of a language of obligations that has geared towards the 
preservation of the state (Kadioglu 2011: 42). 
Furthermore, the Kemalists‘ ―soul searching debate concluded that the revolution required an 
ideology that [would] guide people towards modernity and win their allegiance so they would 
be able to substitute patriotism for religion‖ (Ahmad 2003: 88; see also Kadioglu 1996). 
Ataturk thus suggested that one of the ways to keep national integrity was by introducing an 
ideology that would put nationalism before religion. Thereafter, in May at the third Party 
Congress Ataturk, in a three-hour speech, put forward the Kemalist ideology as the 
―autonomous‖ ideology which was later integrated into the Constitution in 1937. It consisted 
of six principles: namely, Republicanism, Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism, Populism 
and Etatism. These principles may be categorised into four different groups: social; political; 
political/cultural/social; and economic. The social category includes the principle of 
populism; it calls on the political elite to both initiate and maintain the social revolution 
(Dumont 1984: 31–33). The political category covers the principles of republicanism and 
nationalism. Stone (1998) argues that the former represented a political revolution and adds 
that it not only entailed a change from the multi-national empire to the establishment of the 
nation-state of Turkey, but also stipulated the republican regime as the most representative of 
the wishes of the people (Stone 1998: 26). Karal (1981) has characterised the principle of 
nationalism as the anti-imperialist nationalism that is against both the rule of dynasty and the 
superiority of any social class within Turkish society; Kemalist nationalism believes in the 
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principle that the Turkish state is an indivisible whole comprising its territory and people 
(ibid.: 17–19). The social, cultural and political category consists of secularism and 
reformism. The principle of secularism asks for the separation of religion from educational, 
cultural and legal affairs and demands that both thought and institutions should be 
independent of religious practice (Stone 1998: 27; Dumont 1984: 35–38). The principle of 
reformism means promoting a Western way of life and replacing the traditional institutions 
with the Western equivalents. Lastly, the economic category contains the principle of Etatism 
under which the state is expected to both regulate the country‘s general economic activity and 
engage in areas of the economy where private enterprise is not willing to invest or has proved 
to be inadequate (Stone 1998: 26–27; Dumont 1984: 39–41).Kadioglu (1996) said that 
liberalism and democracy had already been discredited in the eyes of the Republican elites in 
the 1930s due to the instability of the regimes in Western Europe, and therefore they were not 
included within the founding principles of the Republic. I however think the reason liberalism 
and democracy were not made part of Kemalism is because both principles were seen and 
treated as sources of threat for the future, integrity and unity since the inception of the 
Turkish Republic. 
Ozdogan (2010) argued that the concern with the security and survival of the state is a 
significant dimension of Turkish Nationalism (Ozdogan 2010: 47) and agreeing with 
Ozdogan, Keyman (2011) pointed out that the  goal of saving the state through modernisation 
remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the Republican era (ibid.: 19). To save the 
state therefore Ataturk chose to establish the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defence 
Assembly (YMMUK – MGK hereafter) by a decree in 1933. The MGK was given the 
responsibility of preparing the necessary principles concerning national mobilization that 
would best serve the interest of Turkey‘s independence and territorial integrity. It was 
composed of the President, the Prime Minister (PM), the General Chief of staff, and the 
members of the Council of Ministers and a personal clerk who was responsible for preparing 
National Defence Policy. This meant that saving the state was put before security of it 
citizens; Turkish Nationalism was serving the state rather than the citizens (Kadioglu 
2011:35). 
Ataturk‘s top-down and authoritarian approach could not however prevent opposition groups 
from coming together. As shown above the Kurds and the Islamists stood against the new 
lifestyle Ataturk introduced. With the formation of vocal opposition political parties Ataturk 
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began to fear for the future of his Republic. However it was with the Kurdish movement and 
the Islamist protests in different parts of Turkey, that his fear for integrity and unity of the 
Turkish grew seriously. Thus the debate about state security developed to take a different 
form and an institutional solution was sought. 
3.2.2. Moving towards adopting features of liberal democracy and joining the early 
European Organisations, 1933–1957 
 (i) Adopting a multi-party regime 
When Ataturk died in 1938, he was succeeded by Ismet Inonu. Inonu was selected as the 
leader of the CHP and the President of the Turkish Republic. Ahmad (2003) notes: 
As the world war wound down, the Inonu regime found itself in a difficult predicament. 
The majority of the people in Turkey were suffering severe hardship. All the basic 
needs were in short supply… All classes except the bureaucracy were alienated from 
the regime: businessmen by the arbitrary wealth tax, which had enriched a few Muslims 
but revealed how autocratic the state could be; the landlord and peasants by the agrarian 
Legislation and the harsh and arbitrary rule of the gendarmerie; and the urban masses 
by the labour legislation, which overworked them, gave low wages and left them 
hungry. (Ibid.: 99) 
Karaosmanoglu (2000) has noted, ―After the Second World War, democratisation became 
and indispensable element of Westernisation. The first significant development, in this 
regards, was Turkey‘s transition to a multi-party regime in 1950‖ (ibid.: 209). Inonu‘s 
Assembly speech in November 1945 was considered a definite green light for further 
democratisation; he said: 
[I]n fact: The democratic character has been preserved in particular throughout the 
Republican period. Dictatorship, in principle, has never been accepted and it has been 
considered harmful and unbecoming to [the] Turkish nation. Our only shortcoming is 
the absence of a party to face the government party. There have been past experiences 
in this direction. There have even been attempts encouraged by those in power. It is 
unfortunate that such attempts failed twice because of the reactions that appeared in this 
country. But the needs of the country will lead to the establishment of another political 
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party through the normal operation of the atmosphere of freedom and democracy. 
(Quoted in Ozbudun 2000: 15). 
Before approving the formation of the Democrat Party (DP), however, Inonu had to make 
sure that the DP would safeguard Republican Westernisation reforms. Thus the DP was 
established in January 1946 when Celal Bayar, the leader of the party, confirmed that his 
party would respect Republican principles (Heper 2000: 72). In the next General Election in 
1946, the DP also stood in the elections as opposed to the CHP. Ozbudun (2000) recognises 
the 1946 General Election as ―the first truly competitive election in Turkish history‖ (ibid.: 
16) since the CHP was not the only party running in the election. The DP won 61 seats as 
opposed to 396 for the CHP. Since they were not happy with the results of the election, the 
DP claimed large-scale electoral fraud and manipulation had been committed, the true extent 
of which seems difficult to establish; thus further democratization of the electoral process 
remained a principal demand of the DP in the 1946–1950 periods (Ozbudun, 2000: 16). The 
DP‘s small but significant success in the 1946 General Election forced the CHP to make 
concessions in both their program and structure; for example, religious instruction was 
allowed to be resumed in the schools– though in a quite restrictive way in that a parent had to 
specifically request it (Weiker 1981: 122). Additionally, in order to revive his party‘s 
political popularity Inonu cautiously opened the economy to market forces, devalued the 
currency, eased import facilities and permitted banks to sell gold (Ahmad 2003: 103). On the 
other hand the opposition forces, according to Ahmad (2003) told ―voters that nothing would 
change while Inonu remained in power; Inonu, not Ataturk, had come to symbolise the single 
party regime‖ (ibid.: 104). 
Four years later at the 1950 General Election, the CHP lost its popularity and lost the 
elections to the DP. Mango (1994) described the DP‘s victory thus: ―A major change in the 
Turkish political system occurred in 1950, when the twenty-seven year reign of the 
Republican People‘s Party was brought to an end by a stunning electoral victory won by the 
break-away Demokrat Party‖ (ibid:.13,italics in original). The DP won 50% of the village 
vote and a substantial majority in town and city, thereby winning generally with a 55% 
majority (Robinson 1963: 142). Thereafter ―Inonu and his Republican Party relinquished 
power without violence‖ (Robinson 1963: 142); Ahmad (2003) notes: ―The party in power 
had accepted the verdict of the voter, and this was seen as a great step forward for the 
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democratic process‖ (ibid.: 104). I agree with Ahmad that having the CHP respect the voters‘ 
preference was a milestone in adopting liberal democracy into the Turkish political system. 
This chapter will identify three reasons why the CHP lost ground to the DP at the general 
elections (for the details see Zurcher 1993: 231–45). First, the CHP became saddled with the 
legacy of having been strongly authoritarian, and having concentrated power in the hands of 
particular groups (intellectuals, the central bureaucracy, the military) to the exclusion of 
others (such as local leaders and later, the rising group of private entrepreneurs) (Weiker 
1981: 122). Second, the CHP did not attract the newly rising middle classes who wanted the 
state to provide greater opportunities for industrial and commercial talents (Dodd 1983: 7–8). 
The last reason is that the CHP government‘s strict control of the countryside in order to 
hasten the social and the cultural revolutions meant losing the votes of those Turks who had 
been unsettled by the rapid changes. ―[T]he DP was the vehicle through which large numbers 
of lower-class Turks were brought into connection with Turkish political life‖ (Weiker 1981: 
128), but it was also supported by the commercial middle class, the urban poor and the 
modern sections of the rural population (Dodd 1983: 8). 
Although during the 1950 General Election the DP pledged to improve the democratic 
features of the Turkish political system, it failed to keep its promises. Jenkins (2001) notes 
that Menderes‘ policy preference were shaped by ―short-term political advantage‖ (ibid.: 11) 
and this indeed would seem to be the case. The DP introduced a number of restrictions on 
opposition political parties, on the work of academics and on the press. Mango (1994) notes: 
―The secular elite were, or were believed to be, in favour of liberal democracy. Before and 
immediately after the elections of 1950, many supported the DP. But it soon became clear to 
them that electoral power threatened their material interests and their way of life‖ (ibid.:12–
13). I would agree with Erogul‘s (1987) assessment that the DP‘s vision for political 
liberalisation was limited to two actions (ibid.: 108): the proclamation of a general amnesty 
and the promulgation of a liberal press law. While religion had been restricted to the private 
sphere by Ataturk in the 1920s, the DP removed these limitations and eased the restrictions 
on religious education (Lombardi 1997: 15; Cornell 2002: 25; Mango 2004: 57–60) and lifted 
the ban on the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic, on 17 June 1950. Furthermore, a new 
decree gave the government the authority to distribute official notices to withhold critical 
publications (Aksin 2007: 266; Erogul 1987: 108). Despite its original promise to refrain 
from settling old scores, the DP soon launched an open attack on the opposition (Dodd 1983: 
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9; Erogul 1987: 102). The Public Party (MP) was soon closed on the basis that its views and 
activities were against the Turkish Republic. On 24 December 1952, the DP Government 
made a number of changes in the constitution and replaced the modern Turkish text accepted 
in 1945 with the former version in order to gain popularity within reactionary circles. The DP 
then formed a new body called the ―Investigation Commission‖ and granted judicial power to 
it. Publications and discussion of the work of this Commission was prohibited (Aksin 2007: 
263). Despite all the restrictions the DP had adopted, in 1957, the Democrats won their third 
election and kept their third majority in Parliament although their share in the polls dropped 
from 57% to 48% (Mango 1994: 14). 
Upon Ataturk‘s death, Turkey, with its new President Inonu, stepped up the liberalisation of 
the Turkish political system, as we have seen above. The formation of the DP, its landslide 
victory in 1947 and the CHP‘s handling of the DP‘s electoral success proved that Inonu did 
not want to adopt Ataturk‘s ruling style. While Ataturk treated democracy as a source of 
threat for his Westernisation and modernisation project, Inonu opted for a more liberal demo-
cratic approach for consolidating democratic credentials in Turkey. Inonu‘s successor Men-
deres, however, adopted a much stricter attitude towards the opposition political parties upon 
the DP‘s success. The next chapter will show that the adoption of the multi-party system 
came along with its own problems, for instance, political instability. 
 (ii) Turkey’s position in newly established European organisations 
As shown in the beginning of this chapter, perceived failure of the League of Nations have 
motivated Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand and many others to look for other ways to prevent 
any other war between the European countries. Turkey however managed to join the League 
of Nations in July 1932. Whilst after the Second World War Turkey was experiencing a 
multi-party political system, economically exhausted European countries were looking for 
ways to recover from their desperate economic situation. In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was 
introduced by the USA to contribute to European recovery; in total Turkey received 137 ($ 
million) aid between 1948 and 1951. In order to handle the dealings of the Marshall plan the 
Committee for European Economic Cooperation was established in 1948, and then converted 
into a more permanent Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1949. 
There was clearly a shared optimism at the end of the Second World War that if the European 
states could work together in joint schemes and organisations, barriers of mistrust could be 
broken down. Thus in May 1949 the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed between the 
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representatives of ten states (Nugent 1999: 12). The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 
to achieve greater unity between its members by maintaining and developing the rule of law, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms (Lelievelt and Princen 2011: 6) and Turkey also 
joined the Council of Europe in August 1949 and this proved Ozcan‘s (2008) point that the 
become an ―active member of the Western camp‖ (ibid.: 92) during the multi-party system. 
Following the Council of Europe‘s success, in April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation (NATO) was formed: a military intergovernmental alliance through which each of the 
members pledged support to the other members in the event they were attacked (Lelievelt and 
Princen 2011: 6). Signed by the USA, Canada and ten European countries, this gave the latter 
a guarantee of their continuing independence and integrity against Russian attack for at least 
twenty years. And thereafter so to provide for common deference in case of an attack on any 
of its members and prepared for common deference in case of an attack on any of its makings 
and prepared to guard for the foundation of NATO, the Western European Union was estab-
lished by the Brussels Treaty between the UK, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Neth-
erlands. Three years later, in 1952, Turkey joined NATO. Kuniholm (1991: 34) notes: 
[A]s the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe, and US policy shifted 
from containment in the Middle East (under the Truman Doctrine) to containment in Eu-
rope (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey‘s main strategic role was increasingly 
seen in European context: as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, and 
tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO‘s southern flank, and serving as at a staging 
ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union. Underpinning Turkey‘s early role in 
the NATO alliances was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important 
part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would 
provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic 
assistance.  
Karaosmanoglu (2000) argues that ―Turkey‘s decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly 
from a profound belief in Western values and in the virtues of Western political orientation 
by establishing a long-standing institutional and functional link with the West‖ (ibid.: 209); 
agreeing with Karaosmanoglu, Tank (2007: 135) notes ―Turkey, for its part, backed up its 
commitment to the West with military force‖.  
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The Second World War produced a greater realisation than had existed ever before that 
unfettered and uninhibited nationalism was a recipe for war, which in the post-1945 world 
was increasingly seen as meaning mass destruction (Nugent 1999: 12). In September 1946, 
the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, called for a kind of United States of Europe. 
He formulated his conclusions drawn from the lessons of history in his famous speech to the 
academic youth held at the University of Zurich in 1946: 
There is a remedy which ... would in a few years make all Europe ... free and ... happy. 
It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with 
a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a 
kind of United States of Europe.  
Lelievelt and Princen (2011) have said that Churchill‘s speech became historic because he 
proposed to recreate the European family in a regional structure called the United States of 
Europe – he urged France and Germany, the two arch-enemies, to take the lead in setting up 
such a federation (ibid.:5). Providing the inspiration to the people of Europe as the binding 
factor in the allied fight against Nazism and fascism, Winston Churchill consequently became 
a driving force behind European integration and an active fighter for its cause, and following 
Churchill, Robert Schuman draw up a plan with the aim of forming a coal and steel 
community. Schuman said: 
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate 
to the dangers which threaten it. … Europe will not be made all at once, or according to 
a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de fact 
solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the 
age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place 
concern these two countries. With this aim in view, the French Government proposes 
that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that 
Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common 
High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of 
the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should 
immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic 
development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of 
those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of 
which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus 
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established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not 
merely un-thinkable, but materially impossible. (Quoted in Piodi 2010: page range). 
The European Coal and Steel Community was thereafter established with the Treaty of Paris 
in April 1952 between Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands; the Treaty came into force in July 1952. Upon the successful establishment of 
the ECSC two more projects were put forward: (1) a European Political Community (EPC) 
was drafted in order to provide for a common foreign policy; and (2) European Defence 
Policy (EDP) was also drafted. These however forced the nations involved to talk about how 
much each was ready to give up of their sovereignty. Since France did not approve these 
projects, Jean Monnet, unhappy with the lack of progress in European cooperation, resigned 
as a President of the High Authority (Lelievelt and Princen 2011: 11). Monnet thereafter 
proposed his federalist ideal by setting up the Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe. Monnet pressed for broadening cooperation in the field of energy by proposing a 
European Atomic Energy Community (ibid.). Around the same time the Dutch Foreign 
Minister came up with a proposal for a common market that would cover all types of 
economic activity. Representatives of the founding member states discussed these different 
proposals in a series of meetings in Messina. In the end the governments agrees on the 
establishment of two new Communities that were laid down in the Treaty of Rome: (1) the 
European Atomic Energy Committee (Euratom), which would strive for the development of 
nuclear energy; (2) the European Economic Community, which would focus on the 
establishment of the free market of goods, persons and capital between the member states 
(Nugent 1999: 42). The Community‘s four main institutions would be: a Council of 
Ministers, representing the member state governments, to co-decide on policies not in the 
Treaty; a High Authority, consisting of independent appointees, acting as a daily executive 
making decisions on the policies of the Treaty provisions; a Court of Justice, consisting of 
independent judges, to interpret the Treaty and adjudicate conflicts between member states 
and the High Authority; and a Commons Assembly, drawn from members of national 
parliaments, to monitor the activities of the High Authority. 
When I paid attention to political and social settings in Europe and in Turkey, above, I found 
that Ataturk and his successors worked towards the aim of making Turkey like and part of the 
West at two complementary levels. At the first level, as shown in the beginning of this chap-
ter, Ataturk took a number of steps to reform the former Ottoman Turkey and bring it in line 
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with European countries in every aspect of life. He recognised Turkey‘s relations with the 
West as the only way for civilisation. It does not matter how authoritarian he became, what 
undemocratic ways he used, and despite the Kurdish and Islamist opposition, he never made a 
U-turn on his Westernisation and modernisation programme. At the second level, both 
Ataturk and his successors followed every integrationist development in Europe closely and 
expressed their interest in joining these federal or intergovernmental European organisations, 
as shown in this section. Turkey joined the League of Nations in 1932, the European Council 
in 1949 and NATO in 1952 and received Marshal Aid between 1948 and 1951. The subse-
quent chapter will show that Turkey applied for associative membership of the EEC in 1959. 
3.3. How useful are the historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalist 
approaches in explaining the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe? 
Historical institutionalism‘s position on institutional genesis, discussed above, instructed me 
to go back to the early years of the Turkish Republic to find out about the origins of both the 
MGK and Turkey‘s interest in forming relations with Europe. Having done that, I found that 
the partition of the Ottoman Empire led to the formation of the Turkish Republic. I observed 
that Ataturk was the only influential character in shaping the top-down perceived 
Westernisation and modernisation reforms and the single party regime of the newly 
established Turkish Republic. 
When I paid more attention to the political settings, I analysed how and why opposition 
political parties were closed by the governing party, the CHP. Since the people of Turkey 
could not express their discomfort with Ataturk‘s reforms and the changes came along with 
them through a political party, I noted that the Kurdish and Islamists groups formed protests 
against the governing single-party regime. The closure of the opposition political parties and 
growing protests against Ataturk‘s Westernisation and modernisation programme generated 
debates about the future of the Turkish Republic, as well as of its integrity and its unity.  
Peter‘s reference to the role of ideas in forming an institution was very helpful to find out that 
when Ataturk recognised what I shall call ―the need to protect the Republic and its very 
principles‖ against those who opposed his Western values and way of living, he first took 
counter-measures to oppress the rebels. And when the opposition to the principles of the 
Turkish Republic grew stronger among Kurds and the Islamic-oriented, he then took a 
119 
 
vigorous step and institutionalised the idea, that is to say ―the need to protect the Republic 
and its very principles‖, by forming the MGK. 
As far as how useful this framework has been in to understanding the origins of Turkey‘s 
interest in forming relations with Europe, I went as back as far as the end of the First World 
War. I found out about the pro-integrationist European political elites and their projects for 
bringing European countries together. Although Ataturk‘s Westernisation and modernisation 
project were in line with what the European political elite expected Turkey to be like, 
Turkey‘s positions in these projects were not clear. However, looking at political and social 
settings in the newly established Turkish political system, I noted that Ataturk‘s top-down 
reforms were shaped by Ataturk‘s desire to see Turkey as part of the West so that Turkey 
could catch up with the civilised nations of Europe. This was not however a desire shared by 
everyone in Turkey. 
When studying the political and social settings in which the MGK was established I have also 
unveiled the origins of four important elements of Turkish politics: (1) origins of Turkish 
Nationalism; (2) the infrastructure security debate; (3) the origins of the Kurdish problem;   
and (4) the roots of the resisting Islamists. And I observed that democracy was not a priority 
in the early years of Turkish Republic, but the adoption of a second party in the late 1940s 
allowed to me trace the transition period from a single-party regime to a multi-party political 
system. The subsequent chapters will consider how and why these identified elements 
evolved and changed and what implication they may have had for the development, nature 
and pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. 
I now want to discuss to what extent sociological and rational choice institutionalisms can 
explain both how and why an institution originates, respectively. I will begin with discussing 
how well sociological institutionalist approaches can explain the genesis of both the MGK 
and Turkey‘s interest in Europe. As shown above, the MGK was not given, but it was 
established by Ataturk in 1933. The sociological institutionalist‘s suggestion that the 
institutions are socially constructed may however help to open up a debate as to whether 
Turkish society demanded the formation of the MGK. The study of the political and the 
social settings of Turkey showed that there was not a social demand for the MGK; the society 
did not ask for just such an institution to be established by the government of the day. Using 
the sociological institutionalist approach, when I look at the evidence above to find out about 
what the people of Turkey wanted in those years, I have noted that the opposition political 
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parties demanded a more democratic political system, the Kurds asked for freedom to speak 
their own language and the Islamists wanted to practice their religion freely in public space 
and wear Islamic gowns. These socially constructed demands however, as seen above, were 
overlooked and were in fact oppressed by Ataturk‘s single-party regime. 
The case that Ataturk borrowed from the existing world of institutional templates before he 
set up the MGK is the next sociological institutionalist point of view to consider. This is 
again very interesting to think about and one can carry out a long detailed research into 
whether Ataturk was influenced by any other institution in another country. However in order 
to carry out this research it is necessary to look at similar institutions in different countries 
and check whether Ataturk was influenced by them. I would argue that conducting such a 
research may reveal interesting points about Ataturk and what countries he was influenced 
by. This is not however something this thesis is interested to do. One of the reasons for this is 
that the evidence above shows that domestic and political and social developments were 
much important in shaping Ataturk‘s decision in forming the MGK. 
The next task is to test how well rational choice institutionalism‘s three approaches can 
explain why institutions originate. It is right that the MGK did not just happen, but one needs 
to question whether it was planned to establish the MGK. This means that one needs to check 
if Ataturk planned to form the MGK. The evidence above shows that the origins of the MGK 
lie in Ataturk‘s fear for the security and unity of his Republic. In order to tackle the disorder 
caused by the Kurdish and Islamic protests, and in order to protect the future of the Turkish 
Republic, he initially introduced countermeasures. Upon the failures of the countermeasures, 
Ataturk opted for an institutional solution, and formed the MGK. I now want to judge if 
Ataturk and his colleagues were self-interested, and whether they wanted to reduce political 
costs and increase their gain. One could conduct a detailed research to find out about 
Ataturk‘s and his closer allies‘ characteristics and analyse what genuinely motivated them in 
their political career. The results of this research could then be utilised to explain why 
Ataturk established the MGK. Relying on the analysis I made above I would argue that 
Ataturk never was self-interested, but always held the integrity and the unity of the Turkish 
Republic before his possible personal gains. Nevertheless one can still argue that the MGK 
was established to protect Ataturk‘s Republic from the opposition political parties and 
opposing groups so that his project would not collapse. Furthermore, Ataturk‘s single-party 
regime can be recognised as a gain for Ataturk‘s CHP. The evidence however does not 
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support this claim as Ataturk promoted the idea of a multi-party system as he believed in 
liberal democracy, but he thought people were not ready for such a move. I do not want to 
give the impression that I approve of Ataturk‘s treatment of the opposition political parties, 
the Kurdish rebels and the Islamists, but it is also clear that his behaviour was not to increase 
personal political or economic gain. The very last rational choice institutionalist suggestion I 
want to discuss is the case that the MGK was established to increase cooperation and 
diminish social dilemmas. One can argue that to a certain extent this can be recognised as the 
one of the reasons behind Ataturk‘s decree to form the MGK. This is because Ataturk‘s new 
Western political system and way of living were perceived to be in the interest of the people 
of Turkey in the long term. Yet it was however challenged by those who, for example, did not 
want to change the way they used to dress. If one treats the matter in this way then you can 
argue that Ataturk‘s long-term plans clashed with, for instance, the Islamists‘ short-term 
interests. It can then be suggested that this then led into a social dilemma which could only be 
resolved through cooperation facilitated by the MGK. 
As far as Turkey‘s interest in Europe is concerned, there is clear evidence since the early 
1920s that Turkey wanted to be both like the West and part of the European project. The 
historical institutionalist approach has helped me to go back and look at the political and 
social settings in which Turkey‘s interest in Europe originated. I found that after the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk adopted a Westernisation and modernisation 
programme which meant reforming every aspect of Turkish peoples‘ life in line with 
European equals. This was done through a top-down approach. I agree with the rational 
choice institutionalist approach that it was chosen and it did not simply happen since it was 
Ataturk who decided that his Turkish Republic should be like a Western European country. 
And both Ataturk and Inonu preferred Turkey joining any of the intergovernmental and 
federal pro-integration European organisations formed after the First World War. Is it that 
Ataturk and his successors were self-interested and wanted to increase their political gains by 
Turkey‘s relation with Europe? Looking at the evidence above I cannot say that Ataturk and 
his successors were self-interested, but they were motivated by the aim of Westernising the 
former Ottoman Turkey so that Turkey could catch up with the rest of the world. The third 
rational choice institutionalist approach is to look at whether Turkey‘s interest in forming 
relations with Europe originated to increase cooperation and diminish social dilemmas in 
Turkey. I found this approach very helpful to discuss whether Ataturk and his colleagues 
opted to form relations with the European countries so that the opposition political parties and 
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the opposing group could also develop an interest in Western European values, begin to 
imitate the European values voluntarily and start to cooperate with their European 
counterparts, so that social dilemmas could be diminished. The evidence above however has 
shown that Ataturk adopted a Westernisation and modernisation programme so that Turkey 
could be accepted among the European states without paying attention to what the people of 
Turkey wished; social dilemmas increased, therefore. 
Moving on to consider how well sociological institutionalism can explain how Turkey‘s 
interest in forming relations with Europe originated, I want to begin by questioning the case 
that Turkey‘s interest in Europe was socially constructed. For Turkey‘s interest in Europe to 
be socially constructed the demand for being like Europeans and forming relations with 
Europe should have emerged from the people of Turkey over a certain number of years. This 
approach can lead one to carry out a detailed research to find out about what the people of 
Turkey thought of Europe and of European values in the past, for instance, twenty years. The 
above evidence has shown that the Turkish Republic‘s interest in Europe was shaped by 
Ataturk‘s personal interest in Europe. Lastly I want to consider whether Ataturk and his 
successors borrowed from other countries‘ experiences before they established their interest 
in Europe. As I noted earlier in this chapter, after the World War many of the European 
countries began to be interested in founding a United Europe for the economic and the 
political benefits of their countries. It may be that Ataturk and his successors learned from the 
experiences of the pro-integrationist European countries. 
3.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tested whether rational choice, sociological and historical 
institutionalisms can best explain the origins of both the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in 
Europe. While rational choice and sociological institutionalisms are lacking signposting as to 
how one researcher may begin a research into institutional genesis, historical institutionalism 
instructs one to go back and look. Having said that, I have also found that rational choice 
institutionalism has potential in providing some reasons to explain why institutions are 
established. In contrast, sociological institutionalism is able to pointing to some possible 
ways to explain how institutions are established. Since the MGK was established in 1933, this 
chapter began with studying the early years of the Turkish Republic, and followed by 
studying the political and social settings in which the MGK was established. Whilst studying 
the political and social settings in the years between 1923 and the mid 1930s I found that 
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Ataturk adopted an authoritarian style so as to Westernise and democratise the former 
Ottoman Turkey and have observed that Ataturk wanted to create a modern, Western and 
democratic country out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. This meant that he had to 
reform every aspect of life of the people of Turkey. Opposition political parties and protests 
against Ataturk‘s reforms were treated as threats for both the integrity and unity of the 
Turkish Republic. Thus Ataturk felt the need for securitising the Turkish Republic and 
established the MGK as one of the ways to reach this aim. Having studied the years after the 
establishment of the MGK, I have found that Ataturk and his successors paid close attention 
to the pro-integrationist developments in Europe and made every effort for Turkey to join 
these federal and intergovernmental European bodies. Additionally, this chapter has provided 
a new analysis of not only the genesis of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe, but it 
also helped to highlight Turkey‘s security infrastructure, the origins of Turkey‘s Kurdish 
problem and the roots of resisting Islamists. This is because (1) the genesis of the MGK has 
been entirely overlooked in the literature (2) the origins of Turkey‘s interest in Europe has 
not been studied in the context of the genesis of the MGK; and (2) rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalisms‘ positions on institutional genesis have not been 
utilised before as it has been in this chapter. This chapter has highlighted the origins of the 
MGK and Turkey‘s interest in Europe through utilising the historical institutionalist 
framework of institutional genesis. Based on this background the next chapter will study the 
implications of the multi-party system for the evolution of the MGK and for Turkey‘s wish to 










CHAPTER 4: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MGK AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TURKEY–EEC/EC RELATIONS 1957-1983 
Introduction 
Turkish and European Studies tend to point to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and Law 
2945 as crucial in granting more powers to the MGK (Bilgin 2007; Heper and Guney 2004; 
Roy 2005; Efegil 2001; and Kardas 2004) and suggest that the Turkish military gained a say 
in the Turkish political system through having empowered the MGK (Tank 2001; 
Karaosmanoglu 2000; Kotsovilis 2006; and Ozcan 2007). And the development of Turkey–
EEC/EC relations covering the years between 1957 and 1983 have generally been descriptive 
and historical accounts of a number of chosen key periods, for instance, Turkey‘s Associative 
Membership application and the army‘s 1960 intervention. The impact of the instability of 
Turkish domestic politics has not been considered in the context of Turkey‘s aspirations to be 
admitted to Associative EEC Membership. The connections between the evolution of the 
MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations have not been studied together in 
one piece of work. Furthermore schools of New Institutionalism have not been utilised to ex-
plain the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. This 
chapter will investigate how and why the MGK was empowered alongside how and why 
Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed the way they did, and furthermore it will show that his-
torical institutionalism is better equipped to explain the evolution of the MGK and the devel-
opment of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. To do this I will divide this chapter into two parts. In 
the first I will discuss the strengths and weakness of the existing material on empowerment of 
the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In the second part I will show 
how useful the historical institutionalist concept of critical junctures is in highlighting how 
and why both the MGK was empowered and Turkey–EEC/EC relations progressed slowly 
and stalled in the 1980s. The conclusions will bring together all the findings of this chapter. 
4.1 Literature Review and Theoretical Debate 
The empowerment of the MGK has not been studied in the context of the evolution of the 
MGK before. Many academics have noted that MGK‘s powers were increased with the Arti-
cle 118 of the 1982 Constitution and the law 2945 (Bilgin 2007b; Heper and Guney 2004; 
Roy 2005; Efegil 2001; and Kardas 2004) and others have pointed how the military‘s position 
in the Turkish political system was strengthened with the new powers assigned to the MGK 
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(Tank 2001; Karaosmanoglu 2000; Kotsovilis 2006; and Ozcan 2007). Bilgin (2007b) notes, 
―The 1982 constitution further reinforced the role played by the NSC through changing its 
status from an advisory body ‗outlining the principles of the national security policy‘ to one 
that ‗determines the views with regard to the decisions on the formulation, setting, and im-
plementation of the national security policy and maintenance of the necessary coordination‘ 
which are then ‗included in the agenda of the Council of Ministers‘‖ (ibid.: 562). Heper and 
Guney (2004: 184) and Roy (2005: 31) argue that MGK‘s powers were extended by both the 
1982 Constitution and Law 2945. For example Efegil (2001) states that the MGK became the 
most important institution in the policy-making process by the introduction of Article 118 in 
the 1982 constitution (ibid.:149–50). Kardas (2004) however points to the importance of Law 
2945, saying that Law 2945 granted the MGK functions and responsibilities which were be-
yond the remit of the 1982 Constitution, and suggests that Kemalist principles were also im-
posed on the MGK by this Law (ibid.: 301). These authors have proved very helpful for find-
ing out about not only when the MGK began to gain authority and decision-making powers in 
the Turkish political system, but also how the MGK‘s powers were extended. The question as 
to why the MGK was given more power has also been of interest to academics.  Tank (2001) 
the need for such a body came from the inability of the military to make their views known to 
be politicians and their sense of alienation from the political process, factors which led to the 
1960 coup‖ (ibid.:220). Karaosmanoglu (2000), however, has suggested, ―The military, after 
three direct interventions (in 1960, 1971 and 1980), chose to wield influence in politics indi-
rectly, especially through Turkey‘s National Security Council (NSC)‖ (ibid.: 214). Kotsovilis 
(2006: 49) comments that the army, by Article 118, entrenched itself in the political arena 
and Dorronsoro (2004: 31) argues that the Turkish army granted special privileges to the 
MGK to ensure they retained control in politics. Ozcan (2007) said ―After the regulation of 
12 September 1980, the MGK‘s authority and duties were expanded, and the military wing 
within the MGK gained a determining influence over the council‘s decisions‖. (42) Accord-
ing to Ozcan (2000), this meant that the MGK was given a superior position in the legislative 
branch of government and this undermined national sovereignty and prevented Turkey from a 
having a democratic legislation, since the MGK was accountable to the TBMMM (ibid.:70–
87). 
However, these works do not provide a detailed explanation of exactly how Article 118 of the 
1982 Constitutions or Law 2945 made the MGK an influential institution in the Turkish 
political system. They also overlook the fact that the MGK was established in 1933 and had 
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evolved from an advisory body to a paramount political institution by the early 1980s. They 
therefore do not pay attention to how and why the MGK evolved from 1933 to 1980; I 
suggest it is important to show how and why the MGK was incrementally changed from the 
early 1960s to early 1980s. The third problem is that although it was the Turkish Security 
Forces that took control in 1960, 1971 and the 1980s, it does not necessarily follow that all of 
the decisions made at these Critical Junctures were made by the military; civilians for 
example were involved in the preparation of the 1960 and 1982 Constitutions. This thus 
means that it was not only the military choosing to give more power to the MGK. 
Additionally, the MGK was not and is not a military dominated army as it also has civilian 
members too and each side has equal say on the decisions made in the MGK. I think it is 
important to pay attention to the triggers of the Critical Junctures to gain an insight to the 
political, economic and social developments that may have contributed to the occurrence of 
the Critical Junctures. It is by this way one may unveil how and why the MGK was 
empowered. 
On the development of Turkey-EEC/EC relations, Birand (1990) writes from a descriptive 
historical perspective and gives a very informative insight to Turkey-EEC/EC relations. It is 
mainly written from a Turkish point of view and concentrates on the role of domestic politics 
and political actors and focuses on the number of chosen key periods in the process, namely 
Turkey‘s Associative membership application, the Ankara Agreement, a transition stage, and 
the Turkish application for full EU membership. Although Birand pays attention not only to 
Zorlu‘s role in Turkey‘s application for the Associative Membership of the EEC, but also to 
the impact of the military‘s interventions on Turkey-EEC/EC relations, his works is very 
descriptive and lacking analysis. He does not question how and why the military intervened 
in politics and what changes the military interventions have brought to the Turkish political 
system. In similar with Birand, Karluk (2003) provides a detailed descriptive account of the 
development of Turkey-EEC/EC relations and concentrates on different aspects of the 
relationship, and discusses social, economic and political policies of the EU. Karluk neglects 
to question why and how Turkey –EEC relations developed the way they did and how and 
why Turkey‘s application for Associative Membership progressed slowly. In contrast to 
Birand and Karluk, Bac (1997) pays attention to what role Greece has played in Turkey‘s 
Associative Membership application. Bac (ibid.: 54) argues,―[h]ad it not been for Greece‘s 
application, it would have taken Turkey much longer to decide what kind of a relationship to 
establish with the Six‖. I would argue that Bac not only overstates how much Greece‘s 
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application influenced Turkey‘s application, but she also fails to pay any attention to what 
role domestic political leaders have played in making the application. In this chapter I will 
show that Zorlu was the main driving force behind Turkey‘s application. Whilst studying the 
triggers of Critical Juncture 1960, I have found out about Zorlu and how influential he was in 
getting Turkey to apply for the Associative Membership of the EEC. This is something I want 
to study in greater detail because it is important to have awareness of who and what political 
actors were influential in Turkey‘s European policy before the MGK‘s position in the Turkish 
political system was enhanced and it had become the only institution shaping most of 
Turkey‘s domestic and foreign policies. Bac additionally analyses the period after Turkey 
applied for the Associative Membership and considers the progress of the negotiations 
between Turkey and the EEC in the context of both domestic and EEC level political 
developments. She however neglects to question how and why the military interventions have 
slowed Turkey‘s application and negotiations processes.  
Having debated the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature both on the MGK‘s 
empowerment and on the way Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed, I now want to move on 
to discuss the different schools of New Institutionalism, and which school‘s position on 
institutional evolution can best explain the evolution of the MGK and the development of 
Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In chapter 1 and chapter 2, I have shown that both sociological 
and rational choice institutionalisms do not comment on how and why institutions may 
evolve. Whereas historical institutionalism points not only to the connection between 
institutional change and institutional evolution, but also to the concept of critical juncture 
which can be used to explain how and why institutions change. It is agreed that critical 
junctures generate institutional change (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 
1991), which leads me to ask the following questions: 
 What institutional changes took place in the position of the MGK in the Turkish 
political system between 1959 and 1983? 
 Did changes take place at a critical juncture? 
 And, how can one identify a critical juncture? 
As far as the sources of critical junctures are concerned, while Cortell and Peterson reference 
domestic triggers, Hogan emphasises social cleavages and social tensions. This is again very 
useful to think about, and leads to the following questions: 
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 What triggered the critical junctures in Turkish political history? 
 Did domestic factors trigger critical junctures in Turkey? 
 Did social tension play a part in the rise of the critical junctures in Turkey? 
In considering how and under what conditions political elite make decisions at the critical 
junctures, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) describe it as a significantly relaxed period which 
has two consequences: (1) the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors 
expands substantially and (2) the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest 
are potentially much more momentous (ibid.: 343–44). This is again very helpful to formulate 
the questions below: 
 Which political actors decided to increase the MGK‘s powers in the Turkish political 
system at a critical juncture? 
 Under what conditions at a critical juncture was it decided to empower the MGK? 
If however I formulate the above-outlined framework of institutional genesis to explain 
policy development, particularly in reference to the development of Turkey–EEC/EC 
relations, the following are the questions I come up with, utilising the characteristics of the 
concept of critical juncture: 
 What changes took place in Turkey–EEC/EC relations between 1959 and 1983? 
 Who made decisions in relations to Turkey‘s European policy at a critical juncture? 
 Under what condition at a critical juncture did Turkey–EEC/EC relations progress 
slowly and stall? 
As said earlier, both sociological and rational choice institutionalisms do not comment on 
institutional evolution. Above I have outlined the historical institutionalist approach on how 
and why institutions evolve and how this approach can also be utilised to explain policy 
development. In the next part of this chapter I will test how useful the historical 
institutionalist framework of institutions is in explaining how and why both the MGK was 
empowered and Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed between 1959 and 1983. 
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4.2. Explaining the empowerment of the MGK and the development of Turkey-EEC/EC 
relations, 1957-1983 
4.2.1. The Evolution of the MGK amid the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 
In Chapter 3 I have shown that Turkey adopted a multi-party system in 1946 and Ismet 
Inonu, then the President of the Turkish Republic, allowed the formation of an opposition 
political party, named the Democrat Party (DP). The DP then won the 1950, 1954 and 1957 
General Elections, leaving the CHP behind as the opposition political party. Although it was 
initially thought that the DP would enhance the features of liberal democracy in the Turkish 
political system, its strict attitude towards the newly established opposition political parties 
gave signals that the transition to a multi-party system was not going to be smooth for 
Turkey. The DP‘s strict policies initially motivated university students to protest in different 
parts of Turkey (Lombardi 1997: 15).Then low-ranking lieutenants of the Turkish Security 
Forces (TSK) began to express their concerns over the restrictions applied on the opposition 
political parties. They questioned the DP‘s position on the secular nature of the Turkish 
Republic since the DP had relaxed the laws on the practice of religion in the public sphere. 
On 27 May 1960, ―[C]onsequently, when relations between government and opposition 
deteriorated dangerously, to the point at which the government seemed prepared to re-
establish a pre-1950 style, one-party authoritarianism, the military found themselves on the 
horns of a painful dilemma‖ (Tachau and Heper 1983: 21). I would argue this was the first 
critical juncture of Turkish political history, which will be called hereafter Critical Juncture 
(I). 
I quickly want to consider the role of the army in the Turkish political system. Lyber has said, 
―The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else … in fact, Army 
and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, 
of one institution, composed of one body of men‖ (quoted in Lerner and Robinson 1960: 19). 
Under the Turkish Republic the role of the army grew ―out of a specifically Turkish 
historical, social, and cultural context‖ (Jenkins 2001: 9) that had always occupied a special 
place in Turkey, especially in the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire (Birand 1991: 93). Ataturk aimed to separate the army‘s role from that of 
the government in order to reduce the army‘s authority in politics as he believed in the 
―supremacy of civilians‖ (Atay 1998: 69). At the same time, Ataturk did not want a weak 
army as he was mindful that the army‘s political support was essential for his power and 
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authority (Lerner and Robinson 1960: 2–4). Demirel (2004) has noted: ―the Republican 
leaders were realistic enough to recognise that a strong and loyal army was vital if the young 
Republic was to endure‖ (ibid.: 129). I agree with Atay and Demirel that Ataturk kept the 
army away from intervening in the everyday work of the government, but he ensured that the 
army would be there whenever needed. Additionally Tachau and Heper (1983) described 
Ataturk‘s position on the role of the army as:  
―One of the important aspects of the so-called Kemalist regime was the 
attempt on the part of Mustafa Kemal to separate the military from the 
ordinary conduct of political affairs. In addition to his public statements on 
this point, he took official action by persuading the parliament to forbid 
military officers to stand for election unless they resigned their commissions. 
The aim of this policy was not only to prevent the military from exercising 
direct political influence, but also to insulate the military establishment from 
the pulling and hauling of the political arena.‖ (Tachau and Heper 1983: 19) 
Despite Ataturk‘s desire to steer the army away from involvement in the everyday politics of 
Turkey, Tank (2001) claimed that the army legitimised its ―guardianship‖ position as in the 
most trusted institution (ibid.: 220). The army‘s intervention in politics in 1960 proves Tank‘s 
point that the army was the most trusted institution.  
Under military rule, the Constitution and the TBMM were dissolved and their powers were 
vested in a new body called the National Unity Committee (MBK) made up of thirty-seven 
lieutenants headed by General Cemal Gurses (Hale 1994: 131). The MBK formed a 
―Constituent Assembly‖, composed of members of the MBK, and trade unions, professional 
organisations, and members of both the CHP and the Republican Peasants‘ Nation Party 
(CKMP). The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 6 January 1961 and worked 
towards drafting a new Constitution for Turkey which was then promulgated in 1961 (Hale 
1994: 136–37). The 1961 constitution formally recognised the MGK (Zurcher 1993: 258; 
Michaud-Emin 2007: 27). While the MGK, (then known as the YMMUK) had been 
responsible for advising MPs since the mid 1930s, its responsibilities were extended by the 
1961 constitution. It was given the responsibility of both determining the internal and 
external defence policies and providing expert knowledge to the Council of Ministers ―so to 
assist‖ (yardimcilik etmek uzere) them in the overall formulations of a national security 
policy (Kardas 2004: 297 and Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, author‘s translation). 
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Michaud-Emin (2007) has said that by this change the emphasis was to be placed on the word 
―assist‖ in describing the duties of the MGK in the areas of national security. In addition, the 
MGK was assigned a General Secretary, responsible for presentation of proposals to the 
MGK, the examination of the work of the MGK and the organisation of the meetings of the 
MGK (Bayramoglu 2004: 77–78). Heper (1992) has suggested that with the 1961 
Constitution, a new dual political regime was established; Article 4 of the 1961 Constitution 
said that ―the nation‖ was to exercise its sovereignty through ―authorized agencies‖, 
including the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council.  Heper described this 
process of change as ―stacking the statist elites against the political elites‖, and argued that  in 
this way―the makers of the 1961 Constitution tried to check what they perceived as 
tendencies on the part of political elites aspired toward a debilitating pluralism; in the 
process, bureaucratic elites aspired to have the last work‖ (1992: 180). 
Since the MGK was constitutionally recognised by the 1961 Constitution, I have studied the 
background to how and why this incremental change was introduced in 1960. I identified that 
the Turkish army intervened in politics in 1960, and I recognised this as a critical juncture. 
Cortell and Peterson‘s reference to a coup d‘état has been helpful to identify the army‘s 1960 
intervention as Critical Juncture (I) in Turkish politics. As far as the triggers of Critical Junc-
ture (I) was concerned, I studied the domestic political developments after Ataturk died to the 
point when the Critical Juncture (I) emerged. I found that upon Ataturk‘s death, Inonu acted 
as the President. Unlike Ataturk he opted for a multi-party system, which meant that he al-
lowed different voices to be heard in politics. The DP was then formed in Inonu‘s politically 
encouraging atmosphere. During the election campaigns the DP pledged to bring more de-
mocracy and freedom to the Turkish political system. As shown above however once the DP 
was in power, it opted for more restrictions on the opposition political parties and lifted many 
of the restrictions Ataturk applied on the practice of religion in public life. I would argue that 
the DP‘s position on the opposition political parties, in relation to restrictions on what aca-
demics could write, and in relation to the practice of religion were the triggers of Critical 
Juncture (I). One other reason why I recognised the 1960 army intervention as Critical Junc-
ture (I) is that it was followed by a number of changes, for example: entirely a new Constitu-
tion was adopted, known as the 1961 Constitution; the MGK was constitutionally recognised; 
and the MGK‘s responsibilities were extended to assist the Council of Ministers on the for-
mulation of National Security Policy. As far as the conditions under which these changes 
were introduced, the triggers of Critical Juncture (I) show that the conditions under which the 
132 
 
army and selected civilians made their decision were dominated by the need to eliminate the 
threat again the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. As far as Streeck and Thelen‘s modes 
of institutional change are concerned, I can say their identified fives modes of institutional 
change does not explain of mode of change in the MGK. I would therefore add a new mode 
of institutional change to Streeck and Thelen‘s list of modes of institutional change, and that 
would be ―empowerment‖ which means extending the existing institution‘s position and 
powers through Constitutional changes. 
The first general election after Critical Juncture (I) took place in 1961 and was contested 
between fourteen political parties. The results were inconclusive: the CHP won 173 seats; the 
Justice Party (AP) gained 158 seats; and the New Turkey Party (YTP) won 65 seats in the 
TBMM. Ismet Inonu, the leader of the CHP, chose to form a coalition government with the 
AP despite their ideological differences. Berberoglu (1982) has suggested that the AP 
blocked the implementation of the new Constitution. By the end of 1962, the AP had allowed 
over 50 landowners who had been exiled during the 1960 army intervention to return to 
Eastern Anatolia. By doing this, the AP, according Erogul (1987), eliminated the chances of 
land reform in that region. In addition the team of experts which was responsible for the 
preparation of the First Five-Year Development Plan was forced to resign on 26 September 
1962 (Erogul 1987: 126). Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the AP, and Inonu however did 
not agree on whether to introduce an amnesty to the former DP MPs who were convicted 
during the 1960 army intervention. 
In 1961 a group of trade unionists founded the Turkish Workers Party (TIP) and Mehmet Ali 
Abdulkadir was selected as the leader of this newly established political party. Within a year 
the TIP received significant support from intellectuals and university students, while at the 
same time it maintained its rank-and-file working-class base. The TIP and the YON group 
were the only legally organised left-wing forces in the country. Although the labour 
movement and the forces on the left in general were not yet strong enough to pose an 
immediate threat to the Turkish Republic, they were nonetheless steadily gaining momentum. 
The TBMM therefore on 19 January 1963 set up a cross-party Commission to Combat 
Communism (Berberoglu 1982: 91). Leftist groups assumed that Turkey‘s relations with the 
US required suppression of the masses (Hale 1994: 177). They therefore suggested that if a 
leftist bureaucracy supported a leftist military, the masses in Turkey would not be oppressed 
any longer (Dodd 1983: 11). Under this climate, the 1965 general election was held; while 
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Demirel‘s AP won 240 of the seats in the TBMM, Inonu‘s CHP only received 134. The AP 
thereafter formed the government, and Demirel was directly selected as the Prime Minister 
(PM). 
By 1968, the leftists had gained significant support among university students. In the same 
year some of these students occupied their own university campuses, attacked American 
sailors and burned the American Ambassador‘s car (Dodd 1983: 12). The right-wing groups 
similarly became active and destroyed ―law and order‖ in the universities and outside. In the 
meantime, the former exiled pro-Turkes officers were granted permission to return to Turkey; 
by the end of 1963 many of them had arrived in Turkey. Political violence first began at the 
universities as the extremist section of the TIP and students in Ankara formed the Federation 
of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (DG) in 1969 which was followed by a number of Marxist 
revolutionary organisations, such as the Turkish People‘s Liberation Front (Dev-Sol or 
Devrimci-Sol) (Hale 1994: 177). On 16 February 1969, two people were killed and about 
sixty injured in the clash between the leftist and the rightist groups – this day was named 
―Istanbul‘s Bloody Sunday‖ (Dodd 1983: 12). Berberoglu (1982) has said that repression 
against the left and the progressive forces intensified under the fourth coalition government 
because right-wing forces enjoyed good relations with the AP (ibid.: 92). When the next 
general elections were held in 1969, Demirel – despite all criticisms – gained 256 seats in the 
TBMM and formed the government as the PM again. 
Although Demirel had the electorate on his side, by 1971 he was asked by the military to 
resign when he did not produce any long-term solution to the political instability which was 
widespread both across Turkey and almost among every organisation representing different 
political values and principles. In the urban industrial areas the workers began to feel their 
strength after the implementation of the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike 
which was permitted under the new Constitution (Berberoglu 1982: 89–90). By the end of 
October, thousands of workers staged a mass rally in Istanbul to press the government to 
accede to their demands. Since no agreement was reached between the representatives of the 
government and the workers, shortly afterwards the government was dissolved (Berberoglu 
1982: 89; Erogul 1987: 123–24). Calis (2001) has suggested that under these circumstances 
people lost confidence in the political parties (p.155). People therefore chose to take their 
demands to the streets. The demonstrations however were not conducted peacefully, which 
resulted in violence and disorder because the government was not equipped to quell the riots 
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and the upsurges (Cumhuriyet, 11/03/1971). As Calis (2001) has said, once again the army 
was looked toin order to bring a solution to this difficult situation (ibid.: 157) On 12 March 
1971 an ultimatum demanding that Demirel resign was signed by the Chief of the General 
Staff (Memduh Tagmac), Commander of the Army (Faruk Gurler), Commander of the Navy 
(Celal Eyiceoglu) and Commander of the Air Forces (Mahsin Batur). These high-ranking 
military members initially formed a cabinet of ―technocrats‖; Nihat Erim was later chosen as 
the leader of this cabinet. One of the changes Erim‘s government introduced was in relation 
to the MGK‘s position in security policy. An amendment to the 1961 Constitution removed 
the section that read that the MGK was to provide expert knowledge to the Council of 
Ministers so as to ―yardimcilik etmek uzere‖ (―help the Council of Ministers‖, author‘s 
translation) and assigned to the MGK the responsibility of making recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers on fundamental parts of National Security policy (Kardas 2004: 299; 
Bayramoglu 2004: 79–82; Michaud 2007: 28). Another change was related to the MGK‘s 
composition: civilian members were increased by one (Bayramoglu 2004: 80). 
The second form of incremental change of the MGK‘s position in Turkish political system 
thus took place in 1971. I have therefore studied the post-Critical Juncture (I) period 
stretching up to 1971 when the MGK was given responsibility to make recommendations to 
the Council of Ministers in the formulation of National Security Policy. I would identify the 
army‘s ultimatum to Demirel to resign as the Critical Juncture (II) of Turkish political 
history. What did trigger Critical Juncture (II)? The above outline show that the 1961 
Constitution increased political participation since civil liberties such as freedom of 
expression and association were extended as never experienced before. By this fourteen 
political parties were established and a number of left-wing Marxist and right-wing 
organisations were established. Additionally, the 1961 election results were inconclusive, 
which brought two conflicting political parties to form a government, but they hardly agreed 
on any policy area. The subsequent general elections of 1965 and 1969 resulted in AP gaining 
a significant number of seats in the TBMM, which guaranteed them authority and power in 
Turkish politics. Agreeing with Heper‘s (1983) suggestion that the 1971 army ultimatum was 
a ―culmination of a deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, 
fragmentation of political parties, and weak and ineffective government‖ (ibid.:23), I argue 
that the AP‘s closer affiliations with right-wing organisations and Demirel‘s lack of interest 
in handling the political conflict among many different organisations have triggered Critical 
Juncture (II). The conditions under which it was decided to extend the MGK‘s position in 
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formulating National Security Policy were dominated by political, economic and social 
uncertainty, which was caused by Demirel‘s lack of interest in developing a long-term 
solution to the political instability. This in my opinion paved the way for empowering the 
MGK so that it could make recommendations to the Council of Minister in the case of 
political instability. As above the mode of incremental change in the MGK can be considered 
as ―empowerment‖ (my term), this is because the MGK‘s powers extended with changes in 
the Constitution. 
As said earlier, Nihat Erim formed a new government at Critical Juncture (II), which lasted 
for a year, and then general elections took place on the 14 October 1973, and seats were 
shared between the CHP (185), the AP (149), DP (45) and MSP (48). A coalition was formed 
in June 1974 between the MSP and the CHP. These political parties agreed on an amnesty 
covering those convicted of political crimes by the 1971 administration as well as those 
ordinarily convicted (Hale 1994: 217). They however differed on which political party 
prisoners should be given amnesty – while the MSP was against amnesty to cover the left-
wing prisoners, the CHP was only for amnesty for that particular group of prisoners. As a 
result the coalition broke down after three months. Upon this, a bipartisan government was 
formed, headed by Sadi Irmak, which stayed in power until March 1975. Between 31 March 
1975 and 21 June 1977, Demirel formed a right-wing National Front government made up of 
the AP, the MSP and the MHP. At the June 1977 general elections, while the CHP won 213 
seats, the AP secured 189 seats, the MSP gained 24 seats and the MHP won 16 seats. 
Disregarding the CHP‘s calls to form a coalition government, Demirel opted to form the 
second right-wing National Front coalition with the MHP and the MSP. It however collapsed 
in six months as Demirel‘s deputies began to resign from the Party when large proportions of 
Ministerial positions were given to the MSP‘s MPs. Thirteen of them resigned from the AP, 
and the CHP promised these MPs a ministerial position in the next government if they 
resigned from their parties. Demirel therefore was forced to resign following defections from 
the AP in December 1977. Ecevit formed a new government on 21 July 1977 and it lasted 
until 5 January 1978. To stabilise the growing political and social instability, Ecevit declared 
martial law in thirteen provinces of Turkey. Upon these developments the opposition tabled a 
motion denouncing the government for its failure to suppress disorder (Hale 1994: 230). 




Political violence escalated and control seemed to be slipping more and more out of govern-
ment hands. Fights took place between the Kurds and the state Security forces. Religious sec-
tarian divisions increased among the Alewis, the Sunnis and the Shiites (Hale 1994: 226). On 
19 December 1978, a bomb attack in a cinema in Maras, where mainly Alewis lived, killed a 
number of people. A few days later a bookshop owned by leftist groups was attacked by a 
rightist group. As to why political instability escalated, 
Heper (1992) notes: 
The very concept of the state as a generalizing, integrating, and legitimating entity re-
mained alien to the Turkish political philosophy and praxis. This did not prevent the 
political elites from remaining aloof toward civil societal elements. Thus Turkish poli-
tics lacked not only the moderating influence of the phenomenon of political elites per-
forming that function (dual polity) or (b) politically efficacious civil societal elements 
balancing each other‘s demands through their political representatives (pluralism). 
Consequently, a fundamental tension between the states and political elites lingered on. 
Thus the major problem the Turkish democracy has faced has been that of reconciling 
the views of statist and political elites. (ibid.: 188) 
By the end of 1978, about a hundred people were killed in similar incidents (Davison 1998: 
197). In response to these developments, General Kenan Evren first issued a ―warning letter‖ 
in September 1979 and called all the constitutional institutions, particularly the political 
parties, to seek solutions within a Kemalist nationalist perspective, and within the current 
parliamentary democratic regime, to eradicate anarchy and secessionism (Hale 1994: 233–
34). This warning letter was followed by a number of attacks on well-known people. On 27 
May 1980, the Deputy Chairman of the MHP was killed, and the party had a number of 
regional leaders murdered around the same time (Zurcher 1993: 277; Dodd 1983: 19). On 22 
July 1980, Kemal Turkler, head of the Metal Workers‘ Union and formerly the renowned 
chairman of Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) was attacked (Zurcher 
1993: 277; Dodd 1983: 19–20). At one point, nearly twenty people were dying each day on 
the streets. Following these incidents Evren then decided the TSK needed to take control of 
Turkey on 12 September 1980. He formed a body to govern Turkey during the intervention 
and called it the National Security Commission. It was composed of Evren, the Chief of the 
General Staff, Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Army, Tahsin Sahinkaya, Commander of 
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the Air Forces, Nejat Tumer, Commander of the Navy, and Sedat Celasun, Commander of 
Gendarmerie. 
The MGK‘s position in policy making was strengthened by Article 118 of the 1982 
Constitution, which said: 
[T]he MGK shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and 
ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and 
implementation of the National Security of the state. The Council of Ministers shall give 
priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK concerning the measures that it deems 
necessary for the preservation of the existence and visibility of the country, and the peace and 
security of society. (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982: 75, author‘s 
translation) 
The 1982 constitution equalised the number of civilian and army members in the MGK. The 
civilian members included the President, the Prime Minister (PM), the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence; and the military 
members included the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Forces and the General Commander of Gendarmes. The responsibility for decision 
making was given to the President, who was bound to take into account the views of both 
Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff while preparing the agenda. It was decided 
that the MGK would take its decisions with a majority vote and in the case of a tie, the 
Chairman would possess the casting vote. Once the Council made its decisions, these were 
sent to the President and to the PM to be discussed at the Council of Ministers (Bayramoglu 
2004: 82). 
The National Security Council Law, No. 2945 (henceforth Law 2945), ratified in September 
1983, also gave new responsibilities and duties to the MGK. It most importantly embedded 
Kemalist ideas and principles into how it operated and made decisions. This chapter argues 
that this was done to both protect the state ideology (Kemalism) and make sure that decisions 
were made in accordance with Kemalist principles. This Law established an extensive 
organisation for its general secretariat and it came in effect in November 1983 (Bayramoglu 
2004: 87–88). While Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution mentioned that the Council of 
Minister should give priority to the MGK‘s views, Law 2945 gave the MGK the 
responsibility of determining an opinion on the subjects in relations to the designation, 
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determination, and application of the national security policy of the state. It was also given 
the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the national elements of power that could 
affect the national security policy of the state and also political, social, economic, cultural and 
technological conditions and developments. 
The details of the National Security Policy were clearly explained by Law 2945. It said that 
the National Security policy was based on principles relating to internal, external and defence 
type operations. The concept of National Security was to be defined by the preservation and 
protection of the state, which was said to be formed by the constitutional order, national 
existence, national integrity, and contractual rights in the international arena, including in the 
political, social, cultural and economic sphere. The MGK was given direct responsibility for 
protecting and defending national security against internal and external dangers. It was given 
the responsibility to define, determine, and apply national security policy based on the 
principle of the indivisible unity of a state‘s people and its territory according to Kemalist 
state doctrine (Gurbey 1996: 12). By this, the MGK‘s powers were also increased through 
having the authority to consider measures for both the preservation of the country, the peace 
and security of society and to preserve the constitutional order, providing for national unity 
and integrity, orienting the Turkish Nation around the national ideal and values by uniting 
around ―Kemalist thought‖. Lastly, a less strict interpretation of Law 2945 channelled the 
MGK to take direct involvement in wider policy areas. For instance, it was given power to 
have direct involvement in foreign policy, especially the aspects that directly could have 
impinged on national security; and it had to inform the Council of Ministers, in the form of a 
council decision, of the views, measures and principles it had determined. 
The third incremental change on the MGK‘s position in Turkish political system was thus 
introduced by Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945. So to find out how and 
why these changes were introduced, I outlined above what developments took place in the 
Turkish political system after Critical Juncture (II) up to the point when the changes in 
relation to the MGK‘s powers and responsibilities took place. I would identify the army‘s 
1980 intervention into politics as Critical Juncture (III). As far as the triggers of Critical 
Juncture (III) is concerned, I argue that the inconclusive result of the first election after 
Critical Juncture (II) meant that the MSP and the CHP had to a form a coalition, which broke 
after three months since they stood on different sides of the political spectrum, and this 
generated political instability. Although the MSP‘s and the CHP‘s weak coalition government 
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was succeeded by two stable right-wing National Front coalitions of the AP, the MSP and the 
MHP between 1974 and 1980, their lack of authority and control over the clashes between the 
different political and social organisations allowed the army to intervene in order to take 
control of the political, social and economic instability. The conditions under which the 
changes to the MGK‘s position were made were dominated by serious levels of political, 
economic and social uncertainty and instability. I argue that the army felt that the directly 
elected political leaders were not equipped to develop policies to prevent social instability 
and take measure to tackle the clashes between different community representatives; the army 
and a selected number of civilians therefore decided to grant more power to the MGK so that 
it could cover the mentioned shortcomings of the democratically elected government in 
providing a secure and peaceful environment to live to the people of Turkey. 
Overall, I have identified above the three important critical junctures of Turkish political 
history: the 1960 army intervention as Critical Juncture (I); the 1971 army ultimatum to 
Demirel as Critical Juncture (II) and the army‘s 1980 intervention as Critical Juncture (III). I 
outlined that the main source of these three mentioned critical junctures, and the underlying 
reason for them, was that the democratically elected political leaders in Turkey in those years 
lacked the interest and the ability to develop policies to prevent social tensions between 
different groups and communities in Turkey. The conditions for the changes that took place 
were dominated by uncertainty about the future; so that Turkey would not be plunged into 
another political, economic and social crisis in the future I argue that therefore it granted 
more power to the MGK; and the modes of the incremental changes were ―empowerment‖. 
This takes to me to the next section, to study the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations in 
the context of the above explained three critical junctures. 
4.2.2. The Development of Turkey-EEC/EC Relations in the Context of the Critical 
Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 
(i)Zorlu, the Associative Membership Application and Critical Juncture (I) 
Leche notes: ―The starting of accession negotiations was a step forward in a process that 
began in 1959 with Menderes‘s application for association with the EEC and the subsequent 
signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963‖ (ibid.: 33). I would argue that Leche overstates 
Menderes‘s role in Turkey‘s application for Associative Membership of the EEC and below I 
will show Fatih Rustu Zorlu, the Foreign Minister, was the main character behind Turkey‘s 
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Associative Membership application. It is important to study Zorlu's role in Turkey's 
application for the EEC's Associative membership since it highlights the background to the 
Critical Juncture (I) and provides a context for the researcher to study rigorously as to how  
the Critical Juncture (I) contributed to the progress of Turkey's EEC Associative membership 
application in 1959.  Zorlu used his political knowledge and experience at every stage of the 
application process to ensure that the application was submitted properly. In the early 1950s, 
Zorlu had already been allowed to attend meetings of the Council of Ministers because of his 
expert knowledge of European economics and politics (Gunver 1985: 42–52). Between 1947 
and 1949, Zorlu served as chairman of the Turkish delegation at the European Economic 
Council. During this time, he also served as chairman of the Turkish delegation at the Havana 
Conference in 1947. In 1948, he received promotion to become an assistant to the secretary 
general in charge of economic affairs. Zorlu was appointed secretary general of the 
International Cooperation Administration in 1950. The same year, he was elected as deputy 
of the Democratic Party from Canakkale and entered politics. Zorlu was then appointed 
deputy prime minister and Minister of State on May 17, 1954, and served until July 29, 1955, 
at which time he was appointed Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tamkoc 1976: 360). 
Birand (2005) described Zorlu as a disciplined politician whom Ahmad (1993) regarded as 
the ―architect of Turkey‘s Foreign policy under Menderes‘s government‖ (ibid.: 118). 
In July 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry received two telegraphs, one from Athens and the 
other from Brussels, both of which informed Turkey about Greece‘s Associative EEC 
Membership application (Birand 2005: 51). Zorlu told officers at the Foreign Ministry: ―How 
come none of you were aware of Greece‘s intention to make this sort of application? Are you 
all sleeping here? You cannot even make a good doorman‖ (Birand 2005: 52, author‘s 
translation). These reported utterances of Zorlu underlined his very personal interest in 
Turkey becoming part of Europe. Zorlu then asked officers at the Foreign Ministry to find out 
about how to approach the EEC. At that time people in Turkey did not know much about the 
EEC and were not aware of the outcomes of any relationship with the EEC. 
Zorlu first contacted President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to inform 
them about Greece‘s application and explain why Turkey also needed to apply for the EEC‘s 
Associative Membership. Bayar and Menderes were reluctant to make an application and 
questioned the outcomes of this application not only on the Turkish economy and politics, but 
also for Turkey‘s relationship with the United States (US) – Menderes and Bayar had to be 
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persuaded about the benefits Turkey might receive from the EEC‘s Associative Membership 
(Birand 2005: 52–53). Oran (2005) said that Zorlu used statistical data to show Bayar and 
Menderes that Associative Membership would bring economic relief to Turkey (Oran 2005: 
819). As to their concerns about America‘s reaction, Zorlu contacted the American Embassy 
and three days later, the American Embassy informed them that the US was happy to find out 
that Turkey was interested in improving relations with Europe (Oran 2005: 819). Zorlu, with 
the approval of Bayar and Menderes, submitted the application on 15 July 1959 (Vardar 
1994: 125). 
The governing political party, the DP, chose to not to inform the public about the Associative 
Membership application (Cumhuriyet, 31/07/1959). Oran (2005) has suggested that there 
were two reasons for this. The first was that the government wanted to premeditate 
reactionary attitudes against the application. The second was that the government believed 
that the EEC might refuse Turkey‘s application, in which case the opposition political parties 
could use this against the government, damaging the government‘s prestige and power in the 
TBMM (Oran 2005: 819). Thereafter, in September 1959 the EEC confirmed that Turkey‘s 
application was applicable and proposed that the European Commission would contact the 
Turkish authorities to discuss the requirements, the nature of Associative Membership and 
the dates for beginning negotiations. 
The negotiation process was made up of ten meetings, culminating in the signing of the 
Ankara Agreement (AA) in 1963. In the first two meetings (28–30/09/1959 and 2–
4/12/1959), representatives of both sides presented their expectations from this relationship, 
but no firm decisions were reached. The first two meetings indicated that Turkey‘s 
application would be treated as equal to Greece‘s application. At the third round of 
negotiations, Zorlu suspected that the EEC was not treating Turkey‘s application as fairly as 
promised and he took further actions to ensure Turkey‘s application received the required 
attention. He aimed to speed up the process of decision making on the application (Karluk 
2003: 532); and in March 1960 published a memorandum saying, ―How can you compare 
Turkey to Greece? Do you think the potential of a small country like Greece would be same 
as that of Turkey?‖ (ibid.: 391, author‘s translation). On 17 March 1960 he contacted the 
EEC members‘ embassies and told them that Turkey was a European country like Greece and 
wanted to be part of Europe. He then implied a warning to the EEC, saying that if the EEC 
was not going to assist Turkey in accomplishing its aim of becoming part of Europe, Turkey 
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would improve its relations with the Middle Eastern countries (Calis 2001: 65; Birand 1990: 
98–99). These interventions demonstrate that Zorlu continued to play an important role after 
submitting the application. 
Zorlu‘s efforts however were overshadowed when Turkey was plunged into domestic 
political and social instability, which as I showed earlier resulted in Critical Juncture (I). The 
National Unity Committee‘s (MBK) decisions in relation to Turkey‘s European policy, as 
well as on the domestic politics, meant delays in the negotiation meetings; therefore, Greece 
received its full Associative Membership in July 1961, while Turkey signed the Associative 
Agreement later in September 1963. At Critical Juncture (I), the TBMM and the government 
were dissolved: the DP was closed down and all other political parties were banned from 
active politics (Oran 2005: 666). The National Unity Committee (MBK) was given the 
responsibility of governing Turkey, headed by Cemal Gursel; and Selime Sarpe was 
promoted to Foreign Minister. These appointments showed that the MBK would adopt the 
former government‘s position on Turkey‘s European policy (Gonlubol 1974: 333). An MBK 
statement was broadcast on radio on 27 May 1960 which said that it would not make any 
changes to Turkey‘s foreign policy, particularly Turkey‘s European policy. Furthermore, a 
memorandum sent to Tevfik Saracoglu on 1 June 1960 said that Turkey would watch 
Greece‘s negotiations with the EEC and act according to the developments of Greece‘s 
application (Oran 2005: 823–24) and the MBK members said that they would not take an 
action unless there was progress on Greece‘s application. Thereafter, when Greece‘s 
negotiations were near to completion, the MBK realised that Turkey was falling behind 
Greece and began to put pressure on the EEC in June 1960 (Tekelli and Ilkin 1993: 14). 
Birand (1990) said that the EEC then offered Turkey a meeting to diminish the risk of having 
Turkey forming relations with the Soviet Union (ibid.: 77–79). When, however, the MBK 
found out about Greece‘s full Associative Membership (9 July 1961) to the EEC, it protested 
against this development and implied a warning to the EEC, saying that Turkey would not sit 
around a table with the EEC unless it guaranteed a Customs Union with Turkey (Birand 
2005: 11–13). As a result, the decisions made by the MBK meant further delays in Turkey‘s 
negotiations with the EEC, and Turkey arguably lost prestige among EC member states 
during Critical Juncture (I). The MBK‘s decision to execute Menderes, Zorlu and Hasan 
Polatkan, the Finance Minister, furthermore made the EEC wonder if Turkey was suitable for 
Associative Membership (Calis 2001: 79 and Mango 2004: 65). The European Commission 
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therefore postponed the scheduled negotiation meetings with Turkey; in addition, the French 
President de Gaulle called for a freeze on Turkish and EEC negotiations (Bac 2001: 26) 
(ii) The Ankara Agreement and the Emergence of Critical Juncture (II) 
Post-Critical Juncture (I), the EEC restarted negotiations with Turkey on 24 July, 1962. The 
negotiation meetings held on 14–21 October 1960, 10–12 April 1961, 18–22 June 1962 and 
8–12 October 1962 were not conclusive since the Turkish and the EEC sides expected rather 
opposite things from this relationship. The EEC wanted to keep its relations with Turkey at 
an economic level, Turkey desired to form political and economic ties with the EEC as a 
member (Oran 2005: 820; and Tekeli and Ilkin 1993: 146–47). 
At the seventh round of the meetings, between 14 and 24 January 1963, it was decided to 
prepare a draft agreement that would be similar to the ―Athens Agreement‖ which would 
assure a Full Membership to the EEC through a Customs Union. In the last three meetings 
held on 18–20 March 1963, 23–24 April 1963 and 16 May 1963, the content of the agreement 
was discussed and the details were made clear. The Ankara Agreement of Association was 
then signed in 1963. Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement said, ―as soon as the operation of 
this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties 
shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community‖. This was to be 
obtained in three stages. Turkey, during a five-year preliminary stage, would strengthen its 
economy with the assistance of the Community that would take the form of tariff quotas to be 
gradually reduced, allowing Turkey to sell limited amounts of tobacco, figs and hazelnuts to 
specific countries of the EEC. It would also grant Turkey the right to obtain 175 million 
dollars for economic development through the European Investment Bank. Moving on to the 
transition stage which would start in 1974 and last in a maximum of 12 years, this would see 
―the gradual establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EEC‖ (Article 4 of 
the Ankara Agreement). Although the details would depend upon Turkey‘s economic 
situation at the end of the preliminary stage, Turkey would be expected to adapt its economic 
policy, with regard to free movement of persons, transportation, competition and 
monetary/fiscal policies, in line with that of the EEC. The last stage was to be based on a 
customs union and implied the reinforcement of coordination of economic policies (Article 5 
of the Ankara Agreement). 
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As far as the business community was concerned, the Confederation of the Turkish Worker 
Trade Union (Turk-is) and the Turkish Industrialists‘ and Businessmen Association 
(TUSIAD) welcomed Turkey‘s application for Associative Membership of the EEC and 
stressed the benefits the Turkish economy would receive from this agreement (Aksam, 
13/09/1963). Bahir Ersoy, who was the Chairmen of the Turkish Textile Employers‘ 
Association (TUTSI), said that ―relations with the EEC would help the Turkish authorities to 
reduce its unemployment rate‖ (Cumhuriyet, 11/09/1963). However, an extremely important 
organisation, the State Planning Organisation (DPT), disagreed with the business 
representatives and suggested that the Associative Agreement would set back financial 
improvements in Turkey. The DPT representatives argued that it would be much more 
beneficial for Turkey if it improved relations with Middle Eastern countries (Bac 2001: 28). 
Zorlu responded to the DPT‘s stance, saying that Turkey‘s future lay at the heart of the EEC 
and relations with the EEC would bring prosperity and political stability to Turkey (Bac 
2001: 28). As far as the political parties‘ position was concerned, the Turkish Workers Party 
(TIP) published a declaration called ―No Common Market‖. The declaration stated, ―even 
though we know that the Common Market would provide us short-term benefits namely 
financial help and loan opportunities ... we are also aware of the fact that the working class 
would be paying these back through heavy interest rates ... [W]e argue that membership of 
the Common Market will bring us a long-term risk of losing independence and undesirable 
consequences for the working-class‖ (Cayhan 1997: 49, author‘s translation). Like the TIP, 
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) criticised the government‘s European policy, the 
MHP regarding the EEC as a Community that was established on foreign cultural values. 
Therefore, it rejected any form of relationship with the EEC and suggested that Turkey 
should find its own way to renew itself by concentrating on the areas of culture, history, 
tradition, and industry. Their alternative for Turkey was to strengthen relations with the 
Turkic countries by organising campaigns to defend the rights of the Turks under Chinese 
and Soviet control. 
While Turkish political leaders and Turkish public was still discussing the benefits of Turkey 
being an Associate Member of the EEC, as shown earlier in this chapter, the social tension 
was growing between the right and left wing organisations, and Demirel‘s governments did 
not have any form of initiative to take control over the clashes and the fights between 
different organisations. Demirel therefore was asked to resign by the army. A new 
government was formed by Nihat Erim in accordance with the army‘s advice. According to 
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Calis (2001) the army‘s intervention in 1971 was not like the coup d‘état in 1960, but rather 
an ultimatum, so that the EC did not freeze its relations with Turkey (ibid.: 161). A month 
before the army sent an ultimatum to Demirel‘s government an implied warning was made to 
Turkey by the EC using the example of military rule in Greece in 1968. Emile Noel, who was 
the European Commission Secretary, had said then that the EC had to freeze its relations with 
Greece because it was no longer a democracy and the EC could not retain a relationship with 
a country that is not governed by democratic means (quoted in Oran 2005: 847). Noel had 
said this to warn Turkey that if an intervention took place in Turkey, the EC would not 
continue its relations with Turkey. 
Even though the 1971 intervention remained an ultimatum, it did not obscure the fact that the 
EC doubted the level of democracy in Turkey. This doubt was confirmed when the army 
decided which political party should govern Turkey during the intervention and for how long 
and where martial law would be implemented. In addition there were concerns raised within 
the EC regarding Turkey‘s human rights record, especially in reference to the closure of the 
political parties the MNP and MSP, and the ban that was put on the MNP and the MSP‘s 
leaders (Calis 2001: 160–61; Oran 2005: 841). Additionally, the cancellation of the King of 
Belgium‘s visit to Turkey did show that the EC was very doubtful about how safe Turkey 
was. Erim‘s government, in reference to European policy, argued that the government‘s 
programme would be administrated with respect to Ataturk‘s principles (Calis 2001: 159). 
Without taking into consideration the views of the opposition political parties in the TBMM 
and ignoring the DPT‘s findings on whether it would be beneficial for Turkey to sign the 
Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement (AA), Erim‘s government approved the 
Additional Protocol, so that the TBMM was left to ratify it without any form of discussion 
(Calis 2001: 160). However, because the signature of the Additional Protocol coincided with 
the EC‘s first enlargement period, a temporary protocol was signed between Turkey and the 
EC, but it was later legally recognised on 1 January 1973. 
(iii) Success of the Eurosceptic Political Parties in Turkey, Greece’s application for Full 
Membership of the EC and Critical Juncture (III) 
In June 1974 a new coalition government was formed by the CHP and the MSP after Critical 
Juncture (II). While the CHP was a fairly stable pro-European political party, the MSP was 
against Turkey–EC relations. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, believed that the 
signing of the Additional Protocol of the AA was against Turkey‘s national interest and 
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industrial development. The MSP stood against not only selling land to the citizens of the EC 
member states, but was also critical of providing accommodation opportunities to the EC 
member states. Despite their different positions on the EC however this coalition 
government‘s programme said that it would work to improve Turkey–EC relations and 
request the relevant changes in the Additional Protocol of the AA (Cumhuriyet, 18/11/1978). 
Upon that, Hasan Korkmazcan, MP from the DP, argued that the MSP had changed its stance 
on the EC for political benefits and in order to remain in the coalition government (Cayhan 
1997: 163). A reply to these critics came from Hasan Aksay, MP from the MSP, who said 
that the MSP had not changed their stance on the EC and argued that the MSP was still 
Eurosceptic. He added that when coalition governments prepare their programmes for their 
governing term, the partners of the coalition governments necessarily make compromises to 
form a strong and affective government (Cayhan 1997: 163–65). When the European 
Commission President, Francois-Xavier Ortoli, was in Turkey in April 1974, Bulent Ecevit, 
then the PM, informed the EC authorities about Turkey‘s request for the revision of the 
obligations arising from the AA (Cayhan 1997: 175 and Ugur 1999: 114). In September 
1974, the CHP–MSP coalition government resigned (Ugur 1999: 115), and the CHP formed a 
new government with non-political technocrats. During this period Turkey‘s European policy 
did not receive much attention (Birand 1990: 338–39). 
In March 1975 a new coalition government was formed between the MHP, the MSP, the GP, 
and the AP. Although the work programme of this coalition government of the four political 
parties said that it would keep Turkey‘s European policy as it was and would aim to improve 
relations with the EC, the government turned its back on an opportunity to apply for Full 
Membership of the EC in 1975. Turhan Gunes, the Foreign Minister, said that Turkey should 
follow Greece and apply for full EC membership, but he could not persuade the government 
to make the application (Tekelli and Ilkin 1993: 239). First of all, the Greek application for 
Full Membership of the EC made the Turks worry about the balance between Greece and 
Turkey (The Economist, 21/06/1975). Oran (2005) furthermore noted that the Turkish 
authorities discussed what actions they should take to oppose the Greek application for Full 
Membership of the EC, and three options were considered: the first option was to put 
pressure on the EC so it refused Greece‘s application; the second was to submit an 
application for membership, but the Eurosceptical political parties – MSP and MHP – were 
not keen on this (ibid.: 849); and the third option, which Turkey opted for, was the most 
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passive one, that was to ask the EC to make sure that Greece‘s Full Membership of the EC 
would not affect the development of Turkey–EC relations (Birand 2005: 238). 
Onis (2001) has argued that there are three reasons why Turkey did not apply for Full 
Membership of the EC: Turkish policymakers underestimated the implications that Greece‘s 
Full Membership would have for Turkey–EC relations; Turkish policymakers overlooked 
Greece‘s fast moving progress on making a Full Membership application for the EC; and 
Ankara was reluctant both to accelerate the pace of European integration and expose 
Turkey‘s industry to premature competition (Onis 2001: 111). I agree with Onis that Turkish 
authorities underestimated the implications Greece‘s Full Membership would have for 
Turkey–EC relations. Onis however is lacking attention to the fact that Turkey was 
experiencing political and economic instability by the mid 1970s. In contrast to Onis, Levin 
(2011) has drawn attention to this and noted, ―When the Turkish leadership decided not to 
apply for Full Membership together with Greece in 1979, they did so because domestic 
political unrest and the state of the Turkish economy made membership unrealistic at the 
time, not because membership was deemed undesirable as the ultimate goal‖ (ibid.: 166). 
Although I agree with Levin that political and economic instability was one of the reasons for 
Turkish decision not to apply for the membership of the EC, it is important to pay attention to 
the position of the ruling political parties on Turkey‘s European Policy. I would argue that the 
ruling Eurosceptic political parties, that is to say the MHP and the MSP, were behind 
Turkey‘s decision on whether to apply for the Full Membership of the EC. The MHP and the 
MSP had since the 1960s been sceptical about Turkey‘s relations with Europe. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the MSP‘s leader Erbakan regarded the EC as a ―Christian club‖ in 
which Turkey did not have a place (Birand 2005: 238). The MHP‘s leader Turkes similarly 
believed that Turkey–EC relations would not benefit Turkish industry as it was not 
sufficiently developed to compete with the EC member states (ibid.: 215). Therefore, when 
Turkey was in the process of considering whether to apply for Full Membership of the EC, 
these two Eurosceptic coalition partners preferred not to apply (Cayhan 1997: 155–75). The 
AP and the GP, despite being pro, were both too weak to challenge the MSP and the MHP‘s 
stance because they only had a minority of seats in the TBMM. Additionally, they were 
determined to keep the coalition by agreeing with the MSP and the MHP, as they knew that if 
they had disagreed with the sceptical political parties, this would have resulted in the break-
up of the coalition, which would have contributed to Turkey‘s existing political and economic 
instability. They therefore adopted a consensual approach. According to Birand, Demirel was 
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determined to keep the coalition government (Birand 2005: 238), and the AP and CP believed 
missing the chance to improve relations with the EC was not as important as Turkey‘s 
domestic stability. 
If Turkey had applied for Full Membership of the EC, would it have received membership 
there and then? Karluk (2003) has argued that Turkey missed the ―train to Europe‖ (p.536), 
but he does not comment on whether, if Turkey had applied, a Full Membership status waited 
for Turkey as the destination. Onis (2001) argues that Turkey‘s exclusion from the 
Community at the time of its ―southern enlargement‖ constituted a case of self-exclusion as 
opposed to exclusion by the community itself (ibid.: 112). I agree with Onis that it was self-
exclusion and the reasons for this exclusion are discussed above, but it is ironic that Onis 
does not comment on whether Turkey in the mid 1970s was capable of handling the political 
and economic obligations of EC‘s Full Membership. I argue that if Turkey had applied for 
Full Membership along with Greece, and if the EC‘s decision on the Full Membership 
application was in favour of Turkey, Turkey would not have managed the EC‘s 
membership‘s obligations because of both unstable politics and an underdeveloped economy. 
Mango (2004), however, has treated this from a different of point of view and argues that the 
EC authorities wanted Turkey to apply for Full Membership of the EC in 1975 so that the EC 
could refuse both of these applications, from Turkey and from Greece (ibid.: 88). Mango 
presents a different dimension to this discussion, but I find him oversimplifying a very 
important question of Turkey‘s self-exclusion from applying for Full Membership. This 
question was also the subject of discussion in a documentary programme on Turkish TV 
(TRT) in 2004. A very well-known politician, Murat Karayalcin, the leader of the SHP 
(Social Democratic Populist Party), argued, in the programme, that Turkey lost its chance of 
joining the EC in 1975. Karayalcin explained that while Turkey was expected by the EC 
institutions to apply along with Greece, Turkey, instead, disregarded the EC‘s welcoming 
approach and did not make an application. He believed that if Turkey had applied, Turkey 
would have, by now, become a full member of the EC. This was because, according to 
Karayalcin, the EC would have had to treat Turkey equally with Greece (quoted from the TV 
programme Ninth Symphony, TRT 19/11/2004). Furthermore, the issue of Turkey‘s ―self-
exclusion‖ was discussed when the EU decided to commence accession negotiations with 
Turkey in October 2005. 
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When Turkey and the EC signed the Additional Protocol in 1973, Turkey–EC relations 
entered into a new phase. The EC accepted a lifting or lowering of the trade barriers for most 
manufactured goods imported from Turkey in 1972 and this allowed Turkey to export 
manufactured goods to EU markets freely. Turkey however lacked a liberal economy. Soon 
after the Additional Protocol was signed, Turkey informed the EC of its economic problems 
and asked for revision of some of the protocols of the Ankara Agreement, such as on 
agricultural policy. Gaston Thorn, then the leader of the Council, said that the EC was 
determined not to make further changes to the agricultural policy. When Calangil heard the 
EC‘s decision on Turkey‘s request, he left the meeting (Oran 2005: 849–50). The EC then 
offered financial aid to Turkey. The meeting of the Council of Association in July was 
postponed to November and the next meeting took place on 20 December 1976 when the EC 
decided that it would make concessions on 33 products out of 65 and provided financial aid. 
However, regardless of the EC‘s proposal, Turkey decided to postpone the implementation of 
the obligations arising from the Protocol for one year under Article 60 of the Additional 
Protocol and by this, the 10 per cent discount was delayed for one year (Oran 2005: 850). 
The Turkish economy slumped into a deep recession between January and March 1978 and 
Ecevit‘s government could not afford to maintain interest payments on loans. The 
government was in breach of the Ankara Agreement (Ozsoy 2002: 25; Onis 1986: 7). This 
economic situation led Ecevit to present a proposal to the European Commission on 9 
October, which asked for $8 million of credit and the freezing of Turkey‘s obligations under 
the AA (Ugur 1999: 117). Turkey‘s request for financial aid was refused, but its request for 
freezing Turkey–EC relations was accepted by the EC (Karluk 2003: 535–36). The EC 
member states received Ankara‘s decision with considerable relief with an EC official saying 
that the situation was so difficult that the EC could not turn down Ecevit‘s request of freezing 
Turkey-EC relations (The Guardian, 19/09/1978). Ecevit‘s request was discussed in a 
documentary TV programme in Turkey in 2004. It was said that Ecevit did not think carefully 
enough before making the decision to make the request. Murat Karayalcin, leader of the SHP, 
in the same TV programme, said that if Turkey at present still had problems with the EC, it 
was because of Ecevit‘s request to freeze relations for ten years in the 1970s (quoted from the 
TV programme, Ninth Symphony, TRT 19/11/2004). 
Gundog Oaken, the Foreign Minister argued at the time, ―We look for alternative relations to 
both the West and the EU‖ (Calis 2001: 175, author‘s translation). He added that this was 
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particularly important for a country like Turkey because it had cultural, regional, and geo-
political values that were, already, similar to Middle Eastern, Balkan and Eastern countries. 
Like the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, began to think about different 
destinies for Turkey at this point. In one of his speeches, he said that Turkey was driven into 
this economic crisis by the Western countries because the EC had refused to provide it with 
economic assistance. He went on to say, ―when any country is forced into an economic crisis 
there are people, institutions or countries that would like to exploit that situation for their own 
interest. I do not know whether this is what happening to our country at present … Yes, we 
are in our worst economic crisis and period of instability. However, nobody should ever think 
that they could force us or put pressure on us‖ (Cayhan 1997: 207, author‘s translation). 
Ecevit went on to imply a warning that if the EC did not provide Turkey with assistance over 
its economic difficulties, then Turkey need to think about strengthening its relationship with 
the Soviet Union. In Ecevit‘s words, ―if at any time they begin to think about pressuring 
Turkey, we will open our doors to those on whom it is thought we had turned our back. If at 
present we are not on the other side of that wall, is because we have decided to be where we 
want to be … [W]e are not interested in crossing over to the other side of the wall … but we 
do not want anyone to force us to do that‖ (Cayhan 1997: 207, author‘s translation). 
After Ecevit‘s pledges to develop a better approach to Turkey‘s economic unsettlement and 
political violence, the AP‘s victory at by elections in October 1979 deprived Ecevit of a 
majority and he resigned. Thus, in November 1979, Suleyman Demirel formed an AP-
majority government with the backing of the MHP and MSP. Demirel‘s government 
disregarded the previous government‘s hostile policies towards the EC. Furthermore, in 
February 1980, at the meetings of the Council of Association, Hayrettin Erkman, the Foreign 
Minister, spoke out about Turkey‘s interest in applying for Full Membership of the EC (Calis 
2001: 189). However, the MSP, whose support the AP needed in the TBMM, did not support 
Erkman in applying for Full Membership. Recai Kutan, who was the deputy leader of the 
MSP at the time, argued that the MSP would not continue supporting the AP, because 
Erkmen was not paying enough attention to improving Turkey‘s relations with the Islamic 
countries and rather aiming to improve its relations with the West and Israel. Kutan believed 




The MSP suggested that Turkey should develop economic and political relations with the 
Islamic countries whom Turkey could trust, and where they would be treated equally, and 
have equal rights with other member countries. Thus, the MSP presented a motion of no 
confidence in Erkman in August 1980. When Erkmen could not gain a majority in the 
TBMM, he resigned (Calis 2001: 19). On the other hand, while the EC was negotiating with 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal for enlargement in the late 1970s, Turkey missed its second 
chance of applying for Full Membership on this occasion too as Critical Juncture (III) 
emerged, when again there were constant clashes among different communities in Turkey, 
but this it was more intense. Therefore at Critical Juncture (III) the National Security 
Commission published eighteen communiqués in the early days of the 1980 intervention; 
each concentrated on different policy areas. The first communiqué outlined its perception of 
the period before 12 September 1980. It underlined the army‘s important role in the 
following: protection of the unity of Turkish land, taking measures to prevent civil war and 
fostering a healthy democratic order (Minutes of the National Security Commission, 
19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 4). The second communiqué said that legislative and executive powers 
would be given to Evren and the Force Commanders of the National Security Commission to 
restore stability to the streets of the Turkish Republic. The National Security Commission 
dissolved the TBMM and the government, declared martial law throughout the country and 
took into custody the chairmen of the following political parties: the AP, the CHP, the MHP, 
and the MSP (ibid. :19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 6). It took decisions not only in relation to politics, 
but also on the future of the economy. The seventh communiqué said that Turkey would 
honour its economic agreement with the EC and aim to continue negotiations with it on the 
Fourth Financial Protocol to be approved (ibid.:19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 8). 
Following these changes, Bulend Ulusu, former admiral, was asked to form a government 
and Ozal was appointed as the Deputy PM to manage the economy – emphasis was put on 
protection of the fundamental principles of Kemalism (Milli Gazete, 23/09/1980). The 
"Martial Law Act‖ was amended in order to enhance the martial law commanders‘ powers by 
giving them the right to: 
 ban strikes, public meetings, and demonstrations 
 suspend newspapers and other publications 
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 dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed 
undesirable, without right of appeal (Hale 1994: 251) 
For example, Turkes, together with 2,000 members of his party (MHP) was arrested and 
charged with instigating civil war and murdering 600 people between 1974 and 1980. Turkes 
was then sentenced (though later released due to his illness in April 1985). Erbakan, the 
leader of the MSP, was charged with violating the Constitution, as well as violating Section 
163 of the Penal Code, which made it illegal to call for the establishment of an Islamic state. 
In February, he was sentenced to four months imprisonment, before receiving a formal 
acquittal on appeal in September 1985. In the meantime, Turkes and Erbakan were banned 
from participating in politics (Milliyet, 10/10/1985, 20/09/1985 in Hale 1994: 252). 
Calis (2001) argues that the National Security Commission accepted Erkmen‘s previous 
policies concerning Turkey–EC relations as a framework for Ulusu's government (ibid.: 210), 
and this was approved by Evren (Oran 2005: 83). Ulusu‘s government was also interested in 
improving relations with the Islamic countries, for which reason he allowed meetings of 
Islamic countries to take place in Turkey and represented Turkey at these meetings. The aim 
of these meetings was to discuss how to improve economic integration of the Islamic 
countries (Milli Gazete, 04/11/1980). Ulusu also went to Saudi Arabia for the Confederation 
of Islam meetings (Milli Gazete, 12/ 12/1980). 
On the day of the army‘s intervention, the European Commission called on the army 
members to respect human rights in Turkey. They continued associational relations with 
Turkey and held negotiation meetings on the Fourth Financial Protocol of the Association 
Agreement (EC Bulletin 1980). The following month however the European Parliament (EP) 
adopted a resolution on the situation in Turkey and expressed its concern over the military‘s 
takeover and requested steps be taken immediately towards guaranteeing Turkish people the 
right to join both a political party and trade unions. It stressed the importance of immediate 
assurances of physical safety of those people who had been detained, for instance, the 
Turkish members of the EEC/Turkey Joint Committee. Thereafter, the EC appeared to apply 
a ―wait and see‖ policy over Turkey (Milli Gazete, 28/09/1980). In early 1981, the EP then 
began to discuss what strategy it should take towards Turkey – discussions caused divisions 
among the EP‘s political party groups. On the EP‘s first meeting in relation to Turkey, called 
―Conditions in Turkey‖, which took place in April 1981, the European Socialist groups 
proposed to terminate Turkey–EC relations, referring to the 1967 army intervention in Greece 
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when the EC terminated its relations with Greece (EC Briefing 1980: 3). Then in 1981 when 
Turkey requested to have a meeting with the delegates of European Parliament–Turkish (joint 
committee), the EP refused to meet with Turkey. In response to the EP‘s criticisms and 
attitudes towards Turkey, Evren said that conditions in Turkey were not only improving day 
by day, but it was soon going to adopt democracy again (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981). He 
furthermore promised that a consultative parliament would soon be established and a new 
Constitution would be prepared (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981, 01/05/1981). 
The National Security Commission worked on an extensive number of policy areas. It passed 
a large number of Bills in different policy areas that had not received a majority in the 
TBMM before the army‘s intervention, ensuring they were in line with Kemalist principles. 
Turkey‘s European policy was one of those policies on which the political parties had failed 
to achieve consensus for many years either because of weak coalitions or Eurosceptical 
political parties (Cumhuriyet, 30/03/1981). There were two instances when Turkey had 
missed its chance to apply for Full Membership of the EC when it had a good chance to join. 
Therefore, the MGK wanted to ―waste no more time‖ on the question of whether Turkey 
should apply for Full Membership of the EC. While questions were raised about Turkey‘s 
place in a democratic Europe, on 25 March 1981, Turkey–EC relations were on the agenda of 
a National Security Commission meeting. It was discussed whether Turkey should apply for 
Full Membership of the EC. Except for Turgut Ozal, the deputy Prime Minister, and Haydar 
Saltik, the Chairman of the State Planning Organisation (DPT), the other members – Kenan 
Evren, the Chairmen of the National Security Commission; Bulend Ulusu, the Prime 
Minister; Ilter Turan, the Foreign Minister; Kaya Erdem, the Ministry of Finance; Cenap 
Keskin, the Turkish representative in Brussels –agreed that when Turkey returned to 
democracy, it would apply for Full Membership of the EC (Cumhuriyet, 30/03/1981). Ozal 
did not believe Turkey was competent to join, but the National Security Commission said that 
Turkey could improve its political and economic system in the midst of the long process of 
negotiations, ―one never goes to the battlefield fully prepared … one completes the 
preparations on the battlefield‖ and ―it seems that we already wasted 18 years by not making 
this application any earlier‖ (Birand 2005: 302). Furthermore, the National Security 
Commission decided that it would start the preparations by asking the Minister of Finance to 
remove the existing restrictions on custom so as to normalise relations with the EC before an 
application was made (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981). 
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Echoing arguments it made in the 1960s when Turkey applied for Associative Membership, 
the DPT wanted Turkey to maintain Turkey‘s autonomous economic development and was 
suspicious of diktats received from the EC. The DPT looked at the possibility of alternative 
economic relations with the countries of the Middle East and South Asia. The DPT pointed 
out that Turkish infrastructure was weak and thus it was less able to compete with European 
countries, while this would not be the case with Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and India. The DPT 
claimed that if Turkey could consolidate its bilateral relations with these countries, Turkey 
would be a leading country among them, whereas within the EC it would be a weaker partner. 
The National Security Commission however disregarded the sceptical stances of Ozal and the 
DPT and proposed that separate departments specialising in the EC be created for every 
ministry. Ozal suggested that the DPT be in charge of this process, but the National Security 
Commission did not agree because it wanted an institution that was pro-European to be in 
charge of this process. A new EC expert group under the leadership of the National Security 
Commission then was established (Birand 2005: 303). 
As for domestic politics, Evren promised that Turkey would follow a two-step journey back 
to democracy; the first was to establish a constitutional assembly that would be responsible 
for preparing a constitution. As far as the composition of the Constitutional Assembly was 
concerned, it was decided that it would consist of the National Security Commission and a 
consultative parliament. The consultative parliament was made of forty members who would 
be selected by the National Security Commission with certain restrictions. For example, if 
you were a member of political party before 12 September 1980 you were disqualified, and 
applications from the East of Turkey were not accepted (Cumhuriyet, 01/07/1981). Lastly, 
the National Security Commission‘s composition remained as it was. The constitutional 
assembly was established so that it would assist the National Security Commission in the 
passage of laws and help reach the public, while remembering to protect the unity, 
independence and secular nature of Turkey. It was also expected to respect human rights and 
the rule of law. But the most important role of the constitutional assembly was to prepare a 
constitution, present it to the public for referendum, and ensure that the constitution received 
full support. Once the constitutional assembly ensured that the constitution was approved, it 
would move on to prepare an electoral law that would allow free elections, but until then, the 
political parties would not participate in the work of the constitutional assembly (Cumhuriyet, 
03/07/1981). There was another positive movement from Turkish side, as Evren agreed with 
the EC authorities that ninety days of detention without trial was too long and against human 
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rights (Cumhuriyet, 25/07/1981). Therefore, he promised to make improvements on the issue 
by reducing detention days without trial to a more appropriate number of days. Evren 
continued by claiming that they would return political power to the hands of those 
democratically elected once they had achieved stability. However, Evren also argued that 
they would make these changes cautiously to achieve the best results, so Turkey would not 
suffer from similar problems of instability in future (Cumhuriyet, 25/07/1981). Evren and the 
rest of the members of the National Security Commission believed that once the 
constitutional assembly was established the EC would soften its attitudes towards Turkey. 
However, these moves did not change the EC‘s attitudes as it was not fully convinced that the 
constitutional assembly would have authority over the National Security Commission. It was 
noted that ―the Constitutional Assembly does not meet the need for restoration of democracy, 
since in the last resort the overall power still remained in the hand of the National Security 
Commission‖ (EC Doc. 1981a; Cumhuriyet, 21/02/1981). Therefore, the National Security 
Commission‘s first step towards democracy was not found acceptable because Turkey was 
supposed to take bigger and more serious steps towards democracy, such as a democratically 
elected parliament through free and open elections. The establishment of the constitutional 
assembly was a positive movement, but it lacked these democratic elements. 
The second stage was to hold an election in 1983, prepare a new ―Political Parties Law‖ 
which went into effect on 24 April 1983, and allow new political parties be formed (Ahmad 
1993: 188). In the hope of restoring democracy gradually and having adequate time to 
consolidate democracy in Turkey, restrictions were applied on the number of political parties 
allowed to stand in the election. It was suggested that political parties with similar views 
should gather under a single political party and there should not be more than three political 
parties (Cumhuriyet, 20/06/1983 and 15/08/1983; Narli 2000: 114): the Nationalist 
Democracy Party (MDP), Motherland Party (ANAP), and Populist Party (HP) were chosen as 
the three (Cumhuriyet, 26/08/1983). 
Another way to preserve the new democracy was, Evren argued, to have a new type of 
politician that would henceforth be the only type of politician in Turkey. The new politician 
for Turkey was expected to protect the unity and secular nature of Turkey and have this as 
his/her priority (Cumhuriyet, 24/08/1983). The possibility of having a different type of 
politician, that is to say having politicians who would be interested in the equality of classes, 
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or have religious orientations, needed to be diminished if not discarded and replaced with 
Evren‘s new type of politician. 
The National Security Commission then continued to exert similar methods to gain stability 
between 1981 and 1982. It applied restrictions on political involvement of citizens and trade 
unions by dissolving the confederations of trade unions including the Marxist trade-union 
federation (DISK) immediately after the coup. This resulted in the DISK‘s leader, Aptullah 
Basturk, and over fifty officials of this confederation being given the death penalty in 
December 1981 by the Martial Law Command prosecutor for alleged involvement with 
terrorism. Although they had denied any involvement in terrorism, they were judged under 
section 141 of the Penal Code with having run a Marxist-Leninist illegal revolutionary 
organisation that had conspired to set up the ―dictatorship of the proletariat‖ (Dodd 1990: 54; 
Harris 1985: 66). Their five-year trial ended in December 1986 (Hale 1994: 253). 
Furthermore, the Turkish Peace Association, a pro-disarmament pressure group, was charged 
under section 141 with having been an allegedly communist front organisation (Hale 1994: 
253). The National Security Commission also brought tight control to the universities by 
means of a new Higher Education law, which virtually ended their independence from the 
government (Hale 1994: 253). 
The National Security Commission‘s decision on the DISK prompted Mr Pannella to table a 
motion on the forthcoming execution of a Turkish trade unionist (EC Doc. 1981b). In the 
same motion, it was claimed that the military regime in Turkey was being increasingly 
repressive and totalitarian and the motion requested the suspension of the trade unionists in 
prison. It also requested that Turkey comply with the European Convention on Human Rights 
which Turkey had ratified. Allegations of breaches of provisions of the European Convention 
of Human Rights by Turkey were formally tabled, under Article 24 of the Convention, by 
five countries, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, of which three were 
members of the European Community. These allegations were referred to the European 
Commission (Cumhuriyet, 02/07/1982). Furthermore, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission recommended to the Council of Ministers ―that aid under the Fourth 
Protocol should be withheld pending further progress towards restoration of civilian rule‖ in 
December 1981 (Dodd 1990: 60–61). And in July 1982 the EP expressed its concerns in 
relation to reports alleging the continued use of torture and the ill-treatment of prisoners. It 
argued that it was disturbed by the continuing political trials of former politicians among 
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others, the difficulties with which the defence council was confronted and the constant 
demands for the death penalty. And it asked the National Security Commission to ensure that 
human rights were respected, particularly in the case of persons on trial or in detention, and 
called for the removal of all restrictions preventing former Turkish political and trade union 
figures from taking part in public debate and voting in parliamentary elections. The EP also 
called on the European Commission to recommend that the European Council of Ministers 
adopt the Fourth EC–Turkey Financial Protocol as soon as the National Security Commission 
completed the various stages of re-establishing democracy in the Turkish political system. It 
proposed sending a delegation representing all shades of political opinion of the European 
Parliament to act as observers during the campaign preceding the constitutional referendum 
planned for the autumn of 1982 as it had already done in associated countries (OJEC 1982). 
4.3. Conclusions 
The strength of historical institutionalism‘s approach to institutional evolution is that it 
accepts that institutions evolve through institutional change. Pierson argues that institutional 
change is an important part of institutional evolution. This is very helpful because it 
instructed me to look for institutional change in the MGK‘s position to understand and to 
explain how and why the MGK evolved. As to what concept to use to explain institutional 
change, Peters‘ point that historical institutionalists generally use the concept of critical 
junctures and the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain institutional change has been 
informative. As said earlier in Chapter 1, I use the concept of critical juncture to understand 
and explain incremental institutional changes. Hogan and Cortell and Peterson‘s references to 
the likely sources of critical junctures have allowed me identify the military interventions of 
1960, 1971 and 1980 as Critical Junctures (I–III). Additionally Gourevitch‘s and Capoccia 
and Kelemen‘s points on the characteristics of critical junctures have helped me to highlight 
under what conditions the Critical Junctures (I–III) took place, what changes were introduced 
to the MGK‘s position in Turkish political system at these critical junctures, and what impact 
the choices and the decisions made at these junctures had on the development of Turkey–
EEC/EC relations. One other point is that Streeck and Thelen‘s emphasis on the modes of 
institutional change has helped to show that the mode of changes in the MGK‘s position was 
―empowerment‖. 
When I applied historical institutionalism‘s position on institutional evolution to find out 
about both the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations, I 
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identified the Turkish army‘s interventions in politics in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980 as Critical 
Junctures (I–III). I highlighted the interaction between these critical junctures and the 
evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations (1959–1983). I 
found that these critical junctures were instigated by domestic political, economic and social 
instabilities and the politician‘s lack of control over these tensions. I then highlighted that the 
MGK‘s position was incrementally empowered at each of these critical junctures. While the 
MGK was an advisory body in 1930s, by the 1980s it evolved into a paramount institution in 
the Turkish political system. I argue that the MGK was empowered because the Turkish 
politicians were not able to take the initiative to produce policies not only to prevent political, 
economic and social tensions among the people of Turkey, but also to take measures to 
control the domestic instabilities. Therefore the MGK was empowered to make 
recommendations to the Council of Ministers to maintain peace and social well-being in 
Turkey. I found that although the Turkish military was pro-European and wanted Turkey to 
improve its relations with the EEC and gain an Associative Membership of the EEC, its 
decision to close political parties, to execute Menderes and Zorlu, and to restrict people‘ 
involvement in politics slowed down Turkey‘s progress in receiving the EEC‘s Associative 
Membership in early 1960s. Furthermore, Critical Juncture (II), that is, the army‘s ultimatum 
which demanded Demirel resign, made the authorities in the EC wonder about democratic 
features of the Turkish political system. By the 1980s, at Critical Juncture (III), the EC 
constantly asked Turkey to establish a democratic political system and respect human rights; 
however the strict governing style of the army meant that the EC chose not to have any 
dialogue with Turkey. 
This chapter has provided a new analysis of the evolution of the MGK and development of 
Turkey–EEC/EC relations. This is because (1) the Turkish army‘s intervention in politics has 
not been studied in the context of critical junctures and therefore the role of critical junctures 
in both the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relation have not 
been studied before and (2) historical institutionalism‘s position on institutional evolution has 
not been utilised before as it has been in this chapter. Therefore the chapter is different to 
what has been said previously on why the MGK‘s powers were extended and how Turkey‘s 
relationship with EEC/EC developed. It is also different because it pays a greater attention to 
domestic causation in how and why the MGK evolved and how and why Turkey–EEC/EC 
relations developed slowly and stalled by the 1980s. 
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In this chapter I also demonstrated that Critical Junctures (I–III) have contributed to the 
evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In particular, as 
shown above, by the early 1980s the MGK acquired new powers and responsibilities by 
which it became the most effective institution in the Turkish political system. In the next 
chapter therefore I will analyse how the MGK practiced its newly acquired powers and assess 
what this meant for both the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s Full Membership 


















CHAPTER 5: THE MGK’S TENDENCY TO RULE THROUGH A STATE OF 
EMERGENCY AND ITS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH EC/EU MEMBERSHIP 
CRITERIA, 1983–1997 
Introduction 
Every book or journal article written on Turkish politics mentions the National Security 
Council‘s (MGK‘s) important position in the Turkish political system. A number of them 
discuss this around its role in determining Turkey‘s Kurdish policy, but mostly by implication 
rather than directly. Their arguments tend to be limited to stating that the MGK plays a 
significant role in determining policies on the Kurdish issue, and questioning whether the 
army members of the MGK overrule the civilian members‘ position in relation to the Kurdish 
Workers‘ Party (PKK), without very much in-depth analysis. Examples include Barkey and 
Fuller (1998), Nachmani (2003) and Guler (2005). Thus, there is a need to go beyond this 
current academic analysis and approach. It is important to look at how the MGK developed; 
how it began to practice its newly acquired powers and responsibilities; what social and 
political developments enabled the MGK to use its new status in the Turkish political system; 
and how/why the MGK‘s practice of its extended powers did influence the progress of 
democracy and human rights in Turkey between 1983 and 1997. Additionally, for most 
academics who have written on relations between Turkey and the European Community, 
Turkey‘s treatment of its Kurdish citizens and the Kurdish issue have generally been seen as 
an obstacle to Turkey‘s aspirations to join the EC, and they have suggested that Turkey‘s 
poor human rights records caused deterioration in its relations with the EU. Apart from lack 
of depth in their analysis, these works do not pay necessary attention to domestic political 
developments in Turkey. Examples include Cornell (2001), Ergil (2000), Evin (2005), 
McDowall (1992), Abramowitz (1993), Cooper (1994) and Calis (2001). It should be asked 
what institution could have been behind the handling of the PKK, and how this handling 
impacted on Turkey–EC/EU relations. We also need to perhaps reassess what caused poor 
democracy and human rights in Turkey at this time. This chapter proposes to test whether 
rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the relationship 
between the MGK and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. 
 Thus there are three main questions this chapter will tackle: 
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 What school of New Institutionalism can best explain the relationship between the 
MGK‘s path of state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations? 
 How and why did the MGK determine the Turkish government‘s political actions 
regarding the Kurdish issue/the PKK? 
What developments between 1983 and 1997 made Yilmaz‘s government call for a freeze on 
political dialogue with the European Union (EU) in 1997, when the government had worked 
hard to revitalise the relationship in the early 1980s, had applied for Full Membership in 
1987, and had signed the customs union in 1994? 
To answer the above questions, this chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part I 
will assess the current literature on the Kurdish issue and the PKK in the context of relations 
between Turkey and the EU, and discuss their weaknesses and omissions. Then I will move 
on to develop a theoretical debate as to which school of New Institutionalism can better 
explain the interaction between institutions and institutional action. In the second part I will 
adopt the historical institutionalist framework, using the concepts of path dependence and 
unintended consequences to explain the interaction between the MGK‘s policy preferences 
and Turkey‘s bid to join the EC/EU. In the third part I will make an assessment about firstly 
how and why the MGK maintained the state of emergency in the Kurdish region and 
secondly assess what school of new institutionalism is better equipped to explain the 
relationship between the institutional action and policy outcome. My conclusions will draw 
together all the findings of this chapter. 
5.1. Assessment of the literature on the Kurdish issue, the PKK, and Turkey-EU 
relations and the theoretical debate 
Turkey‘s relationship with the EC/EU (1983–1997) and the emergence and evolution of the 
PKK and the Kurdish issue have been widely researched among scholars specialised in 
Turkish politics (Gunter 1994; Ergil 2000; Yegen 1996; Guler 2005; Ozcan 2006; Heper 
2007; and Marcus 2007). These two research areas are often considered together in order to 
try to understand not only how the Kurdish issue impacted on Turkey‘s integration into the 
EU, but also how the EU influenced Turkey‘s treatment of the Kurds (McDowall 1992; Van 
Bruinessen 1992, 2000; Abramowitz 1993; Ergil 2000; Cornell 2001; Kirisci 2004; Evin 
2005). I would argue however that there has been a lack of depth in many of these analyses, 
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and there is a need for the kind of focus on the detail of Turkish domestic politics that I 
undertake in this chapter. 
Gunter (1994), writing in the early 1990s, argued that Turkey had an assimilative policy to-
wards the Kurds and suggested rather that the government should have constructed ―a socie-
tal and legal order that recognises the country‘s population as consisting of many strands, 
each entitled to some degree of identity‖, to resolve the issue of conflict with the Kurds (ibid.: 
24). Yegen (1996) argued that the Turkish state both misrepresented the Kurdish question and 
concealed the exclusion of Kurdish identity (ibid.: 216). Moving from how Kurds have been 
treated; Ergil (2000) analysed what consequences this treatment had on the Turkish political 
system, in particular he questioned how the Kurdish problem affected the fragility of Turkish 
democracy. For him: ―One of the greatest obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey has been the country‘s treatment of its Kurdish citizens. … The Kurdish problem is 
but one symptom of more general weaknesses of Turkish democracy‖ (ibid.: 123). Addition-
ally, Ulmar (2000) argued that the throughout the1990s both the government and the political 
parties treated the Kurdish question as a national security matter. Thus the Kurdish question 
was dealt with outside the political settings. According to Ulmar, this therefore gave the 
Turkish military the right to take actions in relation to the Kurdish problem (ibid.: 126). 
Pro-state academics like Guler (2005) and Heper (2007) have been less critical of state 
policies towards the Kurds. Guler (2005) has argued that ―Turkey neither has a Kurdish nor 
an identity problem, it has a problem with terrorism‖; and according to her, the PKK since its 
inception aimed to establish a Kurdistan independent of Turkey through what she named ―a 
bloody war against Turkey‖ (ibid.: 29). Similarly Heper, on the question of whether there was 
an assimilative policy applied to the Kurds, disagreed with the above mentioned academics 
Gunter (1994) and Ergil (2000), saying: ―the Turks and the Kurds, along with every other 
element of Turkish polity and society, have gone through a long process of mutual 
acculturation and, therefore, came to share a constellation of common ideals, values, and 
attitudes‖ (Heper 2007: 12). 
Ozcan (2006) and Marcus (2007) both discuss the PKK and the role of its leader, Ocalan. 
Ozcan‘s focus is the PKK‘s organisational structure and he argues that significant factors 
contributed to the growth of this organisation: the PKK‘s philosophy of the education; the 
emergence and the formation of capitalism in Turkey; and the Republican nature of Turkish 
political system, all of which have consolidated the PKK‘s structure. Marcus gives a 
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descriptive historical account of how and when the PKK was established, how it evolved, and 
the political developments and changes that occurred in the aftermath of the capture of 
Ocalan. Marcus describes the state policy towards the Kurds as ―assimilative‖ and 
―ignoring‖, based on ―refusal‖ (ibid.: 26, 85, 126 respectively). 
The literature outlined above does not ask what institutions shaped the governments‘ policy 
on the PKK and the Kurdish issue; it also fails to discuss how and by whom the PKK was 
handled. They therefore have not questioned the nature of the state of emergency in the 
Kurdish region and the consequences this had both on Turkey‘s political system and on the 
lives of the local inhabitants. However, a handful of scholars such as Guler (2005), Barkey 
and Fuller (1998) and Nachmani (2003) have identified the MGK as the key actor in 
determining policies towards the Kurds and the PKK. These works generally however lack 
further discussion of their arguments and evidence to back up their points of view. For 
instance, Guler (2005) argues that the MGK is the ―key actor in defining Turkey‘s policy 
toward the Kurds [and] makes Turkey‘s Kurdish policy‖ (ibid.: 139). It is not clear from this 
work why Guler thinks that the MGK is or was the key actor in determining Turkey‘s 
attitudes towards the Kurdish issue. Similarly Barkey and Fuller note: ―When it comes to the 
Kurdish question, the National Security Council (NSC) is the most influential state body‖ and 
they argue that the MGK has submitted opinions on ―renewing Operation Provide … 
renewing the state of emergency in the south east … deciding the curriculum in schools‖ 
(1998: 143–44). These academics however fail to question to whom the MGK made 
recommendations, and why it called a state of emergency in the South East of Turkey. They 
do not look at whether the MGK succeeded in eradicating the PKK. Most importantly, 
Barkey and Fuller lack a discussion of what kind of regime evolved in the state of emergency 
zone over this time. Nachmani (2003), rather, speculates on how powerful the army members 
of the MGK were in dealing with the PKK and notes that ―policy towards the Kurds 
continued to be determined by the army … in the mixed decision-making bodies the military 
has the upper hand when it comes to the Kurdish issue. The discussions pertaining to the 
Kurds made by Turkey‘s National Security Council (NSC) – a body that makes 
recommendations to the cabinet – often reflect the military stand and [are] rarely overruled‖ 
(Nachmani 2003: 33–34). However, Nachmani does not acknowledge that Article Seven of 
the Law of the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National Security 
Council (see appendix 1) states that army and civilian members of the MGK have equal 
number of votes in the decision making process and a decision is only made by simple 
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majority. Additionally, in the early 1990s, when Ozal talked about developing a political 
solution to the Kurdish issue, the MGK‘s press releases showed that Ozal had succeeded in 
influencing the views of all the MGK members, including the military members. I would 
argue that this indicates that as long as the civilian members of the MGK were determined to 
pursue a policy and had strong negotiation skills, they were able to change the opinion of the 
army members of the MGK. It is therefore important to simply assess the MGK‘s role in the 
government‘s handling of the Kurdish issue and go beyond speculating whether the army 
members of the MGK were stronger than the civilian members. 
As far as Kurdish question is discussed in the context of Turkey-EU relations, Cornell (2001), 
Evin (2005) and Ergil (2000) make made general statements about how the Kurdish issue 
affected Turkey‘s aspirations to join the EU. I found these mentioned very useful to 
understand how the Kurdish question has been treated in the context of Turkey‘s aspirations 
to join the EC/EU; and there is seems to an agreement how negatively the Kurdish issue 
impacted on the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. Cornell argues that the Kurdish question 
was the most serious internal problem of Turkey and became the main obstacle to its bid for 
closer integration with Europe (2001: 31). Evin analyses the Kurdish issue as ―the key area of 
tension between Turkey and the European Union‖ (2005: 38). Ergil earlier suggested that the 
Kurdish issue played a very important role in the process of Turkey‘s accession to the EU 
(2000: 123). However, these works lacked detailed analysis of how and why the Kurdish has 
been either an obstacle for Turkey‘s accession to the EC/EU or source of tensions between 
Turkey and EC/EU. 
McDowall (1992), Abramowitz (1993), Cooper (1994) and Calis (2001), in contrast to the 
above mentioned academics, have focused on why the Kurdish issue has influenced the na-
ture of Turkey–EC/EU relations. McDowall refers to the state‘s oppressive policy towards 
the Kurds and its poor human rights records (1992: 21). Agreeing with McDowall, 
Abramowitz and Cooper both argue that political relations with Europe have not prospered 
mainly because of the internal war against the Kurdish insurgency and the PKK (Abramovitz 
1993: 166–67 and Cooper 1994: 127). Calis argues that EC‘s perception of the Kurdish issue 
as an ethnic problem, and the Turkish government‘s recognition of this as a move threatening 
the indivisibility of the Republic, have resulted in conflicting conceptions that ultimately 
troubled the relationship between them (2001: 263).  Picking on Calis‘s argument in relation 
to Turkey and the EU‘s different security perceptions, Ozcan (2008) argued that during the 
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1990s the impact of the EU on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy were limited since Turkey 
was not a candidate country. Also Turkey‘s struggle with the PKK and the criticisms of Eu-
ropean countries from the point of human rights was a major point of friction. Additionally 
Ozcan (2008) argued that the security threat against the territorial integrity of the state legiti-
mized the role of army in the politics in the eyes of the general public and many Turks be-
lieved that European countries either did not understand Turkey‘s concerns or consciously 
opposed Turkey‘s policies (ibid.: 133). 
There has been academic engagement with both the Kurdish question and Turkish foreign 
politics in the context of wider international politics in the 1990s – the end of Cold War, the 
beginning of the gulf War and the emergence of the newly independent former Soviet states. 
Kut (2000) has suggested that in the 1990s Turkey‘s domestic and foreign politics were at 
their most problematic and intertwined; the rising Kurdish problem in the South East of Tur-
key, increasing radical Islam in Iran, Turkey‘s European policy, and Turkey‘s relations with 
Greece were all influencing each other‘s direction (ibid.:57). Kut however puts particular fo-
cus on the standards of democracy in Turkey and its human rights records in shaping Tur-
key‘s problematic European policy. She argues that the1990s made Turkish politicians and 
the public more informed of Turkey‘s geopolitical position, role and power which made them 
feel overly secure at times and overly insecure on other occasions. Additionally, Ulman 
(2000) has conducted archival research into the situation in the 1990s to find out how the 
government, the political parties and the military treated the Kurdish problem and what posi-
tions they adopted on the extension of the State of Emergency in the Kurdish region. Ulman 
observed that the Motherland Party (ANAP) had a changing perception and treatment of the 
Kurdish problem (ibid.: 109); found that Suleyman Demirel recognised the Kurdish question 
as a state security problem that was not in the remit of elected politicians to re-
solve (ibid.: 110); and suggested that the military did not share the power to make deci-
sions in relation to the Kurdish question with the civilian authorities (ibid.: 118–119). 
Van Bruinessen‘s (1992) and Kirisci‘s (2004) focus has been the growing Kurdish diaspora 
in Western European countries. Van Bruinessen analysed how these groups strengthened the 
Kurdish movements in ―Kurdistan‖ and found that the emergence of an organised Kurdish 
diaspora changed the nature of the Kurdish question. In his later work (2000), he showed that 
Turkey‘s poor performance in human rights and its handling of the Kurdish issue was a big 
concern for the EU when Turkey‘s progress was assessed (ibid.: 28). Kirisci (2004) notes 
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how the growing diaspora has influenced the European Parliament‘s attitude towards Turkey, 
arguing that ―the PKK in Europe became increasingly successful in mobilizing the Kurdish 
Diaspora and leading the campaign against Turkey. This was reflected in growing barrage of 
criticisms directed against Turkey for violating the human rights of Kurds. … [T]he European 
Parliament (EP) suspended financial assistance to Turkey‖ (ibid.: 296–97). Although Van 
Bruinessen‘s and Kirisci‘s perspectives have been useful in understanding the role of the 
diaspora in shaping the future of the Kurdish issue, these works do not discuss in any depth 
what made the Kurdish communities in Europe leave their own country; they omit to 
recognise that these were one of the characteristics of the state of emergency; and they fail to 
contextualise them as part of the unintended consequences of the MGK‘s policy of imposing 
a state of emergency. 
Apart from the specific weaknesses and omissions of the works covered above, there are a 
number of general weaknesses and omissions in the above studied literature: 
 they lack detailed assessment of how Turkey‘s handling of the PKK/the Kurdish issue 
influenced the nature of Turkey–EU relations 
 they lack any serious questioning as to which institutions in particular have 
contributed to the government‘s political action towards the PKK 
 they omit to explain the reasons for Turkey‘s weak democracy and poor human rights 
record 
 they overlook how Turkey‘s poor human rights and weak democracy affected 
Turkey‘s progress towards EC/EU membership. 
This chapter therefore will give a detailed assessment of Turkey-EU relations (1983–1997). It 
proposes to do this by questioning the MGK‘s new position in the Turkish institutional 
setting, in particular by paying more attention to its role in handling the PKK. In addition, I 
will outline what consequences the MGK‘s actions had for the Turkish political system and 
then analyse how this impacted on Turkey‘s application for the Full Membership of the EC in 
1987, its aspirations to establishing the Customs Union in 1994, and its position at the 
Luxembourg Summit of 1997. 
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Having debated the strengths and the weaknesses of the existing literature on the Kurdish is-
sue, the PKK, and Turkey–EU relations, I now want to move on to discuss the schools of 
New Institutionalism, and which of their approaches to the relationship between institutions 
and policy outcomes can best explain the interaction between the MGK‘s state of emergency 
path and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, while 
sociological institutionalism adopts a cultural approach to explaining the relationship between 
institutions and policy outcomes, rational choice institutionalism tends to opt for a calculus 
approach. For sociological institutionalists the individuals involved are ―satisfiers, rather than 
utility maximizers‖, which means that the individual‘s choice of action depends on the inter-
pretation of a situation rather than on a purely instrumental calculation (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 939). This is called the ―cultural approach‖ under which the individual‘s established 
routines and familiar pattern of behaviour do trend to decide their actions. If one were to ap-
ply this cultural approach to explain the relationship between the MGK‘s preference to keep 
the state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relation, one would argue that both 
the MGK‘s choice to maintain the state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU rela-
tions were shaped by established routine and familiar behaviour. One main problem with the 
cultural approach is that it takes the established routines and familiar behaviour as given, it 
does not seem to question how they are established and in what time scale they have devel-
oped. Nevertheless I will later check how useful the cultural approach can be for the question 
in hand in this chapter. For rational choice institutionalists the individuals are utility maxi-
misers; institutions affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the 
actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action. 
Strategic interaction clearly plays a key role in such analyses (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939; see 
also Lecours 2005: 9–11). If one were to adopt the calculus approach to explain the relation-
ship between the MGK‘s Kurdish policy preference and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU rela-
tions, then it can be suggested that the members of the MGK were motivated to maximise its 
gains through keeping the state of emergency and Turkish political leaders kept Turkey‘s bid 
to join the EU so to increase their benefits from Turkey–EC/EU relations. The calculus ap-
proach can be useful to highlight relationship between the members of the institution, as well 
as the political leaders‘ behaviour in relation to a policy area. This is something I will test in 
the very last part of this chapter. In contrast to sociological and rational choice institutional-
ism, historical institutionalism offers the temporal approach that can be utilised to explain the 
interaction between institutional action and policy outcomes. As shown in Chapter 1 and 2, 
the historical institutionalist concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences to-
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gether form a very useful framework which I will use below to highlight the interaction be-
tween the MGK‘s maintenance of the state of emergency and Turkey‘s bid to join the EU, 
and the outcomes of this interaction on the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations between 1983 
and 1997. 
5.2. Understanding the relationship between the MGK’s Kurdish Policy and the nature 
of Turkey-EEC/EU relations with the historical institutionalist approach 
5.2.1. The MGK’s Path of State of Emergency 
Chapter 4 showed that the MGK‘s powers and responsibilities were extended at Critical 
Juncture (III). Although it was clear that the MGK had evolved into a powerful institution as 
a result of the changes introduced the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and the National 
Security Council Law, No. 2945, the current academic literature lacks clear evidence that the 
MGK practiced its newly acquired powers in a context of policy making. To fill this gap this 
section will analyse the MGK‘s role in handling the rise of the insurgency by the PKK to 
show how the MGK determined political action in a policy area (the Kurdish question). This 
will be done in three sections: (1) will look at the Kurdish citizens of Turkey, ask where they 
come from and what language they speak, and discuss the emergence of the PKK; (2) will 
analyse how the MGK perceived the PKK, what recommendations (path) it made to the 
government for handling the PKK, and how it maintained this path; (3) will discuss what the 
MGK‘s path-dependent recommendations evolved into.  
(i) Emergence of the PKK 
When the Ottoman Empire fell the Kurds were dispersed between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Turkey. In the process of establishing the Turkish Republic those in Turkey were promised 
local autonomy, but these promises were not kept when the Republic was established. The 
Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and the Lausanne Conference of 1923 were the agreements that 
formed the foundation of the Kurds‘ position in the newly established Turkish Republic. The 
Treaty of Sevres was a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and its allies at the end of 
World War I (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 68). ―The Treaty has provided for local autonomy 
for ‗Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as 
it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontiers of Turkey with Syria and 
Mesopotamia‘ and referred to the possibility of independence for Kurds under certain 
conditions‖ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 68; Lundgren 2007: 21). However the Treaty was 
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never ratified by the signatories and the promises of administrative autonomy and even of 
―independence‖ were not kept (Atacan 2001: 131).The current boundaries of the Turkish 
Republic were established by the Lausanne Conference of 1923. This, according to Gunduz 
(2001) ―settled the ethnic problem once and for all‖ by permitting special status for non-
Muslim minorities only (Gunduz 2001: 25). All Muslim ethnic groups, primarily Kurds, were 
expected to identify themselves as Turks (Kramer 2000: 40; Ergil 2000: 125). 
Multiculturalism was rejected and the existence of separate Muslim ethnic groups was denied 
(Yegen 1996: 216). Until the late 1990s, Kurds were officially referred to as Mountain Turks 
(Dag Turkleri) (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 10–100; Gunter 1997: 6; Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 
111). 
Ergil (2000), and Ibrahim and Gurbey (2000) have observed that there is no reliable figure of 
how many Kurds there are living in Turkey, because the government has been reluctant to 
count the minorities in the belief that having an exact number would mean not only having to 
legally acknowledge the Kurdish minorities, but also having to satisfy their cultural and 
political demands (Ergil 2000: 127; Ibrahim and Gurbey 2000: 182 respectively). The figures 
given in different sources show a broad variation. The 1959 census estimated 10–20 per cent 
native Kurdish speakers (McLaren 2008: 39). Additionally, the results of the 1965 national 
census reveal the breakdown of the population by mother tongues – Kurdish speakers 
numbered 2.37 million. However, Van Bruinessen (1992) argued that a ―reasonable and even 
conservative‖ estimate for the size of the Kurdish population in Turkey in 1975 was 7.5 
million, which amounted to 19 per cent of the total population of 56.4 million (ibid.: 14–15). 
The European Commission‘s Regular Report on Turkey‘s progress towards accession said ―a 
population of Kurdish origin estimated at between 8 and 15 million, depending on the 
source‖ (1998: 19). 
The Kurdish language consists of several dialects and is related to Persian, but heavily 
influenced by Arabic and Turkish as well (Ergil 2000: 126). Van Bruinessen (1992) has 
argued: ―As a result of forced or voluntary assimilation … there are quite few Kurds who 
speak no, or only a poor Kurdish, preferring to use Turkish, Arabic, or Persian‖ (ibid.: 35). 
During the 1980 army intervention, 8,000 villages and towns were renamed in Turkish under 
Article 5542 of Turkish law, names of mountains and lakes were changed into Turkish, 
Kurdish families were forced to give Turkish names to their children (Ergil 2000: 127; 
Nachmani 2003: 33). Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution also introduced a number of 
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limitations on the use of Kurdish. Article (26) stated, ―No language prohibited by the State 
[namely Kurdish] shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought‖ and Article 
(28) banned publication in any language prohibited by law (McLaren 2008: 189). By these, 
according to Gunter (1990: 15–45) and Ergil (2000: 127), military regimes reemphasized the 
idea of the Turkishness of the people in Turkey. 
The Kurdish Workers‘ Party (PKK) was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. Ocalan had 
been a student in Ankara at the time of the 1970 coup, involved with the Revolutionary 
Youth (DEV-GENC) and the Ankara Higher Education Association (AYOD). Following the 
amnesty of 1974, Ocalan gathered six political colleagues to initiate a specifically Kurdish 
national liberation movement based on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism by ―an armed 
struggle to free themselves from Turkish colonization‖ (Marcus 2007: 27). In 1975, Ocalan 
and his followers withdrew from Turkish territory into the Kurdish marches, concentrating on 
building up a following in those areas from which they came: Urfa, Elazig, Tunceli, 
Gaziantep and Maras (McDowall 2000: 418; Marcus 2007: 28). In 1977, the followers of 
Ocalan identified the enemies of the Kurdish people as the fascists (Grey Wolves and similar 
groups); agents of the state and those who supported them; the Turkish Left, which 
subordinated the Kurdish question to the leftist revolution; and finally, the exploitative 
Kurdish landlord class (McDowall 2000: 419). 
The PKK was made of number of different divisions or related organisations which operated 
at various levels of command. Central committees acted as the highest organ of the PKK, 
subordinate only to the General Secretary, who was Ocalan. The Kurdistan National 
Liberation Front (ERNK) was the popular front and propaganda division (Gunter 1997: 35–
37). The Kurdistan Peoples Liberations Army (ARGK) was chosen to be the party‘s 
professional guerrilla army (Gunter 1997: 37–43). The Parliament-in-Exile (PKDW) 
represented the will of the people both inside and outside of Kurdistan (Gunter 1997: 43–45). 
The PKK‘s first goal was to establish a credible military force within Turkey that would 
challenge the political power of the authorities. When this was accomplished, the party was to 
expand its control to Kurdish areas beyond the Turkish border comprising parts of north-
eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria, and north-western Iran, where the Kurdish population was 
in the majority (Radu 2001: 50) and thus create a unified and independent Kurdish state 
(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 23). The method the PKK used against the Turkish Security Forces 
(TSK) was to launch a guerrilla campaign in the southern-eastern provinces. Ergil (2000: 
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127) and Nachmani (2003: 43) have argued that at first the PKK were able to regularly outwit 
the Turkish troops, who were inexperienced in and ill-equipped for guerrilla combat; and by 
employing hit-and-run tactics from their hideouts in the mountain, the PKK guerrillas were 
able to maintain military superiority over the Turkish security forces throughout the 1980s. 
Additionally, ―tourists destinations, and key government economic operations, such as 
transport and communication ... teacher and schools‖ were targeted by the PKK (McLaren 
2008: 188; Amnesty International 1996: 5; Barkey and Fuller 1998: 29). Yavuz and Ozcan 
(2006: 111) have argued that these successes significantly raised Kurdish political 
consciousness and developed new sets of Kurdish political and social networks within and 
outside Turkey. 
(ii) The MGK’s Path on the PKK and Kurds, 1983–1997 
When academics such as Barkey and Fuller (1998: 135), Nachmani (2003: 33) and Yildiz 
(2005) write about state of emergency, they generally devote a few lines to note that it was 
Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister, who called a state of emergency in 1989. There are four 
important facts that they do not mention: (1) when Turkey adopted democracy in 1983 there 
was a gradual movement towards lifting martial law from every part of the country; (2) that a 
state of emergency was called in the provinces where martial law was lifted, and extended 
every four months; (3) the state of emergency was then kept in the ten South Eastern 
provinces; and (4) it was the MGK that not only recommended to the Council of Ministers 
whether to call or remove martial law and the state of emergency, but also took decisions 
about where and when the government needed to take action. I would argue that Ozal‘s 
position in taking political action against the PKK has been overemphasised, and these 
academics have overlooked the MGK's role in calling and maintaining the state of 
emergency. This section will give a detailed account of how the MGK gradually removed 
martial law from many parts of Turkey and replaced it by a state of emergency. Furthermore, 
it will assess how and why the MGK established the path of state of emergency, and how and 
why it chose to maintain the state of emergency in the presence of other options. 
Under Law 2945, the MGK was asked to determine an opinion on the application of the 
national security policy of the Turkish Republic; national security means ―The protection and 
maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, 
cultural and economic interests in international field as well as against any kind of internal 
and external threats, of the State‖ (See Appendix 1). Because this chapter is only concerned 
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with the internal threat I shall not be considering the MGK‘s definition of external threat that 
may also be found in Law 2945. The MGK defines ―internal threat‖ as ―widespread acts of 
violence of either internal or external origin threatening the order, indivisibility of the 
country, and public order‖ (MGK‘s official website, author‘s translation).  
The fight between the ARGK (the Kurdish guerrilla army) and the TSK (the Turkish security 
forces) begun as soon as the PKK guerrillas moved into Turkey from Syria; and the ARGK‘s 
first attack was launched on military installations near Eruh and Semdinli in August 1984 
(Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 126). These developments however were not reflected in the 
MGK‘s discussions until early 1985. This showed that either the MGK did not realise how 
effective the PKK was going to become or it was too early for the MGK to comprehend the 
nature of these developments in the South East of Turkey; Ozcan (2000) noted that in the 
until mid-1980s the Kurdish movement was treated as a regional problem (ibid.:18). In early 
1985, the MGK perceived these clashes as ―regional unsettlements‖ (MGK Press Releases: 
25/01/1985). In the later meetings, between 1985 and 1990, frequent referrals to 
―developments in the South East‖ have been noted (MGK Press Releases: 31/08/1989, 
26/10/1989) and at times these have been recognised as ―terrorist movements‖ (ibid. : 
31/05/1985, 02/03/1986). When the MGK recognised the PKK as an internal threat to 
Turkey‘s indivisibility and public order, it began to make recommendations to the Turkish 
government on how to eradicate this threat. One of the recommendations was to declare, 
withdraw, extend and re-extend martial law or a state of emergency in the provinces selected 
by them. Before going into details, it is important to define what is meant by martial law and 
a state of emergency and identify under which circumstances these could be called and by 
whom. 
In Turkey, the Council of Ministers, after consultation with the MGK, may declare martial 
law in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months. 
It could be declared in the event of widespread acts of violence, which are more dangerous 
than the cases necessitating a state of emergency, that aim at the destruction of the free 
democratic order or the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, or, in 
the event of war, the emergence of a situation necessitating war, an uprising, or the spread of 
violent and strong rebellious actions against the motherland and the Republic (Article 122 of 
the Constitution of the Turkish Republic) (Alexander et al. 2008: 89–90). Provost (2002) has 
argued that the concept of a state of emergency was created in the French Law of 8 July 1791 
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in which ―the individual rights [that?] were entrenched in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen could be suspended in times of war‖ (ibid.: 269 footnote). In Turkey, 
after consulting with the MGK, the Council of Ministers could also declare a state of 
emergency. It could do this under two circumstances: whenever there was one or more of  
natural disasters, dangerous epidemic diseases, or serious crises; and whenever there 
appeared to be serious indications resulting from widespread acts of violence, which were 
aimed at destroying the free democratic order of fundamental rights and freedom, or violent 
acts causing serious deterioration to public order, more rigorous, or throughout the country 
for a period not exceeding six months (Alexander et al. 2008: 90–91). 
English scholars tend to omit a detailed account of where and for how long martial law or a 
state of emergency was called in Turkey. There is a tendency to keep the removal of martial 
law or re-extension of the state of emergency to a sentence without further detail or analysis. 
In this section I will examine in more detail where and how martial law or a state of 
emergency was called, and by so doing will go beyond the current academic works. 
Furthermore, I will question whether the MGK had other options to choose from at the 
choice-points.  
In March 1984, under the chairmanship of Kenan Evren, the President, and the others 
attending the MGK meeting, including Turgut Ozal, PM and M. Necdet Urug, Chief of the 
General Staff, the MGK agreed to recommend to the Council of Ministers that they remove 
Martial Law in 13 provinces (Kirklareli, Bilecik, Mus, Kutahya, Burdur, Canakkale, Kirsehir, 
Gumushane, Sinop, Isparta, Kastamonu, Cankiri, Bitlis); and suggested then calling a state of 
emergency in 8 of those provinces (Canakkale, Kirsehir, Gumushane, Sinop, Isparta, 
Kastamonu, Cankiri, Bitlis) for another 4 months. Additionally, it was decided to re-extend 
martial law in the rest of the country for another 4 months (MGK Press Releases: 
01/03/1984). Despite the EC‘s requests to remove martial law from every province of 
Turkey, the government later in 1984 was then advised to remove martial law and call a state 
of emergency in the following provinces: Afyon, Amasya, Aydin, Balikesir, Bolu, Corum, 
Mugla, Nevsehir, Nigde, Rize, Sakarya, Tekirdag, and Yozgat. The MGK also recommended 
lifting the state of emergency in Bitlis, Canakkale, Kastamonu, and Sinop but not in Isparta, 
Kirsehir, Cankiri, and Gumushane (ibid.: 28/06/1984). Additionally, even though Turkey‘s 
political system was under close scrutiny by the EC in 1986, the MGK members 
recommended that the ANAP government lift martial law and call a state of emergency in 
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Bingol, Elazig, Tunceli, and Sanliurfa; and re-extend the state of emergency for another 4 
months in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and Van (ibid.: 02/03/1986). 
By late 1987, martial law was completely lifted from every province in Turkey but the MGK 
had recommended the government to call for a state of emergency in many of the provinces 
in the South East of Turkey. Since the MGK continuously recommended the Turkish 
government to re-extend these state of emergency orders, by the early 1990s a effectively 
permanent state of emergency zone had been established in the South East of Turkey. This 
zone included the provinces where:  Kurdish citizens of Turkey lived; the PKK camps were 
generally located; and the fight between the PKK militants and TSK soldiers mostly took 
place. Thus in 1987 the MGK‘s press releases showed that the MGK had recommended to the 
Council of Ministers that they remove Martial Law from Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt and 
Hakkari and declare a state of emergency in them for another four months and re-extend the 
state of emergency in Istanbul, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli, and Van for another 4 months (ibid.: 
16/05/1987). 
While the MGK referred to the PKK and its activities as ―regional developments‖ in the mid 
1980s, by the 1990s the MGK‘s use of vocabulary had changed significantly. This issue 
occupied much of the MGK‘s quarterly meetings between the late 1980s and 1997. The PKK 
and its activities were regarded as ―terrorist and anarchic movements in the South East‖ 
(MGK Press Releases: 23/02/1990); as ―Divisive movements‖ (ibid.: 27/01/1992); and as 
―divisive and separatist‖ (ibid.: 31/03/1992, 24/05/1993, 21/061993). The PKK was often 
referred to as a ―separatist terrorist organisation‖ (ibid.: 21/12/1992, 22/01/1993, 22/12/1993, 
30/03/1993, 28/12/1994, 25/01/1995, 24/04/1995, 25/12/1995, 28/12/1995, 31/05/1996, 
31/10/1996); as ―separatist terror‖ (ibid.: 25/08/1993, 22/03/1996, 16/06/1996, 25/07/1996, 
and 28/02/1997); and as a ―terrorist organisation‖ (ibid.: 14/04/1995). Clearly, by this point 
the MGK perceived the PKK as a terrorist organisation and its activities as terrorism. 
Between 1990 and 1997, a number of different options were made available to the MGK‘s 
original path. In the 1990s, Turgut Ozal, then the President, suggested that the PKK could be 
tackled through political and democratic means. The EC/EU asked the Turkish authorities on 
several occasions to lift the state of emergency. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, Ocalan, the 
leader of the PKK, called for a unilateral ceasefire twice in order to create the basis for a 
peaceful solution. However, none of these three options, proposed by different actors, broke 
the MGK‘s stasis; the original path was kept to.  
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In accordance with its established position, the MGK continued to advise the government of 
the day to re-extend the state of emergency in the chosen ten provinces: Batman, Bingol, 
Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van. In October 1996, 
Mardin was included in the state of emergency zone and Elazig was removed permanently 
from the zone (Ibid.: 31/10/1996).  
Assessment of the MGK‘s press releases shows that in the early 1990s, the MGK began to 
discuss whether democratic means could be used to tackle the PKK. Having said that, it also 
expressed openly its support for Ozal, when he put forward plans for a peaceful and 
democratic solution to the conflict between the PKK and the TSK (ibid.: 27/12/1991). In 
early 1992, the press releases showed that the MGK had Ozal‘s proposals for a democratic 
solution on its agenda for discussion and on 25 February 1992, it suggested that the 
government should tackle the PKK through democratic terms and means. Furthermore, they 
advised Ozal‘s government to take measures to strengthen the relationship between the state 
and its citizens living in the state of emergency zone, and suggested that the government 
should improve the economic conditions in the South East of Turkey so that people in that 
region could live in similar conditions of those in the West (ibid.: 25/02/1992). 
There are two important points to be made on the MGK‘s new position on democracy and 
human rights. The first is that the MGK‘s emphasis on democracy, on rule of law, and on 
human rights was never reflected in its practical recommendations; this meant that the MGK 
continued to recommend that the Council of Ministers keep the state of emergency in the 
Kurdish region. The second is that, in March 1992, talks about democracy, human rights and 
the use of democratic means disappeared from the MGK‘s agenda. The MGK began to say 
that the TSK would use every means to fight against the PKK – the MGK‘s emphasis had 
shifted from ―democracy‖ to ―the protection of national and territorial unity‖. The MGK‘s 
Press Releases of August 1992 made this absolutely clear: ―every available method will be 
used to eradicate the terrorist organization to protect national and territorial unity‖ (ibid.: 
27/08/1992, author‘s translation and emphasis). 
Barkey and Fuller (1998: 136) have argued that ―Ozal was successful in shifting the terms of 
the debate within the state and in introducing alternative approaches‖. In addition Larrabee 
and Lesser (2003) argue that the political environment in Turkey is very volatile and suggest 
that political parties come and go, while the MGK is a lasting and stabilizing force that can 
play a conciliatory role in the disputes among political parties. Strong prime ministers or 
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presidents like Turgut Ozal can resist the pressure of the MGK (ibid.: 28).This short-term 
rhetorical change/new dimension was an outcome of Ozal‘s success in influencing the views 
of the members of the MGK. There are two important conclusions one could draw from this. 
The first is that this shows that was dialogue between Ozal and probably the army member of 
the MGK. The outcome indicates that Ozal was successful in influencing the army members 
of this institution, which means that the army members are not in stasis and do not have the 
upper hand in the MGK (this will be discussed further in this chapter). This also shows, in 
contrast to what Peters et al. (2005) proposed above, that there could be challenges among the 
politicians or the members of an institution during stasis and this does not necessarily 
produce a long-term change to the original path, but it creates a new short-term dimension – 
which disappears once the disagreements or the person who initiated the bargaining 
disappears from the political scene. The second is that one could speculate that if Ozal had 
not passed away unexpectedly he could have gradually changed the minds of the members of 
the MGK, could have succeeded in lifting the state of emergency in the early 1990s and could 
have had developed a political solution to the issue there and then 
(iii) Characteristics of the State of Emergency Zone 
The characteristics of the state of emergency ruling have not been contextualised by the 
current academic literature on Turkish politics. This chapter argues that the MGK‘s path of 
state of emergency generated a unique regime in the South East of Turkey with distinct 
characteristics to prevent the local people supporting the PKK guerrillas and to fight against 
terrorism. These characteristics are namely legal measures, regional governors, village 
guards, the anti-terrorism law, and the evacuation of the villages. This section will consider 
the features of the state of emergency and discuss the consequences of the MGK‘s path of 
state of emergency. 
The legal measures taken to fight against the PKK and the PKK supporters included the 
following: 
 Any kinds of assembly or procession or movement or vehicles in certain places or 
within certain hours were prohibited; 
 Officials were authorised to search persons, their vehicles, or property; 
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 People living or entering the state of emergency region had to carry identity cards at 
all times; 
 Permission was required to publish and to distribute newspapers, magazines, etc.; 
 Persons or groups of persons believed to be disrupting public order or public security 
were prohibited from entering the concerned regions; such people or groups were 
expelled from such regions; and 
 Assemblies and demonstrations in both enclosed and open spaces were prohibited 
(Alexander et al. 2008: 90–93).  
The ―regional governors‖ were appointed by the government to contain and to prevent 
existing or potential social disturbances in the region with the use of forces under their 
command or with the use of security forces specially organised for this purpose (Alexander et 
al. 2008: 96). In addition, they were expected to bring co-ordination to the various bodies 
fighting the guerrillas including the police, the gendarmerie, the army and the village guards 
(McDowall 2000: 425).  
The definition of terrorism emerging from the ―anti-terrorism law‖ was identical with the 
MGK‘s definition and perception of what the internal threat was. What the MGK defined as 
an internal threat was defined as terrorism by the anti-terrorism law. One difference was that 
the MGK‘s definition of internal threat predominantly covered the PKK, its guerrillas, and its 
activities, while this law‘s perception of terrorism encompassed everyone in Turkey, most 
particularly those local people who lived in the state of emergency zone. Under the anti-
terrorism law, ―terrorism‖ was defined as any kind of act done by one or more persons 
belonging to an organisation with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Turkish 
Republic (Alexander et al. 2008: 117). Some of the articles which influenced many of the 
people‘s everyday life in the regions are as follows: As far as disclosure and publications 
were concerned, Article 6.2 stated that those who printed or published the leaflets and 
declarations of terrorist organisations would be punished (ibid.: 118). Those who assisted 
members of organisation constituted in the manner described above or made propaganda in 
connection with such organisations would be punished with imprisonment. Where assistance 
was provided to organisations in the form of buildings or premises, the punishment was to be 
doubled. The activities of associations, trade unions, and similar institutions found to have 
supported terrorism would be banned (ibid.: 119). Furthermore, Article 8.1 said that any kind 
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of propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state, either written or oral propaganda and 
assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of Turkish 
Republic were forbidden and those conducting such activities would receive punishment 
(ibid.: 119–120).  
The system of ―village guard‖ was activated in 1985 by the amendment (3175) to the Village 
Law (Article 74), by which the unelected village guards became public servants (Kirisci and 
Winrow 1997: 129), paid by the Ministry of Interior Affairs (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 147). 
The size of this force reached almost sixty two thousands by the end of the 1990s (bid.: 147–
48). According to Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 129), the village guard system was not only 
used to improve security in the rural areas, but also to determine the loyalty of the villagers to 
the TSK. The Regional Governors were empowered to evacuate villages on a temporary or 
permanent basis so as to deprive the Kurdish armed movements from logistical support from 
the civilian population. The exact number of destroyed and evacuated villages is difficult to 
establish, since some villages are comprised of several settlements, each with its own name, 
and some quarters of villages might have been burned, while others were spared. In its 
booklet for the Habitat II conference in Istanbul 1996, the Turkish Human Rights Association 
(IHD) stated that over two thousand villages were destroyed by the end of 1995 (Ibrahim and 
Gurbey 2000: 182). In summer 1997, it was reported that there just over three thousand 
villages were evacuated (Radikal, 14/07/1997). Ergil (2000) has said that the South East of 
Turkey ―differed from the rest of the country‖ (ibid.: 324). The scholars‘ views however 
varied on in how differences existed between the Kurdish region and the other parts of 
Turkey. Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 122), Nachmani (2003: 42), Alexanders et al. (2008: 236) 
and Guler (2005: 30) have described the region as less economically developed, but they lack 
attention as to how and why the Kurdish region had received less economic and financial 
investment. Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 122) have said ―it would be wrong to suggest that this 
was the product of deliberate policy on the part of the Turkish government‖. I would agree 
with Kirisci and Winrow that this was not a deliberate act, but suggest that it is important to 
consider what or who produced or perpetuated the level of impoverishment in the region. 
Unlike the above discussed academics, Yildiz and Muller (2005) and Heper (2007) have 
shown the effects of the state of emergency ruling on the people living in the region and how 
the features of this strict regime violated their civil liberties. Yildiz and Muller particularly 
focus on the role of ―village guards‖, noting that ―the Kurds were subject to further violence 
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by the Village Guard‖ and describing the ―village guards‖ as ―inadequately supervised‖, 
resulting ―widespread notoriety following respected accusations of theft, beatings, and rape‖ 
(ibid.: 17). I would agree with Yildiz and Muller that the village guards misused their power 
and humiliated many women and children in particular. Their emphasis on how much these 
village guards were unsupervised is also vital. There was no job description or any sort of 
educational requirement for one to be employed as a village guard, which meant any men 
interested in taking this position would be given a weapon and this would make him stronger 
than the rest of the villagers. Heper (2007: 60) similarly notes that under the state of 
emergency such ―extreme human rights violations as illegal executions, murders by unknown 
persons, death while in custody, forceful evacuations of villages, and molestations and torture 
did take place‖. Heper then suggests that the reason village guards conducted themselves in 
that way was because they ―thought they were acting as patriots trying to maintain the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of the country‖ (ibid.: 161), although he adds that 
he would not condone such practices, arguing that these were not ―the official policy of 
Ankara‖, by which he means the policy of the government (ibid.: 160–61). While I would 
agree with Heper that it was not an official policy, one should not overlook the fact that the 
civilian and the military members of the MGK had equal say on the decisions made in the 
MGK. The PMs and some of the government ministers who sat in the MGK between 1983 
and 1997 played an equal part in shaping the nature of the recommendations the MGK made. 
When academics write about economic circumstances and human rights records in the 
Kurdish region, I would argue that they should ask what caused this and which institutions‘ 
decisions have been behind these developments, and further ask whether this is deliberate, 
and if not, how this could be explained. Thus, in this chapter I would challenge the 
functionalists‘ arguments that institutions are efficient and that they always produce the 
intended outcome. I ask, if decisions of institutions do only produce the intended or the 
anticipated outcomes, then what can explain the situations where institutions not only fail to 
produce the intended outcomes, but also produce unintended consequences? One can see 
from the evidence above that the characteristics of the state of emergency produced a strict 
regime in the South East of Turkey over time. Local people living in the area were deprived 
of their civil liberties – restrictions were applied on their mobility in and outside the region 
and on how they could assemble. Businessmen were discouraged from making investments in 
these areas because of the constant military operation and clashes between the PKK‘s ARGK 
guerrillas and the TSK‘s soldiers. Many of the schools in the region were shut, depriving a 
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significant proportion of the school children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the area 
remained poor and underdeveloped when compared to other parts of Turkey. In addition, the 
locals were ruled and governed by unelected, unrepresentative and illegitimate bodies; and 
the regional governors and the village guards mostly misused their powers and made the local 
people‘ life unbearable. 
(iv) Tracing the MGK’s Path of State of Emergency and its Options and 
Characteristics 
The assessments of the MGK‘s press releases (1983–1997) have shown that after Critical 
Juncture (III) the MGK gradually lifted martial law from across Turkey and replaced it with a 
state of emergency. By 1987 ten Kurdish provinces remained under the state of emergency, 
and between 1987 and 1997 the MGK continued to recommend that the government re-
extend the state of emergency in these provinces. This means that the MGK‘s path of state of 
emergency was established in 1983, but was more formalised by 1987 and was maintained 
until 1997. When I asked if the MGK had other options to choose from as opposed to its 
original path of state of emergency, I found that a number of options were presented to the 
MGK by different actors: first, the EC/EU on a number of occasions asked the Turkish 
authorities to lift the state of emergency from the South East of Turkey and find a political 
solution to Turkey‘s Kurdish problem; second, Turgut Ozal, who served as both the PM and 
President suggested to the MGK members that they develop a political solution to the 
Kurdish problem, and he publicly talked about removing the state of emergency; and last, 
Abdullah Ocalan, who was the leader of the PKK, called a ceasefire on two occasions and 
called to resolve the Kurdish problem using democratic and political means. The MGK‘s 
press releases show that the MGK did not take much notice of these options: the path of state 
of emergency was maintained. I however found that Ozal succeeded in changing the attitudes 
of the MGK members in relation to the Kurdish question when the MGK began to discuss 
whether democratic means could be used to tackle the PKK in the early 1990s. As to what 
characteristics developed under the state of emergency, I identified five unique features, 
including legal measures, regional governors, village guards, the anti-terrorism law and the 
evacuation of the villages. Under this regime local people were left to be governed by 
unrepresentative and illegitimate bodies, and deprived of their civil liberties. Despite the 
options to deviate from its path of state of emergency and the consequences it had for the 
both local people and Turkish political system, the MGK maintained its original path. In the 
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next section I want to find out what implications the MGK‘s path had for Turkey‘s 
aspirations to join the EC/EU. 
5.2.2. Incompatible Paths of EU Membership and State of Emergency (1983–1997) 
At Critical Juncture (III) the National Security Commission decided that Turkey would apply 
for Full Membership of the EC when it adopted democracy. Since the relationship between 
Turkey and the EC was virtually frozen during the army interlude, Ozal‘s government 
worked towards revitalising the path of EC membership, exerting every means and 
opportunity available. However, the MGK‘s path-dependent approach and its unintended 
consequences made it challenging for Ozal to make progress on the path towards EC/EU 
membership. This will be shown in three sections. The first will consider the ANAP 
governments‘ efforts to revitalise the relationship, and question what made it significantly 
difficult to re-activate the Association Agreement between 1983 and 1989. The analysis of 
the options available for EC membership and the path of state of emergency will be made in 
the second sections. I will discuss how and why stasis was maintained in both Turkey's path 
toward EC/EU membership and the MGK path of state of emergency. I will then outline how 
the introductions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen Criteria formed obstacles on 
Turkey‘s path to join the EC from 1989 to 1994. The last section will cover 1994 to 1997, 
and show that the resolution of the Kurdish issue became a condition to establish the Customs 
Union. I will also analyse why Ocalan‘s second call for a ceasefire was not noticed by the 
leading politicians. 
(i) Revitalising the EC Membership Path, 1983–1989 
Arikan (2003) notes: ―Following the return to elected civilian government after the military 
regime of 1980–1983, Turkey–EU relations showed signs of normalization‖ (ibid.: 64). I 
would argue however that it took many more years than Arikan argues for the government to 
normalise this relationship and convince the EC to begin political dialogue with the Turkish 
authorities. This was because: (1) during the army intervention Turkey and its political 
system lost prestige among the EU member states and (2) the insurgency raised by the PKK, 
and how the MGK dealt with this, had negative implications for Ozal‘s government in its 
attempts to normalise the relationship in these years. Turgut Özal‘s Motherland Party 
(ANAP) won the elections in 1983 by getting 45.1 per cent of the votes and 53 per cent of the 
seats in the TBMM. Therefore Ozal was selected as the PM and General Kenan Evren was 
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chosen as the President. During the 1983 general election campaign Ozal had made two 
important pledges on Turkey's foreign policy: that he would improve economic relations with 
the Middle Eastern and Islamic Countries by increasing imports and exports; and that he 
would apply for full of membership of EC (45. TC Hukumet Programi, 1986). Ozal, as the 
Chair of the State Planning Committee (DPT), had been sceptical about Turkey pursuing a 
path of EU membership. Now, as Prime Minster, he was promising that his government 
would apply for Full Membership of the EU. This has caused a number of academics to ask: 
what factors underpinned this change in Ozal‘s stance on the EU? Birand (1990) argues that 
Ozal‘s interest in the EC was purely economic by referring to a quote from one of Ozal‘s 
speeches: ―We need to use our resources very carefully. In the long term, we are planning to 
strengthen our relations with Europe. We need to make a use of the European market that is 
four or five times larger than the Middle East‘s markets. … [T]his does not mean we need to 
turn our back to the East, rather we need to join the EC and cooperate with the East‖ (quoted 
in Birand, 1990: 464, author‘s translation). Calis (2001) suggests that Ozal treated the EC not 
primarily as an economic market, but as an international organisation, anchoring Turkey‘s 
transition to democracy (ibid.: 221; for more information go to Ozcan 2008: 94-95). I would 
rather agree with Birand that financial interests and the economic benefits of the EU 
membership played a significant role in this. Ozal initially realised that the economic market 
in the EC was much larger than those in the East and then had a growing interest in a free 
market economy which could only have been accommodated within the EC.  
In January 1984, Vahit Halifoglu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the European 
Commission to discuss Turkey‘s position in the EC (Bac 2001: 139). In response to this visit 
the European Parliament (EP) said that it would reconsider the situation in Turkey to decide 
whether to hold joint committee meetings – the delegation of both the EP and the TBMM 
forming the joint committee – again. The EP additionally asked the Turkish authorities to 
begin institutionalising democracy, to remove martial law and to respect human rights (OJEC 
1984; OJECb 1984: 49–50). A year later, a number of human rights cases were submitted 
against the Turkish authorities at the European Commission of Human Rights. In April of the 
same year, the EP reported that the regime in Turkey had launched a systematic campaign of 
genocide against the Kurdish minority as 30 Kurds were given the death sentence and 84 
were under trial. For the EP this meant a "ruthless violation of human rights‖ (OJEC 
1985). The Socialist and Communist party group (PES) asked the Turkish authorities to grant 
cultural rights to the ethnic minorities (Eralp 1997: 139). The Committee of Political 
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Relations produced a report entitled the "Balfe Report", which said that Turkey was a long 
way from respecting the basic features of human rights and advised the EP that the joint 
committee meetings with Turkey should be deferred (European Parliament 1985).  
In the second general election after the 1980 army intervention, in November 1987, Ozal's 
ANAP again won the largest number of seats in the TBMM. Along with the renewed 
confidence his government made a number of constitutional changes as a result of which the 
EC‘s critical position on Turkey began to gradually change. There are four different areas 
where steps were taken to undertake significant changes. The first is that the minimum age of 
voting was reduced from 21 to 20 and the membership of the assembly was increased from 
400 to 450. The second is that the government proposed to amend the Provisional Article 4 
which had said, ―the former chairmen, deputy or acting chairmen, general secretaries, deputy 
general secretaries and members of the central executive committee of the old parties were 
banned from joining any new parties or running as parliamentary candidates until November 
1992. Other former deputies and MPs were not allowed to form new parties, or to serve on 
their central executive bodies, until November 1987‖ (Finkel and Hale 1990: 104, footnote 
2). Soon after a referendum was held, giving the Turkish public a choice over whether to 
have the former politicians back in the Turkish political system (Dodd 1990: 88–90; Ahmad 
1993: 196; Hale 1994: 279). The third is that an amnesty was called, realising the 30,000 
members of the Association of Peace, and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions 
of Turkey (DISK). The last is that the death penalties were overturned by the TBMM (Dagi 
1997: 140). Looking at these constitutional changes, it is obvious that the EC‘s requests in 
relation to Kurds and how the PKK should be handled have not received specific attention 
from Ozal‘s government since there is not a single reference to Kurds in these 
changes. However, criticisms over the TBMM‘s unrepresentative composition were dealt 
with when the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) and the True Path Party (DYP) agreed to 
merge and won a number of seats in the Parliament at the 1987 general election. The EU 
recognised these as progressive movements towards consolidating Turkish democracy and 
advised that Ozal‘s government should further pursue this direction (EPCD Bulletin 1987). 
The EC then accepted Ozal‘s request to have the Association Council meetings at ministerial 
level and Claude Cheysson, responsible for Mediterranean policy and North-South relations, 
visited Turkey (EC Bulletin 1986: 87). During this meeting weakness surrounding features of 
Turkish democracy was discussed and then Turkey was asked to take the necessary steps to 
resolve the Kurdish question (Dagi 1997: 141). 
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Ozal argued: ―for the West, Turkey should not only be important because of its strategic 
position and military strength. … Turkey shares the same values with other European 
countries‖ (quoted in Dagi 1997: 143, author‘s translation); and he applied for Full 
Membership of the EC in 1987 (Eralp 1994:204). However, before the application was 
submitted, Emile Noel, then the Secretary of the European Commission, advised Turkey not 
to hurry making an application because this would not help either to stabilise its political 
system or improve its relations with the EC. In addition, Margaret Thatcher, then the UK 
Prime Minister, suggested that Turkey should apply for Full Membership in the next 10 
years, and this was because, according to Thatcher, Turkey did not yet fully satisfy the 
Association Agreement‘s requirements (Cumhuriyet, 05/03/1986). Despite this cautious 
advice, Ozal‘s government handed in an application in April 1987. The application received 
great attention, both in Turkey and in Europe. There are two important conclusions this 
chapter will draw from the data collected: there is another option to Turkey‘s path to join the 
EU, and the application was supported by Turkish political parties, believing that it could 
anchor the political and economic developments, while the EC member states wanted to grant 
the membership status to those countries with established democracy and strong economy. 
These will be discussed below.  
Except for the Welfare Party (RP), the other Turkish political parties supported the 
government‘s application, but with reservations. The DYP stressed the negative implications 
Turkish political problems might have on the outcome of Turkey‘s application to join the 
European club. The DYP therefore suggested that one of the immediate actions the 
government should take was to remove the restrictions on political participation. By contrast 
the Democratic Left Party (DSP) speculated on the consequences of membership for the 
TBMM‘s sovereignty, expressing their concerns over the directives the government ministers 
would receive from the EC institutions (Milliyet and Tercuman, 05/05/1987). The Social 
Democrat Public Party (SHP) was more optimistic about Turkey‘s place in Europe, believing 
that Turkey had a common history and culture with the other EC member states. The RP, in 
contrast to the above political parties, presented another option to Turkey‘s path of EC 
membership. Necmettin Erbakan, then the leader of RP, said that ―Turkey did not have a 
place in the European Community‖ (Milli Gazete, 15/12/1987) and went on to say that it 
would be in the interest of Turkey to improve relations with the Muslim countries. He added 
that the Turkish authorities had to make a choice between being treated like a second-class 
citizen among the member states of the EU or be the leading country of the Islamic Common 
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Market (RP 1987 Election Manifesto: 41–43; Cumhuriyet, 16/03/1986). Barkey and Fuller 
(1998: 105) argue that Erbakan was urging the establishment of an Islamic NATO, an Islamic 
Common Market, and an Islamic United Nations.  Vehbi Koc, a well-known businessman, 
however, disregarded Erbakan‘s suggestions and said that Turkey‘s only option was to join 
the EC (Milli Gazete, 18/12/1987).  
While the British government of the day had been supportive of Turkey‘s EC prospects, 
headlines of some of the more widely read newspapers had been rather critical of this 
application. Margaret Thatcher, then the PM, said that Great Britain would anchor Turkey in 
normalising its relationship with EC if Ozal took initiatives to improve human rights and 
democracy in Turkey (Hurriyet, Thatcher‘s speech, 25/09/1987; Herald Tribune, 
07/11/1987).  An article however in the Independent argued that Turkey wanted to join the 
EC just as it was and how it aspired to be, and referred to its differences in religion, culture, 
and traditions as reasons why Turkey should not join the EC (The Independent, 15/05/1987, 
cited in Calis, 1999). Another article with a similar perception was published in Financial 
Times entitled “A shock for European Culture‖, by Edward Mortimer. Mortimer argued that 
European countries were well integrated because they shared a common culture, an outcome 
of common history, and claimed that Turkey was different, as its cultural origins went back to 
Islamic civilisation rather than Christianity (Financial Times, 17/07/1987, cited in Calis 
2001). For some, then, in the UK, Turkey‘s common culture, religion and history with the 
Middle East and the Islamic countries indicated not only that it should not join the EC, but 
also that it was less likely to integrate into the EC. These articles also implied that Turkey 
could develop stronger ties with the Islamic countries rather than the EC member states due 
to its common religion and culture with them. One should however recognise that this point 
of view was already present in Turkey, proposed by Erbakan.  
As far as some of the other member states were concerned, France, Denmark, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg did not support the application because of Turkey‘s domestic political 
weaknesses. France focused on Turkish domestic problems and stated that Turkey was 
incompetent to practice the required EC implementations (Milliyet, 16/04/1987). Turkey‘s 
poor human rights records and weak democracy were why Denmark and Luxembourg had a 
critical stance on the application. However, the constitutional changes Ozal‘s government 
made were regarded as a paramount improvement by Belgium. Another group of member 
states that did not support the application included the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, 
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Portugal and Italy, and the only difference this group had to the former was that they looked 
at the application from the economic perspective not from a political point of view. The cost 
of free movement of Turkish workers in the EC member states was a cause of concern for 
Germany (Cumhuriyet, 06/01/1988). As for Spain and Portugal, they did not want to share 
the EC‘s financial benefits, e.g., funds, with a newcomer (Milliyet, 16/04/1987). Italy did not 
want its companies to compete with Turkish firms, particularly in textiles (Soz, 21/02/1988).  
The ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) kept hopes alive that Turkey‘s application 
might be successful, particularly because the EC tends to deepen prior to enlargement. It is 
acknowledged that ―Deepening is a process parallel to, or even as a necessary step prior to, 
enlargement (The EU online glossary). The SEA was signed in Luxembourg on 17 February 
1986, which came into effect under the Delors Commission on 1 July 1987 (Nugent 1999: 
50). The Act consisted of three documents: the first contained a small number of common 
provisions, of which the most important gave the first formal Treaty recognition to the 
European Council (Article 2 SEA); the second set out the amendments to the Treaties; and 
the third was a new and separate Treaty text formalising the procedures known as European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). In addition, this strengthened the economic and social cohesion 
between the member states by adding formally new policy areas to the EC‘s jurisdiction, 
including foreign and security policy, the environment, research and development and culture 
and education.  
Applying for EC membership brought Turkey and its political system under close scrutiny; 
particularly the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International began to pay great 
attention to the protection of human rights in this applicant country. The initial finding was 
that there were serious problems. The characteristics of the state of emergency were, in 
particular, Amnesty‘s focus. Their 1988 report condemned the TSK for rounding up the 
villages in the state of emergency zone, and threatening and beating the local people there 
(Amnesty International 1988: 9). Amnesty‘s reports on developments in Turkish politics not 
only kept the authorities and European public opinion informed about Turkey, but also 
affected how Turkey‘s aspiration to join the EC was received at the EC level. 
The approval of the SEA and its contribution to the deepening of the EC did not produce the 
expected opportunity for Turkey‘s membership application to receive a positive response 
from the European Commission, as the refusal came along in 1989. Turkey was however 
found eligible for membership and was offered a prospect of a customs union. It was said that 
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the EC was ―in a state of flux‖, caused by the third enlargement (Portugal and Spain in 1986) 
and enforcement of the SEA (EC Opinion 1989: 2); therefore, it was not ready for another 
enlargement. However, the political and economic improvements that had taken place were 
recognised as positive by the European Commission. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
Turkey had overcome its four economic weaknesses: very major structural disparities, in both 
agriculture and industry; macro-economic imbalances; high levels of industrial protectionism 
and a low level of social protection; and the report read ―there is still a substantial 
development gap between the Community and Turkey‖ (ibid.: 4–5). As for the political 
improvements, it was reiterated that they ―have not yet reached the level required in a 
democracy‖ (ibid.: 7). The European Commission thereafter proposed to take ―four measures 
in order to enable both sides to enter now on the road towards increased inter-dependence and 
integration‖ and these included completion of the customs union; the resumption, and 
intensification of financial cooperation; the promotion of industrial and technological 
cooperation; and the strengthening of political and cultural links (ibid.: 7). These measures 
were later gathered under the title of the ―Matutes Package‖ on 7 June 1990, but they never 
been implemented.  
Onis (2000: 468) writing about the refusal of the Turkish application, noted: ―The outcome 
was another round of disappointment‖. I would agree that this was a disappointment for the 
government because it not only meant that it would not be a full member of the EC, but its 
aspiration to form a political dialogue with EC had to be challenged further. Another 
interesting perspective came from Arikan (2003) who said: ―The main implication of the 
Commission‘s opinion on Turkey‘s application for EU membership was that the EU wished 
to pursue a containment policy towards Turkey, designed to strengthen EU-Turkey relations 
through reactivating the AA, while delaying Turkish membership for the foreseeable future‖ 
(ibid.: 66). However, I do not believe there was or is a ―containment strategy‖; and would 
argue that Arikan fails to recognise that the Turkish political system, its standards of 
democracy and its economy was simply not at a level that the EC would have expected. The 
EC response suggests rather that when Turkey‘s domestic problems are resolved, when it 
fully both satisfies the requests of the EC institution and harmonises itself with its EC 
counterparts, it has a solid chance to join the EC as a full member.  
We can see in this section the ways in which the MGK was beginning to impact on Turkey‘s 
EC membership path. This path was established at Critical Juncture III by the National 
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Security Commission. Ozal‘s landslide victory at the 1983 General Elections gave him 
relatively conducive grounds to regain trust in the EEC and to begin negotiations with the 
EEC. However, the PKK insurgency and how it was handled by the MGK meant that the EC 
refused to hold joint committee meetings with Turkey. Using the concept of path dependence, 
I have questioned in this chapter whether other options were available to Ozal‘s government, 
as opposed to the path of joining the EC. My assessment of the views on Turkey‘s application 
for the Full Membership of the EC show that Erbakan was against Turkey joining the EC and 
he suggested that the Turkish authorities should optionally consider forming relations with 
the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. 
(ii) Stasis in the Presence of Other Options, 1989–1994 
Tank (2007) has noted: ―Throughout the Cold War Turkey maintained the traditional 
Kemalist line towards the Arab World, choosing to remain distant and disengaged‖ 
(ibid.:136). However, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Union (SU) 
were significant developments in international politics and they underpinned speculations 
over whether Turkey was losing its geo-strategic importance to the EC. In addition to 
Turkey‘s aspiration to join the EC, developing close ties with the newly independent Turkic 
states of Central Asia appeared as another option (q quoted in Ozcan 2008: 94-95). 
Karaosmanoglu (2000) has argued that the end of the Cold War also led to fundamental 
changes in Turkey‘s national security culture and Ankara begin to exert influence in Central 
Asia, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans and began to pay 
particular attention to regional cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs. Its 
interest in cooperative security and multilateralism extended from its willing involvement in 
the Gulf War and participation in peace operations to the initiation of regional arrangements 
such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (ibid.: 210) and also contributed to the 
formations of the Naval Task Force for the Black Sea (BLACKSEARFOR) among the 
coastal states to respond to soft security challenges (Ozcan 2008: 95).  As for domestic 
politics was concerned, Ozal was selected as the new President of the Turkish Republic in 
1989. In the early 1990s Ozal moved to commit Turkey as a staging ground for US and 
coalition air forces against Iraq. Kuniholm (1991) argued: ―Ozal is hoping for a substantial 
return on his country‘s investment in the war effort, from both the Unites States and Europe. 
From Europe – and here Ankara is expecting Washington‘s support – Ozal clearly expects 
military and economic assistance and wants a softening of resistance from the European 
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Community to its application for membership in the 12- nation economic bloc‖ (ibid.: 
35).The 1991 general election results indicated changes in political dynamics as the ANAP 
was not any longer the single political party holding the majority of the seats in the TBMM. 
The ANAP received 24 per cent of the votes, and the others shared the rest of votes, the DYP 
(27 per cent); the SHP (20 per cent) and the RP (16 per cent). Then the DYP and the SHP 
formed a coalition government; Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the DYP, was selected as 
the new PM. 
Ozal, upon receiving his new position as the President, began to campaign about finding a 
solution to the Kurdish issue. To this end he legalised the usage of Kurdish in everyday con-
versation and folkloric music recordings by rescinding Law No. 2932 – which was enacted in 
October 1983 – but usage of Kurdish in the media and education remained prohibited (Gunter 
1997: 19). Ozal considered having a political dialogue with the PKK as an option (Lundgren 
2007: 48–49) and publicly acknowledged the ―Kurdish reality‖. Many political prisoners 
were released following the introduction of an amnesty and asked the Kurdish guerrilla to 
cease clashing with the TSK soldiers. Regardless of a considerable amount of opposition re-
ceived from the ANAP, he initiated discussions about transforming the Turkish Republic into 
a series of confederated states, on the US model, with each state having certain degree of 
freedom in local affairs (White 2000: 162). He then recognised the PKK as a political actor 
and suggested that the PKK should be accommodated in the Turkish political system 
(Lundgren 2007: 49). In response to Ozal‘s proposals Ocalan declared that the PKK was will-
ing to give up on their aim of an independent state and favoured a federal solution. This 
meant that the ANAP for the first began to treat the Kurdish problem in terms of its social, 
cultural, and economic dimensions (Ulman 2000: 109). 
Academics such as Nachmani (2003), Evin (2005), Gurbey (2005) and Lundgren (2007) have 
tried to interpret Ozal‘s attempts to settle the Kurdish issue by political means from different 
perspectives.Lundgren described Ozal as: ―The only major politician who advocated a more 
liberal policy ... Ozal tried to reform the rigid attitude of the state and to introduce a radical 
political change‖ (2007: 48) and Nachmani (2003: 43) has referred to him as ―the last Turkish 
politician to advocate other than purely military means to end the Kurdish violence‖. Evin 
(2005: 38) similarly noted: ―To his credit Ozal was the first political leader to seek ways to 
begin solving the bloody conflict‖. Ozal was indeed one of the first politicians to accept the 
reality of the Kurdish question and he made a number of legal changes to accommodate 
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Kurdish citizens in the Turkish Republic. He however was not the last politician, as in early 
2009 Tayyip Erdogan, who was still the Prime Minister at the time of writing this chapter, 
drew up a democratisation package to strengthen the state-citizen relationship as a way to 
address Turkey‘s Kurdish problem. Gurbey (2005) suggested that Ozal‘s position granting 
cultural autonomy and political liberalisation to the Kurds would consequently have posed a 
danger to the unity of the Republic Gurbey‘s (2005: 141). Gurbey‘s point supported Tank‘s 
(2001) observation that ―any significant concession to Kurdish identity is regarded as 
weakening the ‗unitary state‖ (ibid.: 222). Gurbey‘s analysis of Ozal‘s position on how to 
deal with this issue runs closely parallel to how the MGK perceived the PKK. For the MGK, 
the PKK was an internal threat to Turkey‘s indivisibility and had to be eradicated through the 
strict state of emergency. However, the borders of Turkish Republic remain unchanged upon 
Ozal‘s public talks, and having granted cultural, political and the economic rights to Kurds, 
proving that the fears that these rights may jeopardize the unity of Turkish state were 
overstated.  
While the writers above do not question why the ANAP and Ozal developed a new political 
approach towards the Kurdish problem, Ulman (2000) argues that there are three reasons for 
this: (1) due to the Gulf War, Kurdish identity was widely expressed in discussions in Turkish 
politics; (2) there were widespread and well attended protests in Cizre, Nusaybin, Silopi and 
Silvan in 1990s; and (3) the ANAP wished to secure the Kurdish votes in the region in the 
coming up elections (ibid.: 109). 
The European Parliament asked Turkish authorities in the early 1990s ―to stop the 
prosecution of the Kurdish population and halt the evacuation of the villages‖ (OJEC 1991).  
When the Turkish government however interpreted this as violation of its national and 
parliamentary sovereignty, it called off the long awaited Joint Parliamentary Committee 
meeting with the EC, scheduled for 23-25 March 1992. In the following year, as promised by 
Thatcher, Douglas Hurd, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, emphasised the importance 
of revitalising the EC‘s economic and political relations with Turkey. The European Council 
then in Lisbon decided that a political dialogue between the EC and Turkey should be 
established immediately. Hurd additionally asked for an update report on the current state of 
the relationship and the update report was considered at the Council of Ministers on 20 July 
1992, which made the following suggestions: joint committee meetings should be held every 
six months; Turkey should be invited to the Western European Union (WEU) meetings as an 
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associate member; and Turkey should be granted financial aid (Calis 2001: 258). Thatcher‘s 
support for Turkey however did not prevent the financial aid section being removed from this 
report and the remaining promises forgotten. In addition, the EP reported that it was 
disappointed that Ozal had not succeeded in delivering on his promises to find a political 
solution to the Kurdish problem. This showed that the EP was not aware that President Ozal, 
on his own and in a very short period of time, could not have radically changed what had 
been established by the MGK over many years. I would argue that the EP should have given 
more credit to Ozal‘s efforts and should have given more time to Ozal so that his new ideas 
and policies could have been implemented. The EP should have known that Ozal needed the 
support of the army members of the MGK, of his party, of the opposition political parties and 
of other interests groups to take more concrete steps in implementing these proposed policies. 
On the contrary, the EP kept its critical stance and said that the special units of the TSK and 
country guerrilla groups of the PKK were murdering, abducting and causing the 
disappearances of innocent people (OJEC 1992a). The EP then stressed the need for the 
Turkish authorities to take economic and cultural measures which may pursue a settlement to 
the Kurdish problem (ibid.).  
In 1991 a new coalition government was formed between the DYP and SHP leaving the 
ANAP in the opposition once again. Calis (2001: 255-257) has argued that this coalition of 
the DYP and the SHP followed in the footsteps of Ozal‘s government, but unlike the ANAP 
government their priority was not Full Membership in the EU but establishing the Customs 
Union with the EU. Demirel therefore visited the capitals of some of the European countries 
to inform them about Turkey‘s interest in establishing the Customs Union. He met with John 
Major, the UK PM, and Jacques Delors, the European Commission President and told them 
that ―Post-Cold War Turkey gained a new role based on democracy, secularism, and Western 
values. If the EC was anxious about fundamentalism in the region, Turkey could help the 
EC‖. He went on to say that Turkish public was concerned with the EC‘s constant criticisms 
over Turkey‘s human rights records and democracy (Hurriyet, 24/11/1992). Demirel‘s visits 
however did not have much positive impact on how the EP treated domestic politics in 
Turkey. The EP rather asked the Turkish authorities to restore confidence between the state 
and the local people living in state of emergency region and asked the government to 
establish a dialogue with the Kurdish side to reach a democratic and peaceful settlement 
(OJEC 1992b). Aybet (2006) said that since the early 1990s Turkey found it difficult to 
accept the EU‘s criticisms or interference in its internal security matters; in particular Turkey 
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was extremely sensitive to EU criticism of how it handled the internal conflict between the 
PKK and the Turkish military (ibid: 542). This meant that Turkey found it difficult to 
reconcile its Westernisation project with its internal security policy and highlighted a 
dilemma of reconciling its external (joining the EU) and internal policy challenge (Kurdish 
problem). 
The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992, and came into force on 1 November 
1993. The term Union is used from the very beginning of this Treaty to clearly convey the 
advancement in this historical project. In this way, article 2 of the Treaty of the European 
Union affirms: "This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe." The treaty led to the creation of single European currency and 
created what is commonly referred to as the pillar structure of the European Union including 
the European Commission pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, and the 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar.  In addition, with the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
current and new member states introduced and implemented common policies that supported 
the idea of ―ever-closer union‖.  
Ocalan called for a unilateral ceasefire for the period between 20 March and 15 April 1993 
(Cumhuriyet, 12/03/1993). He said that the PKK should be recognised as a political party. As 
far as disarming the PKK was concerned, Ocalan gave an assurance that the PKK would not 
open fire against the TSK.  He said: ―We do recognise the authority of the TBMM and the 
Kurdish issue could be resolved in the TBMM‖; confirmed that the PKK had given up on it 
aim of having an independent Kurdish region; and added ―we believe in Turkish and Kurdish 
brotherhood‖ (Cumhuriyet, 14/04/1993, author‘s translation). This ceasefire was said to be a 
response not only to the demands of the Turkish and Kurdish public, but also to that of the 
international community (Cumhuriyet, 12/03/1993; Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 36-
37). It is unclear to whom or to what Ocalan refers by ―international community‖, but 
possibly it includes the EC since it has consistently asked the Turkish government to resolve 
the issue since the early 1980s. This also gives an indication that Ocalan was very pragmatic 
in terms of changing the PPK‘s ultimate aim – of having an independent Kurdistan – so as to 
have good relations with the international community.  
The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey found that the important parts of the Turkish 
community treated the unilateral ceasefire as a step towards a peaceful stage all over the 
country. The public began to talk about ―amnesty‖ and ―abolition of the Emergency State 
193 
 
Legislation‖.  Furthermore, the wide-scale military operation planned to be carried out under 
the name of the ―Spring Operation‖ was suspended (ibid.: 37). For the first time in many 
years, Demirel and Erdal Inonu, the deputy PM, visited the state of emergency region.  At 
this visit, Demirel said that if the ceasefire continued by June, he would think about lifting the 
state of emergency permanently in the Kurdish region (ibid.). A prominent academic, Prof. 
Server Tanilli, supported this by saying: ―Turks and Kurds could live together. This 
togetherness should be voluntary and based on sharing equal rights – the Kurdish problem 
should be resolved through political dialogue and democratic means‖ (Cumhuriyet, 
28/02/1993, author‘s translation). Ismet Sezgin, the Home Affair Minister, however was not 
sympathetic to Ocalan‘s calls for a ceasefire and commented: ―We, as the Turkish 
government, will not act in the wake of the bandits. We will not sit around a table with them 
and they should instead deliver themselves to the Turkish legal system‖ (ibid.).  
Ocalan‘s calls for a ceasefire did not however change the MGK‘s path of state of emergency, 
and it maintained its original path. The structural, institutional and policy changes at the EU 
level gave the signals that Turkey‘s accession to the EU was to be significantly difficult in the 
subsequent years. This chapter will identify two important decisions made at the European 
Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1991, which would make Turkey‘s accession to the EU 
significantly difficult for Turkey in the coming years. The first is that ―the associated 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European 
Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required‖ 
(European Council 1993). This meant the EU was beginning the process of accession of the 
Central and Eastern European countries, while keeping Turkey away from these 
developments. The second was the decision which set out the conditions for membership to 
the countries interested in joining the EU, in particular it concerned Turkey‘s path of EU 
membership. These conditions included: 
 stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy;  
 the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
 the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
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 the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union (Bulletin EC, 6/1993: 13).  
According to Serdar: ―Turkey found it degrading to be perceived as on the same level as the 
former Eastern Bloc countries, that had long been under communist rule, whereas Turkey had 
been a democracy since 1923‖ (Serdar 2003: 63). However, I would not agree with Serdar 
and would instead argue that one should note that the above identified political conditions 
which the EU expected the applicant countries to comply with were not completely new to 
the authorities in Turkey. Since the early 1980s the EC had been asking the Turkish 
Governments to consolidate its democracy and respect human rights which meant that since 
the early 1980s the Turkish authorities had had a number of years and a number of 
opportunities to resolve the Kurdish problem and improve standards of democracy and 
human rights. 
We can see from this section is that the years between 1989 and 1993 have witnessed changes 
at the international, the domestic and the EC/EU levels. The Cold War ended in 1989 and the 
Soviet Union collapsed.  At domestic level Ozal began to talk to about finding a political 
solution to the Kurdish question, the MGK‘s press releases indicated that the MGK discussed 
about making sure democratic means are used in handling the PKK and Ocalan said that the 
PKK had given up on their aim to have an  Independent Kurdistan in Turkey.  At the EC/EU 
level, the Maastricht Treaty was approved in 1992, and the Copenhagen criteria introduced a 
number of conditions a country would need to meet before it can join as a full member. I 
would like to make three points in relation to whether these changes had any implications for 
the both MGK‘s path of state of emergency and Turkey-EU relations. The first point is that 
when the Soviet Union collapsed, the option of forming relations with the former communist 
Turkic countries has emerged for Turkey. This did not however mean Turkey had to choose 
to between the EC or the former communist Turkish countries, but since Turkey‘s bid to join 
the EC was not progressing as smoothly as the Turkish Governments would have liked, I 
think  developing closer ties with the Turkic countries could have been an attractive to the 
Turkish authorities. I found nevertheless that this option did not catch Turkish authorities‘ 
attentions and Turkey‘s EC membership path was maintained. The second point is that the 
despite Ozal and Ocalan‘s position  in how to handle the Kurdish issue, the MGK also opted 
to recommend the Government to re-extend state of emergency in the ten Kurdish provinces. 
The third point is that in a rapidly changing world Turkey chose to change neither their 
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aspirations to join the EU nor its path of state of emergency; furthermore, little or no progress 
was reached in either of these paths. The European Parliament constantly refused to begin 
political dialogue with Turkey and have withdrawn financial aid from over Turkey‘s 
treatment of the Kurdish issue. And the MGK‘s state of emergency violated the local people‘ 
human rights and deprived them from a decent life standards, which again contributed 
negatively Turkey‘s progress towards joining the EC. 
(iii) One Step Toward EU Membership and Two Step Backwards, 1994–1997 
Upon Ozal‘s death in April 1993, Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the DYP, was selected as 
the new President, and Tansu Ciller, replacing Demirel, was to be the first female Prime Min-
ister of Turkish Republic. Ciller formed the government in June 1993 and her government 
was determined to establish the long-delayed Customs Union. However, it had to tackle the 
Kurdish condition, since as Arikan noted: ―The EU intensified its efforts to highlight the 
Kurdish issue as a condition for establishing a customs union with Turkey‖ (Arikan 2003: 
128). While I agree with Arikan that this was immediately highlighted, I would suggest it 
would be very useful to know what aspects of the issue formed the conditions and difficulty 
in establishing the customs union. Serdar (2003: 62-63) and Calis (2001: 271) put emphasis 
not only on the rise enforced of disappearances of Kurdish civilians and prisoners, but also on 
other domestic political weaknesses in trying to understand what caused the delay. One 
should note that these were some of the long-listed consequences of the MGK‘s path of strict 
state of emergency. In 1994 the confirmed number of cases of ―disappearances‖ had in-
creased up to 50 and according to Amnesty International‘s 1995 Report on Turkey, ―many 
people ‗disappeared‘ because of their suspected political activities, legal, or illegal which 
could be recognised as a product of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law and some others 
‗disappeared‘ because they had refused to act as village guards. In addition, the European 
Parliament‘s legislative powers were extended with the introduction of the co-decision pro-
cedure in the Maastricht Treaty. By this it became an influential institution in the EU, and 
thus it was speculated by many that the EP‘s requests would have to be met before Turkey 
could sign the Customs Union. Gunter argued: ―During 1995, Turkey came under considera-
ble pressure to correct its most egregious human rights abuse in order to win approval from 
the European Parliament to join the European Customs Union‖ (Gunter 1997: 19).   
Bilgin (2005) points to the role of globalisation in empowering non-state actors in, for in-
stance, shaping the methods used by states to guarantee the security of their citizens. And 
196 
 
Bilgin pays attention to the growing media presence as another dimension of globalisation 
which arguably has meant that governments use violence under the media spotlight and thus 
have to justify their actions to audiences both at home and abroad.  As Bilgin (2005) notes, 
―Turkey‘s struggle with the PKK was conducted under this media spotlight. Turkey‘s politi-
cians and civilian-military bureaucratic elite resented this, as they did, for example, when the 
German government suspended the delivery of weapons to Turkey to investigate whether 
they were used in the struggle with the PKK in April 1994‖ (ibid.: 179). Alain Juppe, then the 
French Foreign Minister, said in 1994 that closing the doors to Turkey would be a political 
and strategic mistake. The European Parliament therefore appointed Carlos Carnero Gonzales 
as a rapporteur to prepare an update report on the political and economic conditions in Tur-
key. The findings of this report later informed the EP‘s requirements for setting the Customs 
Union with Turkey: removal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism law; improvement in human 
rights records; and resolution of the Kurdish problem through political means (Bac 1998: 
246). In July 1995 therefore Ciller‘s government made a number of changes to meet these 
requirements, some of these are as follows: 
 Voting age was reduced – lowered from 21 to 18 
 Parliamentary seats were increased by 100 
 Bans on political activity and participation in unions and other organisations were 
removed  
 Civil servants were granted the right to form or join trade union 
 Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was amended. (Gunter 1997: 19-20) 
Although these changes covered features of the state of emergency regime, the MGK‘s path 
of state of emergency was nevertheless kept as it was. Kirisci and Winrow noted however 
that there was a significant reduction in some of types of prison sentences upon the changes 
in Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 129). The EC therefore 
decided ―to conclude the negotiations with Turkey on the completion and full implementation 
of the Customs Union and to reinforce the relations with this partner‖ (Bulletin EC, 12/1994). 




Lagro and Jorgensen (2007: 5) have argued that the option of Customs Union was not ―big 
news‖ since the European Commission had offered this to Turkey in 1989 instead of Full 
Membership, and I would agree. Barkey and Fuller (1998: 165) and Eralp (1997: 175) have 
identified differences between how Turkey and the EU perceived the Customs Union, with 
Turkey viewing the Customs Union as one step closer to Full Membership of the EU, while 
the EU treated it as a mechanism to improve its relationship with Turkey without linking it to 
the issue of Full Membership. Manisali (2002b: 104-5), who is critical of the Customs Union 
agreement, regarded it as a one-sided agreement under which Turkey was left to interpret the 
EU‘s directives. These directives, according to Manisali, were not in the interests of the 
Turkish economy as Turkey‘s exports rose 40% after signing the Customs Union and he has 
suggested that the Customs Union required businesses in Turkey to export more than import 
(ibid.: 66). Keyman and Onis have noted ―In the absence of firm prospects for full 
membership, however, the customs union provided few incentives for the Turkish political 
elites to undertake the reforms that would satisfy the Copenhagen criteria‖ (Keyman and Onis 
2004: 182).  
After Ozal‘s sudden death, in spite of his recognition of ―Turkey‘s Kurdish reality‖ in 1991 
and promises to lift the state of emergency, Demirel began to claim that Turkey did not have 
a Kurdish question, but a terrorism problem. The U-turn in Demirel‘s position on the Kurdish 
issue was in parallel with the MGK‘s maintenance of the state of emergency. Demirel‘s 
formulation that ―any talk of cultural rights is tantamount to dividing the country‖ once again 
returned to the idea that the PKK and the Kurdish issue was a threat to Turkey‘s 
indivisibility, which was again in line with the MGK‘s perception of the PKK (Yeni Yuzyil, 
22/05/1995, author‘s translation). In addition, as far as Demirel was concerned, only non-
Muslims were recognised as ethnic minorities in Turkey, so since the Kurds were 
predominantly Muslim, they were not minorities.  
Ciller proposed establishing a commission to investigate the Kurdish issue and considered 
allowing Kurdish broadcasts on state-owned television channels, as well as optional classes 
in Kurdish. Demirel‘s response to Ciller on the Kurdish position was that ―concessions could 
not be made while terrorism was rampant‖ (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 137). When faced with 
opposition from the President, her treatment of ―the Kurdish question was reduced to 
eliminating the PKK, body counts, and cross-border raids‖ (ibid.: 138). Apart from the 
political leaders‘ changing rhetoric on the Kurdish question, there was a radical shift of votes 
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to the religiously oriented RP at the 1995 general elections. For the first time, after many 
years, the RP received 21.3%. The ANAP, with 19.6% of the votes, and the DYP, holding 
19.2%, were reluctant to form a coalition with the RP. Therefore a short-term coalition was 
formed between the DYP and the ANAP, keeping Ciller as the PM and selecting Yilmaz as 
the Deputy PM. This lasted until March 1996. Then Ciller formed a government with 
Erbakan, leader of the RP – a detailed analysis of the RP‘s electoral success story will be 
made in Chapter 5. It was under this political climate that Ocalan once again called for a 
unilateral ceasefire which was to begin on 15 December 1996. On the night of 14
 
December, 
on the television channel MED-TV, Ocalan commented that the duration of the ceasefire 
could be re-determined in accordance with the attitude of the government and added: ―Unless 
there is an attack aiming at annihilating us, we will not open fire. It is to give a chance to the 
choice of peace. The other side should at least consent to political dialogue. We are not in a 
position to divide Turkey‖ (Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 48). 
Ocalan‘s call for ceasefire was well received among the businessmen and representatives, but 
the politicians either did not pay attention to the call or denied the existence of the Kurdish 
problem. Sakip Sabanci, an influential Turkish businessman, did get a report prepared on the 
situation in the South East of Turkey, where generally the Kurdish population of Turkey 
lived. The report suggested that economic investment on its own would not solve the 
problems of the region and advised the Turkish authorities to learn from other countries‘ 
experiences of accommodating their ethnic minorities to the political, social and economic 
structure, for example Spain, Britain, and Italy (Hurriyet, 30/09/1995). Halis Komili, 
chairman of TUSIAD, similarly said that ―the Kurdish question was most severe dilemma of 
Turkey and without a solution to it, the other domestic problems would not be resolved‖ 
(Hurriyet, 22/12/1995, author‘s translation). Despite the support from the business platform, 
the government did not respond to Ocalan‘s ceasefire calls and the operations in the region, 
cross-border operations, large scale clashes and deaths continued. The cease-fire ended by 
mid 1996 (Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 50).  
Demirel‘s answers to the question on ethnic minorities at a press meeting in Romania 
explained why he did not respond to Ocalan‘s calls for ceasefire. When asked, ―Turks in 
Romania have been granted a number of rights, why cannot Kurds in Turkey have similar 
rights?‖ his answer was: ―Turks here are a minority. Kurds in Turkey are not a minority. 
Everyone is free to speak their language in Turkey. If you begin to recognise the Kurds in 
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Turkey as minority, then you will be treating them as second class citizens. … Apart from 
non-Muslims, the rest are first class citizens of Turkey‖ (Milliyet, 19/04/1996). Not taking 
notice of Ocalan‘s calls for a ceasefire and rather maintaining the state of emergency regime 
in the Kurdish region made the EU neither release the resources of the fourth protocol nor 
activate the measures to have institutional integration between Turkey and the EU. Forming 
political dialogue with Turkey was no longer a priority for the EU and on 19
th
 September 
1996 the EP decided to freeze financial aid due to ―protracted human rights violations‖ in 
Turkey.  
As Lagro and Jorgensen have noted: ―Turkey-EU political relations began to fade, reaching 
their nadir in 1997, a completely disappointing year for Turkey‖ (Lagro and Jorgensen 2007: 
5). As far as the Turkish authorities were concerned, the EU had not only failed to keep its 
promises over Protocol Four and financial aid, but had also continued to criticise harshly 
Turkey‘s political and economic conditions, which raised questions about the EU‘s 
reliability. Furthermore, the outcomes of the Luxembourg Summit (1997) disappointed 
Turkey. On 12 December 1997 at the Luxembourg Summit the European Council underlined 
the gradual and all-inclusive nature of the enlargement process by which a two-tier accession 
process was set up with the Eastern European and Baltic countries, plus Cyprus and Turkey 
(Bac 1998: 242). A separate emphasis was also put on Turkey‘s eligibility for Full 
Membership, but a different strategy was to be drawn up for it, called ―A European Strategy 
for Turkey‖ to help Turkey to enhance its candidacy for membership (Onis 2000: 463-64; 
Karluk 2003: 125-27). Lagro and Jorgensen (2007: 6) have argued that the decision of 1997 
was so unacceptable to Turkey that the government decided to freeze political dialogue with 
the EU.  
Hence, Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the ANAP and PM, published two declarations to warn the 
EU authorities. In the first declaration, Yilmaz demanded the EU treat Turkey on equal terms 
with the other applicant countries and asked the EU to keep its promises. Yilmaz said, ―If the 
EU does not change its attitudes towards Turkey, we will halt our bilateral relations‖ (Karluk 
2003: 125-27, author‘s translation). The Turkish authorities then turned down the invitation 
to attend the March 1998 European Conference in London because, according to McLaren 
(2000: 119), they felt they had been treated unfairly at the Luxembourg Council meeting. 
Kirisci has said that ―Turkey was excluded from a new list of candidates because of its 
treatment of Kurds‖ (Kirisci 2004: 283); I would add to this the government‘s unwillingness 
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to introduce political reforms and the MGK‘s unwillingness to lift the state of emergency. 
This was confirmed by the President of the European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, who 
defended the EU‘s position at the summit by referring to Turkey‘s human rights record and 
the Kurdish issue; he said, ―it cannot be that a country where torture is still practised has a 
place at the European Union table‖ (Financial Times, 23/11/1997).  
Academics such as Cooper (1994), Rumford (2001) and Serdar (2003) have commented on 
Yilmaz‘s decision to freeze political dialogue with the EU. Cooper regarded Yilmaz‘s 
decision as ―profound and emotional‖ (Cooper (1994: 125). Serdar argued that this decision 
would not necessarily lead to a permanent change in Turkey‘s path of seeking EU 
membership, but he suggested that the Luxembourg Summit‘s decision not to include Turkey 
in the EU‘s enlargement of 2004 made the Turkish authorities question whether Turkey 
would ever be accepted as a full member of the EU, even when and if Turkey fully complied 
with the Copenhagen Criteria (Serdar 2003: 62-63). Rumford noted: ―It was a watershed in 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU and appeared to constitute a major derailment of the process 
of integration‖ (Rumford 2001: 94). I would certainly agree with Rumford that it was a 
watershed in Turkey‘s relations with the EU, but as Serdar said above, it did not lead to a 
permanent change in the EU membership path, and this will be discussed more fully in the 
next chapter. 
In this section I showed that the resolution of the Kurdish issue had become a condition for 
Turkey to establish the Customs Unions with the EU. Although the MGK maintained its path 
of state of emergency, the EU approved the Customs Union with Turkey in 1994 when 
Ciller‘s government made a number of constitutional changes. And when Turkey felt closest 
to full EU membership after having established the Customs Union with the EU, on 19 
September 1996 the EP decided to freeze the financial aid to Turkey due to protracted human 
rights violations. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Summit‘s decision not to include Turkey into 
the EU‘s enlargement of 2004 made Yilmaz to choose to freeze political dialogue with the 
EU. 
5.3. Cultural and Calculus Approaches versus the framework of Concepts of Path 
Dependence and Unintended Consequences –Studying the MGK’s Path of State of 
Emergency in the Context of Turkey’s Path of EU Membership   
In section 5.2.1, I identified what path the MGK established and maintained in relation to 
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both the PKK and Turkey‘s Kurdish problem, and have discussed what characteristics the 
state of emergency developed over a long stretch of years. In the subsequent section 5.2.2, I 
studied how the MGK‘s path of state of emergency interacted with Turkey‘s European policy 
in the years between 1983 and 1997. I found that the MGK‘s path of state of emergency 
negatively impacted on Turkey‘s progress to join the EC/EU and the characteristics of the 
state of emergency meant weak democracy and poor human rights in Turkey; I furthermore 
noted that regardless of these outcomes, the MGK continued to recommend that the Turkish 
government re-extend the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey. In this section I 
will first very briefly discuss how well cultural and calculus approaches can explain 
implications of the MGK‘s state of emergency policy on the nature of Turkey-EC/EU 
relations. I will then use Krasner‘s (1984), Levi‘s (1997) and Pierson‘s (2004) 
conceptualisations of path dependence to discuss why the MGK maintained a state of 
emergency over a long period of time. I will second discuss the benefits and the limitations of 
these conceptualisations in explaining why the MGK opted to maintain the path of state of 
emergency. Last, I will show the utility of Merton‘s (1936) concept of unintended 
consequences in explaining why the MGK kept the state of emergency despite its 
consequences and in the presence of other options. 
Based on the findings in part 5.2 I now want to test the cases that cultural and calculus ap-
proaches can explain the interaction between the MGK‘s Kurdish policy preferences and 
Turkey‘s European policy between 1983 and 1997. I have shown that the MGK chose to han-
dle the Kurdish question by calling a state of emergency in the Kurdish region in the early 
1980s and the policy of state of emergency was maintained throughout the 1990s. Keeping 
the state of emergency over many years can be considered as an established pattern of behav-
iour, as far as the cultural approach is concerned. However the cultural approach does not ask 
how and why an institution may maintain a pattern of behaviour over the years. Additionally, 
through applying the cultural approach one cannot highlight the connection between the 
MGK‘s maintenance of state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. This 
is because the cultural approach is a very reductionist perspective and does not let one ask 
many questions, but rather expects one to accept the given state that an institution or a policy 
is in. As far as the cultural approach is concerned, I cannot comment either on whether the 
MGK members were motivated in maximising their gains through keeping the state of emer-
gency in the Kurdish region or if Turkish political leaders kept Turkey‘s bid to join the EU so 
as to increase their benefits from Turkey–EC/EU relations. The reason for this is that one 
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would need to conduct interviews with civilian and military members of the MGK who sat in 
the MGK between 1983 and 1997 and the Turkish political leaders of the same years to an-
swer the questions in hand. 
The MGK called for a state of emergency to protect the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic, 
to safeguard constitutional order and public order and to eradicate the PKK. The PKK was an 
armed organisation which initially aimed to establish an independent Kurdistan in the South 
East of Turkey through a guerrilla fight, mostly in the mountains. The MGK had therefore 
recognised the PKK as an internal threat to Turkey's indivisibility, to its constitutional order 
and to its public order. Having briefly explained why the MGK called for a state of 
emergency, I will below use the above-mentioned scholar‘s conceptualisations of path 
dependence to understand how and why the MGK maintained its path of state of emergency. 
Krasner (1984) argued that institutions‘ choices tend to naturally canalise for a path of that 
action (author‘s italics). I ask if the MGK‘s choice of instituting a path of state of emergency 
canalised the development of the path for a state of emergency. The MGK‘s press releases 
show that the MGK held quarterly meetings between 1983 and 1997. At these quarterly 
meetings both the civilian and military members of the MGK discussed and negotiated over 
how to handle the PKK. I therefore argue the MGK‘s decisions to re-extend the state of 
emergency in the South East of Turkey did not evolve naturally, but these decisions were 
made at the MGK‘s quarterly meetings. 
In contrast to Krasner, Levi (1997) stressed the cost of reversal and has suggested that 
institutions tend to maintain their original path because the cost of reversal may be higher 
than keeping to the original path. I therefore ask, had the MGK opted for an alternative way 
of handling the PKK such as lifting the state of emergency permanently or resolving the 
Kurdish issue through political and democratic means, would these have cost more to both 
the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s progress towards joining the EC/EU than 
maintaining the path of state of emergency. I argue that had the MGK either removed the 
state of emergency or recognised Ocalan‘s calls for unilateral ceasefire, the cost probably 
would not have been higher than having kept the state of emergency. Had the MGK used 
political means to handle the PKK and resolve the Kurdish issue instead of calling for and 
maintaining the state of emergency, more progress could have been made towards resolution 
of Turkey‘s ethnic minority problem and this would have hastened Turkey‘s accession to the 
EC/EU.  In the early 1990s when Ozal began to talk about finding a political solution to the 
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Kurdish problem, Ocalan as a response declared that the PKK had given up on its aim of 
forming an independent Kurdish state in Turkish lands. This meant that the level of threat 
emerging from the PKK was minimised. Ozal‘s successors Demirel and Ciller and the MGK 
members in the mid 1990s however overlooked the fact that the PKK had changed its 
ultimate aim; they therefore continued to treat the PKK as a serious internal threat and 
maintained the state of emergency in the Kurdish provinces which arguably had higher costs 
for the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s European policy. In addition, the MGK‘s path 
of state of emergency over time generated unique characteristics of governing in the South 
East of Turkey. These characteristics were namely legal measures, regional governors, village 
guards, the anti-terrorism law and evacuation of the villages. These meant local people were 
restricted in what paper they could read, deprived of practicing their civil liberties, governed 
by unrepresentative and illegitimate regional governors, ill-treated by the village guards and 
were left to evacuate their villages. These on the one hand raised questions about the quality 
of democracy in Turkey and raised doubts about what human rights meant to the Turkish 
authorities on the other hand. As a result Turkey could not meet the political and ethnic 
minority aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria for Full Membership of the EU. 
Pierson (2004) noted that institutions maintain their original path as the benefits of that path 
increases over the next round. As far as the outcomes the MGK‘s path of state of emergency 
is concerned, it is difficult to say that these outcomes were attractive to the MGK‘s members 
or to the Turkish authorities. Here I will show that the MGK‘s state of emergency not only 
violated the Turkish constitutional order, but also failed to eradicate the PKK. As said earlier 
the MGK called for a state of emergency to protect the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic 
and to safeguard the constitutional order and public order and eradicate the PKK. However 
under the evolved characteristics of the state of emergency zone, people were ruled by 
illegitimate and unrepresentative bodies such as the regional governors and the village guards 
and people had to conduct themselves in accordance with requirements of the anti-terrorism 
law. This meant that both Article seven of the 1982 constitution, which said ―Legislative 
power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the Turkish Nation. 
This power cannot be delegated‖, and Article eight, which noted, ―Executive power and 
function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council 
of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the law‖, were violated by the existence 
of and the authority held by the regional governors and village guards.  In addition, public 
order was not protected since local people lived under constant military operations and 
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clashes between the PKK and the TSK. However, the MGK had successfully protected 
Turkish territorial unity since the Turkish borders remained as they were between 1983 and 
1997, but the PKK was not eradicated. Furthermore, partly because of the characteristics of 
the state of emergency, Turkey‘s application for Full Membership of the EC was not 
successful and the European Parliament kept a critical eye on the developments in Turkey 
and refused to provide Turkey with financial aid. This meant that the MGK‘s path of state of 
emergency were beneficial neither to Turkish democracy and human rights standards nor to 
Turkey‘s aspirations to join the EC/EU. The only outcome of the MGK‘s path which can be 
considered as a benefit is the protection of Turkish territorial unity and that was vital for 
many in Turkey. 
I found the concept of path dependence very helpful not only to identify what path the MGK 
established and maintained over the years, but also to identify the options that were available 
to the MGK and to the Turkish authorities as opposed to maintaining the state of emergency. 
In addition, the above applications of the conceptualisation of path dependence have been 
useful to gain an insight into what factors may have shaped the MGK‘s preference for 
keeping the state of emergency.  I found that the MGK‘s decisions on whether to maintain the 
state of emergency were made at the MGK‘s quarterly meeting by the military and civilian 
members who sat in the MGK between 1983 and 1997, which meant it did not take place 
naturally. I found that had the MGK opted for other options such as lifting the state of 
emergency permanently, it probably would have not been costly to either the Turkish political 
system or Turkey‘s European policy. I noted that the characteristics of the state of emergency 
had weakened the features of the Turkish democracy and slowed down Turkey‘s progress to 
meet the EC/EU‘s membership criteria. I furthermore found that the MGK‘s path of state of 
emergency did not produce many benefits to the Turkish political system and to the nature of 
Turkey–EC/EU relations. The MGK‘s state of emergency violated two significant Articles of 
the Turkish Constitution which the MGK had to safeguard. Due to the characteristics and the 
consequences of the state of emergency zone, resolution of the Kurdish issue became a 
condition for the EU to establish the Customs Union with Turkey. Although these findings 
are vital, I still have not been able to explain completely why the MGK maintained the state 
of emergency despite the alternative options and their more beneficial outcomes. I here argue 
that the concept of path dependence should be complemented by Merton‘s concept of 
unintended consequences to highlight the relationship between the consequences mentioned 
above and the MGK‘s path of state of emergency. I first want to clarify if there is a clear 
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connection between poor human rights records, weak democracy and the slow progressing of 
Turkey–EC/EU relations and the MGK‘s state of emergency with Merton‘s framework of 
unintended consequences. I then will assess whether these outcomes are intended or 
unintended consequences. Lastly, I will draw on Merton‘s framework to explain what causal 
factor shaped the MGK‘s choice of keeping the state of emergency in the South East of 
Turkey. 
First of all it is necessary to clarify if the MGK‘s action caused the unintended consequences 
to both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations that I have outlined above. 
Thus I ask: had the MGK not opted for the state of emergency, would the situation in the 
Kurdish region have developed as it did, and would this path have hindered Turkey‘s bid to 
join the EC/EU? The short answer to this question is ―probably unlikely‖. Had the state of 
emergency not been called for an initial four months and had it not been consistently 
extended every four months, then the situation would not have produced the unintended 
consequences to both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations that it did. 
This shows that there is a clear connection between the MGK‘s state of emergency and the 
unintended consequences. And these unintended consequences can be added to Merton‘s list 
of sum-total consequences of actions as the unintended consequences to the political system 
of a country and its international relations through (1) poor human rights and (2) human 
rights. 
The second task is to clarify the actual purpose of the MGK‘s given action so to find out if 
the above identified consequences to both the Turkish political system and Turkey‘s 
European integration were intended or unintended. What did the MGK want to achieve by the 
state of emergency? The MGK‘s press releases and my analysis above show that the MGK 
recognised the PKK as a ―terrorist organisation‖ and as far as the MGK was concerned, the 
PKK had to be eradicated, and the local people living in the state of emergency zone had to 
be prevented from helping the ARGK guerrillas with shelter and food or by joining them. 
However, the underlying aim of the MGK was to protect the Turkish Republic‘s 
constitutional order and indivisibility and safeguard public order. And to reach these ends the 
MGK chose to call and maintain the state of emergency. This however unpredictably evolved 
into a strict regime in the South East of Turkey; therefore this shows that the outcomes of the 





Next I want to find out what factor(s) caused the MGK‘s action to produce unintended 
consequences. To do this, the causal factors suggested by Merton will be tested on the 
available empirical evidence. Was it the MGK‘s existing state of knowledge, which meant 
that the MGK thought its intended outcomes, could be achieved through the state of 
emergency? I argue that it would be misleading to say that the MGK supposed that through 
the state of emergency it could achieve its intended outcomes. It is rather the case that the 
MGK was restricted in what type of action it could have taken initially, but it will be useful to 
question why the MGK continued to take the same action over the years. Here, its state of 
knowledge or its restricted space of action cannot be seen as the causal factors. We can ask 
whether the MGK was ignorant of the consequences of its actions? This chapter argues that 
the MGK cannot be considered as ignorant that its actions would produce the unintended 
consequences, instead of the intended consequences. This is because the MGK was composed 
of well-educated and informed senior politicians and military members. 
In that case, is it the MGK‘s ―imperious immediacy of interests‖ that is the significant factor? 
This means, if the MGK wanted to achieve its intended outcomes through the state of 
emergency above, but that it did not think about what further consequences its action would 
have both for the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations. This could be 
argued, but having said that, my analysis above has shown that the MGK was only successful 
in meeting one of the elements of its intention and that is Turkey‘s territorial unity. It 
however violated two of the other elements of its intentions: the protection of constitutional 
order and public order. I would argue this means that the MGK‘s sole aim in calling the state 
of emergency was to protect Turkey‘s territorial unity, even at the expense of violating the 
Constitutional and public order, weakening democracy, creating a poor human rights record 
and slowing the progress of Turkey–EC/EU relations. 
One can challenge this chapter on how and why the outcomes of the MGK‘s actions could be 
recognised as unintended consequences. There are a couple of points: (1) it is not in the remit 
of this work to make a judgment of whether the MGK‘s actions are supportable and (2) here 
it is not suggested that the MGK should not be criticised, but it suggests that one should go 
beyond this and question why the MGK maintained its original path despite its unintended 
consequences, and ask why it did not opt for another option while its actions were not 
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achieving the aims it had set. These questions will be answered below in the context of 
Turkey‘s aspirations to join the EC/EU. 
5.4. Conclusions 
By applying historical institutionalism‘s temporal approach to the MGK‘s handling of the 
PKK, I found that in the early 1980s the MGK – with its newly acquired powers as a result of 
Critical Juncture (III) – recommended that the Council of Ministers call for a state of 
emergency in the ten provinces where Kurds predominantly lived. Additionally I found that 
the MGK kept re-extending this state of emergency from the early 1980s to the late 1990s 
despite the EC/EU‘s request to remove the state of emergency throughout the 1980s and the 
1990s, Ozal‘s call for a political solution in the 1990s, and Ocalan‘s calls for a ceasefire 
throughout 1990. As I noted, the MGK recognised the PKK as an internal threat, and 
therefore it called for a state of emergency to protect Turkey‘s territorial unity and safeguard 
its constitutional order and public order. I also observed that the MGK‘s path of state of 
emergency generated a unique regime in the South East of Turkey with distinct 
characteristics intended to prevent the local people supporting the PKK guerrillas and to fight 
against terrorism.  The distinct characteristics of the unique regime in the South of East of 
Turkey meant people living in the region were restricted in where they travelled, what they 
read, how they assembled and how they associated. It also meant that they were governed by 
illegitimate and unrepresentative bodies. This therefore meant poor human rights records and 
fairly weak features of a democratic political system in Turkey.  As far as Turkey‘s relations 
with the EC/EU were concerned in those years, I found Ozal‘s newly elected government in 
mid 1983 were determined about reestablishing political dialogue with the EC.  As was 
decided by the National Security Commission at Critical Juncture (III), Ozal‘s government 
applied for Full Membership of the EC in 1987 and it was refused two years later when the 
EC also began to have political dialogue with the Turkish delegates.  I found that the state of 
emergency in the Kurdish region was at the centre of debates in the EU and there was a 
constant demand for the Turkish authorities to find a political solution to the Kurdish 
question. Additionally, Turkish authorities were criticised over its weak democratic political 
system and poor human rights record. This is the point where one best can see the interaction 




After Turkey‘s Full Membership application was refused, the European Parliament continued 
on a regular basis to request that Turkey find a political resolution to its Kurdish question, 
instead of military action. When in the early 1990s Ozal openly discussed the idea of 
resolving the Kurdish problem politically, the EC welcomed Ozal‘s initiative and supported 
his position in granting cultural rights to Kurds in Turkey. Since Ozal suddenly passed away, 
and thus did not have the chance to implement many of his policies, the European Parliament 
refused to begin a political dialogue with Turkey and withdrew financial aid over Turkey‘s 
treatment of the Kurdish issue. The introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria meant that 
Turkey had to meet political criteria and respect and protect its ethnic minorities before it 
joined the EU. Despite all these criticisms and the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria 
the MGK opted to maintain its path of state of emergency in the mid 1990s. And by 1994 the 
resolution of the Kurdish question became a condition for the Turkish authorities to tackle 
before Turkey could sign the Customs Union with the EU. When both Demirel and Ciller 
took no steps to improve human rights in Turkey in the mid 1990s, forming political dialogue 
with Turkey was no longer a priority for the EU and on 19th September 1996 the EP decided 
to freeze financial aid due to ―protracted human rights violations‖ in Turkey; this was 
followed by the Luxembourg Summit‘s decision not to add Turkey to the list of candidates 
that would join the EU in 2004. 
I then began to question why the MGK continued its state of emergency despite the fact that 
its path violated human rights and hindered Turkey‘s accession to the EC/EU. Krasner‘s 
suggestion of ‗natural canalisation‘, which means that institutions naturally canalise their 
original path,  does not explain the MGK‘s choice to maintain a state of emergency, since the 
MGK‘s decisions in relation to re-extending the state of emergency were made at its quarterly 
meetings.  Levi‘s reference to ‗cost of reversal‘ also does not explain the MGK‘s reasons for 
keeping the state of emergency, as I highlighted that reversal from the state of emergency 
policy would have been very beneficial for the local people who lived in the South East of 
Turkey, for the Turkish political system and for Turkey‘s bid to join the EU. Pierson's 
emphasise on the ‗increasing benefits‘ of continuing a path has also not been helpful to 
explain why the MGK maintained its path of state of emergency: as the MGK continued to 
re-extend the state of emergency in Turkey, the EC/EU not only refused to grant the Turkish 
authorities financial aid because of violations of human rights in the South East of Turkey, 
but also excluded Turkey from the 2004 Enlargement process. 
209 
 
So to highlight the relationship between the MGK‘s state of emergency and the situation in 
the South East of Turkey and Turkey‘s slow progressing relationship with EC/EU, I found 
Merton‘s framework of the concept of unintended consequences very helpful. I found that 
had the MGK not called for and maintained the state of emergency over a long period of time 
the situation in the South of Turkey would probably not have developed the way it did and 
Turkey–EC/EU relations would probably have not developed the way they did. These were 
unintended consequences of the MGK‘s state of emergency, and they were unintended 
because the MGK called for a state of emergency so as to eradicate the PKK; protect 
Turkey‘s territorial unity and Constitutional order; and safeguard public order. However, this 
had unintended consequences for the political system of a country and its international 
relations through (1) poor human rights and (2) human rights and I argue that these are an 
original contribution to Merton‘s list of sum-total consequences of actions. As to what caused 
these unintended consequences, I found Merton‘s suggestion of the ‗imperious immediacy of 
interests‘, which is one of the factors he suggests may cause unintended consequences, very 
useful since it does to a certain extent explain why the MGK maintained the state of 
emergency in the presence of other options and despite the unintended consequences.  Thus, 
as I have observed, the MGK only wanted to protect Turkey‘s territorial unity, and it did not 
consider the further consequences of its actions, either for its intended outcomes or for the 
Turkish political system and Turkey‘s efforts in meeting EC/EU membership criteria.  
This chapter puts forward an entirely new analysis of Turkey–EC/EU relations post Critical 
Juncture (III) and in the light of the escalated Kurdish question. This is because (1) the 
MGK‘s role in handling the Kurdish question and the PKK have not been acknowledged 
widely; (2) Turkey‘s poor human rights and weak democracy have not been studied in the 
context of the MGK‘s state of emergency; (3) Turkey‘s slow progressing relationship with 
the EU between 1983 and 1997 has not been analysed in the context of the MGK‘s path of 
state of emergency and its unintended consequences; and (4) the framework, of concepts of 
path dependence and unintended consequences, has neither been formulated as it has been in 
this chapter not has it been utilised as it has been in this chapter. Therefore the chapter offers 
an origial perspective on how and why Turkey‘s could not re-establish political relations with 
the EC after Critical Juncture (III); why Turkey‘s Full Membership application was refused 
in 1989; what role Turkey‘s poor human records played in Turkey–EC/EU relations; why the 
EC/EU did not provide Turkey with any financial assistance; why the Customs Union was 
delayed for a long time; and why Turkey was excluded from the 2004 Enlargement process. 
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In this chapter I have analysed how the MGK practiced its newly acquired powers in the 
years between 1983 and 1997. I have shown that the MGK was the main institution in 
Turkish political decision making, making recommendations to the Council of Ministers, in 
relation to the PKK. I have also shown that the MGK was not an army-dominated institution, 
as Ozal, in the early 1990s, managed to begin discussions in the MGK quarterly meetings 
about finding political solutions to the Kurdish question. This meant that civilian members of 
the MGK were able to express opinion and change other members‘ position. And this also 
means that, in contrast to Peters‘ suggestion that path dependence approaches are lacking in 
attention to human agents, I have shown that the concept of path dependence allows space for 
analysing the role of agents in how and why institutions form path dependent actions. 
Although the MGK‘s choices and decisions on the PKK were undermining Turkey–EC/EU 
relations between 1983 and 1997, the EU‘s documents show that the MGK was not known to 
the EU authorities until 1998. In the next chapter I will therefore analyse how the EU treated 
the MGK, what developments took place in relation to the MGK and why and how the MGK 
















CHAPTER 6: THE CURTAILMENT OF THE MGK’S POWERS AND THE EU’S 
DECISION TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY, 1997–2004 
Introduction 
The years between 1997 and 2004 have witnessed long awaited radical changes in the role, 
power, and composition of the National Security Council (MGK). At the same time, there has 
been vigorous progress in Turkey‘s bid to join the European Union (EU). There has been 
some discussion as to what precipitated these changes in the MGK. The general agreement 
among many such as Cizre (2003), Onis (2003), Lundgren (2007) and Faucompret and 
Konings (2008) has been that the Turkish government made these changes to hasten the pace 
of Turkey‘s path to EU membership. I argue that one should study the domestic political 
developments that took place prior to the changes in question in order to explore the sources 
and consequences of the changes. This chapter proposes to test whether rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the changes in the both MGK 
and Turkey–EU relations. There are three central questions to this chapter: 
 What school of New Institutionalism can best explain the changes both in the MGK 
and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations? 
 What domestic political developments initiated the changes in and around the MGK? 
 Have the changes in the MGK triggered the EU‘s decision to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey? 
These questions will be answered in the next three parts. The first part will assess the strength 
and weaknesses of current interpretations of the changes in the MGK and this will be 
followed by a theoretical debate on what schools of New Institutionalism can best explain 
both institutional and policy change. The second part will begin by explaining the EU‘s 
perception of the MGK‘s position both in the Turkish political system and in the policy areas 
it is responsible for. Then it will discuss the antecedents to the changes in the MGK and 
Turkey–EU relations using the historical institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium. In 
the third part I will assess how useful rational choice, sociological and historical 
institutionalism is in explaining how and why both the MGK‘s powers were curtailed and the 
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EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. The conclusion will draw together 
the findings of this chapter. 
6.1. Assessment of the Literature on the changes in the MGK and Turkey-EU relations 
and the theoretical debate 
The changes in the MGK‘s powers and authority, and the new era of Turkey–EU relations 
have received significant academic interest. The question of what triggered the changes in the 
MGK has been debated by scholars who have either suggested that the EU or the European 
Commission‘s Regular reports precipitated the changes in the MGK (Cizre, 2003; Onis 2003: 
Lundgren 2005; Faucompret and Konings 2008) or argued that the prospect of full EU 
membership strengthened the voice of civilian politicians in taking bold steps to change 
civil–military relations (Rumford 2000; Tank 2001; Diez 2005; Watts 2006; Cinar 2008). The 
role of domestic politics has not been discussed in sourcing the changes both in the MGK and 
in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. The following will assess in detail the existing 
interpretations of the changes in the MGK and it will propose a different model of analysing 
institutional changes and their consequences. 
Cizre (2003) suggests that in order to normalise civil–military relations in Turkey, the army‘s 
role in politics was reduced through the changes in the MGK. She then argued that the 
European Commission‘s regular reports played an important role in the government‘s 
reformation of the MGK. And in a different publication Cizre (2007) said ―Since the Summit, 
the possibility of EU accession has become the main driving force for democratic reforms in 
the security sector and civil-military relations. The EU‘s use of pre-conditionality is having 
used as an effective instrument for the promotion of democratic civilian oversight 
mechanisms over the security sector‖ (ibid.:5). Lundgreen agrees: ―In order to meet the 
requirements stipulated by the EU, the NSC has been transformed from an executive to an 
advisory body and civilian control of it has increased‖ (Lundgren 2007: 51-52). Additionally, 
Faucompret and Konings note: ―In response to the EU criticism, the government passed its 
seventh reform package [which] … introduced some fundamental changes to the duties, 
functioning and composition of the NSC‖ (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 154). As far as 
Onis was concerned, this was ―a period of profound and momentous change in Turkish 
history‖ and, he argues, ―clearly, a change of this magnitude would have been impossible in 
the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalised EU anchor in the directions of Full 
Membership‖ (Onis 2003: 13-14). I would not agree with Cizre (2003) and Faucompret and 
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Konings (2008) that the Turkish authorities made these changes because the EU asked them 
to do so, and I argue in this chapter that commentaries of these kind are not only too simple 
but also fail to explain the mechanisms by which the changes took place. Onis‘s (2003) 
emphasis on the EU‘s anchoring role is rather more plausible. Having said that, one should 
also question what initiated the changes in the MGK, rather than what simply paved the way 
for Turkey to reduce the MGK‘s political authority. 
The changes in the MGK have also been considered in the context of power relations 
between the civilian and the military members of the MGK. It has been asked what role the 
EU played in helping the civilian members to change the military members‘ position in the 
MGK. Tank (2001) argues that although the Turkish military has been supportive of Turkey‘s 
EU membership endeavour, it is now its role in the Turkish political system has been under 
pressure from the EU post Helsinki Summit and has suggested that the Turkish political elite 
is beginning to see the central role of the military as a barrier to an eventual EU membership 
and is slowly arriving at the conclusion that, if the goal of this membership is to be realised, 
the military must be willing to sacrifice considerable political power (p.218). The choice to 
be made by the military leadership will be determined by its corporatist traditions and 
political inheritance, Turkey‘s evolving geostrategic posture and assessments of the value of 
the EU membership (p. 218). Diez (2005: 168) points out that that post-Helsinki the 
Europeanization process in Turkey created new circumstances for civil–military relations and 
described it as an era of ―revolutionary‖ changes. He then added that once the EU started the 
accession process, granting Turkey candidate membership status in 1999, the sense of 
powerlessness of the civilian side was removed to a greater extent. This meant that the EU as 
an external reference point played the role of ―legitimizer in Turkish domestic politics‖, 
which ultimately empowered the civilian side (ibid.: 177). On similar lines, Rumford (2000) 
and Watts (2006) observe that credible signals emerging from the EU on Turkey‘s 
membership helped the civilians to question existing civil–military relations in Turkey. 
Rumford argues that as a result of this empowerment, the civilian side more effectively 
demanded the embodiment of more democratic norms (i.e., civilian control of the military) 
within the MGK. They furthermore suggested that this created an opportunity for those who 
were discontent with the status quo, civilians in this case, to seek to change the rules of the 
game (ibid.: 51; see also Watts 2006: 131). In addition, Cinar argues: ―Since the Helsinki 
summit decision to extend candidate status to Ankara, the EU-membership project has 
become the main democratising dynamic providing the elected governments with some 
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leverage in standing up to the military-led establishment‖ (Cinar 2008: 120). On the whole, I 
would disagree with the idea that the European Commission‘s regular progress reports 
initiated the changes in the MGK; these reports rather provided the Turkish authorities with a 
roadmap to comply with the requirements of beginning accession negotiations with the EU. 
My argument in this chapter recognises the importance of the EU‘s support for Turkey in 
curtailing the MGK‘s authority and composition, but I do not agree with Rumford (2000), 
Tank (2001), Diez (2005), Watts (2006) and Cinar (2008) that the civilians on the MGK 
facilitated the changes only when they were empowered by the credible prospect of the EU 
membership. My argument is that the MGK‘s role in handling internal security threats should 
have not been considered: over the past 15 to 17 years, the MGK has prepared the national 
security policy of the Turkish Republic. Since the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the rise 
of radical political Islam were recognised as internal threats to Turkey‘s indivisibility and 
secular nature, respectively, the MGK made recommendations to the government on how to 
handle these threats. The political dynamics related to these two internal threats should have 
been researched and analysed in the context of the changes in the MGK. In this chapter, I 
argue that this relative negligence has resulted in overlooking the connection between 
domestic political incidents and the changes both in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations. 
Having said that, Sarigil (2007) questions how and why the military agreed to the removal of 
its own powers. Institutional change, according to Sarigil, could be understood as a 
―conflicting process‖ which is made of two stages: initiation and bargaining. In the first stage, 
he suggested that certain internal or external developments such as shifts in the power 
structure among institutional actors trigger the process of change. In the second stage, he 
argued, institutional actors bargain over alternative arrangements, either tacitly or explicitly. 
His work suggests a two-dimensional bargaining model involving ―the logic of consequence‖ 
and ―the logic of appropriateness‖. One of his conclusions is that the EU played a primary 
role in initiating shifts in power relations between the civilian and military sides in post-
Helsinki Turkey – an argument which I would dispute for the reasons outlined above. His 
second conclusion was that although the military was highly concerned about the 
consequences of reforms on its own powers, it nevertheless continued to express its 




There are three points to be made in connection with Sarigil‘s analysis. The first is that the 
military was always loyal to Ataturk‘s legacy in its support for Turkey‘s relationship with the 
EU. Chapter 3 showed that during the Critical Junctures (I–III), the military aimed to keep 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU; at Critical Juncture III, it had decided that Turkey would 
apply for the Full Membership of the EC. It is therefore misleading to suggest that the army 
agreed to relinquish its powers because it found itself entrapped in its own rhetoric. The 
second is that Sarigil, like the other academics discussed above, does not put the necessary 
emphasis on the fact that the changes occurred suddenly. He does not question why the 
changes in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations occurred very soon after the closure of the 
Welfare Party (RP) in 1997 and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK), in 1999. Overall, I would not agree with Sarigil that the changes in the 
MGK‘s powers and composition were initiated by the EU, and would argue that Sarigil, like 
others, have overstated the influence of exogenous variables on the future of a domestic 
institution. 
While the above discussed academics have pointed to the role of the EU in the changes that 
took place in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations, Kubicek (2005) and Ozcan (2004) have 
also paid attention to the role of domestic factors. Kubicek sounds a note of warning: ―[Is] 
this, however, entirely an externally driven process? Are Turks responding merely to the 
material incentives of conditionality, or are some Turkish actors advocating reforms for their 
own sake?‖ (Kubicek 2005: 361–63). To explain his point of view, Kubicek uses an article 
from the Turkish Daily News (18 July 2000), which questioned whether the Turks were 
making reforms like students who do their homework only because the teacher tells them to 
do it. He analyses this era of change as democratisation being imposed from outside, but then 
imbued with Turkish authorship, but nevertheless argues that it is more an instrumental 
adaptation to the demands of conditionality than a sincere change based upon acceptance and 
internalization of democratic means. He thus suggests that the Turkish government is 
responding to the ―logic of consequences‖ (do X because you will get Y) rather than the 
―logic of appropriateness‖ (do X because it is the right thing to do‖ (Kubicek 2005: 361–65). 
He emphasises the support ―from below‖ within Turkey as essential for consolidation of 
reforms and argues that although there is evidence of Euroscepticism within the public at 
large, there is a broad support in abstract terms for democratic principles and human rights. 
Like Kubicek, Ozcan (2004) disagrees with the suggestion that increasing prospects of EU 
accession have been exerting a tremendous impact on Turkish foreign policy and on the 
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dynamics of Turkish politics. Instead he suggests that the impact may have stemmed from 
different roots. He points to Turkish society: according to Ozcan Turkish society has become 
more receptive to open debate as interest groups develop, and they are now far better 
organized to transmit their demands across Europe through peer associations accredited with 
the Union (ibid.: 6). Globalisation, the EU integration process and customs union brought 
about their own grinding effects on the prominence of traditional statecraft in Turkey. A vast 
spectrum of civic organisations are involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security 
sector on a greater scale and are thus becoming the agents of a de-securitization process in 
Turkey (Oczan 2004: 6–7). This chapter argues that Kubicek is right to stress the importance 
of support from below in the process of change that has taken place in Turkey and agrees 
with Ozcan over the role of interest groups. However, one should not overlook the fact that 
throughout Turkish political history, the public and interest groups have been predominantly 
supportive of a fairer and democratic political system, but yet successive governments did not 
take the necessary steps to strengthen democracy and improve human rights until the late 
1990s. 
Bilgin (2007b) has suggested that decreasing the numbers of military members of the MGK 
and reducing the frequency of the MGK‘s meetings did not change the role of the military in 
the Turkish political system and argued that ―the military remains the major actor shaping the 
contours of the national security policy document through a mixture of formal mechanism 
and intersubjective understandings, which, in turn, are warranted by the ways in which 
‗security‘ has been understood and practiced in Turkey‖ (ibid.: 563–64). Bilgin (2007b) 
suggested that change became possible owing to some social actors‘ too-prolonged strategy 
of claiming ‗security-speak‘ in order to frame concerns, such as the ‗limited life-chance 
opportunities for a rapidly increasing population‘, in strictly security terms (as ‗threats to 
Turkey‘s future‘) and pointing to Turkey‘s accession to the EU as a solution that would help 
stabilise Turkey‘s foreign relations as well as the economy and provide an anchor for reform. 
This strategy according to Bilgin was successful since it has challenged the state 
establishment‘s monopoly over ‗security speak‘ and de-centred the existing ‗security 
problem‘ through identifying new ones; these, in turn, allowed room for debates, dissent and 
change (ibid.: 556).  
In a different publication Bilgin (2008) has argued that the concept of security is going 
through a change; the  ―new security‖ approach suggests that security policies should not aim 
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only at preventing wars but should be transformed into policies that would bring about eman-
cipatory change (ibid.:43).  A few examples of ―new‖ threats include economic inequalities 
and injustices, environmental degradation and the conflicts produced by international migra-
tion; these are tagged as ―soft security‖ in Western literature and practice whereas 
the traditional military threats stemming from abroad are named 
―hard security‖ (ibid.: 50). Bilgin argues that the change in the approach to what security 
means represents the adoption of a more holistic understanding, including an understand-
ing that covers the military as well as all the remaining non-military aspects of security. And 
it has been argued that ―‗This is achieved by asking the question, ―Who is security for?‖ The 
answer is this: Security is for the people. The state is only the? tool for providing security for 
the people and is never the real aim itself‘‖ (quoted in Bilgin 1998: 50). There are two rea-
sons for the emergence of this new security concept: (1) to meet the needs of the people 
whose insecurities are deepened, rather than eliminated, by the prevailing military-focussed 
approach and (2) to stress the fact that state security is not an end in itself, but only a tool for 
providing the citizens‘ security.  For Bilgin (1998) this means that the state should of course 
be safe in order to provide security for its citizens, but the oppressive policies of some states 
that limit freedoms raise doubt about whether they give enough importance to their citizens‘ 
security (ibid.:60-61). 
Kirisci (2009) refers to a domestic factor in his analysis of how and why Turkey‘s foreign 
policy has changed. Kirisci notes that Turkish foreign policy makers changed their narrowly 
defined focus on national security with their aspiration to trade, expand export markets, and 
attract and export foreign direct investment. He argues that Turkey has been transformed 
from being cited as a ―post-Cold War warrior‖ or a ―regional coercive power‖ to a ―benign‖ 
if not ―soft‖ power and claims that it is crucial to pay adequate attention to the role of 
economic factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, according to him, has been in 
the process of becoming a ―trading state‖ as foreign trade has steadily grown and come to 
constitute a growing proportion of its economy; he suggests that that the formation of a 
customs union between Turkey and the EU in 1996 would also come to play an important 
role in creating an environment conducive to the eventual emergence of a trading state. The 
nature of a trading state is such that a wider range of actors come to participate in foreign 
policy making or diplomatic games and that the interests and priorities of these actors are 
quite different from those of the traditional foreign policymakers of Turkey. Furthermore, the 
rise of the trading state has transformed and is transforming traditional foreign policymakers, 
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too. They are increasingly coming to recognize that Turkey‘s national interest cannot be 
solely determined in terms of a narrowly defined national security, and that economic 
considerations such as the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export 
foreign direct investment are just as important. 
As mentioned above, it is important not to overlook the fact that the changes in question took 
place very soon after two important developments in the endogenous variables, namely the 
closure of the RP (Welfare Party) and the ban on Erbakan‘s involvement in politics in 1998, 
and the capture of Ocalan in 1999. These developments have been studied, but separately and 
independent of the changes in the MGK. The relationship between these incidents and the 
MGK has been overlooked. The aftermath of these developments has not been studied in 
detail. The implications of these incidents and their aftermath for the MGK, for domestic 
politics and for the relationship between Turkey and the EU have been only vaguely 
researched (Kirisci 2002; Nachmani 2003; Duran 2004; Onis and Keyman 2004; Diez 2005; 
Oran 2005; Akcapar 2007; Faucompret and Konings 2008). My argument here is that to 
understand the radical institutional changes that occurred at this time it is necessary not only 
to consider developments in the policy areas for which the institution is responsible, but also 
it is crucial to understand the link between these domestic developments and their aftermath. 
Duran (2005) notes that ―the Feb 1997 process‖ – by which expression Duran is referring to 
the MGK‘s February 1997 where the Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party 
(RP) was asked to take measures to check the growth of religious fundamentalism in Turkey 
– to have brought some significant changes in the "Islamists‘ position in Europe and 
democracy" and has suggested that they came to re-evaluate their views on Turkey‘s 
membership of the EU. Duran suggests that post 1997 the Islamists adopted a new discourse 
according to which democratisation, the rule of law and the Copenhagen criteria should shape 
the reform and restructuring of the Turkish political system‖ (Duran 2004: 140), and this then 
meant that Turkey‘s endeavour to become a full member of the EU became compatible with 
their aim of democratising the Turkish political system. Duran‘s work is a very interesting 
one, but it is not clear what he means by ―the Feb 1997 process‖, the reader is left to guess 
whether he means the MGK meeting that took place in February 1997 when the RP was 
given a list of measures necessary to take control of religious fundamentalism or the period 
which led up to the banning of Erbakan from active politics. It is in addition not clear whom 
he refers to by ―the Islamists‖: is it the political parties or the people who are religiously 
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oriented? On the other hand, Diez, discussing what contributed to improved Turkey–EU 
relations in the late 1990s, refers to three developments: the improved relationship between 
Turkey and Greece; the series of reform packages approved by the National Assembly to 
bring Turkey‘s constitutional and legal system in line with EU requirements; and the rise of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a secular party with religious roots (Diez 2005: 
170). This chapter agrees with Diez that the improved relationship between Greece and 
Turkey has positively contributed to Turkey–EU relations, but Diez does not seem to 
question how and why there have been a number of changes in the Turkish political system 
and what role domestic political developments played in this. Diez also overlooks to the fact 
that it is not the rise of the AKP that supported Turkey‘s bid for EU membership but the 
moderately conservative and pro-European approach the AKP adopted that has positively 
contributed to Turkey‘s bid to join the EU. 
On the capture of Ocalan, when discussing causes of the changes in the Turkish political 
system, Keyman and Onis have noted that the Helsinki decision was very influential in 
initiating changes in the Turkish political system and argue that civil society also contributed 
to this. In addition, they note, ―we should recognise that the end of the armed conflict with 
the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) in the early part of 1999 also helped to provide a more 
congenial environment with which democratisation reforms could proceed‖ (Keyman and 
Onis 2004: 181-82). Oran (2005: 352) similarly suggests that Ocalan‘s trial and then his 
arrest allowed the Turkish government to take rigorous steps to consolidate democracy. This 
chapter agrees with Keyman and Onis (2004) and Oran (2005) that after Ocalan‘s capture a 
wide scale of political reforms were made in Turkey and this contributed positively to 
Turkey‘s path toward EU membership. Both of these works however lack not only to outline 
the political reforms they are referring to, but also more concretely how and why Ocalan‘s 
arrest contributed to Turkey‘s democratisation period. 
Faucompret and Konings have noted: ―The PKK lost much of its élan when its leader 
Abdullah Ocalan was arrested in February 1998‖ and suggest that it was only with the EU‘s 
pressure and the PKK‘s defeat by the TSK that the Turkish government lifted the state of 
emergency and introduced constitutional amendment (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 168). I 
would argue that certainly after Ocalan was captured, the PKK adopted a new moderate 
approach so that its demands could be accommodated in the political debates in Turkish 
politics. Nachmani similarly has said that ―Turkey crushed the PKK armed uprising‖ 
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(Nachmani 2003: 2) and added ―Turkey‘s integration in Europe and in the West seems to 
grow stronger as Turkey‘s external adversaries and internal conflicts become weaker and 
appear to be less threatening‖ (ibid.: 3). However, the PKK was not crushed; it is important to 
recognise the fact that the PKK had called for a ceasefire after Ocalan's capture; therefore 
there were no armed clashes between the TSK and the PKK. Kirisci notes, ―The apprehension 
of the leader of the PKK in February 1999 very quickly brought the violence to an end. A 
general improvement in the political climate in Turkey occurred and the coalition government 
elected to power in April 1999 committed itself to reforms‖ (Kirisci 2002: 3). Kirisci also 
argues that the EU played an influential role not only in the removal of the state of 
emergency in the South East of Turkey, but also in creating an environment conducive to 
solving the Kurdish problem (Kirisci 2004: 264). However, I would argue that all these 
discussed works overstate the impact of the EU in the removal of the state of emergency and 
fail to see that the capture of Ocalan and his conciliatory approach have on their own 
generated an improved security environment which paved the way for changes to take place 
in the MGK‘s state of emergency. 
By contrast, Akcapar (2007: 41) does recognise that an improved internal and external 
security environment emerged in Turkey when Ocalan was arrested and has noted that this 
helped Turkey to improve its relationship with the EU. Akcapar however does not explain 
how and why Ocalan‘s capture generated an improved internal security environment and in 
what ways this changed the pace of Turkey–EU relations. In addition, she omits to connect 
this with the closure of the RP and the newly established Justice and Development Party‘s 
(AKP) moderate Islamic and pro-European approach, which contributed to this improved 
security environment. This chapter argues that the removal of the leaders of the two internal 
threats and the aftermath of this formed the endogenous pressure that underpinned the 
changes under consideration.  
Having debated the strengths and the weaknesses of the existing literature on how and why 
changes took place in the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations, I now want to move on to 
discuss which school of the New Institutionalism‘s approach on institutional change can best 
explain the changes both in the MGK‘s position in Turkish political system and in the pace of 
the Turkey-EU relations. Although rational choice institutionalism offers many approaches to 
how and why institutions change (see Chapter 2 for more details), I will test two of them in 
this chapter. One of which suggests that institutional change occurs easily – all one needs is 
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to do change the incentives and behaviour will almost immediately change (see Goodin 1995; 
Keman 1996) and the other one argues that institutions change when they are dysfunctional 
or yield sub-optimal results. If one applies the first rational choice institutionalist approach on 
how and why the MGK has changed, then one would argue that when the EU changed the 
incentives by granting Turkey a candidate membership status in 1999, then the Turkish 
authorities changed their behaviour in relation to the MGK. This is a very interesting point of 
view and goes hand in hand with the above mentioned academics‘ point of view as to how 
and why the MGK‘s powers were curtailed (Rumford, Diez, Cinar and Watts).  And in the 
very last part of this chapter I will however test the case that the MGK's powers and functions 
were changed when the EU changed its incentives in relation to Turkey's bid to join the EU. 
If one however adopts the second approach, it could be argued that when the MGK was 
dysfunctional and yielded sub-optimal results, the MGK‘s powers and functions were 
changed, for example, to make it more functional. It is however unclear how one would 
assess whether an institution is dysfunctional. Testing however whether the MGK was 
changed because it was dysfunctional and yielded sub-optimal result can reveal an interesting 
insight to the MGK‘s ability in accomplishing its functions—this will be done in the very last 
part of this chapter.  
Before I move on to discuss how well the above discussed rational choice institutionalist 
approaches can explain how and why the pace of Turkey-EU relations has changed, I want to 
clarify one point. When the pace of Turkey-EU relations is discussed, I argue one need to be 
aware that there are two independent variables involved in this: (i) Turkey‘s treatment of the 
EU and its position on making changes in its political system and (ii) the EU‘s treatment of 
Turkey and its position in relation to Turkey‘s bid to join the EU. And the interaction of these 
two independent variables makes up the dependent variable: the pace of Turkey-EU relations. 
If however one applies the two rational choice institutionalist approaches on how and why the 
pace of Turkey-EU relations changed, one would suggest that Turkey-EU relations has 
accelerated when the EU granted Turkey a candidate membership status. This would mean 
that the greater attention would be given to the EU‘s role in the change of Turkey-EU 
relations; whilst domestic Turkish politics, as well as the reforms took place in the Turkish 
political systems would be overlooked. The second rational choice institutionalist approach 
suggests that when Turkey-EU relations yielded sub-optimal outcomes, it was decided to 
change the pace of the relationship. This approach however fails to provide a framework for 
to go and find out about what can be the sub-optimal outcomes of Turkey-EU relations and 
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for whom, is it the EU or Turkey or both. I will nevertheless test these two approaches in the 
last part of this chapter. 
As far as sociological institutionalism is concerned, Clemens and Cook, Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983, 1991) identify three mechanisms of institutional change: (i) ―coercion‖, 
which involves explicit pressures from other institutions, as well as from the cultural 
environment; (ii) ―mimesis‖, under which one organisation recognises the success of another 
and attempts to copy it; (iii) ―norms‖, through which an organisation adopts the 
―conventional wisdom‖ that certain forms are more ―modern, appropriate, and professional‖. 
If one applies the first mechanism on to the case study in hand, then one would say that the 
other institutions and the cultural environment have put pressure on the MGK to change its 
position in the Turkish political system. Whereas the second mechanism would suggest that 
when the MGK recognised success of another institution and it attempted to copy it, changes 
began to take place in the MGK‘s powers and functions. However if one adopts the third 
mechanism then it could be said that conventional wisdom was behind the curtailment of the 
MGK's powers so that MGK can be modern and be more fitting for the modern days. I now 
want to move on to how well the above mentioned three sociological institutionalist 
mechanisms can explain the change in the pace of Turkey-EU relations. As far as how and 
why the pace of Turkey-EU relations changed, the first approach would suggest that change 
has occurred through pressure from other countries or the other EU like bodies, for instance, 
the NATO. The second may argue that both Turkey and the EU recognised successful 
relationships of other countries and copied them; therefore change took place in Turkey‘s bid 
to join the EU. The very last one mechanism can say both Turkey and the EU must have 
adopted the conventional wisdom so that they can establish a much modern and professional 
relationship. This shows that like rational choice institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism gives great importance to the external factors in the study of institutional 
change. Testing these three mentioned mechanisms of sociological institutionalism will be 
useful to develop an interesting debate as to which mechanisms have triggered changes in the 
MGK and in the pace of Turkey-EU relations. 
Brief discussion of how well the rational choice and sociological institutionalists‘ approaches 
can explain institutions change point to a number of reasons as to how and why changes may 
have taken place in the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations. Both schools of the New 
Institutionalism share common grounds in granting greater emphasis in the role of external 
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factors in producing institutional and policy change. They lack interest in the role of domestic 
factors in triggering institutional and policy change. Additionally both schools do not provide 
the researcher with a framework  or a method of research that could be utilised to test if their 
approaches can explain how and why the MGK‘s powers were curtailed and Turkey was 
granted a candidate membership status in 2004. In contrast historical institutionalism points 
to the concept of punctuated equilibrium which can be used to explain institutional change. 
Krasner‘s concept of punctuated equilibrium is very useful to formulating a number of 
questions, which have been mentioned in Chapter 2, to unveil the triggers of the changes in 
the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations.  Additionally the concept of punctuated 
equilibrium helps to draw strong connections between Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. While 
Chapter 5 explained the MGK‘s long years of stasis in keeping the path of state of emergency 
it had adopted in the early 1980s, Chapter 6 proposes to consider changes in the MGK‘s path 
of state of emergency, as well as changes in the both the MGK‘s powers and Turkey-EU 
relations. Additionally the concept of punctuated equilibrium recognises the importance of 
exogenous shock in breaking the years of stasis, which then lead one to ask what exogenous 
shock took place both in Turkey and in the EU. In the next part, I will apply the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium to explain how and why the MGK and Turkey-EU relations have 
changed. 
6.2. Unveiling the triggers of the changes in the MGK and Turkey-EU relations with the 
Historical Institutionalist approach 
6.2.1. Turkey Receiving Candidate Membership Status 
Turkey was not included in the 2004 enlargement of the EU at the Luxembourg Summit in 
1997. A different strategy, however, was drawn up to improve relations with Turkey. As part 
of this, the European Commission announced a document titled ―European Strategy for 
Turkey‖ in March 1998. It said: ―The European Council considered that it was important for 
a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the 
European Union in every field‖ (European Strategy for Turkey 1998: 1). The strategy 
consisted of developing the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement: intensification of 
the customs union; implementation of financial cooperation; approximation of law and 
adoption of the Union acquis; and participation, to be decided case by case, in certain 
programmes and in certain agencies, as provided for in paragraphs of 19 and 21 of the 
Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council (ibid.). 
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At the Cardiff Summit in June 1998, the importance of satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria 
was reiterated, if a country wanted to join the EU. According to Oran (2005), three 
developments took place post-Cardiff Summit in relation to Turkey‘s bid to join the EU: (i) 
Turkey was described as ―candidate member‖ rather than an ―eligible country‖; (ii) Turkey 
was included into the mechanism of assessing and preparing the candidate member 
country for Full Membership; and (iii) it was decided that the European Commission would 
produce Annual Progress Reports for Turkey, a process that is applied only to those officially 
recognised as candidate member countries. He therefore suggested that these gave out the 
signals that the EU was stepping towards recognising Turkey as ―candidate country‖. 
In spite of these positive moves on the EU‘s side, the Turkish authorities continued to be 
critical of the EU‘s position on Turkey‘s accession. The European Commission, however, 
proved its commitment to the Turkish authorities by (1) producing the first ―Progress 
Report‖ on Turkey in November 1998, (2) suggesting that the ―European Strategy for 
Turkey‖ should be improved, (3) treating Turkey like a ―candidate country‖ in the European 
Commission‘s 1999 Progress Report and (4) suggesting that a partnership document be 
prepared for Turkey – from which process it was excluded at the Luxembourg Summit. 
Consequently, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 Turkey was officially recognised as a 
candidate country for eventual membership as long as it met Copenhagen criteria. 
The Confederation of the Turkish Worker Trade Union (Turk-Is) and the Turkish 
Industrialist‘s and Businessmen Association (TUSAID) welcomed the new status, and both of 
these Unions defended the move to Full Membership of the EU. The Turk-Is was not, 
however, entirely convinced whether the EU wanted Turkey as a full EU member state, or it 
wanted to keep Turkey under its control for geo-political gains. These groups also were 
cautious of EU treating Turkey as a colony (Radikal, 12/12/1999). Karluk (1998: 36) and 
Manisali (2001: 178) did not treat the offer of candidate membership as a success, arguing 
that accepting candidate membership status meant rejecting ‗other better opportunities‘. By 
the ‗other better opportunities‘, they pointed to forming relations with the Turkic and Middle 
Eastern countries. They shared Turk-Is‘s concerns about Turkey risking its independence by 
affirming this new status. Thus, they argued that Turkey should make a decision on whether 
it wants to be with the EU as a dependent country or form a Turkic Union and be the leader 
country in that region. Nachmani (2003), on the other hand, asked: why did the EU grant 
candidate membership status to Turkey after having it dismissed from the 2004 enlargement 
of the EU? Nachmani asked: ―Was there any connection between the 1991 War in the Gulf 
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and the December 1999 EU Helsinki decision to invite Turkey to negotiate its entrance into 
the Union?‖ (ibid.: 1); and he argued: ―Perhaps not a direct one, but one cannot fail to see that 
the 1990s were marked by crossroads, developments, events, etc. which united two dates, 
perhaps even led to the December 1999 decision‖ (ibid.: 1). Altunisik and Tur suggested that 
by candidate membership status, the EU had practiced its policy of ―not totally alienating 
Turkey‖ (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 120). 
(i) Unveiling the MGK 
Chapter 3 showed that the MGK began to receive academic attention very soon after its 
powers were extended at the Critical Juncture III by both Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution 
and Law 2945. Up to this point, the EU's official papers show no interest in either the powers 
of the MGK or its position in the political decision-making process. When Turkey was 
recognised as a candidate member country in 1999 however the regular reports produced by 
the European Commission began to pay considerable attention to the MGK‘s role in Turkish 
politics. Thereafter the MGK‘s composition, powers, functions and internal structure began to 
be cause for concern in the EU about Turkey‘s suitability for membership. 
A well-known Turkish politician, Ismail Cem, who served as the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
between 1997 and 2002, has observed that the MGK ―provides a forum for the top civilian 
and military personalities to share views and to make recommendations to the government on 
national security issues‖ (interview quoted in Cem 2001: 122). Cem‘s observations of the 
MGK, as someone who had at that point been a civilian member of the MGK for about three 
years, were the following: (1) ―the MGK is not a place, which is dominated by the military‖; 
(2) ―this is a consultative body. It is for the government to decide whether to go along with 
the proposals of the NSC or not‖; (3) ―what we discuss really are security issues. In a country 
like Turkey – which has faced in its recent past several vital security issues, both internal and 
external – it is normal that such a body is more functional than in some other 
countries‖; (4) ―[t]he military here is under the control of the Prime Minister and the 
government. So there hasn‘t been any recent case which could be interpreted as the military 
going beyond its role‖ (ibid.: 123). Cem added that the MGK does not interfere with the 
government‘s efforts in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, and he suggested that the MGK 
and the government were two separate institutions where each had separate functions to 
pursue. As far as Turkey‘s relations with the EU were concerned, Cem disagreed that the 
MGK‘s position in the political system would hinder Turkey‘s accession to the EU. He said 
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―I don‘t agree with that analysis; it contains lots of scenarios that are based on exaggerations‖ 
(ibid). 
Cem‘s analysis, however, would seem overly optimistic about the effect of the MGK‘s role 
on Turkey–EU relations. European Commission reports (1998–2004) constantly 
requested the Turkish authorities to relinquish the MGK‘s powers and change its 
composition. These reports first of all informed the Turkish authorities about which features 
of democracy its political institutional setting was lacking and then formed pressure on it to 
comply with the EU‘s requests and recommendations. My argument in this chapter is that this 
type of pressure can be seen as ‗exogenous pressure‘ because it emerges outside both Turkey 
and the MGK. The following will study the regular reports (1998–2004) to analyse the EU‘s 
perception of the MGK and it requests for change. 
 As well as unveiling the MGK‘s influential position in politics, the 1998 report touched on 
the composition of the MGK. Particularly, the military members were at the centre 
of scrutiny. The report argued said that the MGK‘s recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers were a strong influence on government policy. The Turkish constitution allowed 
the army to play a civil role and intervene in every area of political life. Furthermore, it stated 
that: ―The National Security Council demonstrates the major role played by the army in 
political life. The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act 
without the government's knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive 
military operations‖ (ibid.: 10). Both the 1998 and the 1999 reports, furthermore, agreed ―the 
organisation of public authorities in Turkey has most of the basic features of a democratic 
system, but the MGK‘s position in the political settings and lack of civilian control of the 
army members of the MGK prevent these authorities from functioning in the same way as 
they do in the Member States of the European Union. The 2000 report focused on the 
institutional strength, power and authority of the MGK, and said: ―Its conclusions, statements 
or recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process, … In addition, it 
appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in practice seriously limit 
the role played by the government. …[T]here seems to be too little accountability to the 
Parliament with regard to defence and security matters‖ (ibid.: 14). 
Moving onto the 2002 report, this noted that although the MGK was transformed into an 
advisory body, it continued to carry political influence. Like the other reports, the 
2002report felt that the army members of the MGK had a greater say in politics than they 
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should. It noted: ―The introduction of a civilian majority of members and the limitation to an 
advisory role, in line with the Accession Partnership priority, do not appear to have changed 
the way the NSC operates in practice. ... Although decisions are taken by majority, opinions 
of its military members continue to carry great weight‖ (ibid.: 24). The same report identified 
four separate areas of day to day politics in which the MGK played a significant role. It said 
that the MGK was still active in making recommendations to the government on lifting the 
state of emergency in the provinces of Hakkari and Tunceli on 30 July; and it pointed out that 
the MGK was, at the same time, making recommendations on the extension of the state of 
emergency for Diyarbakir and Sirnak while indicating that the state of emergency in those 
provinces be lifted – this particular functional capacity of the MGK was dealt with 
extensively in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it observed that: ―On various occasions throughout the 
year, military members of the National Security Council expressed their opinions about 
political, social and foreign policy matters in public speeches, statements to the media and 
declarations‖ (ibid.: 25). The third area was the MGK‘s contributions to the debates about the 
reforms the government was supposed to make in order to comply with the EU‘s political 
criteria; they have been particularly active on issues such as cultural rights, education, and 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (ibid.: 25). The fourth area was related to the 
seats the MGK members held in the civil institutional platforms, such as the RTUK 
(Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music) (ibid.: 25) 
Both the 2003 and 2004 reports touched on the MGK‘s position in civilian bodies including 
the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) and the High Education Board (YÖK) (ibid.: 18-19, 
12).  They additionally noted: ―In order to align civilian control of the military with practice 
in EU member states, it is important that … military representation be withdrawn from 
civilian bodies and for Parliament to ensure full control of the defence budget‖ (ibid.: 19, 12). 
The 2004 report added ―it is important that the civilian authorities fully exercise their 
supervisory functions in practice, in particular as regards the formulation of the national 
security strategy and its implementation, especially concerning relations with neighbouring 
countries‖ (ibid.: 23). 
(ii) Endogenous Variables 
Chapter 3 showed that the MGK‘s path of state of emergency had evolved into a significantly 
strict regime in the South East of Turkey with a number of unique features including regional 
governors, village guards, legal measures, terrorism law, and evacuation of the villages. This 
228 
 
regime partly contributed to Turkey‘s poor human rights records, its weak democracy and to 
the unsettled nature of Turkey–EU relations and these are recognised as unintended 
consequences of the MGK‘s path of state of emergency. Since this chapter is considering 
whether the changes in and around the MGK were caused by either exogenous or endogenous 
pressure, it is necessary to separate variables in two categories namely exogenous variables 
and endogenous variables. The EU and its regular progress reports on Turkey can be thought 
as exogenous variables, and the EU‘s requests for change can be considered as exogenous 
pressure. The MGK‘s policy remits such as the Kurdish issue and state of emergency will be 
treated as endogenous variables and developments in the endogenous variables, generating 
pressure for change, shall be endogenous pressure. A new field furthermore will be added to 
the list of endogenous variables, which is the MGK‘s handling of the religious movement and 
the Welfare Party (RP). By the end of 1990s, the RP, a religiously oriented political party, 
gained a significant support from the electorate and managed to receive a large number of 
seats in the TBMM. This resulted in political discomfort in Turkey – it was feared that the 
RP‘s associated religious activities and decisions and movements might endanger the secular 
nature of the Turkish Republic (Cornell 2002: 27-28). From the late 1990s therefore the RP 
was closely scrutinised by both the MGK and the wider political spectrum.  Below I will 
contextualise the characteristics of the state of emergency, the constitutional restrictions on 
minority rights and the rise of the RP as endogenous variables. First, however, I will briefly 
discuss the European Commission‘s Regular Reports on Turkey as a source of information 
not only to explore the nature of the pressure the EU put on the Turkish authorities, but also 
to give a background understanding of these variables. 
The European Commission Reports of 2001 to 2004 did draw closer attention to the above 
outlined characteristics of the state of emergency. They recognised the village guards as 
―undisciplined and abusive‖ (EC Regular Report 2002: 16). The 2001 and 2003 progress 
reports pointed to the regional disparity in Turkey. It therefore asked the government to 
improve the economic situation in the South East of Turkey. It said that a comprehensive 
approach involving enhancement of economic, social and cultural opportunities for all 
citizens would help to improve the situation (ibid.: 32, 139). Keeping the state of emergency 
in the South of Turkey, and the hardship experienced by displaced persons, have been the two 
other areas of focus for the European Commission. The 2002 Progress report noted: ―The 
majority of the displaced rural population continues to live in urban centres in very difficult 
economic and social conditions and inadequate health care, lack of hygiene, malnutrition, 
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insufficient drinking water, and improper disposal of sewage and garbage are common 
problems; this situation has adverse consequences for the children whose education and 
literacy levels are unsatisfactory‖ (ibid.: 16). It, furthermore, asked the government to 
improve infrastructure and re-build villages for those returning to their villages (ibid.: 39). 
Picking up on the same issue, the 2003 report noted: "Although limited financial assistance 
has been provided to some returnees, there is a more general lack of financial resources to 
support return to villages, to compensate villagers for the destruction of houses or dwellings 
and to develop basic infrastructure in areas previously subject to armed clashes‖ (ibid.: 40). 
 Apart from the characteristics of the state of emergency, constitutional and legal aspects of 
Turkey's political system were also criticised by the European Commission in four 
particular areas. The first was the ‗legal restrictions of the use of Kurdish language‘. The 
1998 report noted that Kurdish is no longer banned in the context of cultural activities but 
cannot be used in ―political communication‖ or education, and that radio and television 
broadcasting in any of the Kurdish languages is forbidden (EC Regular Report 1998: 18–19). 
In the following year, ―the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by 
Member States of the Council of Europe‖ indicated in its January 1999 report that ―the 
essential point is that any such group [Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin] should have the 
opportunity and material resources to use and sustain its natural languages and cultural 
traditions‖ (EC Regular Report 1999: 14). 
The second was the existence of the ―death penalty‖: the European Commission was aware 
of the death penalty not having been applied since the 1980s, but it strongly asked the 
authorities to abolish the death penalty. The third was ―minority rights‖; the European 
Commission‘s 2000 report noted that Turkey had not signed the ―Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities‖ and did not recognise 
minorities other than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty (ibid.: 19). It added that the 
Turkish government had taken two significant initiatives: (1) signing several international 
human rights instruments and (2) endorsing the work of the Supreme Board of Co-ordination 
for Human Rights. Furthermore, the report said that compared to last year the situation on the 
ground had hardly improved, and pointed out that ―Turkey still does not meet the political 
Copenhagen criteria‖ (ibid.: 19). The fourth area was the ―10% electoral threshold‖, which 
hindered the Turkish parliament from being a fully representative body; in particular, the 
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2003 European Commission said ―the electoral system makes it difficult for minorities to be 
represented in Parliament‖(ibid.: 38). 
To return to the domestic politics of this period: Ozbudun (2000) suggests that the rise 
of religiously oriented political parties and growing interest in the pro-Islamic political parties 
were overshadowed by the conflict between the TSK and the PKK until the late 1990s, but in 
fact the beginnings of this rise were clear earlier: ―In the 1990s, political Islam emerged as a 
significant challenge to Turkish state‖. The pro-Islamic political parties do indeed have a long 
history in Turkish politics. Chapter 3, in particular, touched on two of them, the National 
Order Party (MNP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP), and where appropriate it 
explained their attitude towards the EU. This section will give an introduction to the 
chronological development of religiously oriented political parties, and it then will discuss 
the rise of the RP and Necmettin Erbakan‘s success at the General Elections in 1995. The 
Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) was the first religiously oriented political party formed by 
Cevat Rifat Atilhan and it entered politics during the multi-party system period in 1951 
(Yesilada 2002: 63). Its slogan said: ―The sun of welfare and happiness will rise when [we] 
take the Koran into our hands. Believers unite and form your own regime‖ (Cumhuriyet, 
28/08/1951). It was, however, closed in six months. In the meantime, an influential religious 
figure, Sheik Mehmet Zahit Kotku, a leading figure of the Naksibendi order (tarikat) and 
head of the related Iskendur Pasa congregation (dergah) was formulating a political agenda to 
form the next Islamist political party (Yesilada 2002: 64). When Necmettin Erbakan became 
involved in politics in the late 1960s, Suleyman Demirel, who at the time was the leader of 
the AP, refused his candidacy for the Justice Party (AP). Subsequently, Erbakan was elected 
as an MP from Konya in the 1968 General Election, when he stood in the elections as an 
independent candidate. 
Post the 1968 General Election, the key Islamist figures such as Hasan Aksay, Mustafa 
Yazgan, Arslan Topcubasi, and Osman Yuksel Serdengecti began speculating on the AP‘s 
stance on Islamic values, and agreed to form a new political party (ibid.: 64). Hence the MNP 
was established after being approved by Kotku, with an emblem of a hand pointing to the 
heavens in an Islamic manner. If one looks closely into the background of the founding 
members of the MNP, one could see a coalition of the Naksibendi Order and Nurcu 
Movement followers: Erbakan (Member of the parliament and Naksi); Ahmet Paksu 
(Member of Parliament and Nurcu); and Aksay (former Member of Parliament and Naksi). 
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Erbakan replaced Suleyman Arif Emre as the MNP‘s chairman in 1970. The short-lived MNP 
was closed by the Constitutional Court at the Critical Juncture II (CJ-II) in 1971 for 
advocating anti-secular political views and opposing the Republic. When the MNP was 
closed, Erbakan left for Switzerland and began publishing the Tek Nizam (Sole Order) 
newspaper, and also established the Milli Gorus (National View) organization. Upon the 
court‘s dismissal of his case, Erkaban returned to Turkey and formed the National Salvation 
Party (MSP) in October 1972. The other founding members of the party included Aksay, 
Fehmi Cumalioglu, Recai Kutan, Korkut Ozal, and Salih Ozcan (ibid.: 65). It 
remained a medium-sized party between 1973 and 1980; its national vote share never 
exceeded 12% (Ozbudun 2000: 87). Then at the Critical Juncture III (CR-III), the MNP was 
closed. This was followed by forming the Welfare Party (RP) in July 1983 and Erbakan was 
selected as the leader in 1987. 
By the mid 1990s, Erbakan‘s RP began to attract the attention of a wider section of the 
community and his party gained about 21.5% of the votes in 1995 General Election, 
which was translated into to the largest number of seats in the TBMM (ibid.: 87). The RP had 
to look for a coalition partner as it did have the majority to form the government on its own. 
Despite leading a campaign before the General Elections based on anti-RP discourse and 
claiming to be the guarantor of the Republic against rising political Islam, the True Path 
Party‘s (DYP) Tansu Ciller formed a coalition government with the RP in January 1996 
(Yesilada 2002: 67). Ciller commented ―it is said two parties working together having 
different bases of support would be difficult. However, parties with the same 
constituency could equally lead to harmful competition. I think we will be able to 
complement each other, find the right way and use the competition for service to our 
country‖ (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 57). 
(iii) Changes and Antecedents to the Endogenous Variables 
Krasner‘s emphasis on institutions maintaining stasis for long stretches of time is appropriate 
here because, as shown in Chapter 3, there were changes neither in the MGK‘s position nor in 
the pace of Turkey–EC relations between 1983 and 1997. Then changes suddenly began; the 
equilibrium was punctuated after nearly fourteen years. There are three main areas of 
change I wish to discuss here: the first area concerns the changes within the MGK; the second 
developments in the security situation, the endogenous variables; the third, changes in 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU. 
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With regards to the first area, in 2001, 2003 and 2004, a number of changes took place in 
how the MGK operated. The most significant changes in the MGK were made in 2001. To 
reduce the political power of the military members, the number of civilian members of the 
MGK was dramatically increased from five to nine, while the military representatives 
remained at five. With these changes, the civilian members of the MGK included the 
President, the Prime Minister (PM) and the PM‘s four advisors: the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Justice Minister, and the Minister of Defence; 
and the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the army, navy, and air forces and the 
General Commander of Gendarme were among the military members (Hurriyet, 29/12/2001). 
In addition, in order to curtail the political authority of the MGK over the Council of 
Ministers and the Governments, the wordings of the Article 118 were revised. The new text 
emphasised the advisory nature of this body, stressing its role in making recommendations, 
where now the government was only required to ―evaluate‖ them rather than 
give them ―priority consideration‖ (Hurriyet, 29/12/2001). The 7th reform package, 
introduced in 2003, brought in a number of other changes: (1) internal restructuring; (2) 
restricting access to the civil institutions and (3) enhancing the transparency of defence 
expenditure. The executive and supervisory powers of the General Secretariat of the MGK 
were abolished; and the Secretariat‘s responsibility to follow on the implementation of the 
MGK‘s recommendations was abrogated. Furthermore, while restructuring the MGK 
internally, reducing or wiping out the presence of the military members was a clear intention. 
The following amendment said that the post of Secretary General would no longer be 
reserved exclusively for a military person (Bayramoglu 2004: 110); in August 2003, it was 
decided to appoint a military candidate to replace the outgoing Secretary General for a year 
term (Ozcan 2007: 43). In August 2004, as the first civilian Secretary General of the MGK, a 
senior diplomat was appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Prime Minister. 
Additionally, it was decided that the MGK would meet every other two months, instead of 
meeting every month (Hurriyet, 17/06/2003; The Times, 31/07/2003). Secondly, the 
provisions authorising the MGK unlimited access to any civilian agency was restricted; and it 
no longer had a representative in the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video, and 
Music (Hurriyet, 17/11/2003). Thirdly, new provisions were adopted with a view to 
enhancing the transparency of defence expenditures: the Court of Auditors, upon request of 
Parliament, was granted leave to audit accounts and transactions of all types of 
organisations, including the state properties owned by the armed forces (EC Regular Report 
2003: 19; Ozcan 2007: 45). 
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In 2004, there were further changes in the MGK‘s position in civil boards and bodies. Its 
representatives withdrew their membership from both the High Board for Radio and TV 
(RTUK) and the Council of Higher Education (YOK). On the internal restructuring of the 
MGK, there was a substantial staff reduction: 20 of 53 staff with military backgrounds were 
removed from employment (Hurriyet, 3/12/2004). In addition, some of the legislative 
changes that had been made in past years were actually implemented in 2004. The 
changes to the power of the General Secretariat read as ―the Ministries, public institutions 
and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-
classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the 
NSC‖ (EC Regular Report 2004: 22). Furthermore, under this regulation, the office of the 
Secretariat General of the MGK was transformed to serve purely the consultative function of 
this institution and its role was limited to the definition of the agenda. 
 In December 2003, the Law on Public Financial Management and Control was amended to 
allow the inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in the budgets of the relevant 
administration, i.e., Defence Ministry, as of 1 January 2005, and the dissolution of these 
funds by 31 December 2007 (Ibid. 22-23). This related in particular to the Defence Industry 
Support Fund which was used for major arms procurement purchases and was expected to 
reach US $1.3 billion in 2004. These provisions also contributed to strengthening the role of 
the Under Secretariat for Defence in defining budgetary appropriations in the field of military 
expenditures. Secondly, moreover, further new provisions were adopted in relation to the ex-
post audit of military and defence expenditure. A regulation was adopted in February 
enabling the Court of Auditors, on the request of the President of Parliament, to audit military 
and defence expenditures. In May 2004, a constitutional amendment deleted the exemption of 
the ―state property in possession of the Armed Forces in accordance with the principles of 
secrecy necessitated by national defence‖ from the control of the Court of Auditors. 
However, appropriate enabling legislation will be needed to allow this important reform to be 
applied in practice. 
The second area involves changes in the endogenous variables; in 1997, the TBMM was 
advised by the MGK to lift the state of emergency in Batman, Bingol, and Bitlis; while in the 
other provinces the state of emergency was extended for four months (MGK Press Releases, 
25/09/1997). In 1999, another province (Siirt) was removed permanently from the state of 
emergency zone (ibid., 27/10/1999). In 2000, the MGK recommended that 
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government should lift the state of emergency in Van; and the state of emergency was 
extended for four months in the remaining provinces (ibid., 26/06/2000). This was followed 
by lifting the state of emergency in Hakkari and Tunceli (May 2002) and in Diyarbakir and 
Sirnak (October 2002) (ibid., 30/05/2002 and 22/10/2002 respectively). In June 2002, 
following a recommendation made by the MGK, the Parliament decided to lift the state of 
emergency in the provinces of Hakkari and Tunceli. This measure took effect as of 30 July 
2002, and in the same year, the MGK indicated that the state of emergency would be lifted 
permanently from the rest of the provinces (EC Regular Report 2002: 42).  
The TBMM took a number of further steps to address the remaining characteristics of the 
state of emergency regime. In 2003, in order to foster social peace in the region, the 
Parliament adopted a law on "social reinsertion" which entered into force on 6 August 2003. 
This law provided a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the 
activities of the PKK; however, it excluded the leaders of the organisation, as well as those 
who committed crimes. According to official figures of September 2003, of 2,067 
applications 524 prisoners have been released (EC Regular Report. 2003: 39). In addition, a 
legal procedure was opened against some village guards involved in murders (ibid.: 40). In 
2004, a ―Law on Compensation of Losses‖ resulting from ―Terrorist Act ― was adopted in 
July, and this represented recognition of the need to compensate those in the South East who 
have suffered material damages since the beginning state of emergency regime. 
 In order to improve housing conditions, and provide access to educational and health 
facilities and psychosocial care for women and children among the internally displaced 
persons, a new project called ―The Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project‖ was 
introduced. The 2003 report said that 82,000 people were authorised to return to their villages 
in the period between January 2000 and January 2003. The same report noted: ―There is, 
however, concern regarding the lack of transparency and adequacy of consultation in the 
development of this project and disquiet about the absence of a clear strategy that explains 
the project aims, scope and budgetary implications‖ (Ibid). The 2004 report added that the 
project was inconsistent and slow in pace. 
In relation to ethnic minority rights, in August 1999, the Turkish Parliament adopted the 
Repentance Law (No. 4450) that was applicable for a six month period, and it granted an 
amnesty notably to the PKK members; it excluded those of the PKK command structure and 
those who had killed members of the Turkish Security Forces. In April 2001, Turkey signed 
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Protocol 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the general 
prohibition of discrimination by public authorities (EC Regular Report 2001: 15). In August 
2002, the TBMM abolished the death penalty and in January 2004, Turkey signed the 
protocol banning the death penalty in all circumstances. 
 As for Human Rights and the protection of minorities: (1) Turkey has signed and/or ratified 
several international conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights. Constitutional 
amendments were introduced allowing for the signature of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (EC Regular Report 2004: 16); and (2) Turkey has made 
increased efforts since 2002 to comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) (ibid.: 16). In addition, the constitution was amended to lift the ban on the use 
of the Kurdish language. The changes allowed radio and TV broadcasting in languages and 
dialects other than Turkish including Kurdish. Subsequently, Kurdish language courses have 
opened and television and radio broadcasting in several different languages, such as Kurdish, 
Arabic and Bosnian, has begun. There has also been greater tolerance towards the use of 
Kurdish during cultural events in the South East (ibid.: 18). 
The third area covers changes in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Along with the European 
Commission‘s progress reports on Turkey, there have been other documents exchanged 
between Turkish authorities and the EU institutions. Upon granting Turkey candidate 
membership status, the EU offered Ankara a pre-accession strategy which was designed to 
support the reforms that were necessary for Turkey‘s accession to the EU. At the Nice 
Summit in December 2000 thereafter the EU Council approved an Accession Partnership 
(AP) document and this document identified the principles, the priorities, and the 
intermediate objectives/conditions for Full Membership. It was then published in the Official 
Journal of European Community in the following year. Onis (2003) noted that the AP 
highlighted that Turkey had to take radical steps in order to satisfy the Copenhagen 
criteria, not only in the political arena but also in the economic sphere (ibid.: 12). 
In 2001, Turkey presented its programme for adaptation of Acquis Communautaire, 
application, coordination, and monitoring of National Program of Turkey (OJEC 2001: No. 
24352). However it was a disappointment for the Turkish authorities when the 2002 
European Commission progress report did not recommend the beginning of accession 
negotiations. Kirisci (2002) said that Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President, during the Prague 
236 
 
NATO Summit held talks with the EU governmental leaders about the EU‘s reluctance over 
giving Turkey a date to begin the accession negotiations (ibid.: 4).  Then Abdullah Gul, the 
PM, and his delegation went to the Copenhagen Summit and declared their goal of 
negotiations for December. Although the Franco-German alliance was not receptive to the 
idea of early negotiations with Turkey, Britain and Southern European countries such as 
Spain, Italy, and Greece on the other hand, showed more commitment to accommodating 
Turkey by offering the possibility of an early date to initiate the negotiation process (Keyman 
and Onis 2004: 186). Consequently, the final Presidency Conclusions offered December 2004 
as a date when the decision to open negotiations could be taken ―without delay‖, ensuring 
that Turkey meets the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria.  
Following this the European Commission‘s 2004 regular progress report found Turkey 
satisfying the political criteria, and recommended beginning the negotiations. In December 
2004, therefore, the heads of EU states reiterated the EU Commission‘s stance on Turkey and 
said that Turkey had sufficiently implemented the political criteria and that the EU could 
open the negotiations in October 2005. It then set out a framework, made of requirements, for 
starting accession negotiations: Turkey was to bring into force six pieces of legislation 
including the law on associations, the new penal code, the law on intermediate courts of 
appeal, the code of criminal procedure, the legislation establishing the judicial police and the 
law on execution of punishments. In addition, Turkey was required to sign the Adaptation 
Protocol extending its existing Association Agreement with the EU to all new Member 
States, including the Republic of Cyprus. When Turkey fulfilled these requirements, the EU 
opened the accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 as planned. In addition, two other 
pillars were designed to provide assistance for Turkey in the pre-accession phase: ‗reinforce 
and support the reform process in Turkey‘ and ‗strengthen the political and cultural dialogue‘ 
(EC Regular Report 2005: 4). 
Having above identified changes in the three interconnected areas of Turkish politics I now 
ask: 
 What punctuated stasis in these three areas? 
 Why was the state of emergency lifted after nearly 17 years? 
 What motivated the removal of restrictions in the use of Kurdish language? 
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 What triggered the curtailment of the MGK‘s power and authority? 
 Why the EU decided to begin accession negations with Turkey? 
As mentioned earlier, my contention in this chapter is that Krasner‘s emphasis on exogenous 
pressure is not appropriate here. The European Commission‘s regular progress reports on 
Turkey (1998–2004) and its consistent requests for changes in the institutional settings of 
Turkish political system did form an exogenous pressure on the Turkish government. This 
pressure however was simply treated as a roadmap by the authorities showing how to comply 
with the EU‘s standards. I argue in this chapter that it was rather endogenous pressures 
that played a greater role in triggering the radical institutional changes that took place over 
this period. Developments in endogenous variables are more likely to have an impact on the 
future of an institution than pressure for change received from externally. The closure of the 
RP and the ban on Erbakan‘s political involvement and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan 
are developments which not only took place prior to the changes under question, but they also 
concern the internal threats on which the Turkish government was advised by the MGK for 
many years. These developments are more likely to have an impact on the MGK and its 
position in political decision-making. In addition since these developments are related to the 
endogenous variables, they generate changes to the future shape of the endogenous 
variables. In terms of how these developments concern Turkey–EU relations, the MGK‘s 
handling of the PKK and the Islamic movement over the years weakened Turkey‘s 
democracy and raised questions about the standards of human rights in Turkey and as shown 
throughout this thesis Turkey-EU relations have been unsettled as a result. I therefore argue 
that long years of stasis in the MGK‘s powers, in the MGK‘s endogenous variables and in the 
pace of Turkey-EU relations were punctuated by the endogenous pressure, generated by the 
developments at the MGK‘s endogenous variables. The changes I have discussed in the 
endogenous variables however improved both the quality of democracy and the standards of 
human rights in Turkey and hence accelerated the pace of Turkey–EU relations. 
6.2.2. The specific relevant changes in the endogenous variables 
(i) Development One: Closure of the RP and the rise of the Pro-European and Moderate 
Islamic AKP (1997–2003) 
Kotsovilis (2006: 51) notes that ―the RP aimed to integrate the political principles of Islam 
with the state and thus reorient Turkish politics away from Liberal Europe and towards 
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authoritarian regions of the Muslim world‖ and all of these challenged the state and its 
secularist foundations. On the economy, the RP proposed an Islamic-inspired ―just order‖, 
conceived as the third way and thought to be different from and superior to both capitalism 
and socialism. It claimed that the ―just order‖ is the ―true private enterprise regime‖ and 
heavy state control was necessary for implementing this order (Ozbudun 2000: 88). Erbakan 
was not just interested in continuing economic cooperation with the Islamic countries, but 
also wanted to establish an Islamic NATO, which, after its establishment, was to 
be called the D-8 – made of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Turkey (Dagi 1998: 116–18). Winrow (1997: 3) argued that the RP seemed more 
interested in the Islamic world than the Turkic; and Erbakan's official visits to Egypt and to 
Libya proved Winrow‘s point on the RP‘s aspirations to form good relations with the Islamic 
countries. 
Erbakan devoted most of his time and attention to the promotion and financing of the Islamic 
revival in Turkey (Altunisik and Tur 2005); to which end he organised a fast-breaking dinner 
in January 1997 and invited the sect leaders to this dinner and started to talk about 
introducing Sharia (Islamic Law) (Ulman 2000: 122). Then when the RP‘s calls for Sharia 
received a lot of positive attention from Turkish Muslims, demonstrations and rallies were 
organised in support of the RP.  One of these was the Jerusalem Night (Kudis Gecesi, 
author‘s translation), organised by the Sincan municipality of Ankara (Hurriyet, 
03/02/1997; Milliyet, 03-04/02/1997). The event used posters of the leaders of the Lebanese 
Hisbullah and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Muhammed Riza Bagheri, the 
Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, was invited to this event (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 59). The 
Iranian Ambassador called for Sharia rule in Turkey and declared that ―we do not need to be 
afraid of being called fundamentalists. … fundamentalists are the most intelligent, civilised 
and believing people‖, and a governor from the RP said that they would ―impose Sharia on 
the secularists by force‖(Cumhuriyet, 02/02/1997, author‘s translation). As a result of this 20 
tanks and 15 armoured vehicles were seen on the streets of Sincan on the morning of 4 
February 1997. Suleyman Demirel, the President, sent warning letters to Erbakan and called 
on him to respect and to protect the secular nature of Turkish Republic. Some military 
officials were reported in the newspaper as reflecting the general concern in the different 
ranks of the armed forces, noting, ―Turkey has been pushed towards disaster thanks to 
political interests and calculations, and nobody tries to stop this situation‖ (Hurriyet, 
03/02/1997). The Naval Commander Admiral Guven Erkaya commented that the reactionary 
239 
 
Islamic movement had become more dangerous than the PKK. This is when first Erbakan and 
the RP‘s policies and activities were recognised as internal threats and more dangerous than 
the PKK (Ulman 2000: 123). 
The RP leadership reacted in a rather dismissive way towards the worries of these circles. 
Erbakan argued that ―the issue is not secularism; these are just worries of the people who 
want to use secularism as hostility to religion. They are only a handful. And they have 
become fossils‖ (Cumhuriyet, 05/02/1997). Furthermore, having disregarded all the warnings 
and suggestions to respect the secular nature of Turkish Republic and its constitution, 
Erbakan‘s RP was discussed at the MGK‘s meeting on 29th February 1997 under the chair of 
Suleyman Demirel, the President and the following members of the MGK: Necmettin 
Erbakan, the PM; Tansu Ciller, the Deputy Prime Minister; the Minister of National Defence; 
the Minister of Home Affairs; the Force Commanders; Gendarme; the General Secretary of 
MGK; and Ismail Hakki Karadayi, Army of the Chief of the Staff. The meeting was ended 
with eighteen written measures to check the growth of religious fundamentalism in Turkey. 
Five of the MGK‘s 18 demands are: (1) the ending of schools, residences, and foundations 
operated by religious brotherhoods; (2) a reduction in the number of Imam schools to a level 
commensurate with the need for imams; (3) the ending of the infiltration of 
fundamentalism into bureaucracy, the judiciary, schools and universities; (4) measures to stop 
subversive activities emanating from Iran; and (5) extension of compulsory primary 
education from five to eight years. Following this the Chief of Staff announced changes in the 
National Military and Strategic Concept; the internal threat (Islamists) was the priority over 
the external threat (Ulman 2000: 122-123). In the briefing held in the military headquarters it 
was stated that the separatist (PKK) and religious groups (RP), were both trying to divide the 
Turkish Republic with their operations. Therefore the internal threat preceded the external 
one and became a top priority (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 60; Ozcan 2000; 19).  
Tank (2001) ―In recent years, the priority of the task of maintaining internal security has been 
further strengthened. The turning-point came following a meeting of the MGK on 28 
February 1997 which issues 18 recommendations to the government, seeking to eliminate the 
‗tide of radical Islam‘. This led to changes in the National Military Strategic Concept (Milli 
Askeri Strateji Konsepti), whose primary target since 1984 had been the Kurdish separatist 
threat and external threats of interstate war. The new concept, announced to the public in 
briefings in April 1997, shifted focus to new internal threats to the country‘s unity and 
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ideology. It was ‗reactionary‘ Islam that evoked the greatest concern, while Kurdish 
separatism was downplayed (the capture of Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) leader Abdullah 
Ocalan in February 1999 further diminished this threat). As part of the process of refocusing 
efforts towards the new primary threat, the Western Working Group (Bati Calisma Grubu) 
was established in the General Staff headquarters. This group of intelligence experts monitors 
Islamist activities in all sectors of society, from the media to local government and education, 
and ensures that the 28 February recommendations are implemented. Emphasising the 
seriousness of its concerns, the military in 1997-99 examined its own ranks, weeding out 700 
officers (including a number of colonels) and non-commissioned officers suspects of 
harboring fundamentalist sympathies‖ (p.221) 
I showed in Chapter 4 that the MGK between 1983 and 1997 mainly developed 
recommendations to the Governments in how to weaken and may be, eradicate the PKK, but 
Karadayi‘s statement gives the indications that by the end of 1990s the ‗reactionary Islamic 
movement‘ led by Erbakan and the RP had become the main internal threat in Turkey. Thus 
the MGK tried to take a control of it initially by giving warning to Erbakan, but when this 
had failed, the MGK opted for the above explained radical option. However, the below will 
show that the closure of the RP and the ban on Erbakan‘s political involvement have paved 
the way for the rise of a moderately religious political party, which have generated an 
‗improved security environment‘ in Turkish politics. 
In May 1997 the state attorney opened a case for the closure of the RP based on the allegation 
that it had become the headquarters of action against secularism. When Erbakan resigned in 
June 1997, Aksin (2007) noted: ―Demirel entrusted the job to Mesut Yilmaz on the grounds 
that the country needed a government to diminish tensions‖ (ibid.: 306–7). Hence, the 
Constitutional Court closed the RP on 16 January 1998 and Erbakan was banned from 
politics for a period of five years (Hughes 2010: 140–46). I recognise the Constitutional 
Court‘s decision in relation to the RP and Erbakan as the one of two developments in the 
MGK‘s endogenous variables that has generated ―improved security environmnent‖ and 
therefore put pressure for punctuation in the long years of stasis in the MGK, in the MGK‘s 
endogenous variables, as well as in Turkey-EU relations. Upon the closure of the RP, the 
Virtue Party (FP) was formed by Recai Kutan in December 1997 and most of the former RP 
parliamentary deputies then joined the FP. They attempted to tone down their criticism of 
secular reforms by embarking on a campaign to present a new image for their party. The 
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younger elites of the party, led by individuals such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former 
Mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Gul went so far as to emphasise the need for a system-
oriented political party and they openly challenged the old guards led by Kutan (Yesilada 
2002: 68). Though the FP had tried to cultivate a more a moderate image than the Welfare 
Party, it was still distrusted by the secular elite, especially the ―military‖ (The Guardian, 
24/03/1999). It was finally closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, on the grounds that it 
was a continuation of the RP. 
Erdogan was elected as the Mayor of Istanbul in the local elections in March 1994 as a 
member of the RP. Erdogan‘s speech of December 1997 in Siirt put his political 
career at risk. There, he read a poem comparing ―mosques to barracks, minarets to bayonets, 
and the faithful to an army‖, and it was interpreted as militaristic, constituting racial and 
religious provocation. However, this was a poem quoted from a book published by a state 
enterprise and recommended to teachers by the Ministry of Education. The Turkish Appeal 
Court imprisoned Erdogan for ten months, stripped him of his office and barred Erdogan 
from standing for elections. Following this, Erdoğan resigned as mayor. The EU in a 
statement of 25 September 1998 said that it regretted the ruling of the Turkish Appeals Court 
and expressed its concern at the implications of this decision on democratic pluralism and 
freedom of expression in Turkey (EC Regular Report 1998: 10). In addition, the American 
Consul-General in Istanbul paid Erdogan a visit of sympathy. 
After serving four months of his sentence, Erdogan was released in 1999 and established the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in August 2001. Although the AKP gained a landslide 
victory in the 2002 General Elections, Erdogan's conviction of 1998 barred him from serving 
in parliament both as an MP and the Prime Minister (Aksin 2007: 308–9). Erdogan‘s 
disqualification was removed through a constitutional amendment in December 2002. 
Following this Erdogan won a by election in March 2003 and formed the new government, 
taking office in May 2003. Faucompret and Konnings (2008) noted that the AKP‘s landslide 
victory of November 2002 ―sent shock waves throughout Turkish society. The traditional 
centrist parties – tainted by alleged corruption, incompetence and continuing infighting –
 were swept away by a new party, the AKP. … while all other parties but the CHP 
disappeared‖ (ibid.: 16). 
Lieutenant General Nevzat Bolugiray argued that Erdogan, ―in comparison to the previous 
Turkish political leaders …is much closer to the people, he is decisive about learning and 
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determined to resolve problems. Even though he makes mistakes, he shows efforts to learn 
from his mistakes and tries not to repeat them. He will definitely contribute to the new 
changing period by being critical of the ‗National Vision‘‖ (quoted in Avci 2008: 123). 
Bolugiray‘s views in relation to Erdogan is not representative of the Turkish Security Forces‘ 
(TSK) position on Erdogan, but it both shows that Bolugiray praised Erdogan for who 
arguably learned from his mistakes and gives the indications that the TSK members were 
beginning to acknowledge that the religiously oriented political parties and political leaders 
were changing.  
Similarly a well-known Turkish academic, Metin Heper said ―Erdogan will continue to 
represent the views of Islam, but more as a moral force than an outfit, political one … He 
thinks that for the individual you need ethics derived from Islam. He also thinks that at the 
community levels, Islam should to some extent regulate interpersonal relations. This is the 
extent to which he wants to use Islam‖ (New York Times, 11/11/2002). I think Heper could 
have made his comments about Erdogan‘s position on Islam much clearer had he compared 
Erdogan to Erbakan. This is because Erbakan, who was banned from active politics in 1997, 
in contrast to Erdogan wanted Islam to shape every sections of life, in particular the political 
structure. 
The AKP had two fundamental features by which it differed from the other 
religiously oriented political parties. Cosar and Ozman (2004) identified one of these as a 
―synthesising tendency‖, which was related to the self-definition of the party (ibid.: 62). 
When Erdogan was asked whether the AKP was a religiously oriented political party, he 
answered: ―‗We are fed up listening to these types of questions. We are not a political party 
based on religion. The best way to find out whether this is true or not is to watch…The AKP 
is a party of the right of centre which has reshaped the political centre… and brought together 
the right of centre in one place in a stronger manner‖ (The Guardian, 07/11/2002). Turunc 
(2007: 84) similarly noted: ―The AKP depicted itself as a national party not based solely on 
regional, ethnic or religious support‖. To one interviewer, Erdogan argued ―we are 
conservative democrats … our notion of conservative democracy is to attach ourselves to the 
customs, traditions, and values of our society, which is based on the family. …This is a 
democratic issue, not a religious issue‖ (quoted in Turunc 2007: 84; see also Cosar and 
Ozman 2004: 63 and Aksin 2007: 314). I agree with Turunc‘s observations about the AKP 
having both claimed to be a national party and adopted a conservative democrat identity, but I 
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argue it is much important to ask what AKP‘s representativeness and political identity meant 
for Turkish politics? In this chapter I argue that the AKP‘s political stance and identity have 
contributed to the ‗improved security environment‘ in Turkish politics that was generated 
after the closure of the RP and the ban on Erbakan‘s involvement in to politics. Unlike RP 
and Erbakan, the AKP and Erdogan succeeded in gaining political popularity across the wider 
political spectrum by both its stance on the issues related to Turkish domestic politics and its 
position on Turkey‘s European policy.  These therefore evaporated concerns over whether the 
AKP was a continuation of the RP or whether it wanted to bring Islam to Turkey.  
It was however asked why the AKP was labelled as ‗conservative democrat‘?  Cosar and 
Ozman (2004: 65) argued that it was ―an attempt to provide the AKP with a breathing space 
from the intrusion of both Kemalist elites and the Turkish armed forces which have insisted 
on perceiving the AKP as a pro-Islamist and fundamentalist political party‖. Additionally, 
Erdogan wanted to dissociate himself from his past of having served as a ―former disciple of 
Erbakan‖. The AKP‘s relations with the army proved this argument right. The chief of the 
general staff issued a stiff warning to the government in January 2003, and concerns were 
raised in relation to the AKP‘s commitment to secularism and its attitude with respect to 
Cyprus and EU membership (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 16). Cosar and Ozman (2004) 
described the second feature as the ideological stance of the party, and this mainly concerns 
the policy proposals and implementations by the AKP. The socio-economic and 
administrative policies of the AKP government were arguably representative. Furthermore, 
the AKP displayed a neo-liberal stance both during the election campaign and after forming 
the government. The neo-liberal market-based approach dominated the AKP‘s economic 
policies and identity. This approach has been symbolized by their emphasis on ―making 
Turkey an international trademark‖. Furthermore, Erdogan aimed to transform active politics 
into the ‗politics of merchants‘ (Cosar and Ozman 2004: 63). 
As far Turkey–EU relations are concerned, Erdogan abandoned Erbakan‘s anti-imperialist 
stance and adopted a strong pro-EU stance (Onis and Keyman 2003: 103; Cosar and Ozman, 
2004: 63; Tocci 2005: 80; Aksin 2007: 314). He then went on a tour of European capitals to 
secure a definite date for the start of accession negotiations just after the elections of 3 
November 2002 and despite not being the PM at the time (Duran 2004: 134–35). On his 
European tour, Erdogan claimed that Europe would not only be deciding whether to give 
Turkey a date for starting the accession negotiations, but would also be taking an historic 
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decision on whether or not the EU is essentially a Christian club (Hurriyet, 14/11/2002).  
Kotsovilis noted: ―While the AKP was feared and reviled by the many, ironically the future 
of Kemal‘s dreams for Modernisation and Westernisation, together with democratic 
consolidation, may rest with this very party‘s fate and performance in government‖ (2006: 
52). Turunc (2007: 88) noted: ―The priority in the AKP‘s foreign policy is Turkey‘s 
membership of the EU‖ and the AKP perceived Turkey as part of Europe, therefore it should 
take its place in the EU. Since 2002, no other Turkish government has implemented as many 
constitutional reforms as the AKP government. This has impressed public opinion in both 
Turkey and the EU (Faucompret and Konnings 2008: 17). And Cizre (2007) said ― The EU 
was instrumental in the JDP‘s plans to introduce reforms which involve society and include 
concern for citizens‖ (ibid.: 8). I agree with Turunc that Erdogan prioritised Turkey‘s 
European policy, but I suggest that Turkey-EU relations was stalled between 1997 and 1999 
until Turkey was granted a candidate membership of the EU, therefore it is important to ask 
what impact Erdogan‘s stance  had on Turkey‘s position in the EU? And, what implications 
this had on the pace of Turkey-EU relations? In this chapter I argue that Erdogan‘s pro-
European approach and the changes he introduced hastened changes in the pace of Turkey-
EU relations and therefore in 2004 the EU decided to begin accession negotiations with 
Turkey in 2005.  
(ii) Development Two: The capture of Ocalan and the Emergence of Moderate Kurdish 
Approach (1999–2003) 
Khalil (2007) notes that Syria harboured Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, for 
years, and the Turkish government held evidence of Ocalan‘s presence and his organisational 
capacity in Syria. The Turkish government thus asked the Syrian government to expel 
Ocalan, and seriously threatened Syria with war if it did not remove him (ibid.: 395). 
Schmuelevitz (1999) argues that when Turkish armed forces held manoeuvres along the 
Syrian border in September–October 1998, Turkey managed to convince Syria that it had no 
choice but to expel the rebel leader (Shmuelevitz 1999: 608). Relations between the two 
countries were normalised only after Ocalan left Syria. The PKK leader initially sought 
refuge in Rome, but when he was not given asylum, he tried to obtain asylum in Russia, 
Greece and Holland. Ocalan was thereafter was detained at the Greek embassy in 
Kenya on 16 February 1999 (Khalil 2007: 395).  
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A couple of months before Ocalan was captured in Kenya, he appealed to the British and the 
European authorities to mediate in the struggle between his movement and Ankara. He 
said: ―What we want is for this war to stop for the Turkish state to recognise that the Kurdish 
problem is a political one and accept the need for dialogue. I think that is nothing compared 
to the IRA‖ and he added that Europe had a moral responsibility for this ―because of its 
failure to secure a homeland for the Kurds when the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in the 
1920s‖ (The Guardian, 12/12/1998). However, his appeals did not receive much attention 
among European countries or in the EU. 
Ocalan, during his trial in 1999, developed a ―conciliatory and apologetic manner and 
rhetoric‖ (Siitone 2008: 79). He said that continuing rebellion was a ―mistake‖ and 
apologised to relatives of soldiers killed by his Kurdistan Workers‘ Party or PKK. He added 
―Turkey enjoyed political freedom and freedom of expression‖ (The Guardian, 13/06/1999). 
It was surprising to many that Ocalan neither mentioned the Kurdish people who lived under 
difficult conditions of a state of emergency nor the Kurdish villagers who were displaced as a 
result of the constant clashes between the TSK and the Kurdish guerrillas. Kirisci (2004) 
suggested that the discourse Ocalan adopted during his trial throughout May and June 1999 
contributed significantly to the dramatic decline in the intensity of the armed conflict between 
the TSK and the PKK guerrillas (ibid.: 278). However, Kirisci does not explain how and why  
Ocalan‘s new conciliatory discourse contributed to the decline in the armed conflict. I would 
argue that it is important to recognise that Ocalan‘s new approach generated a sense 
of an improved security environment in Turkey and his call for a unilateral 
ceasefire substantiated this environment – as a result of these, the conflict between the TSK 
and the PKK was significantly reduced. Additionally I would argue that the capture of Ocalan 
and his apologetic approach during his trial is the one of the two developments that has 
generated ―improved security environment‖ in Turkish political system and punctuated the 
long year of stability in the MGK, in the MGK‘s endogenous variables and in the pace of 
Turkey-EU relations. Then changes suddenly began; the equilibrium was punctuated. 
Ocalan argued: ―The atmosphere of armed conflict and violence constitutes an obstacle to 
human rights and democratic developments. The violence that mainly derives from the 
Kurdish problem plays a fundamental role in this. It is necessary to stop the violence in order 
to overcome the dilemma and solve the problem‖ (quoted in Larrabee and Lesser 2003). The 
PKK then pledged to transform itself from a guerrilla group into a political organization and 
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it promised to call a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal (The Guardian, 25/08/1999). This 
was followed by Ocalan‘s order: ―I call upon the PKK to end the armed struggle and 
withdraw their forces outside the borders [of Turkey] for the sake of peace from 1 September 
1999 (Kirisci 2004: 285; Siitonen 2008: 79). This coincided with Ocalan being sentenced to 
death for treason, but he managed to be influential on the PKK while under arrest and 
issued a set of orders to his PKK rebel movement to observe a ceasefire and withdraw from 
Turkish territory from 1st September, 1998. Siitonen (2008: 80) has noted that many Kurdish 
people regarded Ocalan as a traitor for trying to save his own life with calls for ceasing the 
military struggle. I agree with Siitonen that Ocalan regarded as a traitor by many Kurdish 
people, but it is important not overlook to the fact many other Kurdish people and the PKK 
recognised Ocalan‘s decisions and actions upon his arrest as an opportunity for the people of 
Turkey to find a political solution to Turkey long-lasting Kurdish problem. Khalil 
(2007) argues that Ocalan‘s capture and his conciliatory approach was a significant 
opportunity for Turkey to reconcile with its Kurdish citizens through recognising their 
identity and granting them greater rights within the Turkish state (p.396).  I would agree with 
Khalil on this point and argue that the rights-based solution could have anchored Turkish 
governments in developing better relations with its Kurdish citizens. Furthermore, in the 
same year, Suleyman Demirel, the President, met with the Democratic People' Party 
(DEHAP) representatives to talk about the problems of the South East, where predominantly 
Kurds lived under the state of emergency regime. 
The PKK‘s decision to end armed conflict opened the way for further changes in this 
organisation, and structural changes were introduced. In April 2002, at its Eighth Annual 
Congress, the PKK formally abolished itself and established the Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress (KADEK). As far as the KADEK‘s new aim was concerned, regional 
autonomy within the Turkish state was what they aimed at. Another strategy was the 
articulation of an approach called the ―democratic Turkey solution‖, which meant essentially 
a rights-based solution to the Kurdish problem. According to Tocci (2006) these rights 
included ―the freedom to publish and broadcast in Kurdish; private and public education in 
and of Kurdish; the freedom to establish and operate Kurdish civil society associations, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expressing non-violent political opinion; freedom from 
torture and access to fair trial the abolition of state security courts, the abolition of the death 
penalty; lifting the state of emergency in law and practice and abolishing the village guard 
system; a general amnesty for all militant; freedom to establish, and operate political parties 
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and reduction of electoral threshold; and the reduction of regional disparities and priorities of 
socio-economic development in the southeast, including through local autonomy‖ (ibid.: 
123–24).  
The pro-Kurdish HADEP‘s choice to disassociate itself from the PKK after Ocalan‘s capture 
have contributed to the ‗improved security environment‘ in Turkey; to show this argument, I 
will next give a historical account to the development of the Kurdish political parties in 
Turkey, analyse the relationship between the PKK and the Kurdish political parties, discuss 
how and why this relationship has changed over time and what implications this had for 
Turkish politics 
The first pro-Kurdish political party had been established in June 1990, called the People‘s 
Work Party (HEP). The founding members of the HEP were MPs expelled from the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SHP) for attending a conference in Paris related to the Kurdish 
question. Upon long discussions and negotiations, the SHP and the HEP merged to run under 
the SHP‘s umbrella at the October 1991 general elections, and the former HEP deputies 
secured their seats. While taking their oath in the parliament, several former HEP deputies 
spoke in Kurdish and displayed colours associated with the PKK; soon after this incident, 
they left the SHP to re-establish the HEP. Howe of Kurdish political and cultural rights and 
for formulating a framework of ―the rights to self-de ver, the HEP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court in July 1993 due to overt promotion termination‖. Guney (2002: 
125) notes that ―the court‘s decision was on the grounds that the party had become a focus of 
illegal political pursuits and was engaged in activities against ―the indivisible unity of the 
state with its territory and people‖. 
When the HEP was closed, the Democracy Party (DEP) was formed, in 1993, but it 
was a short-lived political party. Guney (2002) notes, ―division emerged between a moderate 
flank and a radical group‖ on whether to support the PKK (ibid.: 125). The incidents 
following showed that the radical group were more influential. During its congress in 
1994, PKK flags were displayed and Turkey was presented as an occupying country. 
Following this, the DEP was seen as closely associated with the PKK. At the same Congress, 
Hatip Dicle said that the PKK was a political, not a terrorist, organization, and another 
leading member of the DEP referred to the PKK‘s terrorist activities as a struggle for ―an 
independent and unified Kurdish state‖, and demanded a political solution to the Kurdish 
question. When the DEP was closed by the Constitutional Court, most of the DEP members 
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fled abroad and formed a Kurdish parliament in exile in 1995 (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 53). 
The remaining parliamentary deputies‘ immunities were removed in March 1994 and six 
DEP deputies were arrested, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The party then was 
closed in June 1994 by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that Dicle and the other 
members had made provocative statements against the Turkish Republic (Guney 2002: 125). 
The closure of the DEP was followed by the formation of the People‘s Democracy Party 
(HADEP) in May 1994 by Murat Bozlak, a lawyer. Guney (2002) notes that the HADEP 
initially seemed to have a moderate approach towards the Kurdish question and kept its 
distance from the PKK (ibid.: 125). It did not join the parliament-in-exile in the 
Netherlands in order to disassociate itself from the PKK as well as keep its seats and position 
in the TBMM. Its efforts to stay among the mainstream political parties in the TBMM 
however were evaporated by the developments that took place at its second Congress in June 
1996, when masked men let the Turkish flag drop to the floor and raised the banner of the 
PKK in its place (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 54). As a result of this incident, all HADEP 
members, including the party‘s leader, were arrested; furthermore, HADEP supporters were 
charged with belonging to a leading an illegal armed group, under Article 168 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. Following this, Guney (2002) notes, the public prosecutor said that the HADEP 
acted as a front for the PKK (ibid.: 125; see also Ergil 2000: 178). 
In January 1999, the public prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to close the party on 
the ground that there had been an organic link between the HADEP and the PKK. The 
prosecutor argued that the HADEP Congress had turned into an arena of support for Ocalan. 
The Prosecutor said that ―the PKK threatened to kill people who did not vote for HADEP‖ 
(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 95). Although it remained open and its vote share increased only 
marginally between 1995 and 1999 (Sayari and Esmer 2002: 142–44), it did not pass the 
nationwide threshold. At the local elections, the HADEP won the control of seven 
municipalities in the South East of Turkey, including the biggest city of the region, with more 
than 1 million Kurds, Diyarbakir (Guney 2002: 128). 
On the Kurdish issue, the HADEP called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the 
Turkish Security Forces and the PKK. For long time, it hesitated to deny its linkage to the 
PKK. Guney (2002) suggested that the HADEP developed a different discourse on this matter 
by the mid 1999s; in June 1999 the HADEP‘s mayor in the town of Kiziltepe in Mardin 
province visited family of policemen killed by the PKK terrorists and expressed his 
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condolences (ibid.: 130).  His statement – ―Enough is enough. We all suffered a great deal‖ –
 may be taken as a sign of willingness on the party of the HADEP to disassociate itself from 
the PKK (ibid). The Mayor of Diyarbakir, Feridun Celik, also made similar statements. On 
one occasion Celik stated: ―From now on we should leave this debate behind and start to 
think how we shall be able to live together as Turks, Kurds, Lazes and Circassian, so that we 
can jointly work for this country‖ (ibid.).  
This was followed by a statement by Murat Bozlak, the leader of the HADEP:  
It was claimed that HADEP has been the political arm of the PKK. It is not true. 
This is not something we claim today. We made the same point in 1996 … Let me 
point out in all my sincerity: HADEP is not a separatist party. Neither is it a 
vulgar nationalist party. Ours is a leftist mass party. We have never perceived 
ourselves as a Kurdish Party … All of those who dies … [In one of our meetings 
in Istanbul]? … [w]e brought together the mother of a soldier who had died with 
the mother of a young man from the Southeast who also lost his life on top of a 
bus, and pleaded with everybody that from now on we should put an end to the 
loss of lives … Yet we are still seen as a Kurdish party. (Guney 2002: 130)  
It was moreover noted that when Ahmet Turan Demir, the Deputy Chairman of the HADEP, 
was asked by a journalist, ―It is claimed that the PKK is trying to politicize the Kurdish 
problem, what are your views on this?‖ he said:  
We want everyone to have the rights to freely engage in politics. If the PKK wants 
to engage in politics in a way that accords with Turkey‘s laws and regulation, then 
the necessary legal and constitutional groundwork should be prepared for this. If 
the creation of an environment that will preclude a return to violence is desired, 
then we should welcome this. Whoever wants to participate in politics in 
accordance with the State‘s laws and the regulations, the ground should be 
prepared for this. This is one of the criteria for democracy. (Guney 2002: 130)  
I agree with Guney that by the mid 1990s the HADEP began to dissociate itself from the 
PKK, but I will ask why the HADEP chose to dissociate itself from the PKK and what this 
meant for Turkish politics? I argue that the HADEP dissociated itself from the PKK because 
it wanted to gain space in the Turkish political system to develop a political ground for the 
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resolution of the Kurdish problem and I think this has also contributed to the improved 
security environment in Turkish politics. 
6.3. How useful are the historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalist 
approaches in explaining the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey-EU 
relations?  
When I applied the concept of punctuated equilibrium to look at the changes in the MGK and 
in Turkey–EU relations, I first noted that there have been long years of stability in the MGK, 
in the MGK‘s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations.  I then identified 
that the EU both granted Turkey a candidate membership status in 1999 and decided to begin 
accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. When Turkey was granted a candidate member 
status in the EU, the European Commission produced Regular Progress Reports on Turkey. 
By studying these reports I analysed that the EU began to develop an awareness of the 
MGK‘s position in Turkish political decision making in 1998 and onwards. It furthermore 
requested that the Turkish authorities make a number of changes not only in the MGK‘s 
authority, composition and powers, but also on the MGK‘s endogenous variables such as the 
adoption of legal and constitutional changes to grant cultural rights to Kurds and the removal 
of the state of emergency from the South East of Turkey.  These then were followed by 
radically curtailing the MGK‘s position in the decision making process, which meant that the 
MGK was transformed into an advisory body, like it was in 1960s. And a number of 
Constitutional changes were introduced in relation to the extension of cultural rights of Kurds 
and the removal of the state of emergency in 2002. In this chapter, I do not deny that the EU 
put exogenous pressure on the Turkish authorities in making the changes they did, but I argue 
that it is primarily developments in the MGK‘s endogenous variables that initiated the 
changes in the MGK and in the MGK‘s endogenous variables. I have therefore studied the 
antecedents to the changes under question; and have identified that the capture of Ocalan, the 
ban on Erbakan‘s political involvement, and the closure of the RP, were all very effective 
developments in the MGK‘s endogenous variables. I argue that these developments generated 
an ‗improved security environment‘ in Turkish politics and suggest that Ocalan‘s apologetic 
approach during his trial and the emergence of a moderate religiously oriented AKP also 
contributed to this ‗improved security environment‘ and acted as endogenous pressure for 
change in the both MGK and Turkey–EU relations. 
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Since rational choice and sociological institutionalism did not provide a framework for the 
researcher, but have only pointed to a number of reasons as to how and why institutional 
changes have taken place, this chapter relied on the credentials of the historical institutionalist 
concept of punctuated equilibrium. Here, however, based on the findings above, I will test 
how well both rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches can explain how 
and why the MGK‘s powers were curtailed and the EU decided to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey. 
Considering the evidence above, it is difficult to tell if Turkish governments introduced a 
number of reform packages, reduced the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system to an 
advisory body and lifted the state of emergency from the Kurdish region just because the EU 
granted Turkey a candidate membership status. There are two reasons for this. The first is 
that of how one would prove that it is really the case; by which I mean how could one 
researcher prove that only when Turkey realised there was a good chance for it to join the EU 
and become a full member of the EU, did changes began to take place in the Turkish political 
system? Secondly, Chapter 5 has shown that the Turkish authorities were well informed by 
the European Commission‘s report on Turkey‘s full membership application that when 
Turkey met the EU‘s criteria, it could join the EU as a full member. Additionally the 
introduction of the Copenhagen criteria had set a number of conditions for Turkey to meet 
before it could join the EU. The European Commission‘s Report (1989) and the Copenhagen 
Criteria (1992) could have been treated as an incentive by the Turkish authorities. However 
they were not; therefore, how can one explain why the Turkish authorities did not treat the 
European Commission Report and the Copenhagen criteria as an incentive, but did so treat 
the candidate membership status in 1999? 
As far as the second rational choice institutionalist proposition is concerned, it would be 
interesting to research whether the MGK‘s roles and powers were changed because it was 
dysfunctional and it was not producing beneficial results. It is however unclear on what basis 
one would assess how dysfunctional the MGK was and to what or to whom it was not 
producing beneficial results. And in terms of timing, why only in 2001 was it thought that the 
MGK was dysfunctional, but it was maintained as it was back in the 1990s. Chapter 5 has 
shown that the MGK‘s resistance, in keeping the state of emergency in the Kurdish region for 
almost fourteen years, produced a number of unintended consequences for both the Turkish 
political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations. This then leads one to ask why in the 1990s 
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the MGK‘s authority was not reduced, when it was clearly slowing Turkey‘s progress in 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Applying the same approach to the changes in the pace of 
Turkey–EU relations, there is little clarity again as to how one might measure how and for 
whom the Turkey–EU relations were dysfunctional. 
Using the evidence above I want to discuss how beneficial the sociological institutionalist 
mechanism of institutional change is in explaining the changes in the MGK and in Turkey–
EU relations. Looking at the evidence above one can say that there is evidence that the 
European Commission, in its Annual Reports on Turkey, requested the Turkish authorities to 
reduce the MGK‘s role in the Turkish political system to that of an advisory body. One 
however needs to show how influential these reports were on Turkish political decision 
makers. In order to do this one would need to analyse the political leaders‘ positions on the 
requests of the European Commission. As far as the pace of Turkey–EU relations is 
concerned, the ‗coercion‘ mechanism cannot say much about how one would trace who may 
have put pressure on either Turkey or the EU or on both of them in relation to changing their 
attitudes towards each other or towards Turkey–EU relations.  
Researching to find out about if conventional wisdom has played a part in both changes in the 
MGK and changes in Turkey–EU relations can produce a very interesting study. Chapter 5 
has shown that the MGK‘s policy preferences and assessment of the EU‘s regular reports in 
the chapter have shown that the MGK was unsuitable for a modern and democratic country. 
Clearly there was a need to modernise and democratise the MGK, but there is no evidence to 
support this point of view. Additionally, as far as the role of conventional wisdom is 
considered in the context of Turkey–EU relations, it is unclear how one would measure how 
and for which side involved (Turkey and the EU) conventional wisdom has been influential 
and why. One can suggest that both sides (Turkey and the EU) realised the need to modernise 
their relationship after years of slow progressing relationship. Conducting a research into this 
may produce an interesting study as to how and why conventional wisdom influenced either 
Turkey or the EU or both. 
6.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tested whether rational choice, sociological and historical 
institutionalisms can best explain the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–
EU relations. I have found that both rational choice and sociological institutionalism point to 
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a number of reasons as to how and why the Turkish authorities may have decided to reduce 
the MGK‘s powers and the EU may have offered Turkey a date for accession negotiations. In 
contrast to both of these schools, historical institutionalism has pointed to the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium which I utilised to unveil the triggers of the changes in MGK and in 
Turkey–EU relations. 
Having utilised the concept of punctuated equilibrium, this chapter provides a new analysis of 
the changing phase of Turkey–EU relations post the stalemate of the Luxembourg Summit 
and in the face of receiving a long awaited date to begin accession negotiations with the EU.  
This is because (1) the changes in the MGK have not previously been studied in the context 
of domestic political causation; (2) the capture of Ocalan and the ban on Erbakan‘s 
involvement in politics and the closure of the RP have not been studied in the context of 
changes both in the MGK and Turkey–EU relations; (3) the change in the pace of Turkey–EU 
relations has not been analysed in the context of developments in the MGK‘s endogenous 
variables; and (4) the concept of punctuated equilibrium has not been utilised in the literature 
on institutional change as has been done in this chapter. Therefore this chapter provides an 
original and different account of what triggered changes in the MGK, in the MGK‘s 
endogenous variables and Turkey–EU relations by putting greater emphasis on domestic 
causation. 
I have a number of questions related to my findings in this chapter: Will the MGK‘s position 
in the Turkish political system remain as it is or be abolished or be radically empowered? 
How will the MGK‘s endogenous variables develop – for example, will the Kurdish question 
escalate, or will the Turkish authorities adopt political, economic and social solutions to the 
Kurdish question and resolve it once for all, and will the religiously oriented moderate AKP 
continue along the same lines or radicalise its political rhetoric? Finally, will the EU keep the 
speed of accession or will it stall? And most importantly, what will the answers to these 
questions mean for Turkey‘s aspirations to be a full member of the EU, or will Turkey, after 
all, look inward and not outward? In the next chapter I will draw together the conclusions of 
my research, outline the contributions I make to both EU and Turkish studies and to historical 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
The first objective of this thesis was to provide an historical account of the role the 
Turkish National Security Council (MGK) has played in the development, in the nature 
and in the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between 1923 and 2004. To meet this 
objective I have investigated not only the origins of the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in 
being part of Europe, but also the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–
European Economic Community (EEC)/European Community (EC) relations  between 
1923 and 1983. I have analysed the impacts of the MGK‘s path of establishing a state of 
emergency in parts of the country on both the Turkish political system and on Turkey‘s 
effort to join the EC/European Union (EU) between 1983 and 1997. I have also researched 
the domestic causation of the changes in the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political 
system and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations between 1997 and 2004.  
The second objective of this thesis was to test the utility of historical institutionalism as 
opposed to rational choice and sociological institutionalism in highlighting the interaction 
between the MGK‘s institutional processes and Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. And to 
meet the second objective I have unveiled the usefulness of historical institutionalism‘s 
framework of institutional genesis in to explain the origins of the MGK and of Turkey‘s 
interest in being part of Europe and have shown benefits of sociological and rational choice 
institutionalisms‘ in pointing to a number of reasons as to how and why institutions origi-
nate, respectively. I have shown the benefits of the concept of critical junctures to explain 
and to understand what role critical junctures have played in the evolution of the MGK and 
in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. I have demonstrated the utility of histori-
cal institutionalism‘s temporal approach in highlighting the interaction between the MGK‘s 
path of state of emergency and Turkey‘s slow progress in meeting the membership criteria 
of the EC/EU and have pointed out the weaknesses of the cultural and calculus approaches 
in explaining the interaction between institutional actions and policy outcomes. Lastly I 
have shown the effectiveness of the concept of punctuated equilibrium in unveiling the role 
endogenous pressure has played in curtailing the MGK‘s powers and in the EU‘s subse-
quent decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey, and have highlighted the bene-
fits of rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches to institutional change. 
Having met the two objectives of this thesis, I am making a number of original 
contributions to the both European and Turkish studies and to historical institutionalism; 
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below I will outline these contributions. In the very last part of this chapter, I will discuss 
possible future areas of research. 
As I have shown in Chapter 1, the existing literature on Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations has 
largely overlooked the MGK‘s role in Turkey‘s European policy. Therefore (1) the origins 
of Turkey‘s interest in being part of Europe  and the origins of the MGK have not been 
studied in the context of domestic political, social and economic developments; (2) the 
development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has not been studied in the context of the 
evolution of the MGK; (3) the relationship between the MGK‘s decisions and preferences 
and Turkey‘s slow progressing relationship have not been considered; (4) the interaction 
between the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations has not been 
analysed in the context of political developments in the MGK‘s endogenous variables.  
This thesis makes an original contribution to EU studies by highlighting the interaction 
between the MGK‘s institutional processes and the three significant phases of Turkey–
EEC/EC/EU relations.  
By utilising the historical institutionalist framework on institutional genesis in Chapter 3, I 
have highlighted that the principles of Kemalism were vital in explaining the genesis of 
both the MGK and Turkey‘s interest in being part of Europe. Ataturk‘s reformist 
principles meant that he not only wanted his newly established Turkish Republic to adopt 
a Western political system, but also expected the people of his Republic to adopt a 
Western outlook, culture and share Western values. When, however, these principles, the 
political structure adopted, and the kind of day-to-day life that came along with these 
principles, were not supported by some sections of the community, Ataturk established the 
MGK so as to protect the secular, Western outlook of the Turkish Republic and the very 
principles of Kemalism.  
In Chapter 4 I have shed a light on role of what I have termed Critical Junctures (I–III) in 
the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations and in the evolution of the MGK. I have 
shown that the choices and the decisions made at these critical  junctures meant that (1) 
Turkey‘s Associative Membership application faced delays in the 1960s; (2) the EC began 
to doubt the standards of democracy in the Turkish political system; (3) the EC constantly 
requested the Turkish authorities to adopt a democratic political system and criticised both 
the closure of political parties and the restriction applied on political involvement, and 
then chose to freeze dialogue with Turkey. Since the historical institutionalist framework 
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on institutional genesis directed me to pay attention to the wider political, economic and 
social contexts, I have also noted the important role Zorlu played in making Turkey‘s 
Associative Membership application in 1959, discussed the impact of eurosceptic political 
parties on Turkey‘s decision not to apply for Full Membership of the EC in 1975,  and 
have analysed the implications of Ecevit‘s handling of Turkey‘s economic problems on 
the development of Turkey–EC relations in the late 1970s.  These are original 
contributions to the literature on the origins and on the development of Turkey–EEC/EC 
relations. 
I have shown that the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations between 1983 and 1997 was 
shaped by the MGK‘s path of establishing a state of emergency in the South East of 
Turkey. I have demonstrated how and why the MGK‘s choice of maintaining the state of 
emergency over fourteen years produced unintended consequences for both the Turkish 
political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations, drawing on the framework of the concepts 
of path dependence and unintended consequences. While Turkey‘s poor human rights 
records, weak democracy and the Kurdish question have been recognised as the main 
obstacles to Turkey‘s integration in to the EC/EU (Van Bruinessen 1992; Cooper 1994; 
Ergil 2000; Calis 2001; Cornell 2001; Kirisci 2004; and Evin 2005), in Chapter 5 I have 
shown in detail that these were unintended consequences of the MGK‘s path of state of 
emergency. These are very important contributions to the literature covering the period 
between 1983 and 1997, showing in greater detail that the unintended consequence of the 
MGK‘s path of state of emergency meant that the EU not only refused to re-establish 
political dialogue with Turkey until 1989 but also delayed responding to Turkey‘s Full 
Membership application for two years (Kuniholm 1991: 41).  I noted that the EC criticised 
Turkey over keeping the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey and asked the 
Turkish authorities to find political solution to the Kurdish problem. When the EC‘s calls 
for respect for human rights did not receive much attention in Turkey, the EC refused to 
release any financial aid for Turkey. Additionally I have shown that the EC made the 
resolution of the Kurdish question a condition for Turkey to establish a Customs Union 
with the EC in the mid 1990s and ultimately the EC excluded Turkey from the 2004 
Enlargement processes over protracted violation of human rights in 1997. Furthermore, 
Merton‘s framework on the causes of unintended consequences have enabled me to 
discover the reason the MGK maintained the state of emergency despite its unintended 
effects; I would argue that the MGK solely concentrated on its desire to protect Turkey‘s 
257 
 
territorial unity and it did not think about what further consequences its action would have 
for the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations 
In this thesis I have also unveiled the domestic causation of the changes in the MGK, in 
the MGK‘s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. The changing 
phases of Turkey–EU relations (1997–2004) have generally been studied in the context of 
the EU‘s pressure on Turkey to take up the changes outlined in the European Commission 
Regular Progress Reports (Cizre 2003; Onis 2003; Lundgren 2007, and Faucompret and 
Konings 2008), or it has been suggested that the credible EU membership status granted 
incentives to civilians to democratise civil–military relations (Rumford 2000; Diez 2005; 
Watts 2006; and Cinar 2008). I showed in this thesis that the EU and the European 
Commission‘s Regular Annual Progress Reports have been important in informing the 
Turkish authorities in what areas they were falling behind the EU standards, and 
instructing Turkey about what steps the Turkish authorities needed to take so as to meet 
EU standards. In Chapter 6, with the help of the concept of punctuated equilibrium, I have 
shown that political developments in the MGK‘s endogenous variables, such as the 
capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK (the Kurdish Workers‘ Party), in 1999 
and the ban on political involvement by Necmettin Erbakan – the leader of the Welfare 
Party (RP) – as well as the closure of the RP in 1997, generated an ―improved security 
environment‖ which subsequently formed endogenous pressure for change. Ocalan‘s 
apologetic rhetoric during his trial in 1999 and the success of the religiously oriented but 
moderate Justice and Development Party (AKP) have consolidated this ―improved security 
environment‖. I then highlighted that the long years of stasis in the MGK‘s powers, 
responsibilities and composition, in the MGK‘s endogenous variables, and in the pace of 
Turkey–EU relations, were punctuated with this consolidated endogenous pressure; and 
changes began. These are important contribution to the literature on Turkey–EU relations 
covering the changing phase of Turkey–EU relations because it provides a detailed 
explanation of how and how endogenous pressure triggered the changes in Turkey–EU 
relations. 
As said in Chapter 1, the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system received little 
academic attention in Turkish studies; having said that, it has generally been agreed that 
the MGK was granted more powers by the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945 so that the 
Turkish military could have control over Turkish politics, and it is generally been agreed 
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that the MGK is an army-led body. Therefore (1) the origins and the evolution of the 
MGK has been overlooked; (2) the MGK‘s position in the Turkish political system has not 
been studied in the context of any particular policy; and (3) the changes in the MGK have 
not been analysed in the context of the domestic political system This has indicated a 
significant gap in Turkish studies. In this thesis I am making an original contribution to 
Turkish studies by shedding a light on the MGK‘s institutional process, utilising the 
institutionalist framework on institutional genesis, institutional evolution, the interaction 
between institutions and policy outcome and institutional change. In Chapter 3, the 
historical institutionalist framework on institutional genesis directed me ―to go back and 
look‖ to understand and explain how and why the MGK was established; this is an original 
contribution to the literature covering the early years of Turkish Republic.  In Chapter 4 I 
have highlighted in the second part of the chapter, with the help the concept of critical 
junctures, that that the army did not just grant more powers to MGK so that it could 
dominate politics, but the MGK was empowered to make recommendations to the Council 
of Ministers to maintain peace and social well-being in Turkey; my research on the 
triggers of critical junctures in Turkish political history has shown that this was because 
the Turkish politicians were not able to take the initiative to produce policies not only to 
prevent political, economic and social tensions among the people of Turkey, but also to 
take measures to control domestic instabilities.  This is also an original contribution to the 
literature on the MGK. Furthermore, within the framework of the concepts of path 
dependency and unintended consequences I have highlighted the role the MGK played in a 
particular policy area. I have shown that the MGK was the key institution handling the 
PKK and the Kurdish movement. In connection to the latter I also showed how the MGK‘s 
handling of these issues interacted with Turkey‘s European policy. This means I have 
demonstrated what role the MGK played in two forms of policies. 
Historical institutionalism has not been utilised at this level in either European studies or 
Turkish studies.  The historical institutionalist framework and its associated concepts have 
not been brought together, and yet also separated in this way so as to understand and 
explain the different parts of institutional processes, as well as the interaction between 
institutional processes and policy outcomes. Therefore doubts have been raised about 
historical institutionalism‘s utility in explaining the relationship between institutions and 
policy outcomes and institutional change. My separation of institutional processes, 
drawing clear lines between these processes and associating a concept to each of these 
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processes is an original contribution to historical institutionalism. I have shown in the first 
part of Chapter 1 that Pierson‘s (2000b) and Thelen‘s (2004) suggestion that ―we need to 
go back and look‖ is very fruitful for explaining how and why both an institution and a 
policy originates. Since this framework has not been applied in an empirical case study in 
the way I did I am making an original contribution to the literature on institutional genesis. 
Additionally, I have shown that historical institutionalism‘s concept of critical juncture is 
useful to understand and explain institutional evolution; I shed a light on how and why the 
sources of critical junctures and the decisions and the choices made at these juncture make 
major contributions to both the evolution of an institution as well as the development of a 
policy. I found the conceptualisations of path dependence (Krasner 1984; Levi 1997; and 
Pierson 2000a; 2002b; 2004) lacking in interest in whether institutions do always produce 
the intended outcomes through keeping to the original path, as well as in whether the 
institutions maintain their original path in the case that the original path does not meet 
their intended outcomes. I therefore complemented the concept of path dependence with 
Merton‘s (1936) conceptualisation of unintended consequences. I then utilised this 
framework to understand and to explain how and why the path-dependent action of an 
institution may produce unintended consequences, as well as why an institution may opt to 
maintain its original path despite its unintended consequences. This is an original 
framework and I have shown the usefulness of this framework in Chapter 5 in how and 
why it may shed a light on to the interaction between one institution‘s path-dependent 
actions and its unintended consequences for other policy areas.  Additionally, I have 
utilised the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain radical institutional changes. 
Although the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been heavily criticised by Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) and Peters et al. (2005), I have shown that focusing on endogenous 
pressure in generating institutional change means that the institution under question is still 
treated as an independent variable and Krasner‘s explanation of punctuated equilibrium 
can be treated as making a prediction about when and under what conditions institutional 
change is likely to occur. This is an original contribution because punctuated equilibrium 
has not been utilised in the way I did in Chapter 6 and this shows that the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium is equipped to explain why and how institutional change occurs. 
As far as my future areas of research are concerned I want to bring in some of the 
questions pointed out in the conclusions of Chapter 6. Will the MGK‘s position in the 
Turkish political system remain as it is or be abolished or be radically empowered? How 
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will the MGK‘s endogenous variables develop – for example, will the Kurdish question 
escalate, or will the Turkish authorities adopt political, economic and social solutions to 
the Kurdish question and resolve it once for all, and will the religiously oriented moderate 
AKP continue along the same lines or radicalise its political rhetoric? Finally, will the EU 
keep the speed of accession or will it stall?  
I found it less interesting to predict the future for the MGK, for the Kurdish question, or 
for the AKP in the context of Turkey‘s accession negotiations. Having said that, from the 
point when Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 and to date, the 
negotiations have either been significantly slow in progressing or have stalled. The AKP 
won its third landslide victory in the 2011 General Elections but has not kept its promises 
about adopting political solution to the Kurdish question. As I write this thesis, military 
operations are taking place in the Northern Iraqi borders of Turkey. And since the AKP 
holds the majority in the TBMM, the opposition parties do not hold seats in the MGK‘s 
meetings. Civilian seats on the MGK consist of the AKP‘s senior cabinet members, with 
the remaining members an equal number of senior generals, and thus the opposition 
political parties in the TBMM do not take part in the MGK‘s meeting and decisions. When 
this was criticised, the AKP representatives agreed to brief the CHP‘s senior MPs after the 
actual meetings about the discussions that took place and what decisions were made. I 
would like to consider the following related questions in the future: why did the AKP 
agree to brief the CHP members about the MGK‘s meetings? Was this encouraged by the 
EU? Or was this change endogenously driven? What does this say about the EU‘s 
influence on Turkey? Why did one of the endogenous variables (AKP) override one of the 
other endogenous variables (the Kurdish question), as well as the slow pace of the 
accession negotiations? 
Another area I would like to look into is Britain‘s political stance on Turkey‘s EU 
membership since 1980s. Britain‘s interest in establishing and retaining strong political and 
economic relations with Turkey and its constant support for Turkey‘s accession to the EU 
raises the following questions:  Why have the British government and mainstream political 
parties (Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour) consistently encouraged accession talks with 
Turkey? Why have the British government or the political leaders viewed the prospect of 
Turkish membership positively? Why has this been consistent since the late 1980s? What 
factors contributed to keeping the British on this pro-Turkey path? Here I would like to utilise 
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the conceptualisations of path dependence to answer these questions and to explain how and 
why the British government has maintained its path of support for Turkey. And if this goes 
well, I would be interested to draw comparisons between ―pro-Turkey of Britain‖ and ―anti-
Turkey path of France‖ and find out about how and why Britain and France diverge in 
relation to Turkey‘s accession to the EU. 
In relation to historical institutionalism, I would like to further improve and refine the 
framework I set out in the thesis. I would particularly like to concentrate on the question of 
whether historical institutionalism leaves any room to study the role of agents or the agent–
institution relationship. My initial finding in this thesis is that researchers can identify the 
interaction between institutions and actors whilst studying the relationship between 
institutions and outcomes, if the wider political context is paid sufficient attention. This is an 
area I would like to address in the future but it brings with it broader and more important 
questions. There is an increasing interest among institutionalist scholars in understanding the 
role of agents, while we nevertheless agree that institutions matter and determine political 
actions and policy outcome. Yet, if we accept the role of agents in political action formation 
and in policy outcomes, does not this mean that we are moving away from studying 
institutions as the primary focus? 
In this thesis I have used historical institutionalism as a framework. And this framework has 
been helpful to understand and explain many questions I had in my mind about the role the 
MGK has played in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, as well how and why the MGK 
originated, evolved, changed and impacted on political action and policy outcomes. As I said 
in Chapter 1, Hay and Wincott‘s emphasis on the historical institutional approach having the 
potential to develop into a theory is an area I like to look into in the future. Some of the 
questions I would like to consider are: is historical institutionalism a theory? Or is it a 
developing theory? And if it is not a theory, what is it lacking in order to be one? Is historical 
institutionalism‘s lack of interest in making predictions for the future a downside to this end? 
Or does historical institutionalism have an as yet unveiled potential to make predictions? And 
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1. LAW OF THE NSC AND THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE NSC 
CHAPTER ONE  
Objection and Definitions 
Objection 
Article 1 - The goal of this law is to arrange the establishment, duty, working principles and 
procedures of the National Security Council and the organization, duty, competence, working 
principles and procedures of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. 
Definitions 
Article 2 - The terms mentioned in this law mean, 
(a) National Security; The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national 
presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field 
as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State. 
(b) The State‘s National Security Policy; The policy covering the principles of the course of 
internal, external and defense actions determined by the Council of Ministers within the 
views set by the National Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and 
achieving national objectives, 
CHAPTER TWO 
The National Security Council 
PART ONE  
Establishment and Duties 
Establishment 
Article 3 - In accordance with the article No.118 in the Constitution, the National Security 
Council was established. 
(Amended in the article No: 15th January, 2003-3789/1) The National Security Council, 
chaired by the President, consists of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the 
Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs, the Land Forces Commander, the Naval Forces Commander, the Air Forces 
Commander and General Commander of the Gendarmerie. 
As well as the regular attendees, depending on the agenda, related ministers and persons can 
also be invited to attend the Council meetings for their views. 
The Secretary General of the National Security Council participates in the meetings however 
does not have the right to vote.  
Duties 
Article 4 - (Amended in the article No: 7th, 2003-4963/24) The National Security Council 
shall, within the framework of the definitions on national security and the national security 
policy of the State as stated in Article 2, take advisory decisions on issues pertaining to the 
determination, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State, 
and shall provide its views with a view to ensuring the necessary coordination; it shall submit 
these advisory decisions and views to the Council of Ministers, and fulfill duties given by 
laws. The Prime Minister may entrust a Deputy Prime Minister with the responsibility of 
submitting to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions and views of the National 
Security Council to be evaluated, and of coordinating and following the implementation of 
these advisory decisions should they are approved by the Council of Ministers. 
PART  TWO 
Working Procedure 
Meetings of the Council 
Article 5 - (Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003-4963/25) The Council shall 
convene once every two months. If necessary, the Council may convene upon the proposal of 
the Prime Minister or the direct request of the President of the Republic. 
The Council meetings shall be held under the chairmanship of the President. The Council 
shall be chaired by the Prime Minister in the absence of the President. 
Agenda 
Article 6 - The agenda of the Council is drawn up by the President of the Republic, taking 
into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. 
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The topics proposed by the ministers who are the Council members and the other ministers to 
be put on the agenda, after taking the opinion of the Prime Minister, are submitted to the 
President through the Secretary General of the National Security Council. 
Decisions 
Article 7 - The Council takes its decisions by the majority of votes. In case of a tie, the side 
which has the Council Chairman is assumed to form the majority. 
The decisions of the Council are submitted to the President and the Prime Ministry to be 
discussed at the Council of Ministers by the Secretariat General of the National Security 
Council. 
The discussion of the decisions in the Council of Ministry 
Article 8 - The decisions of the National Security Council are primarily put on the agenda of 
the Council of Ministers by the Prime Minister and necessary decisions are taken. 
Distribution and steering of the decisions 
Article 9 - (Repealed in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/35, c) 
The minutes of the meetings 
Article 10 - Discussions in the National Security Council are appropriately reported by the 
officials of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. Original copies of the 
decisions and the minutes of the meetings are kept in the Secretariat General of the National 
Security Council. The minutes and the negotiations are to be explained or published. 
Decisions can be explained or published with the permission of the National Security 
Council. 
CHAPTER  THREE  
The Secretariat General of the National Security Council 
PART ONE  
Establishment and Organization 
The Secretariat General 
Article 11 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council was established under 
the authority of the Prime Ministry. 
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The Units of the Secretariat General 
Article 12 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council consists of the 
Secretary General, Deputies of Secretary General, bureau of Secretariat General and the units 
which are indicated below: 
(a) Legal Advisory, 
(b) Main Services Units, 
(c) Personnel and Administrative Affairs Department 
Main Services Units are founded upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval 
of the Prime Minister. 
If necessary, upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime 
Minister, apart from the Main Service Units, temporary service units, special profession and 
research commissions, special education, planning and implementation units within the 
Secretariat General or not, can be established, stating the duties and the periods of service. To 
prolong the periods of service and working of these units is based on the same procedure. 
PART TWO  
Duty and Competences 
(Repealed in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/26) 
The Duty and Competences of the Secretariat General 
Article 13 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council; 
(a) Conducts the secretariat services of the National Security Council. 
(b) Carries out the duties given by the National Security Council and the relevant laws.  
The Competences of the Secretariat General 





PART THREE  
Personnel 
Article 15 - (Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/27) The Secretary General is 
appointed upon the proposal of the Prime Minister and the approval of the President. The 
positive opinion of the Chief of General Staff is to be sought in case a member of the Turkish 
Armed Forces is to be appointed to this post. 
Other personnel 
Article 16 - The personnel employed in the Secretariat General of the National Security 
Council are composed of; 
(a) The ones to be assigned to the staff of the Secretariat General, 
(b) Contracted personnel, 
(c) The ones to be charged from the Turkish Armed Forces to the Secretariat General. 
(d) The personnel of the public institutions and organizations, subject to the 4th article of the 
Law No:160 on the foundation of the State Personnel Organization, who are assigned to the 
Secretariat General upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime 
Minister. 
In the Secretariat General of the National Security Council, first degree staff is appointed by 
notification of the Secretary General and through joint decision; 2nd-4th degrees are 
appointed by proposal of the Secretary General and approval of the Prime Minister; 5th- 15th 
degrees are appointed by approval of the Secretary General. 
In case of a need for the appointment of the personnel in the Secretariat General to other 
public institutions, application is submitted to the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry 
determines the institutions and the establishments where these staff will be appointed to. The 
relevant institutions carry out appointment procedures in accordance with the general 
provisions. 
Special provisions 
Article 17 - Personnel of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are subject 
to the State Employee Law no.657 except for certain special provisions listed below. 
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(Amendment: 17/12/2003-Article 5017/1 ) The staff of the Secretariat General of the 
National Security Council is established or abolished by the proposal of the Secretary 
General and the approval of the Prime Minister, with the supplementary charts determined in 
conformity with the general provisions. 
According to the additional item on wage raises and compensations annexed to the State 
Employee Law with 31.07.1970 no. 1327 Code, payment proportions without exceeding the 
maximum limits are determined by the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of 
the Prime Minister. 
Members of the Turkish Armed Forces who will be appointed to the Secretariat General of 
the National Security Council are determined by joint decision of the General Staff and the 
Secretariat General of the National Security Council. Appointment process of officers and 
non-commissioned officers is executed under the principles of Turkish Armed Forces Staff 
Law no. 926. 
In case of a need, personnel working for other public agencies, mentioned in the 4th article of 
the Law No:160 on the foundation of the State Personnel Organization, may be employed at 
the Secretariat General of the National Security Council; provided that their employment 
matters are kept in their own institutions, their status on discipline, employment record and 
permissions are regulated by the Secretariat General, as long as the Prime Minister finds that 
such an employment is necessary. 
The difference is paid as compensation out of the Secretariat General budget to the personnel 
appointed to the Secretariat General of the National Security Council in accordance with the 
above 4th and 5th clauses, in case sum of the raise and compensation paid in their institutions 
is less than the sum of the payments given to the equal staff. 
The contracted personnel who will be employed at the Secretariat General of the National 
Security Council are not required to fulfill the conditions indicated Article 4 of the State 
Employee Law. Working conditions, principles of contracts, minimum and maximum 
payment limits determined without exceeding the ratios of the Council of Ministers, as well 
as principles of their social rights are arranged by a regulation. (Annex: 8/4/1990 - 417/1 
article) The contracted personnel will be subject to the Retirement Fund on their will. 
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In case of a need, financial contribution for clothing to some personnel of the Secretariat 
General of the National Security Council is made under the provisions of the State Employee 
Law no.657 with the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime 
Minister. 
PART FOUR 
The Working Principles and Various Provisions 
The working order 
Article 18 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council fulfills its duties given 
by this and other legislations, in its own organization and, when necessary, in coordination 
with other ministries, establishments and institutions. 
Internal working conditions of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council and 
relations and working procedures with other ministries, establishments and institutions are 
arranged by regulations. 
Information and Documents 
Article 19 - (Repealed) 
Budget of the Secretariat General 
Article 20 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council is subject to the 
General Budget System. An extra allocation is included in the budget for confidential 
expenditures. The Secretary General is responsible for using this allocation, to the Prime 
Minister. 
Regulation 
Article 21 - (Amendment: 17/12/2003-5017/1 article) The principles and procedures on the 
implementation of this law and the issues mentioned in the law are arranged by a regulation 
prepared by the Secretariat General of the National Security Council, discussed in the 
National Security Council and approved by the Council of Ministers. 
This regulation is prepared and enters into force within three months after the publication of 
the law. 
Repealed Provisions 
Article 22 - The National Security Council Law dated 11.12.1962 and no. 129 is repealed. 
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PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 1 - Implementation of the ongoing decisions of the National 
Security Council functioning according to the repealed law no.129 and the national policy 
decisions accepted by the National Security Council will continue until the enforcement of 
the amendment and abolishment decisions of the National Security Council reorganized by 
this law. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 2 - Until the enforcement of the regulation to be issued under 
the provision of 21st article, the implementation of the provisions of the regulation issued 
according to the National Security Law no.129 will be in force. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLES 3 - Existing organization and staff of the Secretariat General 
of the National Security Council are regulated in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
The personnel of the ministries, establishments and institutions working in the Secretariat 
General and all personnel including contractual employees can be tasked by the Secretary 
General, with their new staff and status, or appointed to the other public establishments and 
institutions with in the context of article 14. 
PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 4 - (Annex: 03-4963/28 article) In accordance with the 
arrangements in the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National 
Security Council Law dated 9.11.1983 no.2945, envisaged by this law, a regulation is issued 
within three months after the publication of this law with in the context of the principles of 
the 21st article of the law no. 2945. 
Entry into Force 
Article 23 - This law enters into force on the date of publication. 
Execution 
Article 24 - The Council of Ministers is responsible for the execution of this law 
  
2. CONSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
By Constitutional setting it is referred to the 1-9 Articles of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, 
which are as follows: 
Article 1- The Turkish state is a Republic. 
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Article 2- The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the 
rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; 
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental 
tenets set forth in the Preamble. 
Article 3- The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language 
is Turkish (Art.3).  
Article 4- The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a 
Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision 
of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed  
Article 5- The fundamental aims and duties of the state are; to safeguard the independence 
and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and 
democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to strive 
for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice 
and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for 
the development of the individual‘s material and spiritual existence. 
Article 6- Sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation. 
Article 7- Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of 
the Turkish Nation. This power cannot be delegated. 
Article 8- Executive power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of 
the Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the law. 
Article 9- Judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Turkish 
Nation. 
 
 
